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Introductory Chapter
Section One: Research Aims
The role of the Scottish sheriff in providing statutory review of administrative
action at a local level is a subject which, until recently, has received little attention
from academic lawyers: discussion of administrative law in Scotland has tended to
focus on common law judicial review, tribunals, administrative decision taking, and
the local ombudsman. This is not surprising, given that review of the decisions of
public bodies has only come to be a significant area of legal practice and research in
Scotland within the last twenty-five years1. In addition, it could hardly be argued
that the most important developments in administrative law have taken place in the
Sheriff Court. It should not, however, be thought that the sheriff's powers in local
administration are insignificant This point was made in the administrative law title
of the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland:
"The ordinary courts of law may, in addition to their general jurisdiction,
exercise specialised functions involving the confirmation of, or hearing of appeals
from, the decisions of public authorities. Thus the sheriff has a wide variety of
statutory tasks in matters concerning local government. Some of these have been held
to be administrative , even although they are exercised in a judicial forum, partly
because the sheriff may be required to exercise a broader discretion than would
normally be appropriate to a court reviewing the decisions of local authorities. Other
statutory functions have been held to be judicial, for the reason that a true lis inter
partes is before the sheriff. However, the reasoning in these cases has seldom been
clear-cut."2
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As will be made plain, the lack of "clear-cut" reasoning in the sheriff's
exercise of his statutory functions follows directly from the lack of consistency in the
powers of review which Parliament has granted to the sheriff. Bradley, in Scottish
Law Commission Memorandum Number 14, "Remedies in Administrative Law",
pointed out that"... a fully satisfactory means of answering the uncertainty relating to
the sheriffs powers on administrative appeals would be the development of general
principles on which the sheriff's powers should be exercised. Detailed research into
the actual work of this kind undertaken by sheriffs would be necessary to establish the
practical value and effectiveness of the sheriff as a local remedy against local
government decisions."3 His statement provides the starting point for discussion.
Accordingly, the main aims of this thesis are to provide a detailed exposition
of the sheriffs statutory powers in local administration; to suggest "general
principles" of the sort envisaged above; and to evaluate and criticise the sheriff's role.
Section Two: Background to Research Aims
It is fair to ask why the sheriffs powers should be singled out for particular
attention. The answer to this question lies in their nature, and in the issues that they
raise. The sheriff's powers within local administration are acute examples of the
British tradition of law and government, which can be characterised as pragmatic,
ad hoc and lacking in theoretical direction.
Under some statutes the sheriff holds an apparently unfettered (and usually
final) discretion to review public authority decisions4: there are also similar powers
in which the sheriff's discretion is, ex facie, that of a public authority charged with
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taking final decisions at first instance5. In other statutes, powers of review are
interpreted as providing for a "true lis"6 between the parties, or, alternatively, a
statutory formulation similar to the grounds of common law judicial review limits
shrieval discretion7. In the first two categories sheriffs interpret their powers as the
modern derivative of an historic role in which the sheriff acted as the local
"administrative" or "ministerial" officer of the Crown8, and in the two latter
categories they view themselves as serving in a more obviously "judicial" role9.
Although the statutes themselves give no indication that Parliament is aware of any
such distinctions, sheriffs are sometimes able to choose, when interpreting their
powers in local administration, whether or not they are to act "administratively", or
"judicially"10, thereby effecting a primitive internal separation of powers.
The first two categories of powers raise the issues of whether the sheriff's
position is anomalous in the context of contemporary views of the ideal role of the
judge and court-based adjudication. If there are anomalies or inconsistencies then they
cannot go unchallenged. They also provide an opportunity to evaluate judicial
decision-taking, and to explore the boundaries of discretionary power and
justiciability in the administrative law arena.
The last two categories facilitate discussion of the effectiveness of court based
adjudication as a means of enabling individuals to challenge decisions taken by
administrative authorities.
In general terms, study of the different categories of powers and functions can
also encourage appreciation of the wider socio-legal pressures which can shape legal
development in Scotland, and of the potential of empirical research.
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However, it should be noted at the outset that conducting research into the
sheriff's jurisdiction within local administration is not an easy task, for four
inter-related reasons, which must be taken into account.
First, although some detailed work has been carried out on the sheriff's
powers in local administration, it is a relatively unresearched area of law. With the
exception of a series of papers by Himsworth11, the literature covering the
jurisdiction is essentially descriptive, as opposed to analytical. Accordingly, one is
faced with a mass of seemingly disparate statutory provisions, set out in alphabetical
order for the benefit of sheriff court practitioners12. This form of presentation is not
without merit, as it enables an appreciation of the size (on paper) of the jurisdiction,
and also of the remarkable range of the subject matter. However, it does little to
further understanding of the nature of functions performed by the sheriff, or indeed
why the sheriff should have any such functions: similarly, it does not facilitate an
appreciation of their effectiveness.
Second, the amorphous nature of the shrieval jurisdiction within local
administration causes difficulties: the descriptive style of the practitioners' texts is
essentially a function of this. Indeed, the use of the term "jurisdiction" is potentially
misleading, as it implies an homogeneous character to a large and seemingly disparate
body of statute law. The most recent textbook on sheriff court practice provides a
list13, which is not exhaustive, of approximately 200 statutes, which empower
sheriffs to act in local administration: for example, sheriffs may be called upon to
decide cases dealing with licensing, mental health, social work, education, public
health, housing and the environment14. Furthermore, individual statutes may
5
provide for different styles of appeal on different grounds under different sections.
Many of these powers are not inconsiderable and may involve weighty, controversial
issues: under s. 18 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 198415 sheriffs are
responsible for the compulsory hospitalisation of the mentally ill; under s.16 of the
Social Work (Scotland) Act 196816, they decide what constitutes the best interests
of a child in the assumption of parental rights by a local authority; and under s.28 of
the Education (Scotland) Act 198017, they effectively decide on the merits of a local
authority's policy on school admissions. In addition, the position of the sheriff varies
from statute to statute (and within individual statutes), with sheriffs appearing at
different levels in the decision taking process.
Third, attempts by the courts to analyse the sheriffs powers are inconclusive,
given that they are hampered by the time consuming and inherently restrictive process
of developing concepts and theories by precedent. Indeed, given the conceptual
difficulties caused by different lines of argument in the relatively few contentious
cases in the field, the last eighty years18 have seen little advance in resolving
confusion over the nature of the sheriffs special "administrative" jurisdiction, and
how wide the limits of any "administrative" discretion to review public authority
decisions should be.
Finally, there is a lack of useful official data regarding the frequency with
which the individual statutory powers which comprise the jurisdiction are exercised:
the Civil Judicial Statistics, as compiled by the Scottish Courts Administration,
merely categorise "miscellaneous and administrative" business into general headings,
which can sometimes raise more questions than they answer19. Only a very few
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statutory functions are singled out for individual noting, and even then the collation
of figures is done on an extremely general basis. Unfortunately, most of the statutory
appeals in the field that this study is concerned with come under the rather unhelpful
heading of "other business". This is no doubt due to the fact that the sheriffs powers
in local administration are not seen as a major part of the Sheriff Court jurisdiction.
The 1967 Grant Report on the Sheriff Court20 stated that the amount of time spent
on this type of business amounted to no more than 5% of court time21. However,
the number of cases brought to court and the amount of time taken up may bear no
relation to the seriousness or policy significance of a single decision, a point which
is taken further below.
With the above obstacles and problems in mind, it should be clear that
achieving the aims of this thesis necessarily involves not only library based legal
research, but also a significant empirical element. Accordingly, the outline of
research objectives set out below stresses the importance of synthesising library based
research and empirically derived data.
Section Three: Research Objectives
In order to fulfil the research aims as set out above, the thesis is sub-divided
into four main parts. The points and arguments which are made are then brought
together in a concluding chapter. The objectives of the constituent parts are as
follows.
(i) Part One is concerned with theoretical issues: general principles are
established for the allocation and exercise of judicial powers of review under statute
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in administrative law.
Chapter one lays the foundation for general principles. Rather than focusing
on the sheriff's role in local administration, consideration is given to wider issues.
The relevance of distinguishing decision taking functions and the nature of
adjudication are discussed. This then leads on to an evaluation of rule of law theory,
and its general constitutional significance. Particular attention is given to the status
of the judiciary and the integrity of court based adjudication as a decision taking
process. A version of rule of law theory is developed, and the importance of
maintaining it through legislation and court decisions is explained.
Chapter two sets out general principles for the allocation and exercise of
judicial powers of review under statute in administrative law. Two categories of
general principles are provided: the first concerns legislation and the allocation of
functions; and the second concerns the exercise of statutory powers by the judiciary.
Both are based around the rule of law theory set out in chapter one.
The general principles and rule of law theory developed in these two chapters
are used throughout the thesis as a means of evaluating the historical development of
the sheriff's powers in local administration, the current jurisdiction, and empirical
material which was derived from fieldwork research into how individual powers
operate in practice.
(ii) Part Two traces the historical development of the sheriff's jurisdiction in local
administration. The objective of the exercise is not simply to explain how and why
sheriffs have come to exercise their present functions. It is intended to develop a
perspective, which puts statutory powers and court decisions into a wider historical,
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constitutional, socio-legal and theoretical context. The chapters in part two also lay
the foundation for part three, in that consideration of the sheriff's powers and the way
that they have been interpreted by the courts encourages the development of
distinctions between different styles of powers: this in turn provides a degree of
homogeneity in discussion of the sheriff's current jurisdiction.
(iii) Part Three sets out and evaluates the jurisdiction of the modem sheriff.
Consideration is given to recent developments in case law and more general issues:
this brings the historical coverage in part two up to date. The sheriffs current powers
are then categorised in an analytical framework, which distinguishes between different
styles of powers. The analysis is based on the theoretical approach established in Part
One and the historical developments noted in Part Two. Four main categories of
power are noted, and individual provisions are allocated to them. The objective is
to systematise the sheriff's powers in order to evaluate them more effectively than
would otherwise be possible. Identifying the main features of the different categories
facilitates criticism of the sheriff's functions.
The last chapter in part three sets out the results of a fieldwork exercise,
which sought to overcome the weaknesses of the Civil Judicial Statistics. The
findings provide a more informed impression of the number of appeals which come
before the courts, and identify the powers which are exercised most frequently.
(iv) Part Four criticises the sheriff's current jurisdiction using the theory and
general principles of the rule of law developed in Part One as the main criteria for
evaluation. The discussion is split into four chapters, with one chapter for each
category of powers. The theoretically based evaluation made in each chapter is tested
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and confirmed using detailed empirically derived material. The fieldwork projects also
examined how specified provisions operate in practice, and full use is made of the
findings to determine the advantages and disadvantages of shrieval adjudication: the
provisions were selected on the basis of the material set out in Part Three.
The thesis is then concluded with a chapter which sets out the main arguments,
and makes a number of suggestions which might be of some value in any future
reconsideration of the sheriff's statutory function in Scottish local administration.
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Chapter One: Adjudication and the Rule of Law
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical background for "general
principles", which are set out in chapter two1. These are intended to promote an
ideal which may be used to evaluate the appropriateness of the statutory provisions
which comprise the sheriff's jurisdiction in Scottish local administration. General
principles are in themselves nothing more than the expression of a particular
perspective on the role of the legal order in administrative law. Accordingly, before
they can be established, it is necessary to give some consideration to the nature of
court based adjudication, and what makes it distinctive and important. The chapter
is sub-divided into three main sections, which explore general themes and arguments
concerning adjudication, decision taking in general, the rule of law and judicial
discretion. A brief concluding section then summarises the main points of interest.
Section One: Distinguishing Decision Takin2 Functions and Adjudication
The Report of the Donoughmore Committee on Ministers' Powers of 1932
sought to set out definitions of "judicial", "administrative" and "quasi-judicial"
decisions2, with a view to delineating the functions of the courts and government
ministers, and was criticised for succumbing to a flawed, circular logic, which
essentially reduced analysis almost to the level of, "if a decision should be taken by
a judge, it is a judicial decision.3" Notwithstanding Jennings' contemporary critique
of the Report, which was to the effect that there was "no essential distinction between
an administrative decision in an instant case and a judicial decision"4, the debate on
the ideal roles of the court and administration has continued5, although its terms of
reference have moved on from making narrow distinctions between rigid categories
of "judicial" and "administrative" functions6. Most public lawyers are able to
perceive that there are aspects of court based adjudication (eg, the impartiality and
independence of judges, or procedural safeguards) which may make a judicial
solution to a particular problem more desirable than less constrained administrative
decision taking (or vice-versa). A loose "tagging" of functions is therefore
convenient7. However, we are not much further forward in terms of determining
precisely when court based adjudication should be viewed as a suitable decision taking
process in public law. This is partly because our legal system and public law lack a
formal constitutional context, and accordingly discussion of the suitability of
allocating functions to courts or administrators can be characterised as an anchorless
debate, and partly because making strict distinctions can become a sterile and
ultimately rather artificial exercise. However, it is contended that it is not an
altogether pointless one. Distinguishing powers, if kept within sensible and practical
parameters can have a useful and justifiable function: thinking about different styles
of decision taking and how they differ furthers understanding of how adjudication
functions in administrative law, and the nature of the judicial role in the wider
context of the political constitution. In particular, it focuses attention on the position
of the judiciary in cases which involve the exercise of judicial discretion in areas with
"direct political involvement". By "direct political involvement" I mean a situation
in which a judge may be required to make a direct evaluation of the policy merits of
decisions reached by elected politicians (or their officials) in areas which are highly
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influenced by political considerations8.
Attention should therefore be given to some of the academic theories which
have sought to set out intellectual mechanisms for the allocation of decision taking
functions according to concepts which attempt to determine the suitability of
adjudication and the range of judicial power or discretion9.
The inter-related issues of the suitability of adjudication and the limitation of
judicial power will each be considered in turn: in general terms, the subject matter
may be characterised as the determination of the "justiciability"10 of particular types
of dispute.
Before considering these concepts, however, some thought should be given
to the definition of adjudication itself: what are its distinguishing characteristics?
Fuller defined adjudication as "a social process of decision which assures to the
affected party a particular form of participation, that of presenting proofs and
arguments for a decision in his favour."11 Following on from this, Jowell saw
adjudication as "a means of institutionally guaranteed participation, since each party
to the dispute may present proofs and arguments to the adjudicator.12" Fuller's
theory makes a number of assumptions. The main ones are as follows. The
adjudicator should be impartial, and must not make his decision until the proofs and
arguments are complete: both sides in the dispute must be given fair and equal
opportunity to present reasoned arguments13. In addition, the adjudicator must base
his decision on recognisable rules, standards or principles, which must be
generalisable and capable of application in future "like" cases14. Reasons must be
given for decisions. The most obvious adjudicators are judges sitting in courts of law,
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although other institutions (eg some tribunals) may be perceived as being adjudicatory
in nature, depending on the number of procedural restrictions imposed on the process
and the decision takers15. Given that I am concerned with the sheriff court, this
thesis is concerned solely with court-based adjudication, which can also be referred
to as "ideal type" adjudication16.
There are a number of important correlative consequences of "ideal type"
adjudication, which must be borne in mind. Firstly, it can depoliticise decision
taking because the judge is perceived to be impartial: the impartiality of judges (as
opposed to other decision takers) is protected by constitutional measures which are
intended to guarantee the independence of the judiciary from political influence17.
Second, adjudication can be characterised as reactive to individual disputes, rather
than proactive in terms of resolving more general conflicts in society18. Third,
because the court's adjudicatory process is concerned with specific, individual
disputes, it focuses attention onto the facts of the instant case, and the legal rights
of individual parties to the dispute19. This means that, as a theoretical "ideal type",
it is a powerful intellectual mechanism for those who are concerned with the
promotion of a society structured around individual freedoms and personal rights20.
Accordingly, court based adjudication has a prominent role in the writings of old
fashioned Whigs such as Dicey21 and Hewart22, and is implicitly of considerable
significance for modem libertarians such as Hayek23.
Defining court based adjudication effectively defines administrative decision
taking. It may therefore be characterised as being a "social process of decision24",
which gives to the decision taker a discretion normally denied to judges, which might
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include the power to take decisions directly on the basis of political factors25. It
should be noted, however, that it is not being argued that judges do not have
discretion, or that their decisions do not have policy implications26: in addition, an
administrator's discretion "... may be constrained ... by non legal factors, such as the
amount of available resources, time, professional norms, and the political pressures
to which the decision taker is (or perceives himself to be) subjected.27" Dworkin
illustrated the nature of discretion by analogy: "Discretion like the hole in the
doughnut does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of
restriction. It is therefore a relative concept. It always makes sense to ask "Discretion
by which standards?" or "Discretion as to which authority?"28"
Galligan has stressed that it is important to view administrative discretion in
this context, for it is all too often that administrative discretion is confused with
arbitrary power29. This leads to a profound misconception of its nature, and a
consequent crippling of debate30. He pointed out correctly that the nature of
administrative discretion varies considerably according to the nature and subject matter
of decision31. Most importantly, he argued that there "... is a tendency to generalise
policies so that they serve not merely to decide one particular case, but ... guide
decisions in all cases to which they are relevant.32" Using such guides to decision
taking is known as the "principle of individuation33", and in its exercise, the guides
utilised by administrators may vary from the general to the specific: there is no such
thing as a "standard" administrative decision, as lawyers often imply34. However,
there are still important distinctions between administrative decision taking and
judicial decision taking.
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Unger has provided a useful definition of the distinction between the
"standards" or "authority" of the two styles of decision taking:
"The administrator focuses on the most effective means to realize given policy
objectives within the constraints of the law. For him, the rules of law are a
framework within which decisions are made. For the judge, on the contrary, the
laws pass from the periphery to the centre of concern: they are the primary subject
matter of his activity. Adjudication calls for distinctive sorts of arguments, and its
integrity demands specialized institutions and personnel.35"
Consideration should now be given to the question of how the limits of court
based adjudication might be devised. Fuller saw the problem in conceptual terms,
concentrating on procedural efficiency in the decision taking process: adjudication by
courts is unsuitable when the degree of "polycentricity" becomes procedurally
inefficient36. Polycentricity is therefore a test of the "integrity", or suitability, of
adjudication as a decision taking process. Fuller described polycentricity in general
terms, and therein lies both the attraction of the concept, and its weakness in terms
of providing an objective test:
"We may visualise this kind of situation [ie a polycentric one] by thinking of
a spider [sic] web. A pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated
pattern throughout the web as a whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all
likelihood, not simply double each of the resulting tensions but will rather create a
different complicated pattern of tensions. This would occur, for example, if the
doubled pull caused one or more of the weaker strands to snap. This is a
"polycentric" situation because it is "many centred" - each crossing of strands is a
16
distinct centre for distributing tensions.37"
The attraction of this concept is immediately apparent. It clarifies the issues
which are at the nub of administrative law: the advantages and disadvantages of the
courts' concentration on instant facts and individual rights through adjudication, in
the context of the wider public policy implications of decisions. However, the
weakness of the polycentric model is that it does not give any firm indication of when
Fuller's own "limit" of adjudication is reached. Indeed, he was well aware that the
recognition of this point was ultimately subjective:
"Now, if it is important to see clearly what a polycentric problem is, it is
equally important to realize that the distinction involved is often a matter of degree.
There are polycentric elements in almost all problems submitted to adjudication
It is not a question of knowing when black is white. It is a question of knowing when
the polycentric elements have become so significant and predominant that the proper
limits of adjudication have been reached.38"
Determining the point where polycentric elements predominate is obviously
difficult, and it is inevitable that any such evaluation will always be open to criticism
of some kind. Democratic accountability and political considerations are part of the
polycentric web: adjudication is clearly inefficient (in a wide construction of the
term) if it leads to a loss of confidence in the judiciary and legal process - a
constitutional crisis39. Accordingly, Galligan has argued that; "The fact that they
[courts] are outside the lines of direct accountability to the political process makes the
position of the courts problematical in imposing restraints on discretionary authorities,
which are themselves politically accountable.40"
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However, without being unduly negative, some theories have the potential to
cause fundamental problems as they do not give sufficient thought to the implications
of prescribing court based adjudication as a decision taking process in politically
sensitive areas.
For example, Lord Scarman argued that the courts must be prepared to meet
the "social challenge" posed by the development of the welfare state41, and, in
particular, the social security system. He felt that if the courts failed to involve
themselves in developing areas of administrative justice, the result would be an
unwelcome "retreat from the universality of the common law42" - despite the fact
that the legislature was plainly unenthusiastic about court involvement43. Lord
Scarman argued that the legal profession (presumably including judges) must work out
a "socially-effective response44" and approved of judge led activism as a means of
doing so. The central issue to be resolved was defining the "... extent to which the
courts should question the justice of an administrative decision: ..., can, or should,
the courts assess the evidence, or lack of it, in determining whether to uphold,
modify, or quash the decision?45" He was critical of the traditional reticence of
judges and lawyers to involve themselves directly in the political process, because
"This view would exclude the ordinary courts, administering the general law, from
reviewing the merits of the decision: it is as if lawyers are to be banned from
refereeing the match, though judges may act as linesmen and practitioners may cheer
on the players.46" He was, however, approving of the response of judges in
commercial and financial fields. There, "... where also the state has intruded with its
administrative agencies, the judges are ready to take the activist line, and intervene
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if there is no substantial evidence to support the administrative or tribunal decision,
if the tribunal took into account a factor which they had no right to take into
account.47"
Lord Scarman's comments should be seen in the context of the tense
relationship between judiciary and Parliament, although he showed little real
appreciation of the fact that the debate was a highly political one48. The end result
of developing this type of approach may eventually be a constitutional crisis, which
would undermine the integrity of ideal type adjudication. Courts are not capable of
assessing "the public interest" effectively in cases involving the policy based decisions
of, for example, government ministers or local authorities: they are appointed rather
than elected, and they are not functionally competent, as the court process and the
focus on the individual case mean that judges have no effective mechanism by which
they can fully assess the polycentric implications of their actions49. It is contended
that what Lord Scarman described as the "self confidence" and "independence50" of
the judiciary are fragile and easily destabilised attributes. As such, they would be
unable to survive the pressures imposed by judges taking a pro-active approach in
cases with direct political implications for elected authorities. A constitutional crisis
would therefore be almost inevitable51. In addition, as Griffith and others have
argued, it is a matter of some doubt whether judicial attitudes- as they stand at the
moment are such as to inspire public confidence in the ability of judges to take a new
role upon themselves52.
Those attempting to advance a concept of "substantive legitimate
expectation"53 (as opposed to procedural legitimate expectation) under the general
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heading of "procedural impropriety" in common law judicial review are treading a
similar, albeit narrower, path as Lord Scarman. Developments of this nature are,
it is contended, to be treated warily, as Lord Devlin would no doubt have agreed
when he made his stinging attack on "... progressives who like moths outside a lighted
window are irresistibly attracted by what they see within as the vast unused potential
of judicial lawmaking"54. Despite the strong nature of his imagery, it is submitted
that he was generally correct in his approach, and given the potential danger of
well-meaning but perhaps misguided exhortations of the sort mentioned above, he
was perhaps equally correct to express himself in such blunt terms.
The danger is that of facilitating a level of flexibility for judges which may
potentially undermine the rule of law in the long term. The rule of law in practice
relies on the positivistic concept that judges are seen to be impartial and independent
of the political process55. Obviously, as Lord Scarman implied, this is intellectually
unsustainable, in that to have a role in the business of government (as judges
obviously do on a wide interpretation of the term) means that one must consciously
or unconsciously express a political view56. However, this does not detract from the
argument that to move away from the powerful fiction of impartiality may in time
result in the degrading of the ideal concept of the rule of law: it will become
observable that judges involve themselves directly in the political process in a way
which is irreconcilable with traditional theory57. However, before going any further,
it is important for us to give some consideration to the concept of the rule of law, for
if it is of no real significance, there can be no strong objection to it being
undermined.
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Section Two: The Rule of Law
Discussion of the rule of law in the United Kingdom is inevitably coloured by
Dicey's championing of it, along with Parliamentary sovereignty, as the basis of his
theory of the English constitution58. Given that Dicey's theory has been heavily
criticised by the British left as the idealisation of the liberal, capitalist state for the
benefit of the political establishment59, and, even by sympathetic academics, as
lacking sufficient intellectual rigour60, it is not surprising that the phrase "rule of
law" has attracted controversy and suspicion. Conservative MPs have adopted it as
part of their own vocabulary61, and the Marxist historian EP Thompson was
condemned for concluding that the rule of law was "an unqualified human good"62.
Dicey's well known, and often criticised argument, was that the rule of law
has three essential features: first, "... that no man is punishable or can lawfully be
made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of the law established in
the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land..."; second, "... no
man is above the law, but (what is a different thing) that every man, whatever be his
rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals..."; and third, "... that the general principles of
the constitution ... are with us the result of judicial decisions determining the rights
of private persons in particular cases before the courts..."63.
Set in its context, Dicey's vision of the rule of law was intended to serve as
an anchor for Whig liberalism, which was endangered by the drift towards state
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expansionism. He was concerned to protect the rights of individuals from the
encroachments of the state (and state functionaries exercising discretionary power)
through the mechanism of adjudication in the ordinary courts64. Viewed in this light,
it can be appreciated that Dicey made an important contribution to constitutional
debate. Unfortunately, the way in which he made his argument was bedeviled by
inconsistencies and mistakes.
Dicey's failings have been laid bare by subsequent writers on constitutional
law65. The main ones are so serious that they effectively remove much of his overall
theory from the ambit of serious academic discussion66, although it is submitted that
he was entirely correct to be concerned with the protection of individual freedom.
However, even as an attempt to describe the constitutional arrangements of the late
nineteenth century, his theory was based on an incomplete and biased assessment of
fact. He ignored the many Crown privileges and immunities which were in operation;
and his evaluation of continental systems of administrative courts and the nature of
administrative discretion (which was invariably confused with arbitrary power) can
only be viewed as bigoted misapprehensions67. In short, he over-egged his pudding.
So too did Hayek, who may be seen as the twentieth century heir of Diceyan
liberalism68. In "The Road to Serfdom", he argued against the further development
of the state and the congruent expansion of discretionary power. He was concerned
to protect the individual's free decision taking capacity from direction by the state69.
Along with Dicey, he placed great value on the rule of law as the totem which would
protect individual freedoms. Indeed, Hayek's arguments were rather more extreme
than Dicey's, in that he sought to show that the development of welfarism/socialism
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was a direct challenge to the rule of law itself: "... any policy aiming directly at a
substantive ideal of distributive justice must lead to the destruction of the Rule of
Law."70 Similarly, any state sponsored attempts to distribute resources or power in
society reduced the freedom of individuals as they would be constrained not only in
a direct sense by the decisions of state officials, but because they would not be able
to plan their affairs freely on account of the uncertainty created by the general
exercise of administrative discretion. The ability to predict decisions with some
degree of certainty is an important component of the rule of law: administrative
discretion (Hayek thought) hampers this, and therefore threatens the rule of law.71
It should once again not be denied that Hayek raised important issues for
consideration and debate. But, as with Dicey, his views, although better written,
were expressed in terms which were almost polemical: this does little to further the
significance of the basic theme that individual freedoms must be protected from state
despotism. Hayek followed Dicey in confusing all administrative discretion with
arbitrary power72 - a dogmatic assumption which, as Dworkin and Galligan have
demonstrated, cannot be sustained73. Hayek over-stated his argument, by implying
that the only way in which the rule of law can be maintained is to abandon the pursuit
of social goals through the state74. He often seems to miss the point that while
political despotism is a real risk and must be avoided, an undiluted implementation
of the rule of law could also be tyrannical, albeit in a different fashion75. Finding
a balance between the two is a question of degree, and it is submitted that the
importance of avoiding both extremes should be appreciated.
Accordingly, it is contended that the rule of law is best considered in the
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context of theories which take a rather more comprehensive view than Dicey or
Hayek. Raz, in "The Rule of Law and its Virtue", is a good starting point76. He
pointed out that those (such as the 1959 New Delhi International Congress of Jurists)
who confuse the rule of law with generic conceptions of altruism, justice, democracy
and equality are mistaken77. The rule of law may exist in a non democratic state -
indeed it may be said to exist (albeit minimally) in states which are racialist and
• 78
oppressive .
Raz's concept of the doctrine is based on the proposition that particular laws
should be subjected to general, open and stable ones: the doctrine of the rule of law
requires only that "the law must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its
subjects"79. He identified the eight main principles which can be derived from the
doctrine:
1. all laws should be prospective, open and clear;
2. laws should be relatively stable;
3. the making of particular laws (in particular legal orders) should be guided by
open, stable and clear general rules;
4. the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed;
5. the principles of natural justice must be observed;
6. the courts must have powers of review to ensure compliance with the doctrine;
7. the courts should be easily accessible; and
8. the discretion of crime prevention agencies should not be allowed to pervert the
rule of law.80
Raz felt there were a number of important virtues of the rule of law: these
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require further consideration.
First, it acts as a control on arbitrary power, which he rightly saw as a
difficult, subjective entity81. Not all arbitrary power is incompatible with the rule
of law, but some actions which have been identified by the "men in power" (eg the
arbitrary use of legal power for personal gain) are "drastically restricted by close
adherence to the rule of law". However, the rule of law has no direct control over
the exercise of arbitrary power82. Raz implicitly recognised that the conflict between
the rule of law and administrative power was not as simple as Hayek has implied.
Accordingly, the rule of law is not viewed as being an absolute standard which sets
the criteria for political society: instead, "... it is a virtue, but only one of the many
virtues a legal system should possess."83
Second, the rule of law promotes the protection of freedoms held by
individuals (although, as indicated above, freedom should not be confused with
political freedom). It does this by promoting a legal framework, which enables an
individual to "choose styles and forms of life, to fix long term goals and effectively
direct one's life towards them"84. The framework is devised by "... a policy of self
restraint designed to make the law itself a stable and safe basis for individual
planning"85. It was noted above that this aspect of the rule of law was a central
feature of Hayek's argument. However, as indicated above, Raz did not consider
that all enactments which limit individual freedoms (eg the exercise of administrative
discretion by state officials) should fall. Instead, he favoured a weighing of the
merits or demerits of any such process86.
This leads on to a consideration of why the rule of law should be of
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importance to all public lawyers. Its main significance is that it is only by observing
the rule of law that the law respects human dignity:
"Deliberate violation of the rule of law affects not only the external
circumstances but also one's very ability to decide, act or form beliefs about the
future. A legal system which does in general observe the rule of law treats people as
persons at least in the sense that it attempts to guide their behaviour through affecting
the circumstances of their action. It thus supposes that they are rational autonomous
creatures and attempts to affect their actions and habits by affecting their deliberations.
Violations of the rule of law affect one's fate by frustrating one's deliberations,
by making it impossible for a person to plan his future to decide on his actions on the
basis of a rational assessment of their outcome. The rule of law provides the
foundation for the legal respect of human dignity"87.
It is intended to base discussion of the rule of law around an adaptation of
Raz's "ideal type" model, although his views are not accepted uncritically, as should
become clear. What then are the main implications of the rule of law for
administrative lawyers? Some points should be noted.
It must be appreciated that the rule of law promotes legal positivism in the
sense that the law can be viewed as an autonomous, scientific and impartial
mechanism which can be used to impose values which may be perceived as either
good or evil88. Accordingly, Raz argued strongly that the law was a mechanism
which should be viewed as being morally neutral, although he recognised that its
exercise may have moral implications89.
However, the view that conformity to the rule of law only ensures that law,
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whether good or bad, is effectively implemented, deserves critical examination. In
arguing that the law is merely an "instrument"90, and that conformity to the rule of
law is what makes it efficient, Raz contended that"... the rule of law is the specific
excellence of the law .... conformity to [it] is the virtue of law itself, law as law
regardless of what purpose it serves."91 However, does his own point that "close
adherence" to the rule of law restricts the use of certain types of arbitrary power not
indicate that it is difficult to deny that law has a moral content? Similarly, if the rule
of law protects "human dignity" to some extent, how can law - when it promotes
despotism or oppression - be viewed as being an entirely amoral mechanism? What
can one make of an argument which posits that there is no moral value in legal
systems because the rule of law is a "negative"92 value since "... conformity to it
does not cause good except through avoiding evil, and the evil which is avoided is
evil which could have only been caused by the law itself'?93
On balance, it is contended that Raz's argument must be supported because
of his rather minimalist interpretation of the doctrine (ie "the law must be capable of
guiding the behaviour of its subjects"94): no hostages are left to fortune. On this
basis, it is possible to adopt a highly positivist view of the rule of law as being
simply a political ideal for the law to aspire to, and law itself as an amoral entity.
MacCormick's basic test of positivism - that"... the existence of laws is not dependent
on their satisfying any particular moral values of universal application to all legal
systems"95 - is passed without difficulty. A natural law position of the sort suggested
by Fuller has not been adopted96.
It is very important to appreciate once again the point implicit in the works of
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Dicey and Hayek, that legal systems (whether democratic or otherwise) which place
great emphasis on the doctrine of the rule of law and its derivative principles should
be viewed as being liberal systems, because they foster values which are central to
liberalism: for example, the protection of the human dignity of individuals,
individual freedom to plan in a stable legal environment, and the control of arbitrary
power.97
Societies which place less emphasis on attaining the ideal of the rule of law
and its derivative principles may therefore be viewed as placing less significance on
liberal values. Accordingly, it is not being argued that law enacted by a regime
which abuses the ideal of the rule of law by, for example, not having an independent
judiciary is not law: it is simply not law which is in accordance with the rule of law,
its derivative principles, and therefore liberal values. This highly positivist
interpretation is therefore entirely consistent with what MacCormick calls the "... last
resort sovereignty of the individual moral conscience, the right to criticise established
law for its injustice as quite distinct from formal validity or invalidity, the right to
weigh up the case for obedience and disobedience, the right and even the duty to
disobey iniquity demanded in the name of the law."98
It can hopefully be appreciated without too much difficulty that in terms of the
statement that "the rule of law is a political ideal which a legal system may possess
to a greater or a lesser degree"99, the Scottish legal system adheres strongly to it.
In this sense, the Scottish legal system may be viewed as being essentially liberal.
Indeed, as was noted above, variations of the doctrine of the rule of law (as set out
by Dicey and others) have had enormous constitutional and legal significance
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throughout the United Kingdom.
It is readily apparent that the doctrine that the law "must be capable of guiding
the behaviour of its subjects"100, and its main derivative principles, have been
developed to a very high degree in Scotland101. For example, the institutions and
conventions of the constitution place effective restraints on the ability of government
to pass retrospective or arbitrary legislation102, there are sophisticated political and
legal processes which provide for the application of natural justice when
appropriate103, the courts have the power to review administrative decisions104,
and the criminal law and law of evidence seeks to ensure that "the discretion of crime
prevention agencies should not be allowed to pervert the rule of law."105 However,
most significantly, the independence of the judiciary is, for the most part, protected
and guaranteed in order to prevent direct political interference in the court
process106, which, under rule of law theory, is given a central role in ensuring a
stable legal environment and the protection of the rule of law. Raz went as far as to
comment that an independent judiciary is "essential for the preservation of the rule of
law."107 The fragility and significance of judicial independence is an important
theme in this thesis.
Notwithstanding the cogency of his arguments, it is submitted that Raz's
opinion that the rule of law should be viewed merely as being a "political ideal"108
or the "inherent excellence"109 of law requires further evaluation when consideration
is being given to legal systems such as Scotland's, which adhere closely to it.
Although it is certainly correct to use these descriptions in general terms, "developed"
liberal systems of this type surely require more attention. The reason for this is as
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follows. As indicated above, if Scotland is taken as an example of a developed
liberal system, the "ideal" of the rule of law has, to a considerable extent, been
realised110. Raz's focus on it as an efficiency or excellence promoting ideal,
although correct, does not give full attention to the fact that its significance has
become even greater111. It would, for example, be very difficult to imagine
circumstances in Scotland where the importance of conformity to the rule of law and
its derivative principles would be denied by the government, legislature or the courts.
This is because they have to a very large extent shaped our constitutional traditions,
legal institutions, and the way we are socialised into thinking about law and
government: were they to be challenged or abused to any significant degree, it would
indicate a significant cultural shift away from basic liberal values and institutions.
Indeed, it is argued that, in a developed liberal society, the rule of law and its
derivative principles can not only be viewed as representing powerful cultural
assumptions of liberalism - they have actually become vital social institutions (eg the
judiciary) and the foundation of law and the legal system112. Accordingly, it is
argued that the rule of law and its derivative principles provide what can be called a
"primary morality" for developed liberal legal systems. They are effectively the most
significant internal criteria of validity for these systems. If they are inadequately
adhered to, or have not become part of the constitutional culture so that the
independence of the judiciary is not assured, then the legal system in question can be
distinguished from a developed liberal system such as Scotland's.
It is recognised that the term " primary morality" might cause a degree of
disquiet: are natural law arguments creeping in?113 However, it is not used as a
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philosophical term of art. The word "primary" is used to highlight the point that in
developed liberal legal systems, the rule of law and its derivative principles have been
assumed into the fabric of the legal system to the extent that they are accepted as
being cultural truisms which have actually been translated into institutional and
constitutional form. The term "morality" is used very generally to denote the idea that
they are standards which are not only used to determine whether developments within
a legal system should be viewed as being good or bad in an ideal sense, but which
also pragmatically represent, promote and buttress basic moral values of liberalism.
It is contended that in developed liberal systems of law and government there
is a cultural consensus that the rule of law and its derivative principles should be
protected from pressures which could seriously destabilise them and therefore create
a crisis for basic liberal values. In Scotland, it is the judiciary and the legislature
who represent and promote this consensus most directly, although it is of great
importance to all. Indeed, as indicated above, the independence of the judiciary is
both a crucial indicator of the importance ascribed to the rule of law, and one of the
main ways in which it is perpetuated.
Clearly, however, not all pressures on the rule of law are undesirable, as Raz
pointed out in a memorable quote: "... the rule of law is meant to enable the law to
promote social good ... Sacrificing too many social goals on the altar of the rule of
law may make the law barren and empty."114 However, it is also contended that
he was correct to note that "Conformity to the rule of law is a matter of degree, and
though other things being equal, the greater the conformity the better - other things
are rarely equal."115 Accordingly, the consensus does not deny that the state should
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suppress individual freedoms in the public interest: indeed, in a liberal democratic
country such as Scotland, it is desirable that its should do so, as "social good"116
is interpreted by elected Parliamentarians and jurisdictionally limited, independent
judges.
It is intended to refer to this consensus as the "secondary morality" of
developed liberal legal systems. Once again, any confusion with philosophical terms
of art should be avoided. Very simply, it may be viewed as being "secondary" in the
sense that it is a derivative of the rule of law and the main principles which develop
from it. As before, "morality" is used to imply not merely an idealistic set of values
and assumptions, but a more pragmatic, concrete entity, which has been assumed
into the legal system.
Secondary morality has three basic inter-related qualities, which are referred
to throughout the thesis. The first is what I have termed the "ethos" of secondary
morality. This is comprised in the broadest possible sense of the traditional positivist
model of law as an impartial instrument which can be used for enlightened or
oppressive purposes. The ethos encompasses a wide range of cultural assumptions -
from highly analytical theories which seek to establish law's autonomy from morality
to simplistic "slot machine"117 theories of justice. Under this interpretation, the
traditional reluctance of Scottish judges to become involved in directly political
matters in administrative law cases is simply a manifestation of this ethos: if law is
an autonomous, impartial science, then it requires impartial, objective scientists to
operate it. Accordingly, in very general terms, this ethos protects and promotes the
rule of law and its most important derivative principle - judicial independence.
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Viewed in this context, individual theories of analytical jurisprudence can be
seen as being comparatively unimportant because they are largely inaccessible even
to those who operate the legal system and who are the decision takers within it - never
mind the ordinary citizen. What is significant about analytical jurisprudence is that
for the most part it bolsters the positivist image of law as being autonomous and
somehow scientific (with occasional exceptions such as Fuller118). It is submitted
that the importance of the works of, for example, Hart or Kelsen is not the concept
of the rule of recognition or pure law respectively119, as these are virtually
meaningless outwith university jurisprudence departments. Instead it is the fact that
these works buttress and confirm the primitive and unreflective positivism of
generations of judges and lawyers, and the works of more accessible writers such as
Dicey120. They do so by developing positivism, rather than denigrating it.
Accordingly, it is argued that the main significance of analytical jurisprudence is not
to be found in the intricacy of each differing theory, but the underlying cultural
assumption which it supports - that the law should be viewed as being independent
and autonomous from wider questions of morality or the political process.
The second quality is comprised of the "standards" of secondary morality.
These provide general tests by which judicial conduct can be evaluated not only by
judges themselves, but also by the wider public. If the standards are met, then
judicial conduct is in accordance with the ethos of secondary morality. The most
important standards are what can be called "ostensive judicial impartiality" and
"ostensive judicial competence"121. Separate consideration should be given to each.
For as long as the judiciary is generally perceived as possessing ostensive
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impartiality, then the ethos of secondary morality - that the law is a positivistic,
structured and morally neutral entity - is buttressed. Ostensive impartiality requires
not only that judges strive to present themselves as impartial, but that they are seen
to be so.
However, if judges cease to be seen as being ostensively impartial, then in
very little time indeed the law and legal system becomes viewed as little more than
a biased, subjective lottery. The most obvious way in which ostensive impartiality
is lost is by judges openly deciding cases in a biased and partial fashion, but
allegations of bias can also arise more subtly by judges becoming involved as decision
takers in areas requiring a "direct political involvement"122. In the administrative
law context, the latter situation can come about in two ways. First, by judges
extending their discretionary law making power in such a way that they precipitate a
clash with the government (or local government) over who sets policy in strongly
political issues. Second, by the legislature creating statutory powers which require
judges to take decisions which might bring them into conflict with the policy
implementation of an elected authority (eg a local authority).
It is important to recognise ostensive impartiality's role as guardian not only
of the ethos of secondary morality, but of the rule of law. This is so for two reasons.
First, if ostensive impartiality is lost, then the most important attribute of the rale
of law - judicial independence - is destabilised. If judges are seen as being partial,
then, in administrative law cases in particular, the perception that they are
independent of the political process is put under intolerable strain. Eventually, the
constitutional protections which safeguard judicial independence may become an
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irrelevance123. Second, on a rather more subtle level, the loss of ostensive
impartiality contributes to the degrading of the rule of law by making it more difficult
for individuals to plan in a stable, reasonably certain legal framework. Obviously,
if judges are likely to behave in an arbitrary, biased fashion (or if there is a
perception that they may do so), then any certainty afforded by court based
adjudication is lost. The importance of the standard of ostensive judicial impartiality
is developed throughout the thesis.
The standard of ostensive judicial competence is closely related to ostensive
impartiality, and its significance is particularly clear in administrative law.
Competence is used in a broad sense to mean a test of whether it is appropriate for
judicial adjudication to be utilised as a decision taking process: are judges competent
decision takers in a particular area? Can the court properly assess all the relevant
evidence, and take account of the consequences of its decisions? Have particular
functions become anomalous or anachronistic? Fuller's arguments on polycentric
decisions are clearly of considerable importance in determining not only whether
judicial adjudication is a suitable process, but also whether it is seen to be
appropriate. It is important that judges are not only competent decision takers in this
respect but are also ostensively competent because failure to maintain this standard
can potentially have detrimental consequences for the ethos of secondary morality and
therefore the rule of law. If judicial adjudication is carelessly utilised in areas with
a strong polycentric effect, then it may be viewed as being an inefficient and weak
decision taking process, which gives rise to uncertainty. This in turn makes it
difficult for individuals to plan in a stable legal environment. In addition, confidence
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in adjudication may be lost, and the judiciary may be criticised for the unforseen
effects of court decisions124. All of these potential consequences are detrimental to
the ethos of secondary morality, which stresses the sophistication and efficiency of
the legal process125, and the rule of law, which champions legal certainty and
stability126. There would be a real danger of these difficulties arising either if judges
expanded their powers, or if the legislature required them to exercise powers, in
areas with a strong polycentric effect and "direct political involvement"127.
The third and final quality is made up of what can be called the
"mechanisms"128 of secondary morality. These provide the law and legal order with
a process and rules which have developed over the centuries, and which can, no
matter how artificially, claim to be "scientific". They are created by the judiciary and
the legislature and have the effect of protecting the ethos and standards of secondary
morality and therefore (albeit indirectly) the rule of law. Accordingly, strict
legislative drafting, the canons of statutory interpretation, stare decisis, and the use
of the Institutional Writers, may all be viewed as mechanisms129. Other common
law developments, such as Lord Diplock's formulation of the grounds for judicial
review of administrative action (ie illegality, irrationality and procedural
impropriety130) can also be described in the same way.
To conclude this section, it is argued that, provided, the rule of law is not
used as a means of denying "major social goals"131, it provides an important and
appropriate means of ensuring "efficient"132 law. It may also be viewed, along with
its derivative principles, as being of tremendous significance for the culture and
institutions of developed liberal legal systems such as Scotland's. As such, it should
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not be undermined without full consideration being given to the consequences of doing
so.
Section Three; The Significance of Rule of Law Theory in Judicial Decision
Taking
With the above points in mind, it is submitted that the rule of law is not
protected by the argument that British judges do not legislate, but by the premise that
they seek to regulate their discretion to make law according to a justifiable process of
decision taking. General discussion of this point is of considerable relevance in terms
of establishing general principles for shrieval decision taking in local government.
The ethos of secondary morality requires not that judges do not become
involved in political issues, but that their involvement is not direct133, and that it
corresponds with what is justifiable according to a consensus on the limits of their
power as determined by largely inchoate concepts of the constitution. This consensus
is, in effect, the ethos of secondary morality, which is in turn maintained by its
standards and mechanisms. This point was implied by MacCormick (although in a
different context):
"In all cases, judicial discretion exists only within the framework of some
predetermined standards. Where these standards are legal rules, the discretion exists
only within a rather restricted field, although rarely eliminated completely. Where
the rules give no guidance or give ambiguous guidance, recourse may be had to other
standards. But since these standards are all less precise than rules, the discretion
involved in interpreting and extrapolating from them is greater.134"
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It is therefore important to note that when judges rely on "standards of
judgement"135 which are not legal rules, they are still operating according to
standards and mechanisms of secondary morality which restrict their discretion to
make law. They seek to maintain both ostensive impartiality and competence, and
therefore judicial independence: this in turn can be seen as protection of the rule of
law. This tendency was illustrated by Lord Hailsham:
"A judge in Britain is hedged about by a far more restrictive view of precedent
than they [foreign judges], and since most decisions nowadays consist in the
interpretation and application of Acts of Parliament, it is even more important that
the rules of construing Acts of Parliament followed by English and Scottish judges are
far more rigid and limiting than any country in the world not operating the British
system ... our traditional method of Parliamentary draftsmanship is so much more
detailed than in any European country as to fetter judicial independence to an extent
quite unparalleled elsewhere. Even on matters where we are wont to leave a question
to a judge's discretion, his use of it is subject to the pyramidal system of
appeal...."136
This is not to follow Dworkin's argument that there is a "right" answer for
judges in "hard" cases which involve the exercise of discretion. That view, as
MacCormick has made plain, cannot be sustained.137 What is being argued is that
there is a "right way" for judges to reach decisions, and that this provides the criteria
for assessing the merits and demerits of individual decisions. This "right way" is
determined by the obligations placed on judges by the ethos and standards of the
secondary morality of law. Accordingly, what happens in a "hard"138 case where
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the rules have run out is that the judge is made particularly aware of the standards of
the secondary morality of law, in that the various inconsistencies in his position as
an impartial operator of the supposedly value free, efficient and autonomous
mechanism of the law are shown in stark relief. The judge is exposed as a powerful
decision taker in the political constitution. The "right way" for him to legitimise his
position in the face of the potential for controversy arising out of the exercise of
discretion is to manipulate the mechanisms of secondary morality in such a way as to
protect its standards and ethos. Statutory interpretation and precedent should be
utilised to avoid (in so far as is possible) the allegation that the judge is exercising a
subjective discretion.
As argued above, it is by doing so that judges prevent destabilisation of the
most important derivative principle of the rule of law - judicial independence. It is
not of course being suggested that this is a distinct thought process which is used by
the average Court of Session judge in a difficult judicial review, or a sheriff in a
statutory appeal, although it is argued that it is this type of reasoning, however
inchoate or unconscious, which directs judges in "hard" cases. Nor is it thought that
vague concepts of the rule of law and secondary morality make decision taking easy
- but they do draw together basic standards which makes it easier.
It is important to note that it is not only restrictions on judicial law making
which protect the rule of law: the legislature must also place restrictions on itself.
Parliament must ensure - for as long as it wishes to maintain the rule of law - that
when allocating functions to the judiciary it does not involve them in areas of decision
taking which require a "direct political involvement".139 This could lead to a breach
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of the standard of ostensive judicial impartiality. Similarly, the legislature should
consider the question of whether a provision could be contrary to the standard of
ostensive judicial competence. There must be an awareness of the importance of the
ethos of secondary morality, together with an appreciation of the consequences of
breaching its standards. For the most part, the legislature has shown itself to be
sensitive to concerns of this nature, but there have been occasions when the judiciary
has been allocated functions which are contrary to the ethos of secondary morality.
The Restrictive Practices Court of the 1960s provides a good example,
although, as will become clear, many of the powers allocated to sheriffs can also be
used as illustrations of this point.140 The government sought to use the judiciary to
decide on claims for exemptions from the ban on resale price maintenance, in order
to divest itself of responsibility for difficult political decisions. As far as government
ministers were concerned, this was an ideal solution.141 However, it was
considerably less satisfactory for those concerned with the legitimacy of the legal
order, as Stevens made clear:
"... a lawyer must insist that the [use of] the court is an unsatisfactory
compromise. In the first place, its operation involves the processes which are
essentially alien to the judicial process, and therefore loses its advantages. Second,
it imposes functions which are inconsistent with the traditional concept of responsible
government; and thirdly, it unfairly exposes the judges to criticism."142
The dangers of this approach were made plain. Arguing that British judges
have "obtained their present respect in society ... by carefully retreating from areas
where overt policy questions were involved"143, he pointed out that there was a real
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danger of constitutional "backfire"144 resulting from poorly conceived legislation
which involved judges in the political arena. Lord Devlin (who was chairman of the
court) made this point very clearly in "Judges and Lawmakers"145. Despite the
rather flowery nature of his prose, it is contended that he was correct to argue that
"... the reputation of the judiciary for independence and impartiality is a national asset
of such richness that one government after another tries to plunder it. This is a danger
about which the judiciary has been too easy going."146
In accordance with the views developed above in respect of judicial law
making, it is argued that this type of legislation should be viewed as being anomalous
and therefore undesirable in a political constitution which seeks to uphold the rule of
law.
Section Four; Conclusion
Judicial decision taking (whether under common law or statute) in areas with
the potential for "direct political involvement"147 is an observable phenomenon
which operates according to a consensus of what is constitutionally appropriate.
In Scotland, the positivist ethos of secondary morality - that the law is
independent and autonomous from wider questions of morality or the political process
- is the dominant consensus. It is protected by the maintenance of the standards and
mechanisms of secondary morality. In its turn it safeguards judicial independence and
therefore the rule of law, which is an important foundation of liberal society. The
answer to the question of whether the concept of the rule of law is of such
significance that it must be protected from destabilisation is, for this writer, to be
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given in the affirmative.
To conclude, it is submitted that general principles for the evaluation and
allocation of the sheriff's powers in local administration can and should be
constructed in the context of this analysis. The implications for the rule of law of
inconsistent judicial decision taking or inappropriate legislation involving the judiciary
are particularly clear in administrative law and should be highlighted. The
significance of this approach is developed throughout the thesis.
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Chapter Two: General Principles for the Allocation ofStatutory Decision Taking
Functions to Judicial Officers
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to set out "general principles" for the allocation
of statutory decision-taking functions to judicial officers of the sort envisaged by the
Scottish Law Commission's memorandum as quoted in the introductory chapter.1
Further general principles are suggested for their exercise. Once articulated, they can
be used as a theoretical base from which both the historical development of the
sheriff's jurisdiction in local administration and current powers can be criticised:
future developments can also be suggested.
It is recognised that it is usually the case that general principles emerge in a
gradual, ad hoc fashion. This is in part a reflection of the primarily inductive and
empiricist tradition of common law theory,2 which has permeated UK administrative
law. However, it is intended to proceed on the basis of the Scottish tradition of legal
development by deductive thought.3 This requires general principles to be established
at the beginning of any study, rather than at the end - in general terms, a
conceptualist approach.4
The general principles set out in this thesis are based on the arguments
advanced in the preceding chapter concerning the rule of law, secondary morality and
the role of adjudication. It was argued that the responsibility for protecting the
rule of law falls mainly on two groups: the legislature and the judiciary. Of the two,
the responsibility of the judiciary to the rule of law is more direct, as their
independence is its most significant feature. However, the legislature also has an
important responsibility to the rule of law, for if it undermines the independence or
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functional competence of the legal order in legislation, the courts may eventually no
longer be able to embody and uphold the ethos and standards of secondary morality:
the independence of the judiciary, the integrity of adjudication, and therefore the rule
of law may then be compromised. If the rule of law is destabilised, then
individualism and basic liberal society may be destabilised as well.5
Accordingly, in constructing general principles for the allocation and
application of statutory decision-taking functions, it is intended to set out two sets of
principles: one for the legislature, and one for the judiciary.
Section One: General Principles for Legislation
It is assumed in constructing "general principles" that any British (or future
Scottish) legislature would always seek to preserve the rule of law, although quite
clearly the emphasis given to it when pursuing "social goals"6 may vary. In simple
terms, it is contended that, when legislating, any Parliament must give consideration
to where the balance between the potentially conflicting interests of the rule of law
and social policy goals lies.7 This is clearly a subjective area, but the democratic
mandate of the legislature provides the legitimacy for decisions of this sort to be
taken.8 Two general principles can be suggested. If they are thought to be naive or
strikingly obvious, it should be appreciated that the legislature frequently appears not
to have given them serious consideration when legislating for the sheriff in Scottish
local administration.
(i) First, when the legislature is creating powers for members of the judiciary to
take decisions, or resolve disputes, there should be an increased awareness that
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important issues have been introduced, by virtue of the judiciary's special status in
rule of law theory. As indicated above, if the judiciary and legal process are given
powers which by their very nature are contrary to the standard of ostensive judicial
impartiality, there is a danger that, by virtue of the denial of the ethos of secondary
morality, the rule of law may be destabilised. In the administrative law context, for
the legislature to require the judiciary to take direct policy judgments - what has been
termed a "direct political involvement"9 - is potentially dangerous. Once judges are
involved in taking this type of decision, it becomes very difficult for them to operate
according to the positivist ethos of the secondary morality of law: that is, it becomes
more difficult for them to present themselves as ostensively impartial decision takers.
The Restrictive Practices Court mentioned in chapter one provides an example of
this.10 The result of this process may be a loss of confidence in the judiciary, or a
constitutional clash between elected authorities and the judiciary which could cause
a destabilisation of judicial independence and therefore the rule of law.
In creating statutory decision-taking powers for the judiciary in areas which
have the potential for a "direct political involvement", it is therefore vital that the
legislature shows an awareness of the importance of maintaining the standard of
ostensive judicial impartiality, and the consequences of failing to do so. There should
be a clear understanding that, when allocating functions to the judiciary, the integrity
of liberal society is, however indirectly, at stake. It is not overly dramatic to express
matters in such terms. Perhaps it is only in the United Kingdom, where there is no
written constitution to emphasise the importance of maintaining a separation of
powers, that the expression of such a fundamental tenet of liberalism could seem to
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be so.
Accordingly, within the administrative law context, a responsible legislature
should strive to operate according to the "general principle" that the judiciary should
not become direcdy involved in the evaluation of the policies of elected authorities.11
If statutory provision for judicial involvement in the business of elected authorities is
deemed necessary, it should be constructed in such a way that the judiciary can
operate as far as possible according to the ethos of the secondary morality of law.
Legislation should protect ostensive judicial impartiality by not allocating to judges
powers which could potentially result in "direct political involvement", without first
ensuring that their jurisdiction is limited to areas which are appropriate for judicial
intervention.
It should be noted that it is not being argued that the courts should never be
able to review the decisions of elected public authorities. Clearly, there are areas of
administrative decision taking where it is entirely justifiable for the court to exercise
strong powers of review. For example, sheriffs have a wide jurisdiction in cases
involving decisions by regional or islands councils to assume parental rights, and few
doubt their suitability as decision takers in this type of case. However, it is important
to note that in decisions of this sort the degree of "direct political involvement" is not
high. The cases involve individual applications concerning the well-being of children,
and the political content of the decision is low.12
In other areas which have a high political content, it is recognised that can be
desirable for judges to exercise powers of review13 when there is a requirement for
legally skilled, ostensively impartial and authoritative decision taking: for example,
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determining whether there have been breaches of natural justice, error in law or
capricious or arbitrary decision taking.14 Whilst it must be recognised that operating
in these areas can give rise to concern for ostensive impartiality because of the
potential for the direct involvement of judges in the determination of policy issues,
the likelihood of this type of dislocation can be limited by imaginative legislative
drafting (as in some appeals to the sheriff)15 and careful judicial decision taking (as
in common law judicial review).16
(ii) The second inter-related general principle concerns the utility and
appropriateness of adjudication. The legislature must show an awareness of the point
that adjudication (and court-based adjudication in particular) has, as a decision-taking
process, a number of serious limitations. By its nature, court based adjudication tends
to operate best when it is utilised as a means of resolving disputes between individuals
(whether juristic or otherwise) which are focused on straight law/fact determinations
with a low polycentric content.17 The adjudicatory process can be a highly effective
means of eliciting and evaluating large amounts of complex evidence in this type of
dispute. Notwithstanding this, it has disadvantages. It is, for example, inherently time
consuming and expensive.18 There may be problems with the evaluation and
comprehension of evidence19; adjudication is also retrospective.20 Others have
argued that, as the adjudicatory process is controlled by the legal profession, it is
directed towards the furthering of professional (and personal) interests, rather than
those of individual litigants.21 There is undoubtedly much truth in these and other
assertions. However, it is contended that even when the disadvantages and problems
of the adjudicatory process have been admitted, it is still the one of the most effective
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means of resolving weighty disputes between individuals, and protecting the rights of
individuals: its continued worth and relevance can be clearly illustrated by the value
that is still placed in it, and the high standards expected of it.22
The fact that court based adjudication is viewed as embodying an ideal
standard of thoroughness, impartiality and integrity in decision-taking in individualised
disputes is an important reason in itself why any legislature should ensure that there
is public confidence that it will meet these standards. It can only do so if it is
allocated an appropriate functional role. As with any other decision-taking process,
court based adjudication loses credibility if it is utilised for purposes to which it is
unsuited.23
In the administrative law context, the most obvious point is that the court
process is an unsuitable means of evaluating, reviewing or taking policy decisions.
As discussed in the preceding chapter, Fuller argued that the more "polycentric" a
problem becomes, the less suitable adjudication is as a means of resolving it.24
Accordingly, the question of whether or not a statutory decision-taking power should
be allocated to a court based adjudicator (such as a sheriff), or an administrative
decision-taker (such as the Secretary of State for Scotland or a local authority), can
be approached by the legislature on the basis that the more the decision taking process
is focused on law/fact determinations which have serious consequences for the
interests of individuals and a low polycentric effect, then the greater the requirement
for court based adjudication.25 Broader decisions, which place more emphasis on
policy considerations, and which have a stronger polycentric effect, require allocation
to decision takers such as tribunals, government ministers, local authorities or public
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servants. These different types of function are not rigidly segregated, but should be
viewed as being on a "spectrum" of decision taking.26 At one end of the spectrum,
there are functions which, for the reasons noted above, are best suited for court
based adjudication. As the weight given to the interests of the individual fade, these
shade into functions which may require adjudication, but not the "ideal type" court
based variety27; and these in turn fade into those which are not amenable to
adjudication at all.
The consequences of the legislature choosing to allocate to the court powers
which it is functionally ill-equipped to deal with are not difficult to identify:
confidence in the process of court based adjudication may be lost, which in turn may
impact on the standard of ostensive judicial competence. If judges are unable to
evaluate the polycentric implications of their decision because the adjudicatory process
prevents them from doing so effectively, it is likely that unforseen policy implications
will arise, which may eventually call into question the efficiency and utility of the
court.28 The continuation of powers and functions which are anachronistic or
anomalous may also have the same result, a point which is developed at length in
subsequent discussion.29 If adjudication is thought to create uncertainty and
confusion, then it is contrary to the underlying assumption of the rule of law, which
is to enable individuals to plan within a stable legal environment.30
Accordingly, as a general principle, it is argued that legislators should resist
the temptation to off-load difficult polycentric decisions on to the adjudicatory process,
or to continue anachronistic or anomalous provisions, if the result is likely to be
criticism of the legal process.
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(iii) There are of course other factors which any legislature has to consider when
allocating functions: cost, access for parties (both physical and procedural), the
desirability of formality, and existing workloads. These can be important in deciding
whether court based adjudication is a suitable option, rather than adjudication by a
tribunal, or other forms of decision taking.31 However, it is submitted that these
«•
factors should be seen as being secondary considerations to the general principles
sketched out above.
Section Two: General Principles for the Exercise of Statutory Powers by the
Judiciary
In a broad sense, the "general principles" which guide the judiciary in the
exercise of statutory decision-taking powers have already been set out in the
discussion of the ethos, standards and mechanisms of secondary morality.
For example, the standard treatment of statutory interpretation supports the
positivistic view of the judge as the impartial "scientific" interpreter of the will of
Parliament, which is a manifestation of the ethos of secondary morality.32 Leaving
aside the intellectual flaw in the argument that a collective body such as Parliament
can have a single will33, it is argued that the "rules" of interpretation, along with
stare decisis, and the Institutional Writers, can be viewed as mechanisms for
structuring judicial decision taking in accordance with the standards of the secondary
morality of law.34 As long as judges do not abuse their discretion, they are
protected (in so far as is possible) from the charge that they are exercising a subjective
law-making power.35 Whist it may be conceded that they are legislating, it is also
possible to argue that they are doing so within a highly restricted remit which is based
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on rules.36 In the final analysis, this provides the means by which the judiciary can
protect the positivist ethos of secondary morality. This is required to enable the legal
order to maintain stability in the rule of law.
Clearly, as indicated above, the legislature can make it difficult for the
judiciary to operate the mechanisms of secondary morality, in that it can create rules
which provide for judicial decision taking in areas with a "direct political
involvement" without limiting the judicial remit in a way which corresponds with the
requirements of ostensive judicial impartiality and competence. There are, as
indicated in the introductory chapter, a number of appeals which put the sheriff in
this position.37 In "hard"38 cases of this type the judge's own law-making capacity
is exposed. How can the court defuse the potential for the denigration of the
standards of secondary morality, and its ethos? General principles are suggested,
(i) The first responsibility of the judiciary must always be to give effect to
Parliamentary intent as expressed in statute. Where there is no clear indication of the
judicial remit (as in the majority of appeals to the sheriff concerning local
administration)39, judges must, as a general principle, recognise that they have a
further responsibility, when exercising their statutory discretion, to the rule of law,
and to the maintenance of the ethos and standards of secondary morality. This is
particularly so when judges are operating in areas which require a strong "direct
political involvement". For example, in cases where the court is required to make a
direct evaluation of ministerial or local authority policy based decisions, without
statutory limitations on their powers40, judges must show an awareness of the
potential dangers for the rule of law which could arise from their decisions. It is
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submitted that, in cases of the sort mentioned above, judges must "retreat" into the
ethos of secondary morality, and seek to uphold the two standards of ostensive
judicial impartiality and competence. The reason for this is comparatively simple.
If they were to adopt a pro-active approach to law making, and promoted what could
be interpreted as direct, subjective policy decisions, the potential for an inappropriate
level of involvement in policy making is clear, and, pursuant to this, the likelihood of
the denegation of the above standards. From the standpoint adopted in this thesis,
this may be seen as being a hazardous and undesirable course of action. It is
recognised that controversy will frequently arise from judicial decisions41 - however,
controversy which is likely to damage the standards and ethos of secondary morality
(and therefore, indirectly, the rule of law) because of the degree of "direct political
involvement" should be minimised whenever possible.
Naturally, the court must also ensure that it is not put in the position where
it can be accused of attempting to obstruct the legislature. There should be, as Lord
Diplock has suggested, "a purposive approach to the Act as a whole to ascertain the
social end it was intended to achieve and the practical means by which it was
expected to achieve them"42 - but this must be tempered by a feeling of obligation
to the rule of law and secondary morality. It is vital in "hard" cases with the potential
for a strong "direct political involvement" that judges strike the right balance between
"retreating" to secondary morality, and taking a more pro-active approach to policy
making. Accordingly, judges should weigh the desirability of narrowing what may
appear to be the intention of the legislature to involve the judiciary in policy merits
(ie "retreating" to secondary morality), against what may be perceived to be the
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advantages of taking a pro-active, "dynamic" approach to the interpretation of their
powers.43 In general terms, the former protects the ethos and standards of the
secondary morality and buttresses the rule of law, whereas the latter may appear to
provide for substantive fairness for individual appellants, but may in the long term
cause instability and uncertainty. The judiciary must always show an awareness of
the dangers for the rule of law of falling towards either extreme.44 As a general
principle, it is contended that, based on the arguments presented above and in chapter
one, it is usually desirable for the judiciary to "retreat" to the former.
(ii) As a second derivative general principle, it is submitted that judges should
ensure that their position is protected from the suggestion that they have either
breached ostensive impartiality and/or competence, or acted contrary to the intention
of Parliament, by utilising the mechanisms of secondary morality in a way which
promotes ostensive judicial impartiality and competence.
It should always be possible to view a judicial decision as being a reasonable
exercise of the discretion afforded to judges under the "rules" of statutory
interpretation, stare decisis, and the conventions of judicial reasoning. The
conscientious and bona fide use of the mechanisms of secondary morality is not
irrelevant as a means of upholding the rule of law and ostensive impartiality: they
discipline judges by restricting their discretion, and they also protect the judiciary and
adjudication from criticism by providing judges with a justifiable and structured
system with which to present the reasons for their decisions.45
It is comparatively easy to identify judicial decisions where the judge has
conducted himself in such a way as to invite criticism by, for example, making
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eclectic use of legal sources. The judge's failure to provide justifiable reasons for a
decision using the mechanisms of secondary morality is exposed. Lord Denning's
judgement in Mandla v. Dowall Lee46 can be cited as an example: his approach
clearly caused difficulties for the standard of ostensive impartiality in that his
objectivity was effectively doubted in a powerful House of Lords decision.
4, Conclusion
It should not be thought that there is any doubt that "general principles", no
matter how general, would count for little if they hampered the policy implementation
of any British government. This does not, however, mean that to make suggestions
concerning the allocation of functions to judicial officers is a pointless exercise: the
rule of law is of such constitutional importance that Parliament should be in no doubt
as to the potential damage which can arise from ill considered legislation involving
the court, and the judiciary should be reminded of its responsibility to it. Discussion
has so far been centred around primarily theoretical considerations. Where does the
Scottish sheriff fit in? The subsequent chapters will illustrate the relevance and
significance of both "general principles" and conceptual issues for the evaluation of
the sheriff's role in local administration.
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Part Two
Chapter Three: Introduction - The Value of Legal History
Although there are many works on constitutional history1, the main
administrative law textbooks give little attention to tracing the law's historical
development. This is perhaps not very surprising, as the traditional approach of
British academic lawyers in this field has been to separate the law from the wider
context of politics and morality, and to focus on constitutional theory, the courts and
precedent.2 The study of British administrative law has therefore often been
distinguished from socio-legal questions of how the law and legal process has
traditionally functioned as part of the system of government.3 However, in a broad
sense, these factors can be viewed as being within the ambit of legal history, and
studying them in tandem with more traditional case and statute based legal research
can tell us much more than "this is how we got to where we are now", although this
in itself is useful. Legal history can also give a deeper understanding of the dynamics
of the legal process, and how, on the basis of previous experience, the law is likely
to develop in the future. It can show how and why ideas and arguments have
developed, and encourages a more informed appreciation of why current law might
be though to be inconsistent or anomalous. In short, legal history enables us to
develop perspective.
Accordingly, it is intended to give considerable attention to the historical
development of the sheriffs powers in local administration. The main reasons for
doing so are uncomplicated. First, there is a considerable degree of confusion and
uncertainty surrounding the sheriffs current jurisdiction.4 Coverage of its historical
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development should go some way towards dispelling this confusion. Second, the
sheriff's powers are frequently upheld because they are thought, often on the basis of
rather glib interpretations, to derive from a venerable historical jurisdiction5: the
accuracy of these assertions should be tested. Third, many of the leading authorities
relied on as precedent are comparatively old6: their relevance can only be properly
evaluated if they are set in their historical context. This enables full appreciation of
the inconsistencies and anomalies which create confusion in the modern jurisdiction.
Fourth, tracing the development of substantive powers is an important part of the
process of categorising the current jurisdiction, which is a central aim of this thesis.7
In so doing, it is possible to identify different styles of provision, and to develop an
understanding of why they were introduced - this again helps to identify present day
anomalies. Finally, discussion of the way in which the sheriffs powers in local
administration have been interpreted by the court over the years provides the
opportunity to expand on the rule of law theory and general principles which were
introduced in part one of the thesis.
Before launching into a discussion of the historical development of the sheriff's
powers, some thought should be given to the potential pitfalls of historical research
from the standpoint of an administrative lawyer. It is all too often the case that in
writing legal history, lawyers make fundamental errors in historical technique. The
most common error is that of unwittingly judging the past according to the standards
of the present, which, to the professional historian, is anathema, as it inevitably leads
to a flawed interpretation. A good example of this tendency can be found in Lord
President Cooper's branding of the period 1350 to 1650 as the "Dark Age of Scottish
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Legal History": more recent researchers have exposed the limitations of this approach,
and, with the benefit of hindsight, it can be appreciated that his analysis is open to
criticism.8
The rather more enlightened approach of Darnton9 has been adapted for the
purposes of this thesis. Darnton exhorts the historian to "discover the social
dimension of thought and to tease meaning from documents by relating them to the
surrounding world of significance, passing from text to context and back again until
he [i.e. the historian] has cleared a way through a foreign mental world".10 For as
long as it is recognised that our perceptions of, "meanings" and "surrounding worlds
of significance" are our own perceptions of the historical actors' perceptions, reached
by an intellectual process peculiar to ourselves and our situation, we are not wasting
time. We can never experience the past - we can only develop our own understanding
of it. If we recognise the weaknesses which are inherent in our reasoning process,
take account of the reliable material, and can stimulate some understanding of our
present context, then historical research is a valuable exercise. Tracing the historical
development of the sheriffs powers in local administration is approached with these
points in mind.
Following on from the above comments, discussion is not limited to a "black
letter law" interpretation of the development of the sheriff's statutory powers: it is
also attempted to blend consideration of the wider socio-legal context in which sheriffs
operated with that of precedent and administrative law theory. This then leads into
the subsequent evaluation of currentmaterial and the analytical framework of statutory
powers which is set out in part three of the thesis.
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The historical chapters are arranged as follows. Chapter four provides a very
brief synopsis of the sheriff's role in local administration prior to the Heritable
Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act 1747, which was an important historical "watershed".
Chapter five covers the important developments of the period 1747-1870. Chapter six
considers subsequent changes in the sheriff's jurisdiction and the wider context of
local administration in the period 1870-1930, and chapter seven covers the period
1930-1967. The dates have not been chosen at random: as will become apparent,
they mark important changes, either within the sheriff's jurisdiction, or in Scottish
local administration generally.
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Chapter Four; A Brief Synopsis of the Sheriff's Powers in Local Administration
Prior to 1747
For reasons of space, it is not intended to give a great deal of attention to the
period prior to 1747, although it should be noted that the medieval origins of the
sheriff are of some relevance in terms of explaining the remarkable range of the
modern sheriffs jurisdiction in local administration.
That the history of the office of sheriff in Scotland is both long and varied
should be appreciated at the outset. The sheriff would appear to have been a Norman
importation of King David I (1124-53)1. The medieval sheriff was a Royal executive
officer, as well as a judge, with an important "governmental"2 role. The term
"governmental" is used to describe military, fiscal and executive powers held in local
administration. The centre of power was the local Royal castle - in feudal theory an
important symbol of Royal authority.3 In England, no doubt the source of King
David's inspiration, the sheriff was a reasonably effective means of extending and
maintaining Royal influence.4 The Scottish experience was, however, to be
different, reflecting the cultural, geographical and later religious divisions in the
Kingdom, as well as a relative shortage of Royal funds. The office of sheriff became
part of the feudal powers held by the nobility, and the administration of the King's
desmegne suffered accordingly. The title, and the power it conferred, was normally
granted "in fee and heritage", and fell within the feudal gift of local nobles, despite
ineffectual attempts by the Crown to reimpose Royal authority.5 As heritable
property, the office of sheriff could be bought and sold. The records disclose that the
last such transactions were in the early 18th century.6
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The governmental duties of the medieval sheriff can be summarised as follows.
As the military officer of his sheriffdom, he was. responsible for quelling or
pre-empting disturbances, conducting the local "wappinschaws", and maintaining the
upkeep of the Royal castle. Other important duties included the serving of Royal
brieves, the execution of Royal writs and letters, and the public proclamation of
Royal announcements. The sheriff was also the local fiscal officer of the Crown, and
"collected and accounted for every branch of the Royal revenue".7 Sheriffs were not
greatly remunerated for their services, but the wide ranging nature of their power
provided ample opportunity for corruption and intrigue. Malcolm records that the
overall picture is one of maladministration, greed and abuse of power: "... official
records disclose the majority of sheriffs as negligent in their duties - failing to collect
royal dues, or to account for those they had collected; given to exacting exorbitant
fees from the lieges; to accepting bribes and giving unjust awards."8
To aid them in their duties and to improve standards, sheriffs were required
by a statute of 1357 to appoint deputes: many ignored this requirement, and it would
appear that the quality of many of the deputes was often no better than that of their
superiors.9
Similar attempts by the Crown to improve the quality of shrieval administration
over the centuries were equally unsuccessful. The nobility was always powerful
enough to resist unwelcome changes and distance made it practically impossible for
the Crown, weak as it frequently was, to enforce and supervise the proper exercise
of duty. Various attempts were made to reform the heritable jurisdiction of the
sheriffs, but largely to no avail: to abolish them in order to re-impose Royal
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authority would have been costly in both political and financial terms. In any case,
the monarchy was committed to the concept of government by feudal patronage, and
sought to manipulate the system to its advantage by seeking the appointment of
sheriffs loyal to the Royal cause. This was understandable, as the combination of
governmental and judicial powers that went with office meant that the sheriffs were
in an ideal position to ensure that the enemies of the Gown were monitored and
controlled.10
For example, the activities of Claverhouse, Viscount Dundee, give an
indication of the importance and power of the office of sheriff for the Crown in the
late 17th century. The office was, even at this comparatively late stage, still a feudal
appointment founded on Royal patronage. Claverhouse had no legal skills, and his
duty as Sheriff of Wigtonshire was to put down covenanting unrest by force of arms
in the field of battle as well as in the local courthouse. In the course of his period in
office, he earned the soubriquet of "Bluidy Clavers" (an alternative to "Bonnie
Dundee") on account of the zeal with which he went about his duties during "the
killing time".11
The Union agreement with England in 1707 saw little change in the system.
Article XX of the Treaty of Union, as subsequently ratified by the Union with
England Act 1706, provided for the continuance of the heritable jurisdiction of the
sheriff:
"... all Heritable Offices, Superiorities, Heritable Jurisdictions, Offices for
Life, and Jurisdictions for Life, be reserved to the owners thereof, as Rights of
Property in the same manner as they are now enjoyed by the Laws of Scotland".12
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The new Parliament of Great Britain, dominated by English members, was
naturally not an enthusiastic reformer of Scottish local administration, especially when
large sums of money would have been required to compensate those holding heritable
office if their powers were to be taken back by the Crown. It is quite possible that
there was a general lack of interest in the jurisdiction held by Scottish sheriffs.13 It
is also likely that there would have been no impetus for reform of the heritable
jurisdictions (in particular because they were protected by the Union agreement) had
it not been for the spectacular failure of government and administration during the
1745 Rebellion. The Rebellion focused government attention on the inefficiency of
Scottish local administration, and on the potential power held by officers such as
sheriffs, should they prove to be disloyal to the Protestant Crown and Westminster
parliament.14 The office of sheriff was to be one of the main targets for reform in
the brutal aftermath of failed rebellion.
To conclude this synopsis, a number of points should be noted. The period
up to 1747 saw remarkably little change in the nature of the office of sheriff. Sheriffs
were important Crown officials, with wide ranging powers, which involved them in
the most important areas of secular administration. There was no concept of the
separation of powers in operation.15 The sheriff was not a product of the post
reformation Scottish "enlightenment"16, but of the medieval feudal system. As such,
there was nothing incongruous in the holder of office possessing wide judicial and
governmental powers by virtue of hereditary right and Royal patronage.
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Chapter Five: The Sheriffs Jurisdiction in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries
Introduction
This chapter covers the period 1747 to circa 1870, and is divided into four
sections. The first explores the socio-legal context within which the substantive law
operated up to the 1868 Commission on the Courts. Attention is given to the changes
brought about by the Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act 1747, and the subsequent
disputes between sheriffs over professional status and the allocation of duties. This
is because this was the only context within which the sheriff's powers in local
administration were discussed in any detail (other than in reported decisions). The
second section examines the attempts made by the court in reported decisions to
evaluate and categorise the sheriff's statutory powers. These are in turn assessed in
the light of the general principles and rule of law theory set out in part one of the
thesis. The third section provides a general discussion of the subject matter of the
powers which constituted the sheriff's jurisdiction in the period under consideration.
The continuation of the range of functions held by the feudal sheriffs and the way in
which they were developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is noted. This
is a particularly worthwhile exercise, because, given that many extant powers have
their origins in this period, it lays the foundations of the argument that much of the
sheriff's current jurisdiction is anachronistic. Finally, a brief summary draws together
the main arguments and points of interest
Before commencing, it should be noted that in section one, the powers in
J
local administration are loosely described as governmental or judicial. No special
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theoretical significance should be attached to either term at this stage. Accordingly,
governmental is used simply to indicate that the power in question derives from the
"ministerial" or executive powers traditionally held by the medieval sheriffs, whereas
judicial denotes any other type of function. The nature of these distinctions is,
however, considered in rather more depth in section two.
Section One; Developments in the Sheriffs Powers from 1747 to the 1870s
Important changes were brought about by the Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland)
Act 1747, which came into effect on the 25th March 17481:
"Be it enacted by the King's most excellent Majesty and by and with the
advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and commons, in this
present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that all the heritable
jurisdictions of justiciary, and all regalities and heritable bailleries and all heritable
constabularies other than the office of High Constable of Scotland ... shall be and are
... abrogated, taken away and hereby totally dissolved and extinguished."2
As indicated in the previous chapter, it took Rebellion to force the demise of
the ancient heritable jurisdictions of Scotland. The Act of 1747 revested the authority
of the heritable office of sheriff in the sheriff court3 and went on to make special
provision for the administration of the Scottish counties by sheriffs who did not hold
office by virtue of hereditary right, but by Royal appointment. Importantly, while
extensive provision was made for the creation of High Sheriffs4, who held office for
one year only, no attempt was made to appoint any, presumably for political reasons.
Some of their governmental duties were informally adopted by the Lords Lieutenant.
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However, the post-1747 sheriffs depute, assisted by sheriff substitutes, took on
most of the burdens of office.5 The range of powers held by the reformed sheriffs
remained virtually as wide as it had been prior to the Heritable Jurisdictions Act.6
The Act also formally introduced the requirement that to be eligible for
appointment as sheriff depute, legal qualification was required. Sheriffs depute were
to be advocates of at least three years standing.7 They were "nominated and
appointed by his Majesty"8, and were required to be resident in their sheriffdom for
at least four months each year.9 Holding office disqualified the deputes from
accepting any other position, although they were permitted to continue practice at the
Court of Session bar.10 Sheriffs depute held office ad vitam aut culpam from
1768.11 These developments were significant, in that they brought the sheriffs'
powers in local administration, along with criminal and civil judicial duties, under
the full control of the legal profession for the first time, a point which has not been
fully appreciated by historians such as Whetstone. The eventual result of this was the
dominance of the values and norms of professional lawyers not only in the courtroom,
but in the discharge of governmental powers. Of particular interest is the adoption of
an adjudicatory, largely adversarial style of decision taking in the jurisdiction within
local administration, a feature which is considered below.12
Interestingly, however, there is some evidence implying that the legally
qualified sheriffs depute were not to take on anything more than the civil and criminal
jurisdictions of the old heritable sheriffs, suggesting that it may have been intended
to effect a more rigorous separation of the judicial from the governmental13. Writing
immediately after the passing of the 1747 Act, Bankton noted that the "Sheriff
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Principal [ie High Sheriff] cannot act in a judicial capacity, the whole power being
lodged in the sheriff depute."14 This could be taken to imply that Bankton also
thought that the ministerial powers of the heritable sheriffs were to be lodged with the
High Sheriffs, with the legally qualified sheriffs depute dealing with "judicial"
business in the sheriff courts. This impression is supported to some extent by the Act
itself, which states that "... it shall not be lawful for any High Sheriff, or Stewart in
Scotland, personally to judge in any cause, Civil or Criminal...."15 However, any
such interpretation is merely conjectural, and, as indicated above, matters did not
turn out as Bankton had envisaged.
It should not be thought that the changes of 1747 were a complete break with
the past. In many respects, the Act built upon what had gone before. As noted in
the previous chapter, deputes had been appointed since 135716, and they had
appointed substitutes to deal with less complicated cases17 (although pre-reform
deputes had not always been legally qualified). In addition, although post-1747
sheriffs were in theory appointed by the Crown, and this was an important symbol
of the revesting of the jurisdiction by Royal authority, the reality was that the
patronage of the nobility was required to secure appointment.18 The position of the
Faculty of Advocates as a "stable" from which socially acceptable, comparatively
well educated and politically reliable candidates could be picked should not be
underestimated throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.19 However, as
Whetstone has noted, in the period immediately following the passing of the Act,
professional attainment would not appear to have been the highest priority as a
criterion for appointment, and membership of the Faculty was easily attained.20
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The mood of government changed in the late eighteenth century. Attempts
were made to create a more efficient system which rewarded those who had
distinguished themselves in practice at the bar.21 As a result, the office of sheriff
depute became a genteel staging post for those who were thought to be suitable
candidates for the Court of Session bench. The majority of deputes remained in
Edinburgh, neglecting even the four month rule, which had required their presence
in their Sheriffdoms for at least part of the year.22 It is not difficult to appreciate
why - distances were great, work at the Bar distracting, and remuneration for the
office poor. Most of the work, of both a judicial and governmental nature, was
performed by the locally based sheriff substitutes. The deputes dealt with matters by
post (evidence in both civil and criminal business could be presented in writing), and
increasingly came to exercise a rather remote appellate jurisdiction, which was itself
to become a source of controversy.23 Writing in 1824, Robert Clark implied that
this process was well established: "The sheriffs depute being now uniformly
nominated from that illustrious body, the Faculty of Advocates, and frequently not
allied to the county to which they are appointed, there is little or no hazard of their
violating either of those moral or legal principles, which ought to encircle the brows
of every upright and independent judge."24
The system of the locally based sheriff substitute performing the laborious
part"25 of the business of the sheriff depute, whilst the Edinburgh based depute
enjoyed a position of status and authority in county affairs, was to cause a
considerable degree of acrimony until the 1970s, when both offices were reformed.26
The at times heated debate between deputes and substitutes is of considerable
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contextual relevance to the way in which the powers of the sheriff in local
administration were viewed, as both groups used them as a means of justifying their
respective positions: the deputes were concerned to maintain their influence and
prestige in the counties, whereas the substitutes sought an improvement in status at
their superiors' expense. As will become clear, this debate was virtually the only
context in which the powers in local administration were discussed by sheriffs outwith
reported decisions. Indeed, it seems to have overshadowed any questions as to the
suitability of legally qualified judges exercising strong discretionary (and often final)
powers in local administration alongside and over elected local authorities. Even
primitive interpretations of the doctrine of separation of powers received little
attention. In her otherwise excellent discussion of the dispute, Whetstone does not
appear to appreciate the peculiar nature of the sheriffs position, perhaps because her
perspective is that of the historian rather than the lawyer.27 In addition, she does
not give any attention to the comments made with respect to the powers in local
administration.
The office of sheriff substitute received little mention in the Heritable
Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act 1747.28 It was, however, to evolve remarkably in the
period between the passing of the Act and the late nineteenth century. In 1748 the
substitutes were poorly paid, part time officials of low status - yet by 1880 they were
respected (although modestly remunerated) local judges and governmental officers,
and usually members of the Faculty of Advocates.29 However, memories of their
previous status were to linger, in large measure due to the efforts of the deputes,
resulting in a stigmatisation which lasted until the 1970s.30
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The "Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Courts of
Law in Scotland"31, published in 1868, provides ample evidence of the undignified
professional fracas between deputes and substitutes, and of the importance of the
powers in local administration for the protagonists. The deputes argued that the
substitutes were not of sufficient ability, authority, or dignity to deal with the more
important governmental duties32: in addition, they laid great stress on the fact that,
as practitioners at Parliament House in Edinburgh, they were not susceptible to "local
influences".33 It was also argued that as substitutes exercised a limited jurisdiction
over sheriff court districts (as opposed to entire sheriffdoms), they were not able to
assess the full range of the deputes' duties.34 Taken together, they felt that these
factors justified their position. However, the substitutes were not greatly impressed
by these arguments35, and sought the abolition of the office of depute. In the
context of a discussion of the Sheriffdom of Lanarkshire, it was mooted that: ".... [if]
it was thought a good system ... not to have two ranks of sheriffs - a subordinate and
a higher one - but to put them all into one rank .... they would all be on a par, with
this difference, that one would be the senior sheriff, and I presume that he would
take the administrative [ie governmental] duty of maintaining the peace and attending
the boards and meetings which the sheriff [depute] must attend."36
Interestingly, the question ofwho actually performedmost of the governmental
work is never answered clearly by the evidence to the report, which is probably an
indication that, as in so many other areas, practice varied widely from one sheriffdom
to the next. Similarly, there was no doubt as to the suitability of sheriffs involving
themselves directly in the business of local administration. However, it is impossible
69
to avoid the suspicion that the dispute over professional status was colouring the views
of both groups as regards the amount of work which was carried out by them and their
suitability for appointment. The substitutes turned the "local ties" argument of the
deputes on its head, by contending that the locally based sheriff substitutes were
better placed to perform the governmental work of the deputes, and that, in fact,
they did so.37
The partisan nature of the evidence is well illustrated by the following excerpts
from the evidence. The deputes' argument that the loss of their governmental powers
would in effect mean the abolition of the office (a point well appreciated by the
substitutes) was made a number of times:
".... If you deprive the non resident sheriff [ie depute] of his ministerial [ie
governmental] duties and responsibilities you must relieve him of the
responsibility of his office to a great extent it would change the office more than
I would like to see."38
The substitutes contradicted this view: "... it seems to me that the office of
sheriff [depute] is unnecessary. The sheriff [depute] may conduct inquiries for the
Secretary of State as to the propriety of proposed provisional orders, and hear
applications for the closure of burial grounds but in all such [governmental]....
matters the sheriff substitute is entitled to act, and I presume to say is just as well
qualified to act as the sheriff principal [ie depute]."39
A view commonly expressed by substitutes was that; " ... almost all the
ministerial [governmental] duties are performed by the sheriff substitute. In fact, with
the exception of a few of what you may call the formal duties, he does it all."40
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For reasons that are not immediately apparent, the Commission does not
appear to have been greatly impressed by the substitutes' submissions.41 Parliament
did not see fit to change the system42 and appeared content to continue to allocate
a wide range of powers to the sheriff. The dispute over professional duties and status,
which was the only context in which the jurisdiction in local administration was
raised, had been left unresolved, and was to continue: the discussion is resumed in
subsequent chapters.
Section Two: Judicial Decisions and the Sheriffs Jurisdiction in Local
Administration
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the court developed an
"internal" separation of the sheriff's powers in local adminstration, choosing to
interpret some as "ministerial"43, and others as "judicial", "privative and final"
powers.44 There were also some functions which were viewed as being "judicial"
but subject to appeal to the Court of Session.45 The promotion of this rather
primitive separation of powers had important consequences. If a power was
ministerial, sheriffs were deemed to be acting outwith the judicial process, and were
able to take decisions with the same degree of discretion as any non-judicial official
acting under statute.46 Despite there being no explicit reference to a "ministerial"
jurisdiction in statutes, or any clear definition of what the term meant, it seems
beyond doubt that it was used to describe those powers which were derived from the
traditional governmental duties of pre-reform sheriffs47 If a power was judicial, but
privative and final, sheriffs were able to utilise the powers inherent in judicial office
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(eg the ability to award expenses)48: it may also be surmised from even early case
reports that there was support for the view that sheriffs should narrow their discretion
to questions of law and jurisdiction rather than merits if they were hearing an appeal
from an elected local authority, such as a parochial board.49 Finally, if a power
was held to be "judicial", it could be appealed to the Court of Session as ordinary
civil business.50 The majority of judicial powers (both final and privative and
otherwise) were allocated under the police and local government legislation of the
nineteenth century, which is discussed in section three below.
Distinguishing between these general categories was not easy, and depended
on how the court chose to interpret the relevant statute. Whether or not an
adjudicatory, adversarial style of decision taking was adopted was not felt by the
court to be relevant: it was the essential nature of the power which determined
allocation. For example, in Love v. Lang51, the First Division of the Court of
Session was required to decide whether a decision taken by Justices of the Peace
"shutting up" a public road was ministerial or judicial. Although the case concerned
justices, the court had utilised the same test in cases involving sheriffs52. If the
power fell into the former category, then the legal protection inherent in judicial
proceedings was not available. The court held that the justices had acted ministerially.
Lord President Inglis differentiated the style of proceedings from the nature of the
decision:
"... there is another question which must be ... decided, whether the
proceedings before the justices were proper judicial proceedings -1 mean not in form,
because, as far as one can judge from the extracts, everything was done in the most
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regular judicial form, but whether, acting under the statute, the justices were acting
in a judicial or ministerial capacity."53
The answer to this was to be found by interpretation of the provision in
question, which caused considerable problems for the court. Lord Deas noted with
almost palpable exasperation that there "... is room for great doubt whether the justices
acted judicially or ministerially The whole difficulty arises from the vagueness
and inaccuracy, if not inconsistency, of the language used in the statute."54
However, it was clear that the historical "pedigree" of the statutory powers,
together with the general nature of the duties provided for, were factors in deciding
whether or not a decision was ministerial or judicial:
"The clause allows thirty days public notice in order that any one interested
may state objections to the road being shut up, and after hearing parties and taking
such steps by visiting grounds or otherwise, as they consider necessary, the order
desired by the road trustees is either granted or refused. In all this the justices act
ministerially in the exercise of that power of superintending the roads of the county
which they have possessed from a very early period."55
In Commissioners of Police for the Burgh of Leith v. Campbell56, the Second
Division of the Court of Session was called upon to consider the nature of the
sheriffs' power to designate a road as private or public following appeal from a
decision of the Commissioners of Police under the Police and General Improvements
(Scotland) Act 1862. This time, Lord Justice Clerk Inglis (as he was then) did not
consider the question of whether the power was ministerial or judicial, but sought
instead to determine whether it was a final and privative judicial power, or one which
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was subject to appeal in the Court of Session. Once again, historical considerations
were felt to be relevant:
"... Now the subject of this action is entirely a matter of burgh police, with
which this court has never had anything to do, and this statute has, I think, for its
object to introduce a procedure very summary and final. I think that the fair
construction of the statute is that the question ... shall be decided by the sheriff, and
that there is no other form in which the proceedings of the Commissioners can be
reviewed: in short, the sheriff's jurisdiction is privative."57
Although many statutes appeared to give sheriffs a very wide discretionary
power to review the decisions of public authorities, the Court of Session was anxious
to limit their jurisdiction from an early stage. In a series of actions arising from a
case concerning the extent of the sheriffs' powers to override the decision of a
parochial board under the Burial Grounds (Scotland) Act 185658, Lord Deas sought
to restrict their discretion in cases where there was a final and privative statutory
jurisdiction:
".... The more exclusive the jurisdiction conferred by the Act, the more careful,
of course, the sheriff or sheriff substitute will be to keep within it, and the more
cautious the result to be arrived at."59
In a later action concerning the same burial ground he argued strongly that the
existence of a privative and exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of local
authorities should not be interpreted as giving sheriffs a strong discretion to overturn
decisions, even if, ex facie the statute, it seemed that one existed:
"... as to the mere suitableness of one piece of ground as compared with
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another, it humbly appears to me that this is a matter which the statute has
committed, not to the discretion of the sheriff, but to the parochial board, who are
the purchasers and proprietors of the ground for behoof of their constituents, by
whom the price and all relevant expenditure are to be paid."60
It would seem that where the sheriffs were reviewing the decisions of elected
authorities such as parochial boards or police commissions, and the statute gave them
what were apparendy wide and final powers of disposal, Lord Deas (who was in the
dissenting minority) set what may be described as an "intuitive" limit on any potential
discretion. It is of course recognised that ideas of local democracy were very much
less developed at the time of these cases (especially in landward rather than burghal
areas61), but, even at this early stage, it would have been surprising had the court
not shown at least some trepidation over the fact that many of the powers involved
sheriffs directly in the decision taking of elected authorities.
This may have been an influence on Lord Deas, and, without being unduly
presumptuous, it is possible to view his narrowing of the sheriff's discretionary
powers in the context of the general principles and rule of law theory developed in
part one of the thesis. Whilst it is not suggested that Lord Deas would necessarily
have viewed matters in this light, it is nonetheless possible to argue that Parliament
had, on the face of the statute, allocated strong discretionary powers to the sheriff
in an area which could potentially have required an unjustifiable "direct political
involvement" and created an unacceptable polycentric effect62. Does this raise the
issue of whether the possibility of sheriffs overturning the decisions of elected parish
authorities was contrary to both ostensive judicial impartiality and competence? If it
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does, it can then be argued that shrieval decisions would therefore have been
potentially contrary to the ethos of the secondary morality of law, making a
restriction of discretion necessary.63
In terms of the theory adopted in part one of the thesis, Lord Deas' minority
judgement can be interpreted as a "retreat"64 towards the standards of secondary
morality, which may be characterised as being in accordance with the general
principles for the exercise of statutory powers set out in chapter two. However, full
recognition is given to the fact that the case is a comparatively early report, and it
is appreciated that the significance of this evaluation should be limited.
Section Three: The SherifTs Duties in Local Administration
A consideration of the range and subject matter of the sheriff's powers in local
administration makes it easy to understand why they featured in the disagreements
between deputes and substitutes over professional status: the duties were many and
onerous, and were an important element in the unprecedented expansion of local
administration in the nineteenth century. Some were also prestigious, and accorded
to the deputes in particular a position of influence and distinction in county society65
- something which, it may be felt without undue cynicism, would have been greatly
valued by ambitious senior counsel. For reasons of space, discussion is limited to the
main areas of the sheriffs' influence in local government and does not comprise an
exhaustive list of their powers. Some duties have been excluded specifically from the
ambit of the thesis, such as those concerned with commercial matters and the
administration of justice.
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Despite the relative paucity of sources, especially for the eighteenth century,
it is possible to ascertain a reasonable picture of the multifarious nature of the sheriffs'
powers in local administration.66 As indicated in section one, the range of powers
had developed from the medieval origin of the office: accordingly, post-reform
sheriffs continued to be involved in most of the main areas of local administration.
During the period under consideration, they were also allocated new powers which
frequently made them pivotal in the implementation and supervision of the immense
statutory reform of Scottish local government which commenced in the early
nineteenth century.67 Their role as the link between central government and the
sheriffdom in matters of local importance was thereby bolstered, and their powers to
take decisions in local administration as both governmental and judicial officers were
increased greatly. There was no consistency in the legislation, and first instance and
appellate powers were allocated in an ad hoc, pragmatic fashion.
The subject matter of the sheriff's jurisdiction encompasses powers held in
connection with: (i) the preservation of public order, (ii) "striking the sheriff fiars";
(iii) electoral law; (iv) fiscal responsibilities; (v) the Commissions of Supply; (vi)
"police government"; (vii) roads and bridges; (viii) poor law adminstration; (ix)
mental health; (x) prisons; (xi) registration; and (xii) shipping.
(i) As in the pre-reform period, the sheriffs (principally' the deputes) had an
important jurisdiction as the Crown official responsible for the maintenance of order
and the suppression of insurrection in their sheriffdoms.68 This power was derived
directly from the military jurisdiction held by medieval sheriffs, and was to continue
until comparatively recently. It should be noted that the sheriffs' duties were not
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simply those of magistrates authorising the use of force by the military: they led and
could personally direct operations, by virtue of the fact that they were the most senior
Crown officials within their sheriffdoms.69 There are numerous examples of sheriffs
exercising these powers throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.70
(ii) "Striking the fiars" was an important and well documented governmental
function "incumbent on all sheriffs and Stewarts".71 It too had been a duty which had
previously been performed by the pre-reform sheriffs. The sheriff fiars was the means
by which the price of "all sorts of grain shall be holden as estimated at in their
counties, where a party liable in a quantity of grain or victual fails in delivering or
tendering it in due time"72, and was a not insignificant function. "Striking the fiars"
was, perhaps surprisingly, to remain part of the sheriffs' jurisdiction until the 1960s,
although by that time it had ceased to be of any real significance.
Bankton gave a detailed description of the procedure for striking the fiars,
which was provided for by Act of Sederunt in 1723.73 The procedure, as one would
expect of an Act of the Court of Session, had an adjudicatory, adversarial style,
even although the purpose of the process was of a governmental nature. The procedure
remained largely unchanged, and was renewed by an Act of Sederunt of 14th
November 1816. However, as Knox and Company v. Law and Others illustrates, it
would seem that the Act of Sederunt was not universally followed, and that a more
inquisitorial style was adopted in some sheriffdoms.74
It is clear that the Court of Session did not consider the striking of the fiars to
be a justiciable matter, and appeals from the fiars were held to be incompetent: the
sheriffs were felt to be acting in a governmental, as opposed to judicial, role. In
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1806, the court held in Home v. Swinton that: "... the sheriff in that part of his duty
acts ministerially .... he does not act under the authority of the Court of Session."75
This point was echoed in Love v. Lang, which was discussed in section two.76 Very
little would seem to have changed by the time McGlashan noted in the 1868 edition
of "Sheriff Court Practice" that the proceedings were "in some respects judicial as well
as ministerial".77
(iii) The sheriffs also performed an important governmental role in electoral law:
this jurisdiction was to last until the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973. Their
powers were again derived from those of the pre-reform sheriffs. Bankton gave a very
full discussion of the subject, which was a controversial and litigious area throughout
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries78, and noted that it was "... a momentous part
of the sheriff's [ie the depute's] ministerial office to serve writs directed to him, in
... the election of members of parliament for counties and borows [sic] .... And this,
not being a matter judicial is within the province of the Sheriff Principal [ie High
Sheriff] in the first place; but in default of him, the Sheriff Depute is bound to do it;
or the Sheriff Principal may waive it; and leave the charge to the same to the Depute,
as he thinks proper."79
Obviously, since no "sheriffs principal" (ie high sheriffs) were appointed, the
duty was de facto performed by the sheriffs depute. The deputes5 role in electoral law
was a crucial one. They were responsible for the execution of the writs of election,
and were in charge of electoral registers and the conduct of general elections.80
Political bias was, however, always a matter of considerable concern, as
throughout the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth centuries,81 Scotland was
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controlled by political patronage as if it was "one vast rotten burgh".82 Corruption,
bribery and coercion were commonplace. Accordingly, provision was made to ensure
that sheriffs did not allow any "local ties" or political loyalties to interfere with their
conduct.83
The electoral reforms brought about by the Representation of the People
(Scotland) Act 183284 were to increase the governmental and judicial duties of the
deputes and their substitutes considerably: indeed, the deputes were to perform a
central role. They were to decide on the merits of claims for representation, dealing
firstly with those claims to which there had been no objection, and were also
responsible for the annual revision of the electoral register. This latter function was
clearly an administrative undertaking of some magnitude, and it may be inferred that
much of the work was carried out by the substitutes and the sheriffs clerks, assisted
by parish schoolteachers in the counties, and the town clerks in the burghs. Where
there was a grievance, an appeal could be heard by a specially constituted body
known as the Judges of Appeal, which was made up of three deputes. Appeals on
registration could be taken further at the circuit Courts of Justiciary, and were clearly
seen as justiciable issues.
Other governmental duties included the division of counties within the
sheriffdom into Polling Districts, and the establishment ofPolling Places for contested
elections.85 The depute or a substitute was to be present at all Polling Places to
ensure that the law was observed. Finally, the Writ for the Election of Members was
served to the depute in person, and proclaimed by him at the Mercat Cross or other
suitable public place. He was also required to; "... openly declare the State and
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Result of the Poll and make the Proclamation of the Member or Members chosen."86
Writing in 1842, McGlashan noted that the sheriff had a number of
governmental and judicial duties in connection with the hearing of appeals from
Parliamentary and burgh electoral registers.87 In the period up to 1870, there was
a considerable amount of legislation dealing with elections and their conduct. The
sheriffs' duties remained essentially the same as under the Act of 1833, but it may
be presumed that the burden of work was increased significantly as the number of
electors was increased.88
(iv) The post-reform deputes also continued to carry out the largely governmental
duties of local fiscal officer of the Crown which had been held by the pre-1747
Sheriffs Principal. Bankton noted that the "Sheriff Deputes, by themselves or
substitutes are bound to serve all writs or processes issuing out of the Exchequer."89
Erskine recorded that their duties in this field involved the levying of "the escheats of
those ... denounced rebels, and the blanch and feu rents, casualties of superiority,
and other duties payable to the Crown, for which they must account in
Exchequer".90 The sheriffs were also, as governmental officials, charged with the
more general duty of "looking after every matter with regard to the Crown's interest
in the county."91
However, the 1850s saw a change in the sheriffs' fiscal duties. Under the
Infeftment Act 1845, it was no longer necessary for the sheriff to give infeftment on
Crown precepts92; under the Act of Sederunt of 3rd July 1846, the fees were levied
in Chancery. The Service of Heirs (Scotland) Act 184793 did allow infeftment on
the sheriffs' precept, subject to the confirmation of the Exchequer: however, the
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Sheriff Court (Scotland) Act 185394 abolished these official fees.95
(v) Notwithstanding this, it should not be thought that the sheriffs' fiscal duties
had been brought to an end. The sheriffs had extensive governmental duties involving
them with the local Commissions of Supply. It is this connection perhaps more than
any other which illustrates the influential position that sheriffs held in Scottish local
administration. The Commissions of Supply were the most important institutions in
county government prior to the establishment of the county councils in the late
nineteenth century.96
During the eighteenth century, the main duty of the Commissions was the
assessment and collection of the land tax.97 They were also charged with
responsibility for the collection (although latterly not the assessment) of the assessed
taxes, county roads, bridges, tolls and ferries. In the nineteenth century, the
Commissions were also required to carry out an increasing number of other functions
in policing and county government.98
The sheriffs depute and their substitutes were allocated important duties in
connection with the operation of the Commissions: indeed, they often seem to have
been the pivot around which the Commissions revolved. For example, the sheriffs,
acting as the local representatives of the crown, were responsible for the calling of
the most important Commission meetings on the dates set by statute. Until 1865,
sheriffs were required to call the annual land tax meetings, and it is clear that without
their involvement little would have been achieved.99 The sheriffs were also given
more general duties, particularly during times of national emergency. For example,
the Napoleonic wars led to the introduction of new taxes, and sheriffs were made
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responsible for their implementation and supervision in Scotland.100
However, throughout the eighteenth century the method of assessment for
taxes was inefficient and haphazard, as the Commissions were amateur, voluntary
bodies, composed of the local gentry. Eventually, central government took direct
control of assessment for taxes, leaving only collection in the hands of the
Commissions. Direction of the local Commissions of Supply fell to the
Commissioners of Assessed Taxes, who were selected from the wealthiest, and
therefore most influential, Commissioners of Supply.101 Under the House Tax Act
1803, sheriffs depute and substitutes were appointed to serve as Commissioners of
Assessed Taxes.102 The sheriffs were given a number of other important
governmental functions to perform in connection with the Commissions. They acted
as deputy conveners of the committees set up to divide the counties into Commission
districts. They were also, by virtue of their office, members of the local
Commissions. For example, the Taxes (Scotland) Act 1812 provided that not less
than three Commissioners were to be appointed for each district "exclusive of the
sheriff depute or substitute in such district", and it was also stipulated that "no more
than one sheriff substitute shall act at any meeting".103
(vi) The authority of the sheriffs' position, their traditional governmental role of
local representative of the Crown, and their connections with the Commissions of
Supply, encouraged the legislature to involve them in the development of what are
now major local government functions. Throughout the nineteenth century, sheriffs
were given important duties in the development and administration of "police
systems". This term covers not only the provision of police forces, but also essential
local services which are now carried out by regional or district councils: for example,
clean water, cleansing, lighting, licensing, public health, paving and planning.104
The massive nineteenth century reform of municipal government was initiated
by the Burghs and Police (Scotland) Act 1833.105 Sheriffs had an important role
in establishing "police systems" under the Act, and in supervising their administration
once they were in operation. For example, it was provided that the sheriff depute
was required to decide, after a local election had taken place, whether the provisions
of the Act should apply to a burgh, and therefore whether local Commissioners (ie
councillors) should be elected to administer the system. If the depute found from the
poll that the terms of the Act were satisfied, he was required to record the minutes
of his decision in the sheriff court book of the county.106
The Act reflected an increased awareness of the importance of proper
sanitation, licensing and town planning for the prevention of disease and the
protection of public safety. The responsibilities of the Police Commissions were
extensive. They covered, among other duties, the apprehension of vagrants, the
regulation of pavements and streets, the demolition of ruinous houses, the
supervision of adequate sewers and drains, and the provision of safe water, gas
supplies, and hygienic slaughter houses. The Commissioners were also empowered
to erect weigh-houses, build waterworks, recruit and supervise fire brigades and
regulate hackney carriages.107 Sheriffs were given a multitude of governmental and
judicial duties in the new "police systems". For example, they were empowered to
swear in police officers and night watchmen, order the removal of stairs and
encroachments on streets, secure or remove ruinous houses, and decide disputes on
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the rates payable on slaughterhouses.108 The "sheriff of bounds" was also to take
the final decision on complaints arising from assessment for local taxes. The sheriffs'
jurisdiction as local judge was bolstered by the provision that "all offenses specified
in the Act may be tried by the sheriff of the county."109
The Police (Scotland) Act 1850, "... for regulating the policing of towns and
other populous places ... and for draining, lighting and improving the same"110,
continued this trend. The Act provided that the sheriff depute (or a substitute) was
to superintend a poll held by householders, and decide whether the Act should be
enforced in the relevant burgh or "populous place". If the sheriff decided that the
establishment of a "police system" was appropriate, then he could authorise the
election of Commissioners of Police.111 They were also allocated governmental and
judicial duties once the Act had become effective in a locality, and a Commission of
Police had been established. Sheriffs were required to settle disputes regarding the
Commissions' account books, decide the amount to be paid from the "common good",
hear appeals on private or district assessment for drainage rates, protect the tenure of
the Superintendent of Constabulary from political interference, and regulate burial
grounds and slaughterhouses on the grounds of public health. Further powers relating
to the protection of public health involved the sheriffs in dealing with purveyors of
"unwholesome and adulterated food", and establishing drainage districts for the
construction and maintenance of drains and sewers. There were a number of other
appeals of this nature concerning drainage from private houses: "persons aggrieved"
could apply to the sheriff over decisions taken by the Commissioners concerning the
levels of house foundations, house drains and the building or rebuilding of any
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house.112
The Act also involved sheriffs in burgh planning. It was provided that it was
not lawful to "... make, or lay out any new street unless and until the proposed width
thereof, with reference to the hight of the houses and other circumstances be
approved by the sheriff."113 Those aggrieved by the laying out of new streets, or
the alteration of an existing plan, could appeal to the sheriff, who were empowered
to order the owner of a "building, wall or other thing" to "take down, repair,
rebuild, or otherwise secure" the structure to the satisfaction of the Surveyor of the
Commission if he felt it to be a public danger.114 It was stipulated that "with
respect to the improvement of burghs and to objections to the works to be constructed
by or subject to the approval of the Commissions", an appeal to the sheriff was final
and not subject to review by the Court of Session.115
However, the most important and clearly governmental duty under the Act was
the appointment of the sheriff depute as the crown official authorised to confirm or
refuse bye-laws drafted by the Commissioners. This function illustrates the
significance attached to the sheriff's role as the local representative of the Crown:
"No bye-law made by the Commissioners ... shall come into operation until the
same be confirmed by the sheriff; and it shall be incumbent on the sheriff, on the
request of the Commissioners, to enquire into any bye-law tendered to him for that
purpose, and to allow or disallow of the same as he may think meet."116
To conclude this sub-section, the sheriffs' duties under the burgh police Acts
led to a tradition of shrieval involvement in legislation concerned with public health:
indeed, the Public Health (Scotland) Act 1867117, which was a landmark in public
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health provision in Scotland, was drafted by Sheriff Depute Munro.118 Sheriffs
were given a number of governmental and judicial powers to secure a more effective
public health administration under the 1867 Act, and many of them were continued
under the Public Health (Scotland) Act 1897.119
(vii) The sheriffs' connections with the Commissions and justices of the peace also
involved them in the administration of roads and bridges in the sheriffdom. In the
early eighteenth century, the responsibility for the construction and maintenance of
roads lay with the Commissions of Supply and the Justices of the Peace.120 Their
efforts, however well intentioned, were haphazard and inadequate.121 Interestingly,
due to the necessity of judicial circuits, the Highways (S) Act 1718122 made the
Lords of Justiciary responsible for the supervision of the Commissions of Supply,
which were required to draw up an annual report on the condition of roads, bridges
and ferries for their Lordships.
Perhaps surprisingly, the role of sheriffs in the expansion and supervision of
road networks for trade and military purposes has received little attention. The
deputes and substitutes were particularly well placed to become involved: as the
local Crown administrators they were closely connected with the Commissions of
Supply and local Justices. In addition, their position in the judicial hierarchy meant
that they were subordinate to the Lords of Justiciary, acting in, what is to a modem
reader, their rather unusual role as road authority.123
Parliament showed little interest in improving roads, or in providing more
effective means of funding. Accordingly, the statute books of the period abound with
Local and Personal Acts, which authorised new systems of local taxation to provide
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funding for road development.124 It was normally provided that both deputes and
substitutes could act as Roads Trustees, who were responsible for administering the
roads under the terms of the relevant Act.125 Effectively, the Roads Trustees were
a sub-committee of the Commissions of Supply, but they maintained a separate
administration. The Highways (S) Act 1845126 brought to an end the need for a
private bill to make changes in road funding. A national system for the funding,
planning and administration of roads, bridges and ferries was introduced by the Roads
and Bridges (Scotland) Act 1878, which maintained the sheriffs' position. Section
113 of the Act provided that sheriffs could serve as Roads Trustees, and there were
also a number of governmental and judicial duties.127
(viii) Sheriffs also held significant powers under the poor law. Prior to 1845, the
administration of the poor laws and parochial relief varied greatly from parish to
parish.128 However, the Poor Law (Scotland) Act 1845129 created Parochial
Boards, which were to administer relief for the poor in compliance with public health
legislation. The Act also provided for a Board of Supervision, which acted as the
central administrative authority, although the local Parochial Boards had a
considerable degree of autonomy.130 Parliament once again sought to utilise the
sheriffs as governmental officials, and the deputes played a prominent part in the
work of the Board of Supervision.131 The statement to the 1868 Commission of Sir
John McNeill, a Chairman of the Board of Supervision, made it clear that sheriffs
depute were the mainstay of the Board.132
At a more local level, sheriffs also had a number of important governmental
and judicial duties. For example, they were empowered to decide disputes on the
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validity of elections to the local parochial boards, and exercised the judicial power
of deciding whether the board had erred in law by refusing relief to an appellant (a
power which had been held by pre-reform sheriffs). Sheriffs were also authorised to
make orders for the removal of English and Irish paupers from Scotland.133
(ix) Sheriffs carried out important functions in connection with mental health.
Under the Madhouses (Scotland) Act 1815134, sheriffs were required to supervise
the regulation of "Madhouses", and the "reception and due care and confinement of
furious and fatuous persons and lunatics." The importance of the sheriffs' powers
cannot be over-estimated: they were responsible for the granting of yearly licences
to those who wished to run private asylums (for the unfortunate gentry and middle
classes), the appointment of Medical Inspectors, the security of asylums, a bi-annual
inspection of asylums, and the rules and regulations necessary for the proper
management of premises.135
Sheriffs were also empowered to make the necessary orders for the "reception
of lunatics". The Act provided that "... no person or persons shall be received into
any house for the reception and the care and confinement of furious and fatuous
persons or lunatics, ..., without an order being made by the sheriff or Stewart depute
or substitute."136 The order had to be signed by a "medical person" who was
appointed by the sheriff. Interim orders could be made for "reception" for a period
not exceeding fourteen days137, and the sheriff was empowered to free any person
who he considered had been "improperly" detained.138
These duties remained largely unaltered until the Lunacy (Scotland) Act
1857139, which established a Board to administer both public and private asylums:
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the Board was to be replaced after a period of five years by two Inspectors. In the
event, it was continued. The powers of the sheriffs were modified, although they
still continued to serve as governmental officials for the purposes of the licensing and
inspection of asylums. Most importantly, their powers with regard to admission of
patients, appeals, transfers and liberation remained, and indeed were made more
comprehensive.140
There was an inferior "twin" system in operation for the care and confinement
of "pauper lunatics". Under the Lunatics (Scotland) Act 1858141 sheriffs were
empowered to order the "reception and confinement" of "pauper lunatics" in special
wards of poorhouses, until proper district asylums could be established. The Lunacy
(Scotland) Act 1862142 created Boards to deal with much of the administration of
the asylums, but the main power of "reception and confinement" remained with
sheriffs, who were still able to order the detention of "lunatics and dangerous
lunatics".143
(x) Sheriffs had traditionally supervised the provision of prisons in their counties,
as part of their governmental duty to provide for the peace and security of their
sheriffdoms. The Heritable Jurisdictions Act 1747 provided that;
"... all and every sheriffs of shires [ie high sheriffs], ..., or their deputies,
within Scotland, shall, and they hereby require to visit and inspect all houses, places
or rooms, as shall be so entered as Prisons, and to disallow and prohibit the use of
the same, in case that they appear to the said sheriffs or Stewarts, or their deputies
respectively, to be places grievous or unhealthy, or not agreeable to the
regulations."144
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It was not until the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1839145 that major changes were
effected in prison administration, but the position of the sheriffs remained prominent.
A General Board of Directors of Prisons was established, with a heavy shrieval
bias.146 Prison Boards were established for each county to carry out the directions
of the General Board, and to administer local prisons. The deputes and substitutes
were the only stipulated members: "... Provided always that the sheriff depute of each
county for the time being, or in his absence the sheriff substitute, acting at the head
or returning burgh, shall, by virtue of their offices, be members of such county
boards."147 The other members were drawn from the local Commission of Supply,
of which the sheriff was also an ex officio member.148
The Prisons (Scotland) Act I860149 continued the appointment of sheriffs
to the local prison boards, and also provided that the sheriffs were responsible for the
implementation of the terms of the Act, the setting of the first board meetings, and
the interim chairmanship of the boards. They were also to settle any disputes arising
from the assessment of local tax payable for the county prison service.150
Subsequent legislation created a number of other governmental duties for sheriffs,
which involved malting regular inspections of prisons, and inquiries in respect of
naturally deceased, executed or insane prisoners. Prison Governors were also
required to submit a monthly report on civil prisoners for the sheriff to consider.151
(xi) Another important governmental role allocated to sheriffs was the annual
inspection of county records: under the Public Records (Scotland) Act 1809152, the
sheriff was required to produce an annual report on the state of the records within the
counties of his sheriffdom. The Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages
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(Scotland) Act 1854153 provided for a new system for the registration of births,
deaths and marriages in Scotland.154 However, the sheriffs continued to have
important powers. It was stipulated that "sheriffs of each county shall have the
control and superintendence of the registrars", and they had a wide accompanying
range of governmental duties to perform. The position of the sheriffs was bolstered
further when they were given the authority to dismiss incompetent registrars.155
(xii) Finally, a rather unusual governmental duty performed by the "maritime"
sheriffs was that of serving as Commissioners of the Northern Lighthouses under the
Erection of Lighthouses Act 1786.156 Serving as a Commissioner in the age of sail
was far from being a sinecure: the post involved making an annual inspection of all
the lighthouses around the Scottish coast in an Admiralty frigate. As Sir Walter Scott
recorded in his travel diary "The Northern Lights", which described the voyage of the
Commissioners in 1812, the wooden hulled sailing vessels of the period were




The period 1747 to 1870 was one of change. The office of sheriff ceased to
be an hereditary, feudal title, and became a post held by lawyers, who were
members of the Faculty of Advocates. However, the medieval range of powers held
by the reformed sheriffs - known as sheriffs depute - remained the same,
notwithstanding the fact that control of the office had passed to the legal profession.
This meant that in addition to exercising a criminal and civil jurisdiction, the deputes
also held the "ministerial", or governmental, power of the hereditary sheriffs, and
the important and prestigious position in county society that went with it. As the
majority of deputes were counsel at the Court of Session bar, many of their duties,
both judicial and governmental, were performed by locally based sheriff substitutes.
In time, the range and complexity of the work performed by the substitutes
necessitated an improvement in their status: in 1747 substitutes were junior assistants
to the sheriffs, yet by 1870 they had become legally qualified, independent judges.
The absence of any reliable or professional local administration in Scotland
meant that sheriffs depute and their substitutes continued to be utilised by Parliament
as the local agent of the government throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. They were in an ideal position to be used as such: sheriffs had their own
local headquarters, staff and authority. They were also comparatively reliable and
educated. In contrast, the Commissions of Supply and burgh councils were amateur,
inefficient and not infrequently corrupt. It is therefore not surprising that Parliament
entrusted the sheriffs with a pivotal role in areas such as the preservation of order,
electoral law, taxation, poor law, mental health, prisons and registration.
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There were massive changes in urban administration in the mid nineteenth
century: government moved from the liberal "laissez faire" model to a proactive,
more interventionist system. Unlike the changes of the twentieth century, this
increase in government was largely based on the development of local, voluntary
administration, rather than central government.158 Communities were able to adopt
local "police" systems by "enabling" legislation, and develop their infrastructure after
a vote - although it should be noted that the franchise was extremely restrictive by
modern standards.159
Sheriffs were given a large number of important statutory powers to implement
and regulate these developments for the reasons noted above. The suitability of
sheriffs exercising wide powers in local administration whilst sitting on the judicial
bench was not questioned by commentators. The separation of powers was given little
attention, least of all by sheriffs, who only raised the matter of the suitability of their
powers in local administration in the context of the dispute between deputes and
substitutes over status.
Nonetheless, a primitive "internal" separation was effected by the courts.
Certain provisions were identified as being part of a set of powers concerned with
local administration, which was discrete from criminal or civil business. Within this
grouping, powers could be seen as being "ministerial", "final and privative", or
subject to appeal to the Court of Session. The use of the adjudicatory process as the
means of decision taking by sheriffs does not appear to have been a factor in deciding
whether a power belonged to one category or the other. In addition, it should always
be remembered that the courts used terminology without any real consistency, and
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judges and commentators were very often rather vague in their interpretation of the
different styles of provision.
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Chapter Six; The Sheriff's Jurisdiction 1870-1930
Introduction
This chapter covers an important period of change and development in Scottish
local administration and is set out as follows. Section one follows the continuing
dispute between sheriffs over the question of professional status, and attempts to put
it and discussion of the statutory jurisdiction generally within the wider context of the
reform of Scottish local administration. Section two gives detailed consideration to
case law developments, using the rule of law theory and general principles adopted
in part one as an aid to evaluation. Section three gives an idea of the substantive
content of the jurisdiction by setting out a short commentary on the sheriff's most
important functions during the period under consideration. The main points and
developments are then summarised in a brief concluding section.
Section One: Developments in the Sheriffs' Powers from the 1880s to 1930
The period between circa 1870 and 1930 was one of remarkable development
in Scottish government and local administration. The Scottish Office was established
in 18851 in response to nationalist campaigning, and began to assume the
responsibility of supervising and controlling the different Boards which directed much
of Scotland's social policy.2 Its power increased steadily as the role of central
government was developed, and functions were devolved to it.3 County councils
were established in 18894, bringing much of the power and influence of the
Commissions of Supply to an end. Burgh and town councils were also reformed.5
The fifty years between 1880 and 1930 saw the establishment of the main features of
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the system of local administration which was to prevail in Scotland until the Local
Government (Scotland) Act 1973.6 The sheriffs' jurisdiction in local administration
must be evaluated in the context of these changes.
Central to the development of government was the extension of the franchise
and the corresponding reform of electoral law at both Parliamentary and local
government level7: politicians at both levels became answerable to a wider electorate,
and sought support at the ballot box by developing administrative powers to secure
popular social goals. The growth in the franchise was itself a response to fear of the
social and political unrest which could have manifested itself if political representation
had remained the privilege of the male property owning classes.8
As well as having implications for the size and power of administrative
authorities, the widening of the franchise also had an effect on constitutional theory.
It led some to voice concern over the danger for Parliament, the rule of law and
traditional Whig liberalism caused by the development of administrative power: a
sympathetic evaluation of Dicey and Hewart places them in this context.9
For British constitutional lawyers, the last century has been dominated by
Dicey's argument that the British constitution is founded on the rule of law and the
supremacy of Parliament: a brief outline of his rule of law theory was set out in
chapter one. His work was particularly influential in the period under consideration
in this chapter.10 Dicey sparked fierce controversy and debate over the nature and
direction of the constitution and the role of the courts as a control of administrative
action - themes which, although Dicey's theory was concerned with England, are
of clear relevance to the sheriff's jurisdiction in local administration.
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As was mentioned in chapter one, it is not difficult to identify the flaws in
Dicey's arguments. However, despite his failings, it is argued that modern rule of
law theorists should give Dicey the recognition due to him. Although his devotion to
the "balanced constitution"11 was in many respects emotional rather than rational,
he provided Britain's notoriously pragmatic judiciary with some theoretical idea,
however flawed, of why they should take care to avoid direct involvement in political
areas, and a warning for Parliamentarians who might have been tempted to make
more frequent use of the court as a proactive instrument of social policy. In the
context of the general principles set out in chapter two, it may therefore be argued
that Diceyan arguments encouraged the judiciary and legislature to uphold ostensive
judicial impartiality and competence, thereby promoting the positivist ethos of
secondary morality and the rule of law itself.
Given the developments of the period, one might have expected commentators
to inquire whether the sheriffs governmental jurisdiction conflicted with either the
democratisation and professionalisation of local authorities12, or Diceyan concerns
that for judicial officers to become too closely involved with political decisions would
be "unconstitutional". In fact, there was little comment, which itself is indicative of
the rather parochial nature of the debate.
As before, the discussion concerning the nature of the sheriffs' powers in local
administration was largely conducted in the context of the argument between deputes
and substitutes over the question of status. An article in the 1898 Juridical Review
made it clear that the substitutes' main complaint was the "niggardliness" of the
Treasury:
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"... since 1853, when the salaries were last adjusted, there has been a large
growth and a great enlargement of the judicial and administrative business committed
to the sheriff substitute. In fact, the "inferior judge", ..., now requires to be a
superior person, .... It is undeniable that the cost of living, as an educated gentleman
occupying an important public office, is expected to live, has much increased since
1853: and yet no step has been taken to establish the minimum salary recommended
by the Commission of 1870."13
Clearly, feelings ran high among the substitutes, and, in the circumstances,
it is hardly surprising. In addition to the fact that they had been paid under the same
terms and conditions for nearly fifty years, they received roughly half the salary of
English county court judges, who had no duties as governmental officials (or a
criminal jurisdiction). Moreover, the Memorial presented to the Treasury by the
Association of Sheriff Substitutes in 1898 painted the dismal picture of substitutes
having to pay their own travelling expenses whilst on official business. It is small
wonder that the Juridical Review article on the matter finished on a plaintive note:
"It may be said that the sheriff substitutes of Scotland deserve generous treatment:
but they are at least entitled to justice."14
Proposals were put forward to raise the salaries of all sheriffs, although
principally those of the substitutes.15 Campbell suggested that substitutes should
receive a salary of seven hundred pounds per annum, subject to a reconsideration of
their role: he suggested a carefully controlled national sheriff substitute service, with
a promotion scheme to encourage elevation to depute - in short, a career judiciary.
What makes these proposals relevant for the purposes of this thesis is that the
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substitutes' governmental duties were an important element in any reconsideration of
functions:
Owing to his residential or local connection with a particular county, it
would be better that the sheriff substitutes be relieved of all purely administrative
duties - in so far as he has any which are not discharged by the sheriff [ie depute] at
present. He should ... be the local judge or magistrate, and no more - and he should
avoid all risk of collision with county officials in ordinary administrative matters."16
It is not unreasonable to suppose that the impetus behind this argument was
provided by the concern that for an independent judge to be involved directly with
political issues was difficult to square with Dicey's emphasis on judicial
independence.17 Similarly, it may have been felt that adjudication was unsuitable
as a decision taking process in local administration.
The dangers of ignoring these factors was illustrated by the 1917 Report on
Scottish Housing,18 which was extremely critical of the sheriffs' activities. The
Report revealed that sheriffs were exercising their governmental discretion to the
detriment of local authority public health and slum improvement policies. It is
clear from the Report that many sheriffs were taking a pedantic, legalistic approach
to interpreting the powers of local authorities: in so doing, they were felt to
"discourage local authorities from trying to improve housing in their district, and
encourage owners [ie landlords] to resist the demands of Public Health
departments."19 The findings provide a clear example of the dangers inherent in the
allocation of powers which require a "direct political involvement" and which have
the potential for a strong polycentric effect The sheriffs limited their discretion by
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strict statutory interpretation to the extent that their ostensive impartiality and
competence was questioned.
Sheriffs were found to be applying the standards of habitability set by the
Public Health (Scotland) Act 1897 some twenty years after it had been passed. This
effectively prevented local authorities from improving the standards of habitability
until there was new legislation setting out an updated test, an approach which showed
the sheriffs and the adjudicatory process in a very poor light:
"So far as the occupant is concerned, it would appear that the law, as
interpreted by the courts, is that his house is reasonably fit for human habitation,
without sink or water closet inside or even adjacent to the house. It goes without
saying accordingly that the house must also be held to be reasonably fit without a
scullery or a bath or water inside the house for drinking or washing."20
The Report went on to praise the efforts of local authorities, and only just
stopped short of suggesting bad faith and bias on the part of the sheriffs:
"In cases where the local authorities have displayed energy and have
endeavoured to secure a raising of the present standard [of slums], the sheriffs appear
to accept a low standard of habitability because that is the standard that has hitherto
prevailed, and they incline to look with disfavour on the views of local authorities
and their officials as being in advance of the times."21
The Commission also noted that"... the standard ... adopted by some sheriffs,
is so low that it is quite out of date, and would appear to be clearly and distinctly in
contravention to the letter as well as the spirit of the law."22
Notwithstanding this strong criticism, sheriffs continued to give little attention
to their governmental powers outwith the context of the continuing disagreements
between deputes and substitutes. The 1928 Commission on the Court of Session and
Office of Sheriff Principal23 provided another opportunity for professional rivalry:
substitutes were still poorly paid24, and the deputes continued to hold the prestige
and status which was traditionally due to the sheriff of the county. As had been the
case before the 1914-18 war, the duties in local administration were viewed as being
an important justification for the continuation of the office of depute, although the
substitutes claimed to perform most of the work.
The Commission was actively considering the abolition of the office of depute.
For example, the Faculty of Procurators and Solicitors in Dundee argued in oral
evidence that there should be:
"... a gradual increase in the status and emoluments of the sheriff substitute,
including a reasonable prospect of promotion to the Court of Session ...", together
with, "... the abolition of the office of sheriff [depute]; [and] that his administrative
[ie governmental] duties be transferred to sheriff substitutes within their districts
"25
It was, however, recognised by some interviewees that a number of the powers
held by the sheriffs depute could be allocated to local authorities, rather than to the
substitutes:
"... such administrative duties as the sheriff principal does perform can be quite
well distributed among the sheriffs [ie substitutes] under the new [ie a proposed]
system, or taken over by existing public officials".26
However, the deputes attempted to refute both arguments by placing great
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emphasis on the importance of appointing Edinburgh based senior counsel as
governmental officials in the counties. Perhaps surprisingly, they chose to give little
attention to the view that it might have been more appropriate for the new local
authorities to assume much of their jurisdiction.27
Sheriff Depute Crole, for example, produced a long report for the
Commission, in which he stressed the importance of the deputes' role in local
administration. He even went as far as to differentiate those powers in which only the
depute could act from those which substitutes could also perform. This may have
been counter-productive, as he was forced to admit that "... the great majority of
those applications may be taken by the sheriff substitute, but the general rule is that
the more important of them are disposed of by the sheriff [depute]."28
Lord Dunedin was also strongly supportive of the deputes' role as the local
official of government being continued:
"From the point of view at Dover House [Scottish Office headquarters at
Whitehall] he [the depute] is the one man you have to depend upon. He is local to
an extent in knowing the place and he is not local in terms of being subject to local
influences. He, as a rule, I am glad to think, has been a man of great common
sense, and again and again when something has to be found out, or when duties have
to be performed in connection with keeping the peace, he is the man upon whom you
have had to depend."29
There was, however, a considerable amount of disagreement, and Lord
Ashmore's comments were entirely contrary to those of Lord Dunedin: "The
administrative duties of the sheriff principal were practically nil in my case."30 The
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evidence of the representative of the Scottish Law Agents Society was also at odds
with that of Lord Dunedin:
"I understand that in some quarters great weight is placed on the administrative
functions of the sheriff [depute]. I have tried to find out what they are, and have not
been able to find anything that could not be performed by an existing official; and
to suggest that the sheriff [depute] has a special value to Dover House because he is
the man on the spot! Well he is not of course: it is only in two cases that he is the
man on the spot [ie sheriffs depute of Lanark and Edinburgh]."31
Interestingly, the substitutes attempted to separate themselves from the
governmental jurisdiction altogether, arguing that they were local judges, and not
governmental officials. Their submission echoed Campbell's monograph of 189832:
"The office of sheriff substitute was never intended to be an administrative one.
It has only grown to be so - first by the indefinite phraseology of the Heritable
Jurisdictions Act; second, by the concurrent raising of that office to that of an
independent judge, and the neglect of administrative duties by the sheriff depute; and
third by the customary habit of the legislature when putting down administrative duties
of allowing them to be performed by the sheriff substitute".33
It is clear that the substitutes were rather more concerned than the deputes by
the potential difficulties which could arise from independent judges such as sheriffs
being entrusted with strong discretionary powers in local administration. Accordingly,
they did not restrict themselves to arguing that the deputes should perform all the
governmental functions, and suggested that some duties should be allocated to local
authorities: "... the sheriff [depute] ought himself to discharge all the administrative
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duties of the office, except when these must necessarily be performed by a local
official".34
Viewed in theoretical terms, it might be argued that the substitutes' position
was generally in accordance with the general principles advanced in chapter two.35
It can also be suggested that their statements imply some appreciation of concepts
such as ostensive judicial impartiality and competence.36
However, in the event, little of substance in terms of reform emerged form
the Commission's deliberations: the sheriffs' role in local administration remained
unchanged.37
Section Two: Case Law Developments
Until Allen and Sons (Billposting) v Edinburgh Corporation in 190938, there
was no more willingness to give detailed consideration to the constitutional
implications of the sheriffs' powers in court decisions, than elsewhere. As before,
distinctions between "ministerial" and "judicial" powers were made, without any real
attempt to define the nature of the classifications. It is never clear whether the court
was attempting to avoid analysing functions deliberately, or felt that the distinctions
which were made were self evident. Powers were distinguished after close
interpretation of the provision and statute in question, but as the essential nature of
decisions was rarely discussed directly, and never in any depth, judicial reasoning
was usually flawed and circular. Typologies continued to be based on varying,
subjective standards, and generalisations about the sheriffs historic governmental
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role.
For example, Lord Mure, in McTavish v. Commissioners of Caledonian
Canal39, which concerned the sheriffs' long standing role in poor law administration,
seemed to view a ministerial role as being one which was merely executive. The
sheriff was empowered to enforce the decision of a public authority, but had no
discretion to vary the decision:
"... the sheriff acted ministerially merely in enforcing payment of the rates laid
on by the Heritors and Kirk Session, and his duties were limited to that."40
Lord Ardmillan concurred with this definition of ministerial action, drawing
upon the earlier cases of Calder41 and Pollock42:
"When ... the sheriff proceeded, as he was bound, to enforce the resolutions
of the Heritors and Kirk Session, he may be said to be acting only in an executive
or ministerial character, the judicial function residing, in the first place, in the
Heritors and Kirk Session, and in the ultimate resort in this court. Accordingly, the
court held, and rightly held, in the case[s] of Calder, ..., and Pollock, ..., that the
sheriff's function was purely ministerial."43
Lord Deas also seemed to view a ministerial power as being the
non-discretionary confirmation and enforcement of a public authority's decision under
statute when he stated; "... he [the sheriff] was simply bound to put his imprimatur
on the proceedings [of the local authority in question], when called to do so, without
examining them".44
However, it is plain from other decisions that sheriffs could exercise a
discretion when reviewing local authority decisions and still be held to be exercising
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a ministerial power45: the interpretation of the instant provision was the central
concern of the court, and terminology was used without any real consistency or
exactitude.
For example, that Lord Ardmillan had no firm analytical test of what
constituted a ministerial decision, rather than one which was judicial, is illustrated
by his rather vague remarks in Stirling and Ferguson v. Hutcheon and Others46,
which was concerned with an irregularity in the exercise of the sheriffs' power to
allow or disallow the adoption of a police system under the Police and Improvement
Act 1862. After a brief consideration of the relevant provision, he commented obiter
dicta: "It... does look somewhat as if his duty were [sic] merely ministerial, but on
this matter I would reserve my opinion."47
The courts also began to use the term administrative as an alternative to
ministerial. This was a gradual process, and there is no apparent reason for the
change. Importantly, however, functions which previously had been viewed as being
final and privative judicial powers were included in the new classification, along with
the more traditional ministerial duties. Echoing earlier cases concerning traditional
ministerial functions, such as "striking" the fiars48, it was made clear by the Court
of Session that when sheriffs were acting as administrative officials, their authority
did not stem from their status as judges: their role was that of a "direct delegate of
Parliament".49 Accordingly, many of the sheriff's powers under nineteenth century
police government legislation came to be associated with, and eventually
indistinguishable from, the earlier ministerial tradition. This process was complete
by the end of the century. For example, in Magistrates of Glasgow v. Glasgow
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District Subway Co.50, Lord President Robertson, in deciding whether a statutory
power to appoint an arbiter under the Glasgow District Subway Act 1890 was an
administrative function, stated: "Nor does the selection of the sheriff [ie by the
legislature], as the person vested with the choice, at all imply that he is to act in a
judicial character. The sheriff is an administrative as well as a judicial officer, and
there are incumbent upon him numerous duties which are not performed in his
court."51 To avoid unnecessary confusion, it is proposed, when appropriate, to use
the term "governmental" as a general description which encompasses both ministerial
and administrative categories.
Notwithstanding the hazy analysis of functions, if a power was held to be
either administrative or ministerial (ie governmental), there were significant
consequences: the Court of Session had no jurisdiction to review a sheriff's decision,
unless he had acted ultra vires. The position of the sheriff was held in one case to be
outwith the judicial process. Lord Justice Clerk Moncreiff made this point in Dubs
v. Police Commissioners of Crosshill52: "... he [the sheriff] is sole judge [of the
issue]. The whole [process] is a political rather than a judicial proceeding "53
Lord Ormidale concurred, and after giving close consideration to the relevant
provisions concluded that: "... I cannot think that it was contemplated by the
legislature that a proceeding of this kind should be litigated as an ordinary judicial
process. The whole matter is local, and the duty which the local judge had to
perform was more of an administrative than a judicial character."54
The lack of any clear definition of what constituted an administrative function
gave rise to flawed logic. For example, in Lindsay v. Magistrates of Leith55, the
108
First Division considered the question of the nature and range of the sheriffs' power
to revise local authority boundaries following an unopposed application under s.ll of
the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1892. The court was of the view that the nature of
the sheriff's power was administrative, rather than judicial: "Nothing can be clearer
than that the duty which the sheriff has to perform here is administrative, and not in
any sense judicial."56 Unfortunately, this was a subjective clarity, and was not
arrived at after any meaningful analysis of functions.
The approach of the court differed from that taken in McTavish57 and
Stirling58 in that the sheriff was held to have a discretion over whether or not to
grant the application.59 It is, however, significant that the Court of Session was
anxious to limit the sheriff's discretionary power. The sheriff was empowered to act
as the local boundary authority, and was not implementing or reviewing the decision
of a local authority. Nonetheless, it was unanimously held that the range of the
power to alter boundaries was restricted, although ex facie the provision in question
there was no particular reason for this to be the case. Lord President Robertson stated
that:
"... it is quite plain from the terms of ss. 11 and 13, and also from the subject
matter of these sections, that the sheriff is exercising an administrative power in
altering boundaries, and he is only bound to do so if satisfied that a change is
expedient.... his duty is to preserve the status quo, unless reason is shewen for the
alteration."60
By the turn of the century, it had become increasingly common for the courts
to interpret powers as "administrative", whilst at the same time limiting the powers
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held ex facie under statute by the sheriffs.61 Allen and Sons Billposting Ltd v. Lord
Provost, Magistrates and Town Council of Edinburgh62 provides a clear example of
this trend, and is still an important precedent. The case concerned an appeal under
the Edinburgh Corporation Act 1899 (as amended), which gave an "aggrieved party"
the right of appeal to "the Sheriff" against the decisions of the Corporation over the
granting of advertising licenses: the sheriff was empowered to grant the licence if the
Corporation had acted "unreasonably". The sheriffs power was held to be
administrative, rather than a "judicial, or legal capacity", as the statute provided for
appeal to "the Sheriff' (as opposed to "the Sheriff Court"), and also because the
sheriff could "pronounce such order regarding expenses as he may deem just."63 The
latter provision was held to imply that, because Parliament had seen fit to legislate
for a special power to grant expenses, the relevant provision was outwith the normal
judicial process, as the sheriff possessed that power under common law when sitting
as a judge.64
That this is a narrow distinction was no doubt clear at the time. However,
what makes the Allen case particularly important is that it provided Lord Low with
an opportunity to give a general idea of what he felt were the main features of an
administrative power. Although he was far from rigorous, he showed that what was
termed an administrative function in the context of the sheriffs' jurisdiction was very
different from what it has come to mean in the wider context of UK administrative
law65:
"The sheriff is not to act in a judicial capacity in the ordinary sense; he is not
to decide a question of law between the parties; he is not to review the decision of
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the magistrates, in the sense of weighing decisions for and against, and deciding to
which side the balance inclines. He is not entitled to interfere except in the one case
when he is satisfied that the Corporation have not reasonably exercised their discretion
under the Act."66
Lord Low recognised that the sheriff's discretion was "very delicate and
somewhat invidious"67, presumably because, apart from the fact that reasonableness
is a difficult concept in itself, it may be impossible to separate it from the other
issues mentioned, notably "weighing decisions for and against".68 However, the
judgement is also interesting because the test of whether a sheriff can intervene
directly in substantive merits or policy concerns anticipates Lord Greene's celebrated
common law test of unreasonableness in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v.
Wednesday Corporation69. Like Lord Greene, Lord Low appeared to be very
concerned with issues which were at the heart of rule of law theory: in interpreting
the intentions of the legislature, he emphasised the importance of external control of
arbitrary power by independent judges, and the protection of individual freedoms
through adjudication. Most importantly, he created a substantive law "mechanism"
which severely limited the sheriff's discretion to intervene directly in the policy or
merits aspects of the authority's decision:
"... I take it that it [the sheriff's jurisdiction] was conferred simply because it
was thought right that some independent Judge in the responsible position of Sheriff
of the County should have the power of correcting the determination of the
Corporation and protecting the rights of the owners of property, if the Corporation
(which is a body representing very many different and conflicting views and interests)
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should, perhaps from excess of zeal to preserve the amenity of the city, capriciously
or arbitrarily deprive an owner of a right to property."70
It is contended that Lord Low's judgement can be evaluated in the context of
the rule of law theory and general principles set out in part one of the thesis. The
legislation had provided for a statutory discretion which had the potential for a strong
"direct political involvement"71 and polycentric effect72: the sheriff was given
general powers to intervene on the question of the "reasonableness" of the licensing
decisions of an elected local authority. In order to limit this potential, the court
"retreated" to the positivist ethos of secondary morality73, and sought to maintain
the standards of ostensive judicial impartiality and competence74 by creating a
substantive law mechanism which required the authority's conduct to be "capricious
or arbitrary" before the sheriff could involve himself in the consideration of merits or
policy. A limitation of this type can be seen as being in accordance with the general
principles for the judicial decision taking set out in chapter two. In this respect, the
Allen decision developed the view articulated by Lord Deas in the mid-nineteenth
century75 - that the sheriff should limit his discretion when exercising governmental
powers.
Before the Allen decision, some sheriffs had sought to limit their statutory
discretion in a series of cases which can also be viewed as involving the potential for
breach of the standards of ostensive judicial impartiality and competence. For
example, in Morgan v. Corporation of Glasgow76. Sheriff Fyfe sought to stress the
point that sheriffs could find themselves acting in such a way as to prejudice local
democracy if they gave a literal interpretation to a governmental provision, and that
this must be presumed to be contrary to the intention of Parliament:
"..., the appellant desires to substitute the judgement of the sheriff for that of
the Commissioners of Police acting under the very special powers given to them by
Act of Parliament To countenance this would be destructive of the usefulness of a
great many of the provisions of Police Acts, and subversive to the principle of local
government upon which these Acts rest, viz., that the parties best fitted to deal, in
the first instance at least, with such questions affecting the public health of the city
are the Police Commissioners placed in office by the citizens."77
However, not all agreed with this approach. As was noted in section one of
this chapter, there was support in some quarters for the continuation of the sheriffs'
strong discretionary powers in local administration. "The Limitations of the Judicial
Functions of Public Authorities"78, which was published in 1930 by Lord President
Cooper of Culross prior to his elevation to the Court of Session bench, provides
another example of this perspective. Following on from his experience as counsel for
the losing side before Lord Low in the Allen case79, Cooper commented at some
length on the sheriffs' role in local administration, and was strongly supportive of
their position. After noting the proliferation of public bodies and the implications this
had for individual liberties, he noted that the "practice of constituting the "sheriff as
the appellate or confirmatory judicial authority in administrative questions is one of
long standing in Scotland, though serious inroads have latterly been made by the
central departments. This change is deeply to be deplored."80
The reasons for his concern and support for the sheriffs' position is to be found
in fears with which both Dicey and Hewart would have been familiar, and which
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were not altogether unfounded, although they may have been overstated: legal
patriotism (though Scottish, rather than English), and the dangers posed to the rights
of the individual by unidentified officials wielding discretionary power, which seems
to have been confused with arbitrary power.81 He was also a strong believer in the
efficacy of court based adjudication as a decision taking process in the administrative
arena:
"... the sheriff can be trusted not only to conduct the inquiry judicially [ie
presumably in an adjudicatory style] and with cold impartiality, but also - and this
is not less important - to create the impression that he is doing so The
proceedings are conducted formally but expeditiously and in the wholesome light of
complete publicity, while the decision is customarily embodied in a reasoned
judgement."82
He defended the ability of the sheriff to deal with administrative problems by
arguing "I have yet to see an administrative issue more complex and technical than
those which are daily arising in the Courts of law and being satisfactorily
determined."83
It is difficult to avoid the impression that Cooper, in making these points,
was overstating his case: his defence of the sheriffs' role took no account of either
the suitability of sheriffs carrying out functions which could be interpreted as
"unconstitutional" challenges to elected public authorities, or the suitability of
adjudication as a decision taking process in public policy areas. Accordingly, his
arguments can be criticised on the grounds that their adoption could run the risk of
causing a breach of the standards of ostensive judicial impartiality and competence,
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which could then have an indirect effect on the rule of law.84 In this respect,
Cooper's views are not dissimilar to those of Lord Scarman, as quoted in chapter
one.85 The significance of his opinions, which were developed on his elevation to
the Court of Session bench, are considered in chapter seven.
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Section Three; The Sheriffs Duties in Local Administration
Sheriffs continued to hold substantial powers in local administration. The
range of their jurisdiction remained as broad as before: when functions were allocated
elsewhere, new governmental and judicial duties were created. For reasons of space,
it is impossible to give a detailed account of the changes which took place during the
period under consideration. However, the main developments are set out below,
building on the material in section two of the previous chapter.
Parliament continued the sheriffs' involvement in: (i) the preservation of
order; (ii) electoral law; (iii) local government; (iv) roads and bridges; (v) fiscal
affairs; and (vi) miscellaneous business (eg "striking" the fiars, mental health and
prison administration, and the supervision of the Northern Lighthouses). There were
also a number of new functions allocated to sheriffs (eg in education and licensing):
these are noted briefly in subsection (vii).
(i) The sheriffs' powers as regards the preservation of order received considerable
attention in this period: indeed, they were seen as being the sheriffs' most important
governmental function at this time.86 This reflected the anxiety which was prevalent
in some quarters concerning the possibility of political and social unrest.
The activities of Sheriff Ivory in the Skye of 1883-86 give some indication of
just how seriously sheriffs were inclined to take their responsibilities. To the modern
eye, his papers make astounding reading.87 In order to control crofting disputes on
the island, a Royal Navy destroyer, complete with detachment of Royal Marines,
was deployed to augment the armed police who were already acting under the
Sheriff's orders.88 Assisted by his substitutes, he adopted a tough and rigorous
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policy of confrontation, and sought to put down the crofters' rebellion by a show of
military force.89
However, it was the miners' strike of 1921 and the subsequent General Strike
of 1926 which presented sheriffs with a nation-wide threat of revolution. It would
seem that they performed well as the "King's representative and Civil, Executive and
Administrative Officer of the Crown"90. Shrieval powers were certainly considerable,
and had remained virtually unchanged since the mid-nineteenth century.
Sheriff Crole, in his evidence to the 1927 Commission, indicated that the
sheriffs' duties were far from being a sinecure:
"The duties of the sheriff in this regard have been heavy, owing to the unrest
among the industrial population, the prevalence of strikes and of threatened strikes
among large bodies of workers, and also the appearance of undesirable and disloyal
elements".91
Lord Murray supported this view, stating that the "most important
administrative duty which the sheriffs perform is in connection with civil
disorder...".92 Lord Dunedin was almost mystic in his assertion that the sheriffs
depute were the most suitable officials to carry out this function:
"["Question! Is that [ie the control of the military and police in a riot] a matter
where a lawyer is specially qualified to do these things?
Lord Dunedin: Not at all. It is not the lawyer part of him, it is part of his
being. As I put it, sheriffs are men of common sense who have been in the county
and know something about it, and can take responsibility on themselves."93
(ii) The sheriffs important position in electoral law remained essentially the same
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as before.94 The depute was the statutorily empowered electoral returning officer for
his sheriffdom, which would usually contain a number of Parliamentary
constituencies. He was required to advise the Secretary of State for Scotland
regarding the places of election for each constituency, and was responsible for the
division of the constituencies into polling districts, each of which was to have a
designated polling place. Deputy Returning Officers (who were usually substitutes)
were appointed, although the deputes were responsible for the overall conduct of
elections at each polling station, the nominations, the delivering of the vote, and the
administration of electoral expenses.95
(iii) The Local Government (Scotland) Act 192996 did not bring the sheriffs'
multifarious responsibilities in local administration to an end. They continued to
exercise a wide range of important governmental and judicial functions under the
Burgh Police Acts, the most important of which were the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act
189297 and the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1903.98 For example, s.145 of the
1892 Act allowed appeal by a property owner aggrieved by street improvements,
s.237 permitted appeal from an owner affected by sewerage works, and s.339 gave
a general right of appeal against the decisions of town councils where property was
affected or a contribution was required towards the cost of work.
The 1892 Act continued the sheriffs' powers in the creation and constitution
of burghs, and the establishment and alteration of boundaries within the burghs for
electoral purposes.99 As was the case with earlier burghal legislation, the 1892 Act
"enabled" communities to adopt its provisions, rather than setting out mandatory
requirements. Accordingly, it was left to a local vote to decide the issue: the
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election was conducted by the sheriff serving, as in Parliamentary elections, as
Returning Officer.100 The last point of note with regard to the 1892 Burgh Police
Act is that the sheriffs' important power to confirm the bye-laws of an established
burgh council was continued by s.318.101
The sheriffs' inter-related powers in housing and public health were also
maintained. Many of their duties in this area were effectively updated versions of the
powers which were created in the early burgh police legislation. For example, the
Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890102 provided that sheriffs were to
superintend housing inquiries with regard to properties which were "injurious to the
health of the inmates or unfit for human habitation...".103 The Public Health
(Scotland) Act 1867 empowered them to "close" such properties104, and the Act of
1890 provided that sheriffs were to hear appeals from property owners aggrieved by
a local authority order to demolish a condemned structure.105
The difficulties which sheriffs faced when exercising this type of power has
already been commented on.106 However, despite the criticism made of sheriffs by
the 1917 Commission appointed to inquire into Scottish housing conditions, their
jurisdiction was updated by the Housing (Scotland) Acts of 1925107 and 1930.108
For example, the Act of 1925 empowered sheriffs to make closing orders if they felt
that a dwelling was not "in all respects reasonably fit for human habitation".109
Similar provision was made under s.20 of the Act of 1930.
The late nineteenth century saw a remarkable development in public health
legislation, and the Public Health (Scotland) Act 1897110 was an important
benchmark in this field of law. The sheriffs' governmental and judicial powers under
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the Act were considerable, and complemented those held under burgh police and
housing legislation.
For example, sheriffs could order the removal or remedy of a public
nuisance111, and were responsible for setting boundaries for a variety of different
purposes (eg drainage, water supply and scavenging).112 They were also
empowered to enter and inspect private property to ascertain whether or not they were
a risk to public health113, and could suspend or prevent persons from carrying out
a trade which could be a health risk.114 Sheriffs continued their duties with regard
to the regulation and closure of burial grounds.115 Sheriffs also conducted public
inquiries into a variety of matters under the 1897 Act when requested to do so by the
Secretary of State for Scotland.116
(iv) Sheriffs continued to exercise their jurisdiction in the administration of roads
and bridges117, despite the advent of County Councils and County Road Boards in
1890118, the Development and Roads Improvement Funds Act 1909119, and the
Roads Improvement Act 1925.120 Although they were no longer required to serve
as County Roads Trustees after 1890121, they continued to exercise powers under
the Roads and Bridges (Scotland) Act 1878.122 As in other areas, sheriffs were
utilised as both governmental and judicial officials in the same statute. For example,
they were empowered to confirm bye-laws made regarding county highways, and hear
appeals regarding the closure or abandonment of a highway.123 Other duties
included the "appointment of arbiters and valuators, and the determination of disputes
or settlements on incidental questions of road management and administration."124
(v) For the most part, the sheriffs' duties as fiscal representatives of the crown
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were of little importance by the beginning of the twentieth century, as "most of the
accounts due to the crown [were] paid direct to or by the Exchequer or other crown
department."125 Sheriffs were, however, still required to render the accounts of the
county to the Exchequer and to carry out Exchequer decrees.126 In addition, they
continued to serve as ex officio Land Tax Commissioners, Commissioners of Supply,
and members of the Standing Joint Committees.127 These offices were, however,
abolished by the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1929128, which established the
basic system of local government that was to remain in operation until 1975129:
however, sheriffs continued to serve as ex officio General Commissioners for Income
Tax in their counties or divisions.130
(vi) Many of the sheriffs' other governmental duties continued largely unaltered.
They continued to "strike" the fiars annually131, and their duties in mental health
administration were maintained.132 Following on from strong shrieval representation
on the nineteenth century Prison Board, the Sheriff of Perth continued to serve ex
officio as a Prison Commissioner for Scotland.133
The eleven "maritime" sheriffs continued to serve as Commissioners for the
Northern Lighthouses, and it would seem that they performed their duties efficiently.
Nor was the responsibility light: in addition to the administrative business of
attending board meetings, they were still obliged to inspect' the lighthouses on a
annual basis.134
(vii) A number of new functions were created. For example, sheriffs were
empowered by the Education (Scotland) Act 1908135 to hear appeals against school
attendance orders. Their remit under this Act provides another good example of a
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wide governmental power: "... any parent aggrieved by the making of an order under
this section may appeal to the sheriff, who shall have the power to confirm or annul
the order, and the sheriff's decision shall be final."136
Finally, the sheriffs' jurisdiction in registration and licensing was extended.
In addition to their earlier powers to grant or refuse certain types of trading
licenses137, the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1903138 provided that sheriffs could
grant, cancel or renew applications for club licenses. If there were objections to the
granting of a licence, sheriffs could, at their own discretion, hear parties and reach
such decision as they saw fit: the decision was final.139
Summary and Conclusion
The late nineteenth century and early twentieth century saw important changes
in the scale and structure of Scottish local administration. Large local authorities with
wide powers and professional executives were established. By 1930, the authorities
were elected by universal suffrage. On a national level, the growth of the Scottish
Office and other government departments meant that the role of central government
in local affairs became more pronounced. The sheriff's role, although still important,
was no longer as significant as it had been. However, Parliament continued to
allocate wide discretionary powers in local government. Although the origins of the
sheriff's governmental function as local representative of the Crown were essentially
feudal, there was no indication on the part of the legislature that the sheriff's position
was anachronistic or inappropriate.
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However, on the wider stage, the implications of the democratisation and
growth of administration gave rise to constitutional tension: writers such as Dicey,
Hewart and Cooper expressed the fear that administrative discretion could subvert
Parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and basic liberal values.
Concerns of this nature seem to have had little real effect on the way that
sheriffs and others saw the statutory jurisdiction in local administration. For the most
part, the only references to it were made in the context of the petty and parochial
dispute between sheriffs over remuneration and professional status. Although there
does seem to have been a feeling among substitutes that many of their statutory
functions could be allocated to public authorities, the argument was not taken very
far, and was refuted by the deputes.
In judicial decisions, the sheriffs increasingly anomalous position did give
rise to some interesting developments. Although for the most part decisions were
confused and inconclusive, Lord Low's judgement in the Allen case showed a
sophisticated appreciation of the constitutional difficulties which could arise from the
allocation of strong discretionary powers to sheriffs in local administration. The
precedent established by Allen can be viewed as being in accordance with the general
principles for the exercise of judicial discretion and the rule of law theory set out in
part one of the thesis. However, as will become clear in chapter seven, influential
commentators such as Lord Cooper were in favour of a more aggressive interpretation
of the sheriff's governmental role, and were less wary of sheriffs making direct
interventions in local administration.
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Chapter Seven: The Sheriffs Jurisdiction in Local Administration 1930-1970
Introduction
Following on from the pattern set out above, this chapter, which takes
coverage up to the 1967 Grant Report on the Sheriff Court1, is divided into three
sections. The first considers the arguments which were made concerning the sheriff's
jurisdiction in local administration, and attempts to put them in the context of wider
developments. The second examines the contradictory and rather complex case law
of the period; and section three sets out a brief commentary on the main powers held
by sheriffs.
Section One: Developments in the Sheriffs Powers 1930-1970
Consideration of the sheriffs' role in local administration was, as it had been
since the early nineteenth century, coloured by the continuing fracas between deputes
and substitutes over professional status, and the use, by both sides, of the
governmental jurisdiction as a means of either bolstering particular points of view,
or denigrating others. Indeed, if anything, the tone of the debate had become even
more petty and insular. This point was recognised by the Lord Advocate in his
evidence to the Grant Committee:
"In Scotland, ... the approach to the problem is to some extent obscured,
perhaps subconsciously, by regional jealousies, the existence of long-recognised
interests and amour propre The desire to maintain or inflate status and its
attendant rewards may result in a sheriff substitute hotly opposing any alterations in
his jurisdiction other than those which appear to increase its importance."2
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It is certainly clear that relations between at least some of the deputes and then-
substitutes was as strained as ever before. Sheriff Depute "A" was sympathetic to the
substitutes' arguments:
"... the Sheriff Principal is the head of the Sheriffdom and the Sheriff
Substitutes are under his control. Consequently, all communications intended for the
latter must be sent through the Principal, just as you communicate with a private
soldier through his Commanding Officer. The relationship between Principal and
Substitute is almost feudal. It is most unfair to the latter and deprives him of the
position he ought to have in his Sheriffdom."3
This was supported by the Memorandum of the Council of Sheriff
Substitutes4, but the eccentric memoirs of Sheriff Depute Lillie5 would appear to
indicate that this was a not a view taken by all deputes. Writing as recently as 1970,
he commented that: "... it was important that the Sheriff's resident representative,
the Sheriff Substitute, should be a person who commended himself by his personal
character more than he should be a person of exceptional intellectual powers.
Integrity, humility, were the chief desiderata and in the main sufficed to meet the
demands of his office."6
A similarly patronising approach was taken in the Sheriff Deputes' written
evidence to the Committee, which is perhaps not surprising as Sheriff Lillie was their
convener.7 They argued that the office of depute was "far from being a sinecure,
and he [the depute] performs a valuable and important role in the administration of
justice and local government in Scotland."8 The idea that substitutes could (and in
fact did) perform most of the duties in local administration was rejected out of hand:
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"Such part could not... be carried out by the senior sheriff substitute of each
sheriffdom. Lacking the authority and status of a sheriff, a sheriff substitute would
not carry enough weight in his dealings with the Scottish Home and Health
Department, with local authorities or even with the sheriff substitutes of his own
sheriffdom."9
Sheriff Depute "B" also laid great emphasis on the importance of the deputes.
In answer to a question which sought to determine the value of the deputes in the
business of the sheriffdom, he stated that it"... seems to me that so much of the work
which a sheriff has to do administratively should require some knowledge of the
personalities of the sheriffdom, the way people live and the way people work, and
I have found that by keeping in personal contact with different institutions in the
sheriffdom, I have been in a far better position to know what to do...."10
The Committee did not, however, see the sheriffs' duties in local
administration as being justification for the continuance of the office of depute. It
recorded that, despite the fulsome reference of the deputes to their administrative
duties, they accounted for approximately 5% of court time.11 Even accounting for
the relevance, or lack of it, of attempting to ascertain the importance of issues
according to the amount of time taken up in court hearings12, the deputes' claims
that they had a heavy workload in local government should be treated warily: "there
were no statistics to show the amount of time spent by Sheriffs Principal on
administrative duties."13 In oral evidence, the Scottish Law Agents Society
representative commented that he;
"... did not see a really busy Queen's Counsel in the Scottish Bar doing all his
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administrative work and also being a Sheriff Principal. That was a point made in the
1927 Commission, that the sheriff [depute] did a tremendous amount of
administrative work,... I do not think there is any real evidence to show that he does.
.... Where the Sheriff Principal acts, it tends to be on the advice of the sheriff
substitutes and sheriff clerks."14
It would seem that the Committee implicitly accepted the view that much of
the deputes' estimation of their own worth was unwarranted and inaccurate.15 There
was also - for the first time in an official report - concern over the involvement of
sheriffs in the business of elected local authorities. The Second Meeting of the
Committee noted that "administrative business, ..., does not give rise to much
trouble, but there was support for the view that business of this kind might be
transferred to local authorities."16
At a subsequent meeting, it was proposed that local authorities should assume
the responsibility of administering local and parliamentary elections: this was,
however, dismissed on the grounds that sheriffs had substitutes and clerks to assist
them.17 The rationale for divesting sheriffs of duties in local administration would
not appear to have been based on any strong concern for constitutional integrity, but
on shrieval enthusiasm for divesting themselves of minor and onerous duties.
For example, it was noted that planning appeals ought properly to go to the
Secretary of State for Scotland, partially because there were recognised policy
implications, but mainly because the sheriffs felt that the workload was too heavy.18
Irksome duties such as registration and burial ground regulation were not popular with
the sheriffs, but more weighty duties were defended vigorously in terms redolent of
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Lord Cooper:
"We do not agree that appeals against certain local authority decisions in
administrative matters should be transferred from the Sheriff (including the sheriff
substitute) to the Secretary of State.... In such matters the right to appeal to the sheriff
forms a valuable safeguard of the rights of the individual against the powers of the
executive. In other words, if it really is an appeal against the decision of a local
authority, we think it should be made with the sheriff."19
In supporting this, Sheriff Depute "C" pointed out that in an appeal to the
sheriff, the appellant would "at least know who he is appealing to".20 Where more
minor duties were involved, the approach of sheriffs was, however, considerably
more relaxed. Commenting in connection with the sheriffs' control over Sunday
amusements in public parks, Sheriff Depute "D" felt able to concede that this was an
area for local authorities alone:
"... certainly I think that it [ie such a minor function] is more appropriate to
the local authority than to the sheriff because the local authority is there to interpret
the wishes of the citizen, whereas the sheriff is not."21
The committee itself felt bound to give some consideration to the issue of the
suitability of sheriffs continuing to exercise their governmental jurisdiction in local
administration.22 The result was almost a paraphrasing of Lord Cooper's views as
set out in his "Selected Papers" and judgements.23 As such, it is argued, the Report
perpetuated the same flaws. The Committee (and the written and oral submissions
made to it) gave little consideration to the potential difficulties for judicial impartiality
and independence, or the integrity of adjudication as a decision taking process,
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which could arise from the exercise of governmental powers. It made only a half
hearted attempt to tackle the central questions of whether, or to what extent, a judge
should be able to interfere with the policy and merits of a local authority's decision,
and whether adjudication was a suitable decision-taking process in such cases.
The Report recommended that sheriffs should continue to exercise their
"administrative" role in local administration. Indeed, the sheriffs' role was strongly
supported in a passage which could almost have been taken straight from Lord
Cooper's paper of 1930:
"We think the sheriff has three qualifications which determine his capacity to
dispose of administrative or quasi-administrative work. First, he is a legally qualified
professional judge, and therefore particularly competent to deal with matters having
a legal content; secondly, he operates in a particular locality and possesses local
knowledge; thirdly, by virtue of his appointment he is independent of any public
authority or private individual in his area. Those characteristics are, par excellence,
those of the arbiter in local disputes...."24
In adopting this view, the Committee made it clear that it was not prepared
to recommend to Parliament that sheriffs should no longer be given the power to
review merits or policy based decisions taken by local authorities. It had been argued
that sheriffs should be limited in these cases to the formula set out in the Second
Report of the Guest Committee on Scottish Licensing Law.25 This had recommended
that in appeals from the decisions of the licensing authorities, the grounds of appeal
should be limited to what was, in effect, a statutory formulation of the grounds for
common law judicial review: the sheriff would have been unable to interfere with a
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decision "unless he was satisfied that a decision was wrong in law, or ultra vires, or
in some respect fundamentally bad or, alternatively, that it was such as to represent
an altogether unreasonable exercise of discretion by the licensing court on the basis
of the facts before them."26 This proposal was, however, rejected by the
Committee on the grounds that it would be unacceptable to prevent sheriffs from
hearing evidence and settling questions on the facts if the original decision taken by
a public authority had not involved a "public hearing of evidence".27
It was nonetheless attempted to recommend some sort of compromise which
would clarify the extent of shrieval discretion to review local authority decisions.
Unfortunately, the Report's solution can be likened to whistling for a wind:
"We recommend that, in the creation of new administrative appeals to the
sheriff, or in the revision of existing legislation which provides for such appeals, the
enabling statutes should clearly define the extent of the appeal and the powers of the
sheriff to interfere with the original decision."28
As will be made clear in parts three and four of the thesis, the failure of the
Report to consider the central issue of whether it is appropriate for an independent
judge such as the sheriff to be put in the position of deciding on the merits or policy
content of local authority decisions has resulted in a considerable degree of confusion,
which has persisted to this day.
Section Two: Case Law Developments 1930-1970
Interestingly, the court itself was no more concerned by these issues than the
Grant Report. It is important to note that the direction taken by the court in the period
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under consideration was significantly altered due to the efforts of one judge in
particular: Lord President Cooper of Culross.
Lord Cooper's interest in the sheriffs' duties in local administration has already
been commented upon. During his tenure of high judicial office, he developed and
implemented the views expressed as counsel in Allen and Sons (Billposting)29 and
"The Limitations of the Judicial Functions of Public Authorities"30 in two important
decisions: Glasgow Corporation v. Glasgow Churches Council31, and Arcari v.
Dunbartonshire County Council32. In so doing, he provided the authority for sheriffs
to exercise strong discretionary powers in local adminstration at a time when the
natural trend of precedent had been leading to a gradual rejection of any direct role
for sheriffs as judges of merits or policy. The trend set by Lord Deas in the
mid-nineteenth century, and established by Lord Low in the Allen case, required that
sheriffs limit the extent of their discretion in governmental cases to the review of
"capricious and arbitrary" decisions.33 In theoretical terms, this interpretation of
their discretion was (and still is) largely inoffensive to ostensive judicial impartiality
and competence, the positivist ethos of secondary morality and wider rule of law
theory.34 However, Lord Cooper took a different view. His efforts have ensured
that modern sheriffs are still unclear as to the extent of their discretion to interfere
with the merits or policy implications of local authority decisions. Consideration
should be given to the series of cases which brought this situation about.
As indicated above, prior to the Glasgow Corporation v. Glasgow Churches
Council case, the courts followed the trend set in Allen and previous cases. Sheriffs
were typically wary of any direct involvement in issues which could have involved
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them in a clash with the merits or policy based decisions of increasingly professional
elected local authorities. For example, in Henry Butler v. The Corporation of the
City of Glasgow35, Sheriff Dods felt that unless it was clear that the local authority
had acted "capriciously and arbitrarily", he was not suitably qualified to assess the
merits of the decision which had been recommended by council officials. He was
very conscious of the inability of the adjudicatory process to provide him with a high
standard of ostensive judicial competence:
"The department of the Corporation which is entrusted with the inspection of
sanitary conditions in the city must be regarded as an expert department, and I
should, a priori, be very slow to reverse any finding to which that department had
come In the present appeal, I find my inexpert judgement in line with the expert
finding of the department."36
However, this approach was turned on its head by Sheriff Black in General
Billposting Co Ltd v. Glasgow Corporation37. He decided that sheriffs were not
precluded from taking decisions on the policy merits of the case. He felt that when
acting administratively (ie as a governmental official), sheriffs were entitled to
interpret their statutory powers to reverse the decision of a local authority literally,
and that they did not have to concern themselves with a self imposed limitation of
discretion:
"I reject altogether the respondent's [ie the Corporation's] contention that I
have no power to review their decision on the merits. That view, if sound, would
render negative the obvious purpose for which an appeal is allowed and would deprive
the provision that the Sheriff may pronounce such order as seems just of any
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intelligible meaning."38
In The Corporation of the City of Glasgow v. Glasgow Churches' Council39,
the Second Division of the Court of Session, and Lord Cooper (then Lord Justice
Clerk) in particular, gave a robust defense of this interpretation of the sheriffs'
jurisdiction40, thereby ensuring that the view that sheriffs could overturn the policy
or merits based decisions of elected local authorities when acting as a governmental
officer did not become an anachronism.
The appeal was brought by the city corporation following a decision by Sheriff
Black that he was entitled to review the merits of a corporation bye-law enacted under
the Glasgow Public Parks Act 1878 and the Glasgow Corporation and Police Act 1895
as the statutory confirming authority. The corporation sought to advance the argument
that as the sheriff was a legally qualified judge, Parliament had intended his review
function to be limited to an evaluation of whether the bye-law was constituted in such
a way as to be challengeable in a court of law.41 However, Sheriff Black's
interpretation of his remit was fully supported by both the Lord Ordinary (Patrick)42,
and the Second Division43. It would seem that in the mid 1940s, the court was less
perturbed by the question of the appropriateness of an independent judge involving
himself overtly in the consideration of the merits based decisions of local authorities
than it had been previously. Had the court chosen to continue the restrictive
interpretation of the sheriffs' jurisdiction, it would have shown itself sensitive to the
views of those, such as Lord Deas and Lord Low, who had voiced the concern,
albeit indirectly, that overt interference in policy issues could be construed as being
"unconstitutional".44
133
However, the Lord Ordinary took the view that sheriffs possessed, like any
other statutorily empowered confirming authorities, a strong discretion. He was
unwilling to concede that the sheriffs' status as independent judges meant that they
should be limited to considering purely "legal" issues:
"... bye-laws are sometimes subject to confirmation by the Sheriff of the
county, sometimes by the Secretary of State for Scotland, or other departmental
authority. Sometimes confirmation by both the Sheriff and the Secretary of State is
necessary. The statutes which give the power to make bye-laws and to confirm them
do not in general place any limit on the considerations which the confirming authority
should have in view ..."45
This amounted to a literal reading of the sheriffs' statutory authority, rather
than one which sought to infer a jurisdiction restricted by albeit vague standards of
constitutional propriety:
"... Parliament has delegated the power to legislate in limited matters to the
Corporation and the Sheriff. In determining whether to confirm a bye-law, the sheriff
acts in an administrative capacity, with a wide discretion."46
What might have given rise to this rather bullish perception of the sheriffs'
authority? The answer to this question is perhaps to be found in the 1931 edition of
"Greens' Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland". In it, Lord Waxk,. a judge of the
Second Division, wrote an authoritative title on the administrative and ministerial
powers of the sheriff.47 He commenced rather dramatically by stating that the
"Sheriff in Scotland is both a judicial and an administrative officer. In the former
capacity he is the local judge of the bounds, and in the latter he is the King's
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representative and executive officer for civil affairs."48 He then went on to discuss
the different powers of the sheriff in some detail, giving considerable weight to the
historical pedigree of the jurisdiction in local administration and the prominent
position of sheriffs in county hierarchy. It is not unreasonable to suppose that his
occasionally pompous assessment of the sheriffs' role may have been influential in
shaping judicial perceptions in subsequent judgements: there is no other readily
available explanation for the shift away from Lord Low's restrictive interpretation of
the administrative jurisdiction.
Lord Wark still held office at the time of the Glasgow Churches' Council case,
and continued to sit in the Second Division when the case was heard. However, he
died shortly afterwards. Accordingly, there was a rehearing, and Lord Cooper (who
was by this time Lord Justice-Clerk) replaced him.49 He took full advantage of the
opportunity not only to re-state Lord Wark's description of the sheriffs' authority, but
also to implement his own views as previously expressed.50
Accordingly, he strongly criticised the pleas advanced by the Corporation,
stating that they "involved a misconception of the office and authority of the Scottish
Sheriff'.51 Describing the contention that the duty of the sheriff under the relevant
statutes was to confirm the "legal validity" of bye-laws as a "violent supposition"52,
he went on to support Lord Patrick and Sheriff Black using Lord Wark's introduction
to his encyclopaedia title as authority.53 His dismissal of the reclaimers' arguments
shows just how emphatically he felt that sheriffs should be able to consider the merits
of local authority decisions or bye-laws:
"..., It [ie Lord Wark's introduction] exposes the fallacy of the suggestion so
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earnestly pressed upon us that a remit to a Sheriff is a remit to a purely judicial
officer, who is "only a lawyer", and on that account assumedly incapable of dealing
with anything but purely legal issues".54
It is difficult to avoid the impression that Lord Cooper was reworking his
1930 article55, but in a court judgement, rather than a collection of essays:
similarly, it must be wondered if having lost the Allen case before Lord Low was a
motivating factor when writing his decision.56 In any case, as before, there was no
consideration of the potential implications of his approach for the independence or
impartiality of sheriffs, or of the ability of an adjudicator to evaluate the polycentric
implications of decisions satisfactorily.
However, Lord Cooper was not alone in taking this approach. Lord Jamieson,
in a very clear judgement, upheld the Lord Ordinary's decision, and placed emphasis
on the importance of the sheriffs' historic role in local administration57:
"The appointment of the Sheriff as the confirming authority may readily be
accounted for by the fact that after 1746 there was no Minister in charge of purely
Scottish affairs until the passing of the Secretary for Scotland Act 1885, and no
departmental authority in Scotland suitable to deal with the matters with which the
Acts were concerned."58
On his elevation to Lord President59, Lord Cooper went on to give an
authoritative re-statement of when the court would hold that sheriffs were entitled to
exercise a wide power of review in Arcari v. The County Council of
Dunbartonshire60. The case concerned the question of whether an appeal to the
sheriff from the decision of the County Council under the Town and Country Planning
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(Interim Development) (Scotland) Act 1943 was judicial rather than administrative,
and therefore appealable to the Court of Session. After commenting that "the sheriff
has been employed from the earliest times, and to an increasing extent in recent
years, in the discharge of multifarious functions which are more administrative or
ministerial than judicial", he concluded that the answer to the question of how
sheriffs were to interpret their powers was to be "found in the provisions of the statute
in question."61
In a highly significant passage, Lord Cooper provided a consolidation of the
different statutory "clues" which had been used by the court in previous decisions as
a means of distinguishing their role. Although not necessarily conclusive, various
features can be extrapolated and summarised as follows.62 First, does the provision
involve the sheriff in what may loosely be termed "local administration"? Second,
do the proceedings originate in the Sheriff Court (ie out of an ordinary action)? Third,
does the provision refer to "the Sheriff', or the "Sheriff Court"?63 Fourth, is the
sheriff's power of decision ex facie wide and final? Finally, are special provisions
made for the sheriff to award expenses? If some or all of these features are present,
then the sheriff may feel that he is able to interpret his power as being administrative.
However, the nub of the distinction was rather more abstract: the central issue was
whether "... there is in a real sense a true lis between the authority who seek to
enforce the status quo and the citizen who seeks to assert his civil right to the
uncontrolled use and enjoyment of the subjects which he owns or occupies."64
Clearly, the distinguishing of a "true lis" from one which is untrue can be
viewed as raising extremely difficult theoretical issues: these are considered in
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chapter nine.65 At this stage, it is sufficient to note that, beyond setting out the
"clues" noted above, which might be of use in statutory interpretation, Lord Cooper
did not provide any further guidance.
Following from the Glasgow Churches case, he implicitly argued that the
designation of a statutory provision as "administrative" can then entitle the sheriff to
exercise a wide discretion on review, notwithstanding the fact that this may involve
conflict with an elected local authority's evaluation of merits or policy.66
Realisation of the implications of these judgements may have motivated Lord
President Clyde, in the subsequent case of Kave v. Hunter67. The case concerned
the question of whether a sheriff's decision under the Firearms Act 1937 was final (ie
administrative) or subject to appeal to the Court of Session (ie judicial). Pointing out
that "there is no single criterion which can be regarded as the conclusive test of
whether it is the administrative or the judicial capacity of the sheriff which is being
invoked"68, he went on to attempt to develop Lord Cooper's distinction:
"If what is appealed is in a real sense a true lis between the parties, so that
the sheriff has to pronounce a judgement between the respective claimants, then the
appeal involves invoking the sheriff in his judicial capacity .... If ... the sheriff has
not really to decide a question of law between the parties, and has not to review the
determination appealed to him in the sense of weighing the considerations for and
against, and deciding which way the balance inclines, but if he is only entitled to
interfere with what has been done provided he is satisfied that a discretion conferred
by the statute has not been reasonably exercised, then the appeal is to him in his
administrative capacity."69
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What is significant about the judgement is that, without expressly
distinguishing the approach taken in Glasgow Churches70, the view that sheriffs,
when acting administratively, have a wide on the merits of the case discretion is
sidelined. Instead, Lord President Clyde revived Lord Low's test of "reasonableness"
as set out in Allen: "... for in [an administrative] case the appeal is given ... not
primarily to determine a legal issue which has arisen between two contestants, but to
provide machinery to protect the citizen from a capricious or arbitrary exercise of a
discretion conferred on an official or on a public authority."71 There was no mention
of the sheriffs' jurisdiction being founded on the antiquarian research of Lords Cooper
and Wark.72 Instead, the test is one which bears a close similarity to those which
are now routinely applied under Wednesburv unreasonableness73 or Lord Diplock's
test of "irrationality"74. As such, it is much closer to the ideal judicial function in
the theory and general principles of the rule of law, which maximise the positive
virtues of adjudication as a decision taking process, and minimise the dangers for
ostensive judicial impartiality inherent in judicial involvement in the merits and policy
of local authority decisions.
Notwithstanding these advantages, the decision remains problematical. The
difficulties arising from Kave v. Hunter are that Lord President Clyde did not
expressly disapprove of the approach taken in Glasgow Churches Council75, and the
fact that his interpretation of the sheriffs position as administrative was rather
tenuous. He appears not to have taken account of the point that the sheriff's
discretion in the Allen case was based on a reasonableness test76, and that when
hearing firearms appeals, the sheriff must "pronounce a judgement between the
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respective parties."77 These flaws have led to a considerable degree of confusion
amongst sheriffs, a point which is developed in parts three and four below.
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Section Three; The Sheriff's Duties in Local Administration 1930-1970
Although the overall significance of the sheriffs' powers in local administration
waned, the number of duties which they were statutorily empowered to perform did
not decrease greatly. In 1967, it was seen as "almost automatic"78 for the legislature
to provide for an appeal to the sheriff for citizens aggrieved by local authority
decisions. Both the Grant Report79 and sheriff court practice texts80 of the time
give a clear impression of the extent (if not the nature) of the sheriffs' jurisdiction.
Following on from the pattern established in previous chapters, this section
provides a brief commentary on the sheriff's powers in the period under consideration.
They are set out under the following general headings: (i) public order; (ii) electoral
law; (iii) fiscal duties; (iv) local government; (v) roads and bridges; (vi) mental
health and prison administration; (vii) education; (viii) licensing; and (ix)
miscellaneous functions (eg lighthouse adminstration and "striking" the fiars).
(i) Sheriffs continued to exercise powers relating to the maintenance of the peace
and public order.81 The Grant Report, in its review of the 1927 Report on the Court
of Session and the Office of Sheriff Depute, did not place much value on them: it
was felt that their erstwhile importance had been a function of the troubled nature of
the times.82 However, under the Public Order Act 1936 sheriffs could empower
procurators fiscal, the police and others to enter premises which were "associated
with [the] activities of organisations which might usurp [the] functions of the police
or armed forces, or use forces promoting political action."83 The Licensing
(Scotland) Act 195984 provided that sheriffs could order licensed vendors of liquor
to close down for a specified period if a riot was taking place or anticipated.
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Although the sheriffs' role as an ex officio member of the Police Committees and
Standing Joint Committees disappeared with their abolition, they continued to
exercise a number of controls over police forces in their sheriffdoms. Under the
Police (Scotland) Act 195685, sheriffs were entitled to issue instructions to Chief
Constables, receive copies of the Chief Constables' annual report, and order the
police to produce special reports when required.86 They also settled any disputes
regarding the constitution of police authorities and any costs due to them.87
(ii) The deputes' traditional jurisdiction in electoral law was maintained by the
Representation of the People Act 1949.88 Sheriffs depute continued to serve as
Electoral Returning Officers89, and a clear picture of the nature and extent of their
duties was given by Sheriff Depute Lillie in his autobiography.90 However, as
before, and despite Sheriff Lillie's best efforts to give a contrary impression, it
would seem that much of the administrative work was undertaken by the substitutes
and sheriff clerks. Indeed, the sheriff clerks took the opportunity afforded by the
Grant Committee to voice their dissatisfaction at the lack of recognition given to their
efforts:
"... just over one third [of sheriff clerks] were opposed to [participation in
Parliamentary elections] .... because by and large it is the Sheriff Clerk who carries
the election, and this ought to be said and we say it."91
This view was supported by Sheriff Substitute "E", who commented in oral
evidence that "... it would certainly be agreed by anybody who knows anything about
it, the whole burden falls upon the sheriff clerk and his department."92
(iii) As noted above, the fiscal duties of the sheriffs were much reduced, although
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a number of responsibilities remained. At the time of the Grant Report sheriffs
continued to serve as ex officio General Commissioners of Income Tax.93 Their
historic role as executor of Royal decrees and collector of payments made to the
Crown under the Exchequer Court (Scotland) Act 185694 was also continued,
although it was of little practical significance by this time.
(iv) The sheriffs' substantial powers in local government were continued, although
there were a number of changes. Notwithstanding the retention of their duties in the
inter-related fields of burgh and "police" government, housing, planning, and public
health, some important duties were re-allocated. For example, the contentious role
of bye-law confirming authority for local authorities was withdrawn by the Local
Government (Scotland) Act 1947, and sheriffs were replaced by the Secretary of
State.95
Despite this, the 1947 Act continued the traditional provision making sheriffs
responsible for the fixing or rectifying of burgh boundaries, and the creation of new
burghs.96 They also heard appeals from disqualified councillors97, and from those
aggrieved on public health grounds by county council proposals to vary "special
districts".98 Section 374 provided for a general right of appeal to the sheriff.
A number of the provisions in the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1892" were
still in force at the end of the period under consideration. Appeals could be made to
the sheriff against local authority decisions in public health100 and planning.101
Sheriffs were also able to review municipal council decisions where private property
was affected, or where the local authority demanded payment for costs incurred for
work carried out by it.102 The Act also provided for an appeal to the sheriff against
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entries, alterations or omissions in burgh street registers.103 Finally, sheriffs could
be called upon by the Secretary of State for Scotland to conduct local inquiries under
the 1892 Act, as amended by the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1903.104
Similarly, many of the sheriffs' powers under the Public Health (Scotland) Act
1897105 continued to be in force. Sheriffs could be called upon to take decisions in
appeals against local authorities in cases involving sewers and drains106,
scavenging107, common lodging houses108, nuisances109, and claims for
compensation.110 A number of duties under the Milk and Dairies (Scotland) Act
1914111 and the Slaughter of Animals (Scotland) Act 1928112 were continued, as
were the sheriffs' powers under the Burial Grounds (Scotland) Act 1855.113 The
public health jurisdiction was if anything expanded: new duties were created under
the Water (Scotland) Act 1946114, the Clean Air Act 1956115 and the Rivers
(Prevention of Pollution) (Scotland) Act 1951.116
The closely related jurisdiction in housing and local planning was updated and
continued.117 The Housing Act 1950 empowered sheriffs to hear appeals concerning
clearing, closing houses, granting demolition orders, and conversions.118 The
Housing (Repairs and Rents) (Scotland) Act 1954 enabled landlords to appeal to the
sheriff against certificates of disrepair issued by the relevant local authority119, and
the Housing and Town Development (S) Act 1957 provided for a shrieval appeal for
those aggrieved by a local authority's refusal to contribute towards house maintenance
costs when a house was subject to a demolition or closing order.120
Following on from their still extant involvement with general planning, a
number of minor duties were allocated to sheriffs under the Town and Country
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Planning (Scotland) Act 1947: an appeal lay to the sheriff from those aggrieved by
a local authority decision to change or undo work carried out without, or in breach
of, planning permission, and there was also a right of appeal against compulsory
purchase orders made in respect of structures of historic or architectural interest.121
(v) Despite sweeping changes in the administration of roads and bridges in the
century between 1850 and 1950122, sheriffs continued to exercise a jurisdiction
under the Roads and Bridges (Scotland) Act 1878.123 Their-powers to hear appeals
form ratepayers aggrieved by the decisions of local authorities to close public roads,
remove roads and bridges from the public list, and to make certain orders,
prohibitions and authorizations were still in force in the late 1960s.124 Similarly,
they were still empowered under the Act of 1878 to appoint arbiters and valuators,
and to determine damages when appropriate.125
New powers of a governmental nature were created by the Roads Improvement
Act 1929, the Highways (Provision of Cattle Grids) Act 1950126 (to be read in
conjunction with the Road Traffic Act 1930), and the Road Traffic Act I960.127
(vi) The long-standing jurisdiction held by the sheriffs in mental health and prison
adminstration was continued.128 The Mental Health (Scotland) Act I960129
confirmed the sheriffs in their central role in mental health provision. Sheriffs were
empowered to commit a person suffering from a mental disorder to hospital or
guardianship130, and could hear appeals regarding discharge from hospital.131 In
addition to these weighty powers, the sheriffs held a number of governmental duties
under the Act132: they also continued to certify to presbyteries or church courts
whether a minister was suffering from a mental disorder under the Church of Scotland
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Courts Act 1863.133 A related provision under the National Assistance Act 1948,
although more a derivative of the sheriffs' powers in poor relief than mental health,
gave to the sheriff the power to order the removal to hospital or other "suitable place"
of those who were too elderly or infirm to care properly for themselves.134
Shrieval powers in prison administration were, by the end of the period under
consideration, virtually defunct, although sheriffs continued to serve on probation
committees.135 However, one other significant governmental power did remain:
sheriffs were empowered to visit and inspect prisons in their sheriffdoms, or in
sheriffdoms where prisoners were being held for offenses committed in their
jurisdiction.136
(vii) Sheriffs also saw their powers in education updated.137 They were
empowered under the Education (Scotland) Act 1962138 to hear appeals from parents
aggrieved by a local authority attendance order.139 In addition, there was a right
to appeal to the sheriff in cases where the authority had failed to reach an early
decision and where the authority had refused to withdraw a child from a special
school or failed to reach an early decision on the matter.140
(viii) The sheriffs' duties in registration and licensing continued to evolve.141
Vestiges of their old jurisdiction remained in the Registration of Births, Deaths and
Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965.142 There was an appeal to the sheriff from the
Registrar143; orders could be issued to informants and the Registrar General; and
the sheriff could authorise a search of a Registrar's office on his demitting office.144
Sheriffs continued to exercise a special jurisdiction with regard to the registration of
marriages.145
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The Licensing (Scotland) Act 1959146 continued the sheriffs' role as the
licensing authority for private clubs, which had been established by the Licensing
(Scotland) Act 1903.147 The Act also empowered licensing courts to make bye-laws
which were subject to the confirmation of the Secretary of State for Scotland: he in
turn was able to order sheriffs to conduct inquiries into the proposed legislation on his
behalf.148
Appeals could be made to sheriffs under the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries
Act 1963 in the event of licences or permits being refused by the relevant local
authority.149 A considerable number of similar duties were provided for by a series
of Acts which regulated widely varying activities.150 These provisions highlight the
continued use of the sheriffs as judicial and governmental officials.
(ix) Sheriffs depute continued the practice of serving as Commissioners of the
Northern Lighthouses.151 They were still required to undertake the annual voyage
of inspection, and it is clear from the memorandum presented to the Grant Committee
by the sheriffs depute that they were assiduous in their duties, attending meetings far
more frequently than other Commissioners, and shouldering a considerable degree of
administrative responsibility.152 The diaries of Lord Stott, however, suggest that
the annual voyage of the commissioners was more in the nature of recreation than
work.153
Summary and Conclusion
The period 1930-1970 saw little change in the way in which the sheriff's
jurisdiction in local administration was viewed: it continued to be used to justify the
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arguments of both deputes and substitutes in their increasingly vitriolic exchanges over
professional status. The parish pump nature of debate ensured that there was little real
consideration given to the wider implications of the suitability of judges exercising
discretionary powers of review over the policy or merits based decisions of elected
local authorities and their professionalised executives. Even by the late 1960s, the
attitudes and arguments of the protagonists were, almost unbelievably,
indistinguishable from those which had been made with equal force one hundred years
before - despite the enormous changes in the scale and nature of local administration.
Although there was more development in case law, the result was far from
positive. By 1970, sheriffs were faced with a confusing mix of convoluted and
conflicting precedent when trying to set limits on their discretion in governmental
appeals. This was largely due to the efforts of Lord Cooper, who was instrumental
in initiating a series of authoritative Court of Session decisions which conflicted with
the approach developed by Lord Low in the Allen case at the turn of the century.
Lord President Clyde's decision in Kave v. Hunter did little to resolve the situation.
Although the overall significance of the sheriffs jurisdiction in local
administration had lessened, and a number of important functions had been allocated
elsewhere, Parliament continued to provide for new powers, and the number of
duties was still significant. Other than making a vague and rather unhelpful
recommendation, the Grant Committee failed to give direct consideration to the
suitability of sheriffs exercising powers which required direct review of the policy or
merits based decisions of local authorities.
As will become clear in subsequent chapters, all these problems are still live
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As indicated in the Introductory Chapter, this part of the thesis evaluates the
powers held by modern sheriffs in Scottish local administration. It is divided into
three chapters. Chapter eight provides general consideration of the main developments
in the sheriffs jurisdiction since 1970. An analytical framework of powers is set out
in chapter nine, and the sheriff's current powers are allocated to appropriate
categories. The analytical framework is based on the general principles and rule of
law theory set out in part one, and the historical material considered in part two. The
results of a fieldwork exercise carried out in twelve sheriff courts in 1986/87 are then
discussed in chapter ten: the data gives a detailed picture of the frequency with which
the sheriff's powers in local administration are exercised, thereby providing a degree
of perspective for the empirical research which is set out in part four.
Chapter Eight: The Powers of the Modern Sheriff in Local Administration
Introduction
Discussion in this chapter is in general terms: the detailed consideration of
individual provisions is set out in chapters nine and ten below, and in part four of the
thesis.
There was no review of the sheriffs' powers following the Grant Report.1 The
jurisdiction in local administration continued to develop in an ad hoc, unstructured
fashion. It would have been surprising if it had been otherwise, as the Report had
not recommended any sweeping changes. However, there are two areas which should
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be noted: the points which are made are then summarised in a brief conclusion.
Section One: General Developments Since 1970
Although the sheriffs governmental and judicial powers in local administration
were continued and many are still weighty and controversial, their overall
significance has declined. The sheriffs duties as local representative of the Crown
have become less relevant. The executive functions which derived from the
ministerial jurisdiction of the pre-1747 heritable sheriffs are now comparatively few
and minor. For example, the sheriffs function as Electoral Returning Officer was
re-allocated to local authorities under the Returning Officers (S) Act 1977, despite the
Deputes' recommendation to the Grant Committee that it should be continued.2 It has
already been noted that sheriffs had lost their power to confirm or refuse local
authority bye-laws.3 A number of other functions, such as "striking" the fiars, were
brought to an end.4 However, sheriffs continue to serve as Commissioners for the
Northern Lighthouses.5 They also serve as the licensing authority for private clubs6
and continue to order compulsory hospitalisation of the mentally ill.7 Detailed
consideration will be given to the sheriffs' powers in licensing and mental health in
chapter eleven: at this point, it need only be noted that sheriffs no longer hold any
executive power to supervise and direct large-scale administrative processes on behalf
of the Crown.
The powers which remain are diverse, and derive mainly from the duties
allocated under nineteenth century local improvement legislation.8 Many provisions
give sheriffs the power to hear appeals from "persons aggrieved" by the decisions of
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public (usually local) authorities. The subject matter of appeals varies widely, as do
the grounds of appeal and the extent of the sheriff's discretion. For example, local
authority decisions on matters as multifarious as licensed premises9, nursing
homes10, cinemas11, and caravan sites12 may be reviewed by the sheriff sitting
in either a judicial or a governmental capacity. As in the past, sheriffs also have
powers to hear appeals in areas such as housing and buildings13, public health14,
roads and bridges15, electoral law16, social work17, and education18.
The context in which the sheriffs' powers are discussed has also changed. The
dispute between deputes and substitutes over status was finally brought to an end by
the creation of a new career structure. As a result of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland)
Act 1971, the part-time deputes were replaced by full time sheriffs principal, and
substitutes were at last renamed "sheriffs".19 The Law Reform (Miscellaneous
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990 introduced, however belatedly, a judicial career
system, which provides for the promotion of distinguished sheriffs to the Court of
Session bench.20 Accordingly, there is now little cause for the duties within local
administration to be cited in petty squabbles between sheriffs over remuneration and
status.
However, the recent development in the law and practice of judicial review
of administrative action has stimulated more general interest in the sheriffs' powers.
Indeed, the case which entrenched common law judicial review as a privative
jurisdiction of the Court of Session, and led to the implementation of the new
accelerated procedure for judicial review under Act of Sederunt, concerned the
question of whether the sheriff court had a common law jurisdiction to review local
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authority decisions.21
Fresh consideration of the role of the legislature, the courts, tribunals,
ombudsmen and decision taking by administrators eventually led to academic
discussion of the sheriffs' powers. A number were discussed in isolation. However,
Himsworth was the first academic to examine in any detail the provisions dealing with
local administration, and to present them as a collective jurisdiction. In a series of
published and unpublished papers22, he set out an extensive list of provisions which
allow appeal to the sheriff from local authority decisions23, established a typology
of powers24, and questioned the continued relevance of sheriffs exercising
"administrative" powers.25
Himsworth concentrated his attention on the sheriffs' appellate jurisdiction to
review the decisions of public authorities. He noted that the legislature has created
new styles of appeal involving the sheriff.26 These appeals have not replaced
existing powers but operate alongside them. The result of this is, if anything, rather
more confusion than before, but an interesting picture does emerge. It should become
clear that in the creation of new styles of appeal Parliament has on the one hand
illustrated the problems inherent in involving a judicial officer and the adjudicatory
process in local administration more clearly than before, whilst on the other it has
given some idea of how sheriffs could be called upon to serve as a useful complement
to the common law review function of the Court of Session.
In recent years the legislature has introduced a number of powers which have
sought to limit the sheriffs' powers of review. Himsworth has sub-divided these
provisions into two broad categories of "restricted powers of review"27: first,
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powers in which the competency or success of any review is dependent on the
existence of specified facts or statutory criteria28; and second, powers in which the
sheriffs' jurisdiction is focused on "legal" and jurisdictional questions.29 In the first
category, the legislature has perpetuated the tradition established in earlier
governmental legislation. Although the sheriff's powers of review are limited, they
are not limited in such a way as to exclude sheriffs from intervening directly in the
policy or merits considerations of decisions taken by elected authorities.30 Indeed,
as will be made clear below, the legislation can effectively require them to do so.
Some examples of this type of legislation may be viewed as encouraging the breach
of ostensive judicial impartiality and competence, and may therefore be criticised in
the context of the rule of law theory and general principles adopted in part one.31
In contrast, the second category, by focusing attention on legal and jurisdictional
concerns32, may be viewed as providing for a review function which is in
accordance with the standards of secondary morality.
Indeed, Himsworth has argued that the legislature, by continuing to create
what he terms "appeals to the sheriff on the merits of local authority decisions"33,
is perpetuating an "area of decision-taking"34 which is "anomalous in terms of the
principles of democracy, legitimacy and efficiency which may be supposed to inform
the system as a whole".35 Certain powers should therefore be seen as lacking
constitutional "justification"36. Assuming this category of powers to be the rough
equivalent of governmental powers, it is argued that Himsworth is correct to take
such a strong stand. Similarly, his assertion that; "[I]f new general rights of appeal
were to be granted or if existing ones came under increasing use by the consumers of
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local authority services, then the resulting pressure from contentious business could
impose uncontainable stress on the legitimacy of the office of sheriff..."37, is also
supported. The general issue of the suitability of the sheriff continuing to exercise
governmental powers is considered in depth in chapters eleven and twelve.
Section Two: Case Law Developments Since 1970
The difficulties inherent in the exercise of governmental powers were
anticipated by Sheriff Macphail in Carvana v. Glasgow Corporation.38 The case
concerned a governmental style of appeal made to the sheriff following the refusal by
a local authority to renew a street trader's licence.39 In the course of his judgement,
Sheriff Macphail produced a sophisticated blend of argument which went some way
towards reconciling the conflicting views of Lords President Cooper and Clyde,
which were noted in chapter seven. Whilst quoting with approval from Lord Cooper's
statement of the distinctions between "judicial" and "administrative" powers40, he
nonetheless endorsed and gave weight to Lord Low's view as expressed in Allen that
sheriffs should limit their discretion when taking "administrative" decisions.41 Rather
disingenuously, Sheriff Macphail stated that while he agreed with the opinion of
Sheriff Black in the General Billposting case ("I reject altogether the respondents'
contention that I have no power to review their decision on the merits..."), and that
there was an "unrestricted right of appeal to the sheriff, he nonetheless felt that
when acting "administratively", "...the sheriff should not, ..., vary or reverse the
decision of the magistrates' committee unless he is satisfied that their decision is
wrong, and ... he should pay due attention to the competence of the magistrates in
155
arriving at their opinion."42 Put simply, Sheriff Macphail argued that sheriffs should
restrict their "administrative" discretion according to a test which is not dissimilar in
its essentials to those suggested in Allen and Kaye v. Hunter43, although he managed
to do so whilst showing every respect to the Glasgow Churches decision.44 His
judgement has been followed in a number of subsequent cases, and it is not difficult
to see why: it offers a relatively smooth passage out of choppy water.
However, two points should be appreciated. First, although the test of
wrongness and competence is a limitation of shrieval discretion which is not as
offensive to general principles and wider rule of law theory than a strong exercise of
discretion, it is a very much less exacting limitation than that which was set out in
Allen.45 It still involves the potential for a direct review of policy and merits which
could be viewed as being contrary to ostensive judicial impartiality or competence.
Second, it should not be forgotten that the interpretation of a limited role is contrary
to the extent of ex facie discretionary power held in the majority of provisions
involving the sheriff in local administration. This should become clear in chapter
nine.46 Given that Sheriff Macphail's decision is only persuasive rather than
binding47, it is always possible that a different interpretation of the sheriffs' powers
could be followed in a subsequent case: for example, Carvana was ignored in
Hamilton v. Chief Constable of Strathclyde.48 In any case, as is noted below, a
recent judgement of the Court of Session may also discourage sheriffs from taking
Sheriff Macphail's approach.49 Himsworth recognised the potential for this sort of
conflict when he commented that a "... "benevolent" approach [ie of the sort taken by
SheriffMacphail] cannot be guaranteed and even where the primary statutory function
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of the local authority is acknowledged, the sheriff himself remains the judge of
whether his views should prevail...".50 Accordingly, the potential for confusion
remains.
The extent of shrieval discretion has not been the only difficulty which the
court has had to deal with. As before, the inter-related difficulty of distinguishing
between "administrative" (ie governmental) and "judicial" roles has also caused
problems for sheriffs.
For example, debate arose as a result of the "considerable degree of
uncertainty"51 created by Hamilton v. Chief Constable of Strathclvde52. which
concerned an appeal to the sheriff from the decision of a chief constable made under
the Firearms Act 1968. On this occasion the sheriff chose to distinguish - on the basis
of a procedural technicality - Lord President Clyde's judgement in Kaye v. Hunter that
in firearms cases the sheriffs' powers were "administrative".53 He placed great
emphasis on Lord President Cooper's remarks regarding the distinction of functions
as set out in Arcari.54 However, he did not appear to consider the central question
of whether or not a "true lis" existed. The sheriff held, contrary to Kave v. Hunter,
that his powers were "judicial", although it should be noted that the grounds for his
distinction were far from firm, and that it was by no means certain that an appeal to
the Court of Session was competent.55
It is argued that although the outcome of the case may be correct (ie that the
sheriff's function is judicial)56, the sheriff's approach was flawed, and deserves
criticism. He was selective in his adoption of the tests for distinguishing functions as
set out by the Court of Session in Arcari and Kave v. Hunter: by failing to give
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consideration to the question of whether or not a "true lis" existed, he failed to apply
precedent satisfactorily.57 Other weaknesses in the decision become apparent,
although these arise more from the conflicting authorities emanating from the Court
of Session, rather than from shrieval error. They provide further illustration of the
difficulties the Court of Session has created by failing to provide a clearer indication
of how sheriffs should interpret the nature and extent of their discretion, and give
weight to the view that the distinction between "judicial" and "administrative" powers
has become tautologous as a result of the court's inability to rule authoritatively on
whether an "administrative" decision implies a limited review of capricious or
arbitrary conduct, or a wider discretionary power.58
The sheriff implicitly took the view that when sheriffs act "judicially" they
have a wider discretion to consider and overturn the merits of a local authority's
decision than when acting "administratively", even though they are fettered by the
possibility of an appeal to the Court of Session.59 Their "periphery of concern"60,
although placing emphasis on questions of law and potentially subject to appeal, is
wider: in effect, sheriffs are to take the decision de novo, and are not limited to
questions of vires or "capricious and arbitrary" action.61 However, the potential for
confusion arises once it is appreciated that this state of affairs only exists if Lord
President Clyde's restrictive interpretation of "administrative" power62 has been
accepted. If Lord President Cooper's wider formulation of "administrative" discretion
is adopted, then presumably the sheriffs' power of decision under it is wider than any
"judicial" power.63 The tables are effectively turned: there is no possibility of
appeal to the Court of Session and no limit on the sheriffs' grounds of review. Under
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Lord Clyde's interpretation, both types of discretion are limited, but the "judicial"
category probably less so, whereas Lord Cooper's judgements would lend support to
the argument that it is the "administrative" category which offers sheriffs most
discretion.
The questions of the extent of shrieval discretion and distinctions between
decision taking functions have both been considered recently in a highly authoritative
decision of the Second Division of the Court of Session. In the 1992 case of
Rodenhurst v. Chief Constable, Grampian Police64, a court of five judges overruled
Kave v. Hunter. The case concerned the question of whether an appeal to the sheriff
over a firearms certificate was an administrative or judicial provision65: if Lord
Clyde's decision in Kave was correct, then it would have been viewed as being
administrative, and there could be no further appeal from the sheriff's decision. The
court held that the sheriffs power was judicial and that appeal was therefore
competent.66
Significantly, the court distinguished Lord Low's test that a decision must be
"capricious and arbitrary" before a sheriff can contemplate review when acting in an
administrative capacity. This was because the provision in the Allen case stipulated
a reasonableness test, whereas none was set out in the equivalent provision in
Kave.67 The decision in Rodenhurst therefore moves the court towards the position
adopted by Lord President Cooper68, and may encourage a more literal interpretation
of instant statutory provisions. The wider result of this distinction in cases where
there is a general power of review may be that sheriffs could feel less inclined to
adopt "benevolent" interpretations of the sort set out by Sheriff Macphail69, and
159
more willing to make evaluations of merits and policy. In terms of the general
principles and rule of law theory adopted earlier, this aspect of Rodenhurst is
therefore potentially rather negative, as shrieval activism in governmental areas must
inevitably lead to concern for ostensive judicial impartiality and competence.
However, the court's reasoning is rather convoluted, and it is likely that the court
has perpetuated confusion, rather than dispelled it. It remains to be seen how matters
will develop.
The decision does, however, correct one of the major flaws in Kave v.
Hunter in that proper consideration is given to the question of whether an appeal
provision is "in a real sense a true lis".70 Unfortunately, the court did not provide
a particularly sophisticated or enlightened explanation of what a "true lis" is , beyond
stating that"... in our view there was a true lis; as the pleas in law show, there were
questions of law which arose between the parties and upon which the sheriff had to
pronounce a judgement between them.... the appeal fell to be disposed of as a
summary application, ... and the sheriff was required to give a judgement in
writing."71
The court's approach to distinguishing functions may therefore be viewed as
being highly proceduralistic: there is no direct consideration of theoretical aspects.
Lord Cooper's test has simply been re-stated.72 A rather more theoretically based
argument on what a "true lis" may or may not be is set out in chapter nine below.
Summary and Conclusion
The significance of the sheriffs powers in local administration continued to
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decline, although sheriffs also continued to hold a number of weighty powers as both
judicial and governmental decision takers in Scottish local administration. The
difficult and anomalous nature of much of the sheriff's powers, together with their
ad hoc, inconsistent range, was, for the first time, subjected to detailed academic
study by Himsworth.
The case law confusions noted in preceding chapters continued, despite Sheriff
Macphail's efforts in Carvana to reconcile the conflicting interpretations of the nature
and range of the sheriffs "administrative" discretion. The recent Court of Session
decision in Rodenhurst, despite the fact that it was produced by a court of five
judges, is not necessarily conclusive. Although great stress is put on Lord President
Cooper's test for distinguishing between administrative and judicial decisions, it is
not expanded in any detail. Whilst it may seem that Lord Cooper's wider
interpretation of the sheriff's "administrative" function is favoured by the court, the
decision is nonetheless rather vague, and it is difficult to predict whether it will affect
the attempts of Sheriff Macphail and others to limit their discretion.
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Chapter Nine: An Analytical Framework of the Sheriffs Jurisdiction in Local
Administration
Introduction
This chapter sets out an analytical framework of categories to which the
sheriff's powers in local administration can be allocated. The nature of the categories
is derived from the rule of law theory and general principles set out in part one of the
thesis, and the historical material in part two. The aim of the exercise is to clarify
the nature of the sheriff's functions. Delineating functions facilitates research into the
different styles of provision which exist, and enables concentrated and effective
consideration of whether certain duties are now anachronistic or anomalous.
It should be noted that the classification is not exhaustive: for example, the
sheriff's duties in arbitration1 and compulsory purchase2 have been excluded from
the study, as have ex officio ceremonial duties.3 The focus is on powers which
involve sheriffs in local government decision taking.
The categories are not intended to be rigid demarcations, and it should be
recognised that in some cases allocation may be a matter for conjecture. It can be
argued that the allocation of functions is a barren and fruitless exercise.4 However,
it is contended that this is not necessarily so. It is inevitable that making distinctions
may involve difficult questions of degree. This should not be viewed as being an
altogether negative aspect of the process. It would indeed be pointless to become too
involved in close argument over individual questions of allocation as there will always
be scope for disagreement However, it would be a mistake to forget the broader
point that engaging in this type of exercise futhers the debate over the function of the
court and the role of adjudication.
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The analytical framework of the sheriff's jurisdiction is made up of four
categories: the chapter is therefore sub-divided into four sections, with a brief
conclusion. It is not intended to look at the nature of the categories or individual
provisions in any great detail in this chapter: in depth consideration and empirical
testing of the categories and constituent powers is set out in part four of the thesis.5
The four categories are the sheriff as:
1. a "first instance executive authority";
2. a "higher governmental authority";
3. a "civil judge"; and
4. an "administrative judge".
Nearly all provisions are brought before the sheriff by means of summary
applications procedure5, although it should be noted that applications for the Sheriff
Principal to perform some ex officio executive duties are not.7
Section One: The Sheriff as a First Instance Executive Authority
This area of shrieval activity may be seen as the derivative of the sheriff's
eighteenth and nineteenth century role as the Crown's "representative and executive
officer for civil affairs"8, acting on behalf of central government in the absence of
effective or elected public authorities.9
As was mentioned in the preceding chapter10, sheriffs are no longer
empowered to supervise and control large scale administrative undertakings (such
as elections), although there are a number of provisions under which sheriffs conduct
public local inquiries. Sheriffs Principal continue to hold a number of comparatively
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minor ex officio duties.11 The remaining powers can be grouped under five general
subject headings: animal welfare, harbour legislation, licensing, public police and
health, and rights of the subject. Although the focus of most of these provisions is
on questions of individual rights, it would seem that, because of their historic
"ministerial" involvement in these and similar areas, and the fact that they are not
called upon to decide questions of law, sheriffs continue to construe powers in this
category as being separate from "judicial" business.12 What then are the main
features of its constituent powers?
In effect, the sheriffs role is that of a first instance executive official acting
on behalf of Parliament. He is not empowered to review the decisions of an
administrative body, such as a local authority: instead, the responsibility for decision
taking comes directly to the sheriff after application by statutorily empowered
individuals. For all practical purposes, the sheriff is therefore the statutory decision-
taking authority and his powers of decision are final13 (although subject to judicial
review).14 It is also in the nature of this category that the sheriff is given a wide
statutory discretion: he is not limited to considering questions of vires or
jurisdiction.15 Whilst some of the powers, for example the licensing of private
clubs16, involve little more than "rubber stamping" and are largely dealt with by
Sheriff Clerks17, others involve difficult hearings and require a considerable degree
of ability and experience for their successful execution.18
The powers which go together to make up the "first instance executive"
jurisdiction of the modem sheriff are set out below, together with a brief indication
of their general nature.
164
(a) Ex officio governmental powers and public local inquiries
Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (c44) si00 Sched 2 para 4.
(Sheriff Principal to act as Chairman of Independent Schools Tribunal.)
Local Government (Scotland) Act 1975 (c30) s4(2), (10).
(Sheriff Principal to appoint members of local valuation appeals tribunals.)
Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (c36) s.123.
(Sheriff to conduct public local inquiries under the Act.)
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (57&58 Vict)(c60) s668(l) as substituted by Sheriff
Court Reorganisation Order 1974 (SI No 2087) Art 6(1) Sched 2.
(Sheriff Principals to serve as Commissioners for Northern Lighthouses.)
(b) Animal Welfare
Performing Animals (Regulation) Act 1925 (15&16 Geo 5)(c38) s6.
(Sheriff to make orders concerning cruelty to performing animals.)
Protection of Animals (Scotland) Act 1912 (2&3 Geo5) (cl4) ss 2,3-
(Sheriff has power to make orders for destruction of maltreated animals.)
(c) Harbour and Dock Legislation
General Pier and Harbour Act 1861 (24&25 Vict) (c45) sl5 (as amended by Sheriff
Court (Scotland) Act 1971 (c58) s4 Sched 1 para 1.
(Sheriff has power to approve bye-laws for harbours and piers.)
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Harbour Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847 (10&11 Vict) (c27) (as amended by the
Sheriff Court (Scotland) Act 1971 s4 Sched 1 para 1) ss 7,26,79,80,85.
(Sheriff has power to certify harbours, approve harbour bye-laws, make provision
for harbour policing etc.)
(d) Licensing
Gaming Act 1968 (c65) Sched 4 para 1(1); Sched 8 paras 1,8,9,10,18.
(Sheriff responsible for the registration of gaming in clubs and miners' welfare
institutions.)
Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976 (c66) ss, 104,105,108 [as amended by Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions)(S) Act 1990 (c.40), Sched.8],109 [as amended ibid], 110.
(Sheriff responsible for the licensing of private clubs.)
(e) Police and Public Health
Burial Grounds (Scotland) Act 1855 (18 and 19 Vict)(c68) s4 [as amended by Local
Government (Scotland) Act 1895 (58&59) (Vict c52) ss21,22; Public Health
(Scotland) Act 1897 (60&61 Vict)(c.38) s.146(2); Local Government (Scotland) 1929
(19&20 Geo5 c25) sl(l),2(l)(e); Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 sl69(l);
SI 1952 Nol334]; slO; sl8 [as amended by Burial Grounds (Scotland) Amendment
Act 1886 (49&50 Vict) (c21); applied by the Church of Scotland (Property and
Endowments) Act 1925 (15&16 Geo 5) (c33) s32]; s32.
(Sheriff has powers to hold inquiries into closure of burial grounds, to allocate new
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grounds, and decide on questions relating to the sale of burial grounds.)
Firearms Act 1968 (c27) ss21(6), 52(4).
(Sheriff has power to allow convicted person possession of firearms, and to order
destruction or disposal of firearms.)
Food Safety Act 1990 (cl6), s.37.
(Sheriff has power to order closure of premises.)
Local Government (Omnibus Shelters and Queue Barriers) (Scotland) Act 1958
(6&7 Eliz 2) (c50) s6 [as amended by the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 (c54) s49 Sched
9 para 48].
(Sheriff has power to deal with any question with respect to provision of bus shelters.)
Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 (c65) s75(2); ss231, 232.
(Sheriff has power to order disposal of public land, and give directions on general
points of difficulty arising under the Act.)
Public Health (Scotland) Act 1897 (60&61 Vict)(c38) ssl54, 157 [repealed in part
by Local Government (S) Act 1973, Sched 27], 16(9),(10),(11); s22 [as amended by
the Control of Pollution Act 1974 (c40) Sched 2 para 1; repealed in part by Clean Air
Act 1956 (c52) Sched 4; Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 Sched 27]; s23
[repealed in part by 1973 Act ibid]; s25; s26; s32(l) [as amended by Criminal
167
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 (c21) ss289F, 289G, inserted by Criminal Justice Act
1982 (c48) s54]; s32(4); s36(l) [as amended by the National Health Service (Scotland)
Act 1972 (c58) sched 6 para 44; 1973 Act ibid; 1975 Act ibid; repealed in part by
Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1981 (c23) Sched 4];
s36(2)]; s41 [as amended by Radioactive Substances Act 1960 (c34) s9 Sched 1 Part
II para 13]; s47(4) [as amended by 1972 Act ibid Sched 6 para 45 and 1973 Act ibid];
s76; s90 [as amended by 1973 Act ibid].
(Sheriff has wide and general powers to make orders after application by local
authority concerning nuisances, pollution and public health.)
(f) Rights of the Subject
Church of Scotland Act 1863 (27&27 Vict)(c47) s2 [as amended].
(Sheriff has power to certify that parish minister is suffering from mental disorder.)
Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (c36) sl8; s56(l).
(Sheriff has power to order compulsory hospitalisation of mentally ill and appoint
acting nearest relative.)
National Assistance Act 1948 (11&12 Geo6) (c29) s47 [as amended by National
Assistance (Amendment) Act 1951 (c57) sl(2); Local Government (S) Act 1973
Sched 27, para 94; and National Health Service (S) Act 1972 (c58) Sched 6, para
83]; s65 [as amended and repealed in part by National Health Service and Community
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Care Act 1990 (cl9) Sched 9]
(Sheriff has power to order compulsory care for chronically sick, aged, infirm or
incapacitated.)
Health Services and Public Health Act 1968 (c46) s72(l) [as amended by National
Health Service (Scotland) Act 1972 (c58) Sched 6 para 139]; s72(2) [as amended by
1972 Act ibid, para 138].
(Sheriff has power to order medical inspections of persons who may be suffering from
an infectious disease.)
Public Health (Scotland) Act 1897 (60&61 Vict) (c38) s54(l) [as amended and
repealed in part by the National Health (Scotland) Acts 1947 (c27) Sched 11 PtI and
1972 (c58) Sched 6 para 50, Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 (c65) Sched 27.,
and National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 (cl9), Sched 9]; s52(3)
[inserted by 1947 Act ibid and repealed in part by 1973 Act ibid]; s55(l) [inserted and
repealed in part ibid]; s55(3) [inserted and repealed in part ibid]; s69(l) [as amended
by 1972 Act (c58) ibid Sched 6 para 55 and repealed in part by National Assistance
Act 1948 (c29) Sched 7, PartEI; and 1973 Act ibid].
(Sheriff has power to make orders relating to provision of care and burial of persons
suffering from infectious disease.)
Section Two: The Sheriff as a "Higher Governmental Authority "
This category of powers is the largest in the analytical framework. Most of
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the provisions are derived from the governmental tradition established in the police
and local government improvement legislation of the nineteenth century19, although
there are new styles of appeal which were created after the Grant Committee's
recommendations.20 The category is effectively made up of those appeals which the
court has viewed, or would be likely to view, as being "administrative"21 functions.
Once more, the statutory powers held by the sheriff cover a wide range of subject-
matter.
The sheriffs statutory role in this area is that of an appellate body, retaking
decisions (usually de novo22) made by a public authority (typically an elected local
authority), following an appeal by a statutorily empowered individual. The decision
is final.23 The review is wider than simply jurisdictional or "legal" concerns.24 It
is important to note that a literal interpretation of the provisions in question can put
the sheriff in the position where he must evaluate the merits and policy aspects of an
authority's decision.25 Crucially, the powers in this category involve strongly
polycentric issues and what has been termed "direct political involvement"26 - that
is, the general subject matter of the appeals can be seen as requiring sheriffs to make
a direct evaluation of the policy merits of decisions reached by elected politicians (or
their officials) in areas which are highly influenced by political considerations.
This is what distinguishes "higher governmental" powers from those in the
"administrative judge" and "civil judge" categories set out below. When creating
powers which might be described as being those of an "administrative judge", the
legislature expressly limits the sheriff to issues which are not dissimilar to those
considered in a common law judicial review: the delineation is clear enough.27 In
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the "civil judge" category, the distinction is more nebulous, but nonetheless still
valid: the legislation focuses the sheriff's attention onto questions of individual rights
which have a low political content and an acceptable polycentric effect: there is little
risk to the standards of ostensive judicial impartiality and competence.
Lord Cooper's attempt to distinguish judicial from administrative functions by
asking whether the statute in question provided for a "true lis"28 marks the starting
point for consideration. What is at the nub of the distinction? What makes a lis a
"true lis"? It is contended that there is more to the distinction than was indicated in
Arcari and Rodenhurst: theoretical issues are also raised.
It must be recognised from the outset that all of the sheriff's appellate
governmental and judicial powers involve (in varying degrees):
(i) the potential for "direct political involvement" and polycentric effect; and
(ii) direct implications for the rights of individual appellants, whose circumstances
may be seriously affected by the decisions taken.
It is contended that when (i) predominates, the provision can be identified as
"governmental": correspondingly, when (ii) predominates, the appeal may be termed
"a true lis", suitable for adjudication, and the sheriff's power may be characterised
as being "judicial". The difficulty arises in evaluating whether the provision is
focused on (i) or (ii). To some extent, this is always going to involve subjective
choice, and there will inevitably be disagreement over allocation. However, what
is suggested here is a test for reaching decision, which is based on the general
principles and rule of law theory advanced in part one. It is not being claimed that
the test does anything more than provide a rough idea of how to make general
171
distinctions between the differing natures of the sheriffs powers. As indicated in the
introductory section, the value of the process is that it encourages consideration of
distinctions between decision taking functions, rather than the provision of definite
and precise classifications.
Two basic rules can be formulated in a simple protasis/apodosis29 style. First,
if a literal interpretation of the provision in question suggests that:
(i) the sheriff is required to conduct a direct review of the policy and merits
aspects of an elected authority's decision in an area which has a high political content
(ie the nature of the provision is such that there is the potential for the ostensive
impartiality of the sheriff to be tarnished because of "direct political involvement"30);
and
(ii) shrieval adjudication has been allocated in an area with the potential for a
strong polycentric effect (ie there is a significant likelihood that the standard of
ostensive judicial competence may be breached)31;
then it may be argued that the sheriff is exercising a power which can be described
as "governmental".
Conversely, if a literal interpretation of the statute indicates:
(i) that there are no strong and direct political concerns involved in the sheriff
reviewing the merits and policy aspects of an authority's decision (ie the sheriff's
ostensive impartiality is not threatened); and
(ii) that shrieval adjudication is not operating in an area in which polycentric
considerations are likely to predominate (ie the legislation is focused on the question
of individual rights and shrieval adjudication is therefore ostensively competent as a
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decision taking process);
then it may be argued that the sheriff is exercising a power which may be described
as being that of a "civil judge".
There are other inter-related factors derived from precedent which may be used
to supplement the classification process. Accordingly, if the sheriffs powers are final
and not subject to appeal to the Court of Session because they extend a pre-existing
jurisdiction, this may suggest that they are administrative (ie governmental) rather
than judicial.32 Similarly, if the sheriff is not required to consider questions of law,
his function may be viewed as being governmental.33 If the proceedings "do not
originate (as in the ordinary "action" or "cause") in a formal demand by a litigant for
a remedy from the sheriff court, but in a notice embodying a decision by the local
authority, and, when the sheriff first appears, he is exercising what is in substance
an appellate and not an original jurisdiction", it may be argued that the decision
should be viewed as being governmental.34 Whether or not the sheriff has the power
to award expenses may also be viewed as providing a clue as to the nature of the
provision: if the sheriff has a special power to award expenses, then there may be
an assumption that the jurisdiction is governmental.35 If a provision is made for
appeal to "the sheriff", rather than "the sheriff court", a governmental jurisdiction
may be implied.36 However, it is important to appreciate that in the context of the
protasis/apodosis tests adopted in this thesis, these points are secondary to the rather
more difficult and nebulous task of conducting an evaluation of the degree of "direct
political" and polycentric effect, and the risks to ostensive judicial impartiality and
competence.
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The protatsis/apodosis tests have been used to identify the statutory provisions
which make up the sheriff's jurisdiction as an "higher governmental authority". The
list provided below is not exhaustive, and it should not by any means be viewed as
being conclusive, but it is hoped that most powers have been identified. As in
section one, the powers have been set out under general subject headings, and a brief
note indicates the nature of the sheriffs functions.
Building/Planning/Roads and Bridges
Building (Scotland) Act 1959 (7 and 8 Eliz 2) (c24), s.16 [as amended by Building
(Scotland) Act 1970 (c38), Sched. 1, Pt. I, para. 5(a); Local Government (Scotland)
Act 1973, Sched. 15, para. 1]; s.6B [as inserted by s.4 1970 Act ibidl.
(Sheriff has power to hear appeals concerning a wide range of local authority building
orders.)
Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 (c26), ss. Ill, 112, 129, 163, 186.
(Sheriff has power to hear appeals concerning a wide range of local authority building
orders.)
Sewerage (Scotland) Act 1968 (c47) s.3(2) [as amended by Roads (Scotland) Act
1984 (c54) Sched. 9 para. 64(2)]; s.14(5); s.21(2) s.15(2).
(Sheriff has power to hear appeals against local authority sewer proposals and orders.)
Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 (c54) ss.l(5)(7), 151(1); s.13(7) [amended by 1989 (c40)
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Sched 18]; s.57(6); s.63(3); s.74(4); s.90(4); s.91; s.93; s.99(4).
(Sheriff has power to hear appeals concerning a wide variety of roads authority
decisions.)
Education
Education (Scotland) Act 1980, (c44); s.28F(2)(3)(4)(8)(9) [inserted by Education (S)
Act 1981, s.l]; s.38 [as amended by Education (Scotland) Act 1981 (c58) Sched. 2
Pt 13 para. 5 Sched. 8]; s.65(l),(2).
(Sheriff has power to hear appeals from education authority decisions on school
placing, school attendance orders, and those concerning children with special needs.)
Licensing
The provisions in this sub-category provide for appeals from local authority
licensing and registration decisions. The subject matter of appeals is not particularly
noteworthy: the important point is that a literal interpretation of the provisions
provide for a wide shrieval discretion to review policy and merits.
Animal Boarding Establishments Act 1963 (c43) s.l(9).
Breeding of Dogs Act 1973 (c60) s. 1(10).
Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963 (c2) Sched. 1 para. 28(1); Sched. 2 para.
7 [as amended by Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973, Sched. 24 para. 26].
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Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 (8 and 9 Eliz 2) (c62) ss.7(l),
32(1).
Celluloid and Cinematograph Film Act 1922 (12 and 13 Geo 5) (c35) ss.l(3), 10.
Cinemas Act 1985 (cl3) s.16(1).
Control of Food Premises (Scotland) Act 1977 (c27) s.3(3).
Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 (c38) s.2(8)
Fire Precautions Act 1971 (c40) ss.4(l), 43(1), 9(2).
Food Safety Act 1990 (cl6), ss.26(2)(e), 37.
Guard Dogs Act 1975 (c50) ss.3(l), 4(1) [applied by Animals (S) Act 1987 (c9),
s.2(2)].
Lotteries and Amusements Act 1976 (c32) Sched. 1 para. 6. -
Nurseries and Childminders Regulation Act 1948 (11 and 12 Geo 6) (c53) ss.6(4),
2.
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Nurses (Scotland) Act 1951 (14 & 15 Geo 6) (c55) s.28(4).
Nursing Homes Registration (Scotland) Act 1938 (1 and 2 Geo 6) (c73) s.3(3).
Pet Animals Act 1951 (14 and 15 Geo 6) (c35) s.l(8), (4).
Poisons Act 1972 (c66) s.5(4),(6)(a).
Riding Establishments Act 1964 (c70) s.l(5)(10) [as amended by Riding
Establishments Act 1970 (c32) s.2(2)].
Road Traffic Act 1972 (clO) s.90(l)(a); s.90(l)(b) [as amended by Road Traffic Act
1974 (c50) Sched. 3 para. 6; Transport Act 1981 (c56) Sched. 12 pt. 111]; s.90(l)(c);
s.90; s.118(1)(2).
(Sheriff hears appeal from Secretary of State.)
Slaughter of Animals (Scotland) Act 1980 (cl3) ss.5(5); 15(4) [as amended by
Animal Health Act 1981 (c22), Sched. 5].
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (c49) Sched. 5 para. 1.
Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 (c52) s.7 [amended and repealed in part SI
87/1689].
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Theatres Act 1968 (c54) s.14(1).
Zoo Licensing Act 1981 (c37) ss.l8(l)(b).
Local Government/Public Health
Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 (c45) s.106(1) s.119(9).
(Sheriff hears appeals from local authority decisions regarding charitable collections.)
Clean Air Act 1956 (4 & 5 Eliz 2) (c52) s.12(3) [as amended by Interpretation Act
1978 (c30) s.l7(2)(a)].
(Sheriff hears appeals from local authority decisions on smoke control.)
Local Government (Scotland) Act 1966 (c51) Sched. 3 para. 3(4).
(Sheriff hears appeal from the decisions of local authorities on building completion
orders.)
Prevention of Damage by Pests Act 1949 (12, 13 and 14 Geo 5) (c55) s.4(l),(5),(6).
(Sheriff hears appeals from decisions of local authorities on pest control.)
Mental Health
Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (c36) s.33(2)(4) [as amended 1991 (c47), s.3];
s.34(l); s.29(4); s.47; s.51.
(Sheriff hears appeals concerning compulsory hospitalisation in State Mental Hospital,
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guardianship and discharge orders.)
Section Three: The Sheriff as a "Civil Judge"
Using the protasis/apodosis distinctions set out in section two above37, it is
possible to identify a number of the sheriffs appellate powers as being those of a
"civil judge". These provisions should be viewed as unexceptional civil hearings, in
which one of the parties happens to be a local authority: although the sheriff's
decision may well have some political content and polycentric effect38, the focus of
the hearing is on individual rights, and there is little possibility of a breach of
ostensive judicial impartiality or competence arising.39 In general terms, these
appeals may be characterised as being analogous to those which the court has held to
be "judicial", or a "true lis"40: appeal to the Court of Session is therefore
competent.
The "civil judicial" powers of the modern sheriff are set out below under
general headings, together with a brief note of their subject matter.
Child Law/Social Work
Foster Children (Scotland) Act 1984 (c56) ss.9, 10, 11(1).
(Sheriff is empowered to hear appeals from decisions of local authorities on fostering.)
Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 (c47) s.29(2)(b)(4) [as amended 1990 (c40), sched
8].
(Sheriff is empowered to grant legal aid for referrals under the SocialWork (Scotland)
Act 1968 s.42.)
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Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (c49) s.16 [as amended 1976 (c36), Sched 3;
1978 (c28), Sched 3; 1983 (c41), s.7; 1984 (c36) Sched 3; 1985 (c60), s.25; 1986
(c9), Sched 1; repealed in part by 1983 (c41), s.7]; s.18(3) [as amended 1983 (c41)
Sched 3; 1978 (c28) Sched 3; 1986 (c9) Sched 1; repealed in part 1975 (c72); 1991
(c50) Sched 1]; s.16A [as inserted by Children Act 1975 (c72) s.75]; s.80.
(Sheriff is empowered to hear appeals from decisions of local authorities on
assumption of parental rights, and is able to order payment of contributions to local
authorities.)
Electoral Law
Representation of the People Act 1983 (c2) ss.56(l),(a),(b),(d); 57; 78; 204;
128(l)(3)(b).
(Sheriff is empowered to hear appeals regarding decisions of the registration officer,
election expenses and local authority voting rights.)
Miscellaneous
Civil Aviation (Air Travel Organisers) Licensing Regulations 1972 CS1 1972 No.
223 Reg 8(2)(a).
(Sheriff hears appeals from decisions of the Civil Aviation Authority.)
Firearms Act 1968 (c27) s.44(l).
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(Sheriff has power to hear appeals from decisions of Chief Constables to revoke
firearms licenses.)
Fire Certificates (Special Premises) Regulations 1976 SI 1976 No. 2003 Reg.
12(1)(4).
(Sheriff hears appeals from decisions of Health and Safety Executive.)
Fire Services Act 1947 (10 and 11 Geo 6) (c41) s.26(2)(h) [see Firemen's Pension
Scheme Order 1973 SI 1973 No. 966 para. 68(1; SI 89/731; SI 90/1841; and SI
91/1097].
(Sheriff has power to hear appeals under the Firemens' Pension Scheme.)
Pilotage Act 1983 (c21) s.26(l)(2)(b).
(Sheriff hears appeals from pilotage authority decisions.)
Tenants' Rights Etc. (Scotland) Act 1980 (c52) s.5(3)(4)(b)(7); s.l6(4)(a)(b);
s.17(3)(4); s.20(l)(2); s.21, Sched. 3 paras 4, 5; s.23 Sched. 4 paras. 4, 5.
(Sheriff has power to hear appeals regarding statutory rights of local authority housing
tenants.)
Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 (c45) s.76; s.6(l).
(Sheriff has power to hear appeals from the decisions of chief constables regarding
lost property.)
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Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965 (c.49)
s.20(i)(ii)(iii) [as amended by 1986 (c9), Sched 1; 1991 (c50), Sched 1; repealed
in part ibid, Sched 2].
(Sheriff has power to hear a variety of appeals from decisions of the Registrar
General.)
Public Health
Sewerage (Scotland) Act 1968 (c47) s.33(2); s.41 [as amended by Roads (Scotland)
Act 1984 (c.54) Sched.9 para.64(4); and 1991 (c.22), Sched. 8].
(Sheriff is empowered to decide disputes between local authorities and statutorily
empowered appellants regarding discharge of trade effluents.)
Rights of the Sub ject
Race Relations Act 1976 (c.74) s.59(4) [see Race Relations (Formal Investigations)
Regulations 1977 (SI 1977 No. 841) Sched. 1]; ss. 62; 63; 38.
(Sheriff is empowered to hear appeals from Commission for Racial Equality
concerning allegations of racial discrimination.)
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (c.65) ss.59 [as amended 1984 (c28), Sched 2]; 68; 71;
72 [repealed in part 1976 (c74) Sched 5; amended ibid Sched 4].
(Sheriff is empowered to hear appeals from Equal Opportunities Commission
concerning allegations of sex discrimination.)
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Warrants
There are a large number of warrants which the sheriff is empowered to grant
in order to enable constables or other officials to enforce the provisions of the relevant
legislation. For reasons of space, it is not intended to list them.
Section Four; The Sheriff as "Administrative Judge"
As mentioned in chapter eight, the legislature has responded, albeit in an ad
hoc fashion, to the recommendations of the Grant Committee and developed statutory
formulae which have as their object the exclusion of matters of policy from the
sheriff's review of public authority decisions.41 The legislation requires the sheriff
to focus consideration on legal and jurisdictional concerns, and, for the most part is
consistent with (although not identical to) the grounds of common law judicial
review.42
The most important formula is s.39 of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 197643,
which stipulates that a sheriff may uphold an appeal from the decision of a licensing
board only if he considers that it: (i) erred in law; (ii) based its decision on an
incorrect material fact; (iii) acted contrary to natural justice; or (iv) exercised its
discretion in an unreasonable manner. Appeal is competent to the Court of Session
from the decision of the sheriff on points of law only. The s.39 grounds have been
adopted and adapted in a number of other statutes, which, taken together, can be
viewed as comprising the fourth category - the sheriff as an administrative judge.
As will be stressed in chapter fourteen below, it should not be claimed that
shrieval decisions under provisions of this type do not have policy implications for
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authorities: the decision of a court based on "reasonableness" or "error in law" can
have some effect on the decision taking authority.44 What is significant about the
adoption of these formulae is that the legislature has shown an implicit sensitivity to
the general principles advanced in chapter two. Accordingly, it is possible to discern
some form of recognition that it is inappropriate for the sheriff, as an independent
judge, to review the policy and merits based decisions of elected local authorities in
areas which have a high political content and polycentric effect: the sheriffs political
involvement is "indirect", and the polycentric effect of shrieval decisions is within
acceptable limits.
The provisions which make up the category are set out below. The vast
majority are concerned with licensing and registration.
Appeals in the style of s.39 of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976
Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963 (c.2) Sched.l para.24 [as under Licensing
(Scotland) Act 1976 (c.66) s. 133(4)].
(Sheriff has power to hear appeals from local authorities on various betting licenses.)
Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 (c.45) s.10(2)(3) [as amended by Transport
Act 1985 (c.67) Sched. 7 para 23(5)]; ss. 24(1), 25(3)(6) Sched, 1 para 18(1); s.28(l)
Sched. 1 para 18(1); s.38(l) Sched. 1 para 18(1); s.39(l) Sched. 1 para 18(1)
[amended by 1990 (cl6) Sched 3]; s.40(l) Sched.l para 18(1); s.41 [as amended by
Cinemas Act 1985 (c.13) para 17] Sched. 1 para 18(1); s.43 Sched. 1 para 18(1);
s.45 Sched. 2 para 24; s.64.
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(Sheriff has power to hear appeals from the decisions of local authorities over various
licensing matters and the regulation of public processions.)
Deer (Scotland) Act 1959 (7 & 8 Eliz 2) (c.40) s.25A(2) [inserted by Deer
(Amendment) (Scotland) Act 1982 (c.19) s.ll; Licensing of Venison Dealers
(Application Procedures)(Scotland) Order 1984 (SI 1984 No.922 Reg.4].
(Sheriff has power to hear appeals from decisions of local authorities on dealers'
licenses.)
Gaming Act 1968 (c.65) Sched. 2 para 33(1); s.52(l); Sched 2 para 61; Sched 2 para
45 [see SI 1978 No.229]; Sched.2 para.47(l) [see SI 1978 No.229]; Sched. 9 para
15 [see SI 1978 No.229 reg 9(l)(b)(c)].
(Sheriff has power to hear appeals from decisions of local authorities on gaming
licenses.)
Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976 (c.66) s.39 [AS (Appeals under the Licensing
(Scotland) Act 1976) 1977 (SI 1977 No. 1622); AS (Appeals under the Licensing
(Scotland) Act 1976 (Amendment) 1979 (SI 1979 No 1520); as amended 1990 (c40),
Sched 8]; ss 17 [amended 1990 (c40) Sched 8]; 26; 31 [amended ibid s.53]; 32; 36;
44; 53 Sched 4 [amended 1990 (c40) s.42; repealed in part ibid. Sched 9] paras 2,
7, 9, 10; s.65 [amended ibid s.48].
(Sheriff has power to hear appeals from the decisions of licensing boards regarding
liquor licenses.)
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Lotteries and Amendments Act 1976 (c.32) Sched 3 [amended SI 1988 No 108 and
SI 1991/2174] paras l(l)(d); l(2)(c); Sched 3 [amended ibid] para 12.
(Sheriff has power to hear appeals from the decisions of local authorities on the
commercial provision of amusements with prizes.)
Conclusion
Provided the process of categorisation remains within sensible boundaries, it
is a worthwhile exercise. The four categories noted above should not be viewed as
restrictive or rigid. Instead, they provide a framework around which discussion of
the different decision taking styles and provisions which make up the sheriff's
jurisdiction in local administration can take place. The value and effectiveness of the
categorisation, which focuses on theoretical rather than procedural issues, is
considered in depth in part four of the thesis.
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Chapter Ten: The Frequency of Appeals to the Sheriff
Introduction
It can be appreciated that the sheriffs jurisdiction in local administration is
substantial - on paper at least. The 1967 Grant Report suggested (without, however,
any empirical justification) that most of the sheriff's powers in this area were seldom
exercised, and that they took up no more than 5% of court time.1 This is what might
be termed a "court centred" evaluation, as it makes no comment on the polycentric
effect for authorities. It also gives little recognition to the fact that many appeals are
of great importance to the individual applicants. Similarly, the high political content
and unusual nature of many of the powers is denied any significance.
However, an appreciation of the number of appeals which are made is of
obvious relevance in any attempt to build up an accurate picture of how the sheriff's
jurisdiction operates in practice. It is difficult to glean anything other than very
general information from the Civil Judicial Statistics Scotland2, which are compiled
by the Scottish Courts Administration.
Accordingly, a fieldwork exercise was carried out in 1987 and 1988, in 12
representative Sheriff Courts situated throughout Scotland (there are 49 courts
altogether). The purpose of the exercise was to find out how often individual powers
were exercised in these courts over the three year period 1984 to 1986 inclusive. The
court records for 1987 and 1988 were not available. The results of the survey enable
a qualified extrapolation to be made and it is possible to build up a sufficiently
representative picture of what powers are exercised, and how often applications are
made.
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The chapter is set out as follows. Section one details the research
methodology. Section two gives a brief idea of the sheriff clerks' views on the
frequency of appeals and the amount of business. Section three provides the main
research findings, and a brief conclusion summarises the main points of note.
Section One: Research Methodology
The twelve sheriff courts were selected on the basis of a rural/urban population
split which was supplied by the Scottish Office Central Research Unit. The
rural/urban split was used to identify three groups of four courts, which provide
representative samples of "city" courts, "town" courts and "rural" courts. The sample
courts were as follows:
(i)"city" courts: Aberdeen Sheriff Court; Dundee Sheriff Court; Edinburgh
Sheriff Court; Glasgow Sheriff Court:
(ii)"town" courts: Dunfermline Sheriff Court; Inverness Sheriff Court; Paisley
Sheriff Court; Stirling Sheriff Court:
(iii)"rural" courts: Dunoon SheriffCourt; Duns SheriffCourt; Jedburgh Sheriff
Court; and Peterhead Sheriff Court.
Access to court records for the years 1984-1986 inclusive was obtained through
the Scottish Law Commission. All the courts were visited in person (the "city" and
"town" courts on more than one occasion). The research methodology was
comparatively simple. First, sheriff clerks took part in a short, semi-structured
interview. Second, the Summary Application books for each year were examined and
a note taken of every entry which indicated that an application had been made under
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the statutory provisions set out in chapter nine. Care was taken to ensure that any
adjournments were accounted for. It should also be noted that some of the provisions
listed above were not in force for all or part of the survey period: the preceding
provision is recorded when appropriate (e.g. for the Mental Health (Scotland) Act
1984, the comparable provisions of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960 are
recorded). Finally, as provisions concerning private landlord and tenant disputes were
excluded from the survey, it was decided that appeals under the Tenants Rights
(Scodand) Act 1980 should also be omitted. In any case, a similar survey and study
of tenants rights appeals was carried out by Himsworth and Adler3 shortly before the
beginning of this exercise. Unfortunately, access to unrecorded decisions was refused.
It was not possible to build up a fully representative picture of club licensing: the
registers were often not available, as they were either in use or could be required by
the court at short notice.
Section Two: The Response of Sheriff Clerks
Short (15 minute) semi-structured interviews were carried out with nine sheriff
clerks (referred to as Sheriff Clerks 1 to 9). It was a condition of interview that their
comments were given anonymously - although in the event nothing of a controversial
nature was said. The sheriff clerks themselves were extremely helpful. Their
seniority varied considerably: Sheriff Clerk 1 was Principal Sheriff Clerk for a
sheriffdom. Sheriff Clerks 2 and 3 were Assistant Sheriff Clerks in very large urban
courts, and the remainder were Sheriff Clerks Depute of varying seniority and
experience. The research findings can be summarised as follows.
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First, on being given a list of the powers which were under consideration in
the survey4, the majority of interviewees agreed that most of the provisions were
seldom (if ever) the grounds of an application. Second, it became apparent that whilst
a small number of powers were exercised fairly frequendy, there was a significant
variation between courts. For example, those courts which had no mental hospitals
within their jurisdiction had little or no experience of applications against compulsory
hospitalisation5, whereas those which did commented on the relative frequency and
sensitivity of these cases. Similarly, Sheriff Clerk 2, who had worked in a number of
busy courts, noted that the number of assumption of parental rights cases6, though
never high, varied according to the policy of different Regional Councils. Sheriff
Clerk 1 made a similar comment with regard to appeals against district licensing board
decisions.7 The amount of involvement that sheriff clerks had with applications also
varied from power to power, although in the majority of cases the procedure followed
was that of a simple summary application. For example, Sheriff Clerks 3 and 5
commented that in compulsory hospitalisation cases8 their sheriff had instructed them
to liaise closely with hospital authorities, whereas the others who had less experience
of these cases had not made any particular alterations to their practice. The more
senior sheriff clerks (i.e. Sheriff Clerks 1 to 3 and 6) pointed out that any inquiries
regarding the registration of private clubs9 were largely dealt with by sheriff clerks
(who are club registrars under the 1976 Licensing Act10) rather than sheriffs,
although the granting of a licence was always the responsibility of a sheriff. Sheriff
Clerk 5 felt that the applications "weren't really court work as such".
Third, sheriff clerks argued that some applications, although made only
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infrequently, were time consuming and required complicated administration and
planning (the assumption of parental rights11 was cited by Sheriff Clerk 2 as an
example). It was pointed out by Sheriff Clerk 1 that a simple entry in the summary
application book gave no real indication of the amount of time and effort that had
been expended. Finally, the majority of sheriff clerks were not impressed by the
Grant Committee's assertion that "administrative and miscellaneous" business took up
around 5% of court time12: it was felt that to try and assess an amorphous grouping
of statutory applications in this way was largely pointless and potentially misleading.
Sheriff Clerk 4 commented that it was an "off the top of the head" assessment, which
took no account of local variation and legislative changes.
Section Three: Data Collected
The data collected from summary applications books confirmed the views of
the sheriff clerks. It was apparent that there was considerable variation between courts
in workload and type of business. For example, Glasgow Sheriff Court had on
average four or five volumes of summary applications for each year, whereas the
small rural courts might only have two or three pages of summary applications
business annually. The difficulties faced by the Scottish Courts Administration when
compiling the Civil Judicial Statistics Scotland were also made clear. Sadly, the
summary applications books are frequently disorganised and sometimes illegible.
Different sheriff clerks have different styles of recording applications: some give a
careful note of the statutory provision in question, whereas others merely give the
short title of the relevant act.13 The value of the research findings must therefore be
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qualified by this.
The most straightforward way of setting out the data is to list all provisions
which were exercised at some time in any of the sample courts. The number of times
that they were utilised can then be set out in separate tables under the headings of
court and year. For reasons of space and clarity of presentation, it is not proposed to
set out the full list of powers included in the survey: reference can be made to the
categories set out in chapter nine above. Table One presents the totals from all twelve
sheriff courts. Appendix "B" sets out the data for each court.
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GRAND TOTAL FROM ALL TWELVE SHERIFF COURTS
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Betting and Gaming Act 1963















Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855
S 4 4 2 6
Civic Government (S) Act 1982











































































































Local Government (S) Act 1973
s 231 1 1
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Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Mental Health (S) Act 1984
Part V N/A 254 289 543
Mental Health (S) Act 1960
Part IV 354 N/A N/A 354
National Assistance Act 1947
unspecified 14 4 3 21
Nursing Homes Registration
(S) Act 1938
s 3 1 1













Deaths and Marriages (S) Act
1965
unspecified re-registrations 164 126 109 399
Road Traffic Act 1972
s 90 9 3 2 14
Sewerage (S) Act 1968
s 10
s 46 1 3 4




























GRAND TOTAL = 31976
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Conclusion
Although the grand total of applications is impressive, the vast majority (92%)
were applications for warrants. The findings tend to confirm the views of the sheriff
clerks: most of the provisions listed in chapter nine are rarely - if ever - used. It is
also plain that business is concentrated in the "city" and "town" courts, which is
hardly surprising. Indeed, Glasgow accounted for 466 out of the 501 unspecified
nuisance applications.14 Since these courts tend to have "teams" of sheriffs based in
them (eg Glasgow has around twenty15), the likelihood of these powers coming to
the attention of individual sheriffs with any frequency is extremely limited. This no
doubt goes some way towards explaining the sheriffs' traditional lack of interest in
their jurisdiction in local administration.
However, a few provisions stand out and are of a weighty nature. For
example, the period under consideration saw over 500 compulsory hospitalisations
under mental health legislation.16 There was a steady flow of appeals under the
Licensing (Scotland) Act 197617 and the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 198218
which were no doubt of considerable importance to the individual applicants. Over
30 children were the subject of assumption of parental rights proceedings19, which,
by their very nature, are highly distressing and complicated hearings. Evaluating the
effectiveness of sheriff court adjudication as a means of reaching decision in weighty
applications of this sort is one of the main aims of part four of the thesis.
As was noted in the introductory section, it is important to look behind the
figures. Merely because there are comparatively few appeals, it should not be
thought that the provisions themselves are unimportant. For example, there was a
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low number of appeals against school placing decisions under the Education (Scotland)
Act 198020, but, as will be made clear in chapter twelve, the effect of those
decisions on education authorities and their policies was very strong. Accordingly,
ascertaining the degree of effect that sheriff court decisions can have on authorities
is also an important issue for consideration in part four.
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Part Four: Introduction
This part of the thesis has four main aims. First, to give separate and detailed
consideration to the different categories of the analytical framework as set out in
chapter nine. Second, to evaluate each of the categories using the general principles
and rule of law theory developed in part one. Third, to present the result of
fieldwork research into powers which (partly on the basis of the data set out in chapter
ten) can be viewed as being "representative" of each of the categories: empirical
material is used to test the various assertions and points which are made. Fourth, to
give consideration to the question of how the sheriff's current jurisdiction could be
reformed.
Chapter Eleven: An Evaluation of First Instance Executive Powers
Introduction: Aims and Objectives
The general aim of this chapter is to marry the analytical approach taken in
Part One with a fieldwork study of how the sheriff operates in practice. Hopefully,
this will result in a synthesis which brings together the most attractive aspects of both
traditions of scholarship: the contextual overview and theoretical structure of the
former and the detailed, empirically tested consideration of particular judicial
functions which is typical of the latter.
The objectives of the chapter can therefore be summarised as follows. First,
to discuss how the first instance executive provisions identified in chapter nine
correspond with theoretical general principles for the allocation of decision taking
powers. Second, to select a power which is representative of the category for
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detailed consideration (powers of compulsory hospitalisation under mental health
legislation were chosen) in order to test the theoretically based evaluation, and, more
generally, to develop an understanding of the practical advantages and disadvantages
of shrieval adjudication.
Section One: First Instance Executive Powers and General Principles
Without indulging in unnecessary repetition, there are two general principles
that the legislature should have regard to when legislating. First, it should consider
whether the range and nature of the decision taking power allocated under statute
involves a degree of "direct political involvement"1 which is incompatible with the
standard of ostensive judicial impartiality.2 Second, it should consider whether the
adjudicatory process been given a task which it is ill-suited to perform, either on
account of its functional limitations, or because the task itself is anomalous or
anachronistic. Has ostensive judicial competence been compromised?3
As was noted in chapters eight and nine, the range of the sheriff's powers as
a first instance official has been curtailed.4 Compared with the number and extent
of powers held by sheriffs until well into this century, or extant higher governmental
powers, the category is small. Given that, with the exception of powers concerning
club licensing and mental health, the majority of powers are seldom if ever exercised,
the category is almost insignificant.5 With the exception of provisions concerning
public inquiries and some ex officio duties6, all the powers listed in chapter nine
concern applications to the sheriff, who is empowered to take final decisions on
matters which may loosely be termed "local administration". Sheriffs are entrusted
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with a wide degree of discretion. Although the court has traditionally viewed these
powers as being "administrative"7, it could not be said that any of them involve a
significant degree of political content: they do not conflict with ostensive judicial
impartiality. The question to ask is whether there is any good reason for the sheriff
to be responsible for their exercise: can it be argued that the powers in question are
contrary to ostensive judicial competence?
The general theme pursued in this chapter is that there are two broad sub¬
categories of first instance executive powers. First, there are those which are
historical anachronisms: there can be little or no justification for the sheriff's
continued involvement These powers are mainly (although not exclusively) to be
found listed in section one (c) and (d) of chapter nine. Second, there are provisions
which are not anachronistic in themselves, but which should be freed from association
with the sheriff's historical role of local representative of the Crown, which adds
nothing to, and may cause confusion within, important modern jurisdictions. The
powers which comprise this category can be found in section one (b), (e) and (f) of
chapter nine: less weighty provisions in sub-sections (b) and (e) may also be
included.8
Powers which fall into the first sub-category tend to be those which require the
sheriff to perform what is basically an executive function. It is difficult to find any
reasons - other than historical ones - which require the involvement of the sheriff. For
example, sheriffs are still required to conduct inquiries and perform a variety of other
duties under the Burial Grounds (Scotland) Act 1855.9 The data set out in chapter
ten indicated that a small number of applications was made during the sample
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period.10 The powers conferred by the Act have traditionally been viewed as being
purely executive or administrative in nature. Lords Dundas and McLaren made this
point very clearly in Liddal v Ballingry Parish Council, and Lord McLaren
highlighted the sheriffs position as an executive authority when he commented that
the "local authority" was "in this case, the sheriff'.11 Their evaluation is supported
by the way in which sheriffs have exercised their powers in practice. For example,
in Dunblane and Lecropt Parish Council, Petitioner, the sheriff visited and inspected
Dunblane Cathedral burial ground personally, before finding it to be "so situated and
so crowded with bodies as to be offensive and contrary to decency".12 The macabre
nature of the sheriffs duties was made plain in Ayr Town Council, Petitioner, when,
prior to finding a burial ground offensive and contrary to decency, "if not also
dangerous to health", it was noted that "human remains are usually found two and
three feet from the surface, sometimes only partially decomposed".13
The question of why sheriffs are still responsible for this function was raised
in evidence to the Grant Committee, and the Report concluded that it was
unnecessary for sheriffs to be involved in these matters.14 Nonetheless, the relevant
provisions are still in force. It should therefore be asked whether the degree of "direct
political involvement" inherent in the sheriffs function is such that it should be
allocated to a local authority. Clearly, it is negligible, and there is no real challenge
to ostensive judicial impartiality: on this basis alone it would be difficult to justify
change. However, the question of whether it is appropriate for an expert in
adjudication to be occupied with such mundane matters requires a different answer.
It is surely time to recognise that this particular power is anachronistic, and is simply
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a remnant of the public health jurisdiction held by sheriffs at a time when local
government was either incapable of carrying out effective regulation, or was not
empowered to do so. There is no requirement for adjudication, and accordingly there
is no reason for the sheriff's continued involvement: performing functions of this
nature does little for the standard of ostensive judicial competence.
Similarly, the only first instance executive function in section one (c) and (d)
to be exercised with any frequency is the provision requiring that sheriffs licence
private clubs in their court district.15 As was indicated in the preceding chapter, it
was not possible to build up an accurate picture of how many applications are made
each year, as it was not possible to obtain access to the registers.16 However, in
the city courts, the sheriff clerks estimated that the number of applications ran into
the hundreds for each year.
It is difficult on first inspection to see why sheriffs, rather than the local
authority, are still empowered to take decisions. No doubt it was originally intended
to maintain a distinction between public houses and private clubs, but given that
many clubs now operate large licensed premises, and appeals may be taken from
licensing board decisions to the sheriff under s.39 of the Licensing (Scotland) Act
197617, the distinction seems obsolete. Why should it remain? Private clubs may
cause the same amount of disturbance to local communities as public premises, and
it is surely desirable for questions of local interest, environmental health and fire
safety in all licensed premises to be regulated by a single local authority.18 For as
long as Licensing Boards operate under the constraints of the s.39 appeal
procedure19, there are no real grounds for thinking that local bias against, for
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example, the aims or membership of a club could be a factor in the decision to grant
or withhold a licence. In addition, whilst it could be argued prior to the Licensing
(Scotland) Act 1976 that sheriffs possessed wide discretionary power with regard to
the licensing of betting and gaming machines in both public and private premises
(sheriffs were able to hear appeals from licensing authorities on their merits20), the
advent of the s.39 appeal procedure makes the range and nature of the sheriffs first
instance power in club licensing anomalous. Why should sheriffs be limited to a
formulation not dissimilar to common law judicial review when hearing appeals
concerning public licensed premises21, and yet be the licensing authority for private
clubs, with a wider jurisdiction than local authority licensing boards? It is submitted
that there is no clear reason.
Three District Council Solicitors and three sheriffs were interviewed in
connection with appeals under s.39 of the 1976 Act: the interview findings are set out
in chapter fourteen. However, the opportunity was taken to ask about the sheriff's
function in club registration. All the District Council Solicitors felt that the sheriff's
position was difficult to justify. For example, one commented that: "It [ie the
sheriff's power] does seem an extremely anomalous and inappropriate function for
sheriffs." A commonly held concern was that the sheriff court process did not provide
the same public health and hygiene standard as the district, council was able to in
public premises. Another solicitor stated:
"All licensed premises are inspected by environmental health authorities to
check that they are up to standard, but they do not get a foothold in private clubs
which may well offer services to the public. For health and hygiene reasons
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safeguarding is required.... I think that club registration should go to the District
Licensing Boards."
It was noted by the third solicitor that councillors on his authority had been
frustrated by the fact that complaints over late night disturbances went to the sheriff,
rather than the District Council.
The sheriffs themselves had clearly given little thought to their role in club
registration, beyond checking any objections, and fire and police certificates. One
sheriff did, however, note that, "The origins of the function are that clubs are
private organisations - but nowadays as we all know many clubs are as public as the
public house next door." There were no strong views on the subject, and none of the
shrieval interviewees were perturbed at the suggestion that their club registering
function should be allocated to district councils.
It would be difficult to argue that the power to license private clubs could be
construed as an area of business which is likely to have any real implications for the
ostensive impartiality of sheriffs. However, it can be appreciated that the allocation
of this function to the sheriff is now no longer appropriate on the grounds that it is
contrary to ostensive judicial competence. The sheriff is primarily an adjudicator,
and it is difficult, if not impossible, to see why a highly paid judge should be
involved in this type of routine regulation, when there is no requirement for
adjudication. There is therefore a strong case to the effect that club licensing should
become a local authority function: appeal could lie to the sheriff from the licensing
board decision, as is the case in appeals concerning public licensed premises.22
Other powers which were not exercised at all in the sample taken in chapter
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ten also appear to be anomalous. Why, for example, are sheriffs still charged with
executive responsibilities concerning harbours and docks?23 The recent case of
Western Isles Islands Council v. Caledonian MacBravne indirectly raised the question
of whether it is appropriate for modern judges to continue to supervise the alteration
of local authority bye-laws in the event of harbour development.24 Similarly, why
should it still be thought necessary to appoint senior members of the judiciary as
Commissioners for the Northern Lighthouses?25
It is difficult to argue that these jurisdictions should continue: they should be
viewed as being at odds with the standard of ostensive judicial competence. The only
real argument to support the status quo with regard to these and similar powers is that
sheriffs would rarely if ever be expected to carry out their statutory functions, and
so there is no real cause for concern. However, it is contended that this is not a
particularly good argument, as, if viewed in a wider context, it condemns the
sheriff's jurisdiction in local administration to anachronism, thereby denying the
potential that Sheriff Court adjudication has as a means of providing statutory review
of local administration at a local level.
The second sub-category of first instance executive powers26, those which
are neither anachronistic, nor contrary to the standards of ostensive judicial
impartiality and competence, raises different issues. Some of these powers are, in
terms of their consequences for individuals, the most weighty and important of the
sheriff's functions in local administration.27 The main points for consideration are
the effectiveness of shrieval adjudication as a decision taking process, and the
appropriateness of the continued association with the historic governmental
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jurisdiction.
What sort of functions are sheriffs required to carry out? There are a number
of common features which link the powers in this sub-category. The sheriff is usually
empowered to decide applications made by public authorities, and is able to exercise
a wide and final discretion. Some of the applications may involve important civil
liberties: for example, should the elderly be removed to hospital because they are
incapable of caring for themselves28, or should individuals be compelled to submit
themselves for a medical examination against their wishes?29 Others are, however,
rather more mundane: for example, sheriffs are also responsible for deciding on local
nuisances.30
The data set out in chapter ten indicated that one of the most frequently
exercised example of a section one (f) power, was compulsory hospitalisation of the
mentally ill under the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984.31 Accordingly, it was
selected for detailed discussion and empirical study.
Section Two: The Compulsory Hospitalisation of the Mentally 111
(i) Introduction and Research Objectives
Sections 18 to 22 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 198432 provide for the
compulsory hospitalisation of a patient suffering from a mental disorder for a period
of up to 6 months. It should be noted at the outset that most patients in hospital are
voluntary patients, and that separate procedures exist for emergency detention, short
term detention, interim detention and the care of the criminally insane.33 Compulsory
hospitalisation follows from the approval by the sheriff of an application made by
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either a mental health officer or a statutorily defined nearest relative, which has been
supported by two medical recommendations.34 In practice, most applications are
made by mental health officer. The sheriff has a wide and final power of decision,
and extensive provision is made for the purpose of making "such enquiries and
[hearing] such persons [including the patient] as he sees fit."35
As indicated above, it would indeed be difficult to suggest that the allocation
of these powers to the sheriff by the legislature was contrary to the general principles
set out in chapter two. The nature of the issues under consideration do not involve
strong political or polycentric considerations. This is not to claim that they are not
present. For example, a shrieval decision may have implications for social work or
hospital policy. However, it is clear that the degree of significance which should be
attached to these factors is very much less than issues such as the health and civil
liberty of a patient, or whether a patient might prove a threat to public safety.
Ostensive judicial impartiality and competence, and the wider values of the rule of
law are not challenged by the sheriff's function.
The question of whether or not shrieval adjudication is the appropriate decision
taking process should therefore be answered in the affirmative. The central issue for
consideration by the sheriff is whether a patient should be deprived of liberty, held in
a locked hospital ward, and subjected to a regime of drugs against his or her will.
Adopting Mullan's terminology, this is an area of decision taking which requires a
great deal of attention to be given to matters of procedural fairness and natural justice,
as the sheriff's function is one "requiring straight law/fact determinations and resulting
in serious consequences to individuals."36
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The primary aim of the empirical investigation into how the compulsory
hospitalisation process operates in practice is to assess the effectiveness of shrieval
adjudication as a means by which patients' rights are protected, and to identify ways
in which the process can be made more efficient. As indicated above, criticism of
powers solely on the grounds of whether or not they contravene the ideal standards
of ostensive judicial impartiality and competence would be lacking. The strengths and
weaknesses of shrieval adjudication as a decision taking process should also be
considered. It is not necessarily enough to argue that decision taking in the sheriff
court is appropriate: the quality of the decision taking should also be evaluated.
However, before detailed consideration is given to the research findings, the
implications of the supposedly "administrative" character of the sheriff's powers
should be examined: is the tenacity of the "ministerial" or "administrative" tradition
potentially or actually detrimental to modem development and practice?
It is important to note that the Act expressly states that the powers and the
jurisdictions of the sheriff when conducting the hearing and investigation are the same
"as if [the sheriff was] acting in the exercise of his civil jurisdiction", and that in all
appeals to the sheriff, the patient has a right to be heard.37 These rather enigmatic
provisions have been taken to mean that Parliament does not expect sheriffs to carry
out a judicial function. The courts have accordingly interpreted these provisions as
being references to the sheriff's "administrative" jurisdiction.38 The "administrative"
nature of the power to hospitalise was stressed by the Inner House in T.F. v.
Management Committee of Ravenscraig Hospital.39 The case centred around the
issue of whether or not the sheriff was acting "administratively" or "judicially" under
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section 113(1) of the Act which concerned the patient's right to be heard. If the
sheriff was acting judicially then appeal to the Court of Session would have been
competent; conversely, if the power was administrative, the sheriffs decision was
final. The court held that the power was "administrative" in nature, and that further
appeal was therefore incompetent.40
The argument accepted by the court was comparatively uncomplicated.
Following Arcari v. Dumbartonshire County Council, it was held that the distinction
was one which should be resolved after a close interpretation of the provision in
question. The court decided that a judge who did not give a party to a judicial
process the right to a hearing "would contravene all of the basic principles of natural
justice. He would be acting unjudicially and would not need to be told so."41 The
fact that it was felt necessary to state that a patient had the right to a hearing was held
to indicate that the proceedings could not possibly be judicial, and must therefore be
administrative. The argument only appears coherent when the weight that was
attached to the sheriff's traditional ministerial role is appreciated. The court noted that
the "involvement of the sheriff in the control and the treatment of the mentally ill is
no new thing,"42 and went on to point out that the;
"... role of the sheriff in the detention, control and discharge of persons who
suffer from mental illness goes back far beyond the Mental Health (Scotland) Act
1960. That role has consistently been regarded as administrative since it began.
Sheriffs and sheriff substitute, now sheriffs principal and sheriffs, have exercised these
functions exclusively and finally throughout."43
This is undoubtedly the case, as should be clear from reference to the historical
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chapters above. The court went on to state; "We consider it to be inconceivable that
the character of this role should be altered other than by legislative provision,
expressly or by the clearest implication."44
Unfortunately, it is not clear from Hansard45 whether parliamentarians were
even aware that sheriffs had an administrative jurisdiction. The parliamentary debate
on the relevant provision is fragmented and of a low standard. However, it would
appear that the intention of the legislature was essentially directed towards securing
an adherence to a decision of the European Court of Human Rights and the European
Convention on Human Rights, which stipulate that those who are the subject of
compulsory hospitalisation proceedings should have the right to judicial review46
Accordingly, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the court, in giving such strong
support to the administrative tradition in mental health, was perpetuating something
of a legal fiction.
It is also evident that, as so often in the past, the court itself was unclear as to
what an administrative power actually is. Whilst the consequence of a provision being
deemed to be administrative (i.e. no further appeal) is clear enough, describing the
nature of an administrative provision proves to be rather more difficult. Nonetheless,
the court made an interesting attempt; "they [the decisions] were all administrative
acts. In every case the sheriff was acting as integral part of the administrative
process. He was not being invited to deliver judgment on a question of law."47
Notwithstanding this development, it must be wondered whether the
reincarnation of the administrative distinction was necessary. Given the sheriff's
important role as guardian of civil liberties, it is argued that beyond indicating to
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sheriffs that they should never view their mental health jurisdiction as being civil or
criminal business, the administrative tag is irrelevant and potentially unhelpful. It
deflects attention away from more important issues - the main one being the question
of how to ensure that the adjudicatory process functions effectively as a safeguard of
patients' civil liberties in modern mental health law. As is made plain below, there
are serious areas of concern which are rather more deserving of attention than arcane
distinctions in sheriff court function.
(ii) Fieldwork Methodology and Objectives
Fieldwork was carried out between 1987 and 1989. Five senior Mental Health
Officers (MHOs "A" to "E"), five consultant psychiatrists (CPs "A" to "E"), six
sheriffs (Sheriffs "A" to "F"), and senior staff at the Mental Welfare Commission
(MWC) and Scottish Association for Mental Health (SAMH) participated in one hour
long semi-structured interviews. The participants agreed to be interviewed on the
understanding that they were to remain anonymous. Whenever possible, the
consultant psychiatrists and MHOs were based in the selected sheriffs' court districts.
The purpose of this was to build up a sample group which provided a picture of how
professionals from five different hospitals interacted with each other and their "local"
sheriffs. The interviewees themselves were unaware of this arrangement, in order that
they would not feel constrained during interview. Most of the interviewees were
extremely helpful, and were very frank about the process, together with the problems
which were felt to exist. It was not possible to interview patients and ex-patients.
The reason for this was primarily practical. Although the research findings should be
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viewed in this context, the information provided by SAMH, MHOs and the MWC was
essentially concerned with the patients' point of view.
(iii) Research Findings
In keeping with the wide ranging nature of the study, consideration was given
to the hospitalisation process as a whole, although the focus was on the effectiveness
of shrieval adjudication. Discussion is split up into two categories: (a) the pre¬
hearing stage, and (b) the hearing itself.
It should be noted at the outset that the consensus amongst most interviewees
was that the shrieval review of section 18 applications was in the best interest of
patients, and that any changes to extant practices should be in the nature of "polishing
up" the decision taking procedure, rather than any radical reform. It was felt that the
section 18 procedures were an improvement on those of the Mental Health (Scotland)
Act I960.48 However, it is contended that there were a number of areas of concern:
shrieval adjudication, although perhaps the most appropriate decision taking process,
has a number of serious flaws.
(a) The Pre-hearing Process
The Decision to Hospitalise
All interviewees agreed that the majority of patients who require compulsory
hospitalisation are already in hospital under section 24 (72 hours detention) or section
26 (20 days detention); however, in one hospital with a large rural hinterland, most
patients come directly to a section 18 hearing from the community.
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The purpose of the hearing before the sheriff is to protect the rights of a person
who wishes to challenge a medical recommendation that they should be deprived of
liberty in order to receive compulsory treatment for mental illness. It is therefore a
matter of concern that many of the MHO interviewees were concerned that patients
could be pressurised into consenting to be "voluntary" patients by medical staff,
thereby bypassing the right to a hearing before the sheriff. Clearly, the effectiveness
of any hearing process depends on applicants having unrestricted access to the court.
MHO "C" felt that some patients had been presented with a "Hobson's choice -
no real choice at all" by some consultants on this vital question. MHO "A" agreed
and felt that the patients could be put in a "Catch 22 position" when confronted with
the choice of "either you stay in as a voluntary patient, or the medical evidence is
such that you will be compulsorily detained." It was recognised by MHO "B" "that
there was a fine line between heavy persuasion and coercion", and the majority of
interviewees stressed that most psychiatrists were motivated by a concern for the
wellbeing of patients.
However, MHOs "A", "B", "C", and "D" all felt that medical staff were not
concerned enough about the civil liberties of patients, however well intentioned they
may be. For example, MHO "C" commented that "doctors are quite arrogant about
civil liberties", and that "coercion is a very powerful determinant" in a patient's
decision to become a voluntary patient Only one consultant psychiatrist agreed that
this was not completely without foundation. Consultant Psychiatrist "A" stated that
the "honest answer is that psychiatrists are arrogant, but they would also think that
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they know best [and] would see the patient's right to treatment against his will as
being a more important civil liberty in comparison to his actual liberty: denying
treatment is a more serious abuse of civil liberties."
This approach is rather different from that taken by MHO "B", who
commented that the most important civil liberty is "the right to chose treatment
yourself, rather than have it forced on you, and if things go further the right to have
a judge and not a doctor decide on your future". It is submitted that it is this
interpretation which is in the spirit of the legislation, rather than that of Consultant
Psychiatrist "A": although his argument is entirely justifiable, the legislation is
nonetheless clear that a hearing should be provided should the patient wish one.
The comments of Consultant Psychiatrists "B" and "D" are more representative
of the views held by the medical interviewees. Consultant Psychiatrist "B" stated that
he was aware of the danger of presenting himself in such a way that he could coerce
a patient into becoming a "voluntary" patient against his or her will: "I am aware that
there is a danger of presenting an overpowering impression to the patient." The views
of Consultant Psychiatrist "D" were similar. He felt that doctors had to remember that
the question of whether or not a patient should be hospitalised was "a balance - is the
medical condition such as to justify as overruling a person's civil liberties?" On the
question of a patient being faced with a "Hobson's choice", he commented that: "it is
matter of how you present it. I think it is outwith the spirit of the Act to coerce - the
doctor should always say to the patient "You have the right to object""
Despite the generally thoughtful and responsible approach which consultant
psychiatrists appear to take to the issue of the patient's right to choose to have a
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hearing, it was alarming to find that MHOs "A" and "B" had been involved in a case
where a senior psychiatrist had advised the Social Work Department that a patient was
consenting to hospitalisation when, in MHO "A"'s words, "in fact she was not [and]
the ward staff said this person was not consenting". MHO "B" went on to say, "I
think in this case, the person concerned [i.e. the consultant psychiatrist] just could not
be bothered with the "hassle" of going to court and decided that his decision was that
the patient was not going to argue... At the end of the day the person was detained...
but she had wanted to exercise her right [i.e. to a hearing]". Nor would it seem that
this was necessarily an isolated incident: MHO "A" stated that "these things do
happen".
Some sheriffs also felt that there was a possible cause for concern, although
by its very nature the issue is one which is not likely to come to the attention of the
court: sheriffs can only hear cases in which the patient has objected to a medical
recommendation. However, views were mixed. Sheriff "B" was very seriously
concerned at the prospect of patients being denied access to the court, and, with the
above example in mind, rightly so. He made a very strong statement, leaving no
doubt that in his eyes the issue was an extremely serious one: "it would concern me
because... the issue at stake is the liberty of the individual: I would be concerned if
a doctor was in effect to say "you will either agree or else". You are getting
Hobson's choice and Hobson's choice means no choice... By proceeding in that way
is compelling the patient to accept the treatment, and that is not voluntary treatment....
I think that it would be quite wrong, highly unfair and highly improper". He went on
to say that he would regard this type of pressure as being similar to the police
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proceeding on improperly obtained evidence, where coercion is involved.
Sheriff "A" knew of at least one case where it appeared that doctors had tried
to, in effect, coerce the patient into hospitalisation. He too felt that some psychiatrists
did not give proper consideration to the question of the patient's civil liberties:
"sometimes you do get the impression that the doctors tend to say, "Well we want
to treat this chap... if he's maybe thrown a tantrum or something", ... rather than
deserving a six months loss of civil liberties." However, he was also conscious of the
fact that it was sometimes very difficult for doctors to tell patients that they require
hospitalisation without potentially appearing coercive, and he appreciated that it was
very likely that in many cases it might be felt to be in the patient's best interest to
avoid a hearing, which could be extremely traumatic; "It is a difficult question - to be
fair, doctors do give the impression that the best way of treating them is to get them
in the hospital and keep them there - but normally they have got very good reasons
for seeming to take that attitude." He reiterated this point by stressing that there was
"no reason to suspect that they [i.e. consultant psychiatrists] are not sympathetic
towards the patients."
Sheriff "C" was rather less concerned about the issue than either Sheriffs "A"
or "B". His impression was that medical staff were aware of the civil liberties aspect
of hospitalisation and that they took care not to appear coercive when recommending
to patients that they consider admitting themselves, rather than initiating the
compulsory hospitalisation procedure. He felt that the procedures which had been
introduced by the 1984 Act involving qualified MHOs49 and shrieval hearings, made
doctors more aware of the value of civil liberties. He also expressed some sympathy
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with the position that doctors could find themselves in, commenting that it was "very
difficult for people to understand their civil liberties when they do not know what is
wrong with them".
The issue is clearly a complicated one, and it is not being suggested that
consultant psychiatrists are generally thoughtless or irresponsible in the way that they
exercise their powers under the Act The majority of patients are no doubt happy to
accept the medical recommendation and are, by virtue of the fact that an application
has been made, very seriously ill. Some are suicidal and a danger to those around
them. However, the incidents referred to by MHOs "A" and "B", and Sheriff "A",
together with the wider worry that there was a danger of coercion (whether it be
intentional or otherwise), are such as to give rise to genuine concern. As Sheriff "B"
pointed out, the issue which is of paramount concern is the liberty of the individual -
something which should only ever be denied under the most stringent safeguards.
Viewed from this perspective, there is enough evidence to suggest that procedures
could be made more effective.
Identifying the potential for problems is comparatively simple, but suggesting
solutions which would not prove inefficient or counter productive is rather more
difficult. One interviewee suggested that the sheriff should have a wider ranging
power over all mental patients, whether voluntary or not, which would involve sheriffs
in authorising all hospitalisations. It is, however, difficult to see how this would work
in practice without the sheriff becoming a meaningless "rubber stamp" for medical
decisions. It was this type of situation which was perceived by interviewees as being
one of the main flaws in the Mental Health (Scotland) Act I960.50
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A more workable alternative was suggested by MHO "B", who wanted sheriffs
to take a much closer interest in their local hospitals. He felt that the sort of situation
that he and MHO "A" had encountered would be very much less likely to occur if the
sheriff was to make regular inspections of hospitals in the jurisdiction: "having
someone like the sheriff coming into the hospital would make some people buck up
their ideas - even if he was just on a magisterial progress through the building, people
would say "The sheriff is here - we had better watch out""
Interestingly, this was precisely the function that sheriffs used to perform as
part of their original governmental jurisdiction under early mental health legislation.51
Apart from this precedent, there is another reason to support a return to shrieval
inspections. MHO "B" pointed out that it seemed anomalous that sheriffs should be
content to hospitalise patients for a period of six months without appearing to have
any interest in conditions in mental wards: "I would like the sheriffs to see the
conditions in which people are detained - they may start to understand the reservations
of some of the patients. There are certain wards where the level of care is not very
good, and it would be an improvement if the sheriff had an oversight of that."
To conclude consideration of this point, it is recognised that solutions are most
likely to be found once all the parties involved are able to recognise that there is at
least a potential problem. On the basis of the research findings it would seem that
some of the medical and shrieval interviewees would need to be convinced. Perhaps
the views expressed in this chapter might go some way towards doing so. There are
no doubt many effective suggestions which could be made, and it is submitted that
debate on this issue should be initiated. Given that the effectiveness of a shrieval
217
hearing, adjudication and the protection of civil liberties are at issue, sheriffs, legal
practitioners and academic lawyers should not stand back from participation.
The Availability of Legal Aid and Representation
The second issue which was identified as a cause for concern at the pre-hearing
stage of compulsory hospitalisation was the availability of legal aid and legal
representation for patients and nearest relatives.
It is again rather alarming to find that patients wishing to challenge a
compulsory hospitalisation recommendation must qualify under the increasingly
restrictive means test for civil legal aid.52 With the surprising exception of sheriffs,
many interviewees felt strongly that legal aid should be automatically available free
of charge to any patient who wished representation, most particularly because MHOs
(who in practice make the vast majority of applications) are automatically represented
by regional council solicitors. It was argued that the position of a patient wishing to
challenge an application is fundamentally different from that of a person wishing to
defend their rights in a normal civil action concerning, for example, a matrimonial
dispute or a nuisance. Patients feel themselves to be defending their very right to
liberty, and are often extremely ill and unable to articulate their viewpoint effectively.
Consultant Psychiatrist "C" was strongly critical of the legal aid hurdles that faced
patients53, arguing that "this is a particularly vulnerable group of people - it seems
foolish and anomalous to make them pay for part of their psychiatric care." The
central point which was made by a number of interviewees was that the applications
should be seen as part of the administrative process of health service treatment, and
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should on this ground alone be free. It is argued that this interpretation is in the spirit
of the legislation, which, as mentioned above, distinguishes the hearing before the
sheriff from ordinary civil business: the sheriffs powers should be viewed as being
part of a modern, special provision for civil liberties in mental health treatment.
Further concerns were voiced concerning the uncertainty of the legal costs
which could face a nearest relative wishing to make an application for the compulsory
hospitalisation of, for example, a seriously ill husband or wife. However, as
mentioned above, the vast majority of applications are made by MHOs and hospital
authorities in part to avoid the legal costs for nearest relatives, and also to defuse
tensions which could arise out of the initiation of the compulsory hospitalisation
procedure by a close relative. Indeed, it would seem that in practice there is little if
any cause for concern as regards legal aid and representation for nearest relatives.
A central factor which can prevent patients from securing legal aid and
representation is time. As noted above, many of the patients who are hospitalised
compulsorily for a six month period are already in hospital under short term detention.
At the time fieldwork was being carried out, which was prior to the Mental Health
(Detention) (Scotland) Act 199154, the legislation55 required that detention under
section 26 (28 days short term detention) could be continued only if the application
had been correctly made out, approved by the sheriff and received by the hospital
before the end of the detention period. The 1991 Act provides that hospital authorities
can apply to the sheriff to extend a section 26 detention by 3 days56: it does not
address the central problem.
The important point to note is that if hospitals wait until the last possible day
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to make their application (as they frequently do) it was felt that some patients are
unable to obtain representation when they require it, that solicitors occasionally have
to provide their services on a "grace and favour" basis, that it has sometimes been
impossible to obtain expert witnesses (who are important in any serious attempt to
challenge medical recommendations), and that cases are not always fully prepared.
Whilst there was praise from all participants (in particular from sheriffs) for solicitors
who were prepared to take on work at short notice without any guarantee of payment,
it is clear that the situation is an unsatisfactory one.
Shrieval interviewees made a number of recommendations with this problem
in mind. Sheriff "B" felt that the hospital authorities should be under a statutory
requirement to submit their application for compulsory hospitalisation at an earlier
stage: this would enable the patient to instruct a solicitor and, if required, obtain a
medical opinion. However, this suggestion would have to be balanced against the
point that the medical authorities may have strong clinical reasons - not least of which
would be a desire to see how the patient is responding to treatment - for holding back
until comparatively late in the 28 day period before recommending further
hospitalisation. This point was illustrated graphically in the B v. Forsley case, and
indeed gave rise to the 1991 Act.57 Sheriff "B" also felt strongly that sheriffs
themselves should be able to grant legal aid for section 18 cases, as under section 29
of the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986.58 As an alternative, Sheriff "A" felt that the
delay in the legal aid process could be avoided by permitting solicitors to arrange
legal aid over the telephone, rather than by more complicated (and time consuming)
form filling. Adopting a different approach, Sheriff "E" argued that sheriffs should
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be able to extend the section 26 detention order for a limited period of seven days in
order to enable a patient to prepare his case for hearing. This would provide sheriffs
with powers similar to that held under section 42(6) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act
196859 (as amended) which enables a sheriff to detain a child prior to a children's
hearing. Clearly, the Mental Health (Detention) (Scotland) Act 199160 would now
have to be taken into account in any such reform, but the rationale for allowing
sheriffs to extend detention to enable a patient to prepare a case still stands, as the
1991 Act serves an altogether different purpose.61
Any changes to current practice are likely to require statutory revision.
However, it is argued that the de facto time limitations which are placed on patients
are such that they hamper the effectiveness of shrieval adjudication as a means of
protecting civil liberties. It is submitted (albeit tentatively) that the most effective
solution would be to enable sheriffs to grant legal aid themselves, and to extend
section 26 orders for a strictly limited period if this was required. As indicated above,
there are similar safeguards in child care law, and given that the mentally ill are a
equally vulnerable group, there is a strong argument for their extension to the
compulsory hospitalisation process.
(b) The Hearing
The question of whether adjudication before the sheriff was effective as a
means of protecting the civil liberties of patients drew a mixed response. There are
a number of points to be considered.
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One Shot Performer v Repeat Performers?
For an adjudicatory process to be effective it has to be structured in such a
way that it encourages the full participation of both parties.62 Following on from the
points made above, it is clear that the fact that the majority of patients are unable to
secure legal representation poses something of a problem, in that they lack the forensic
skills and legal advice of a solicitor. The central issue is whether the process makes
allowances for this, and avoids the most negative aspects of adversarial adjudication,
which are so lucidly illustrated by Gallanter's model of the "one shot performer"
versus the "repeat performers".63 It became apparent that there are some serious
problems.
There was concern that patients who exercise their right to a hearing were
likely to be distressed by the fact that the hearing would (in most cases) take place in
the court building; it was felt that the connotations of criminality would be
overwhelming for the majority of patients. Most interviewees felt it to be generally
inappropriate for the hearing to be conducted in a traditional court room, preferring
either a hearing in chambers or one in the hospital itself. A further problem which
was identified was the difficulty encountered by patients in the court waiting room.
Senior MHO "B" commented: "sometimes we have waited for over an hour to actually
go into court - if you have got a patient who is upset and possibly hallucinating from
my position as somebody who actively wants to get someone treated its great! But
from a fairness point of view it is not". Some felt that sheriffs were not averse to
coming to the hospital, but that sheriff clerks were unwilling to make the requisite
arrangements.
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The response of sheriffs to these general issues was very constructive and it
was clear that they had given a considerable degree of thought to them. However,
it is interesting to note that the sheriffs' individual interpretations of what is desirable
varied quite considerably. Sheriffs "A" and "C" felt that it was "most inappropriate"
for section 18 hearings to be held in a traditional court room setting, and expressed
a willingness to travel to the hospital itself if it was felt to be necessary: it was
argued strongly that the sheriff should take whatever steps are required to put the
patient at ease. Normally, however, hearings took place in chambers. If a patient was
sceptical that he was actually being heard by a judge, a flexible approach was taken,
and the hearing would take place in a court room. Sheriffs "D" and "E" occasionally
held their hearings in a court room, but felt this was acceptable because their court
houses were particularly well appointed, and there were suitable, informal civil court
rooms: unless the patient was very ill, they preferred not to go to the hospital.
Sheriff "B" took a very distinctive approach, and made a point of holding all hearings
in a normal court room (although never in open court). On principle, he disapproved
of visiting the hospital and would only hold hearings in chambers if the patient was
not present. His argument was that the patient should be absolutely clear that his case
was being dealt with by an ostensively impartial judge, although not a criminal court:
"If I were sitting in the hospital, I would be seen as being part of the hospital as
opposed to being separate from it". All sheriffs felt that the patient should be
protected from any taint of criminality or suspicion that the sheriff was conspiring
with the medical authorities: however, it can be appreciated that opinions differed as
to how this could best be achieved.
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The visual impact on a patient of a sheriff in full judicial garb also attracted
strong criticism from some interviewees as it was felt that this would reinforce
unhelpful connotations of criminal guilt. It was also felt that some sheriffs (very
much the minority) were prone to forgetting the delicate nature ofmental health cases;
three interviewees stated that patients had been referred to inadvertently as "the
accused". The question of the suitability of judicial garb again drew a mixed
response from sheriffs. Sheriffs "A" and "C" were again in agreement that the wig
and gown were highly unsuitable, and could only serve to heighten any
misapprehensions that the patient might have as regards the nature of proceedings.
In the small minority of cases where patients wanted reassurance that they really were
sheriffs, they were prepared to don their robes. Sheriffs "D" and "E" had no strong
feelings on the matter, and tended to wear wig and gown if they were in the court
room, but not if they were in chambers. Sheriff "B" felt emphatically that judicial
garb was necessary to ensure that the patient was in no doubt that his case was being
considered by an ostensively impartial judge, rather than one who "would not
obviously be a judge, but just someone sitting on the other side of a desk". He did
not appear to have considered the point that an uninformed patient might feel that he
was facing a criminal prosecution. It is submitted that Sheriffs "A" and "C" were
correct in their approach to these issues.
The Sheriff - A Rubber Stamp or a Safeguard?
Beyond these matters of style, which can, however, be seen as being of
considerable importance to patients' perceptions of the hearing and how they were
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able to participate in them, there are other issues for consideration. Are hearings
•
•
conducted in such a way that patients are able to present their case as effectively as
possible? Do sheriffs make allowances for their state of health and the fact that the
majority are unrepresented? Is the value of the adjudication lessened by functional
limitations which make it difficult for sheriffs to assess psychiatric evidence? Does
adjudication serve as an effective safeguard of patients' rights, or a legal rubber stamp
for medical opinion? Most interviewees were in favour of sheriffs taking an
informal and interventionist role in proceedings, although this was balanced by an
appreciation of the need to ensure that "justice is seen to be done". It was generally
felt that sheriffs were very sympathetic to patients and were usually ready to adopt a
relaxed, inquisitorial approach - especially if there were no solicitors involved (i.e.
acting for either the patient or the hospital authorities). The term "inquisitorial"
seemed to be used to denote a high degree of judicial intervention, rather than a
continental style of procedure. Some interviewees felt that if patients were
represented, their chances of avoiding detention were increased, as "wily" solicitors
would ensure that their clients did not give evidence: this was felt to be potentially
dangerous.
All sheriffs thought it important to ensure that the patient should be made to
feel as calm as possible. All were aware of the need to strike a balance between
creating an informal atmosphere and at the same time ensuring that procedural
formalities matched the gravity of the issues at stake. However, as may be surmised
from the following statements, opinions differed as to where the balance lay. For
example, Sheriff "A" conducted hearings "rather like a children's hearing64: I ask the
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medics to put forward their case fairly briefly, and let the patient or his representative
ask their questions, quite often the patient just wants to chat with the sheriff. Sheriff
"C" took a similar approach, and commented: "I strongly feel that the last thing you
want to do is to make the patient feel like an accused or something - and if you run
it like a normal court hearing you will do that". However, Sheriff "B" maintained the
essence of court procedure: "the hearings are more informal than criminal and civil
hearings, but not necessarily more relaxed, because the issue is a matter of some
considerable importance - the liberty of the individual".
There was inevitably a high degree of judicial intervention when solicitors were
not present, but if there was representation then the hearing tended to become more
of an adversarial contest. The sheriffs felt that they were careful to ensure that
patients were not questioned in an insensitive fashion, and that unsuitable techniques
of criminal advocacy were excluded from the proceedings. All sheriffs felt that it was
an issue of paramount importance in accordance with the rules of natural justice and
fairness generally to allow the patient every opportunity to speak out and express then-
opinions, should they wish to do so.
Opinions were mixed on the question of whether the adjudication provided an
effective safeguard of patients' rights or was essentially a rubber stamp for medical
opinion. It was noted that whilst the majority of cases were straightforward and led
to detention, sheriffs were increasingly likely to question medical recommendations,
although there was wide variation between individual sheriffs. There was sympathy
for the sheriffs' position in difficult cases from MHOs and consultants, but also
concern about some of their decisions. For example, Consultant "B" commented that
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"sheriffs have overturned our decisions - sometimes to our considerable alarm when
we feel our patients are particularly dangerous".
The nub of the issue appeared to be the ability of the generalist sheriff to
assess the patient's mental condition in borderline cases. There were questions
regarding the grounds of granting or refusing to grant recommendations. Some
interviewees claimed that, in taking the layman's view, sheriffs were either too reliant
on medical evidence, or, if they took a more testing approach, unclear as to their
competence. For example, Consultant "A" stated: "in theory the sheriff is a safeguard,
in practice not -1 hesitate to call it a conspiracy, but doctors and the sheriffs are part
of the "Establishment". If a doctor says in good faith that a patient should be
hospitalised, few sheriffs will overrule that", whereas MHO "D" noted that, "sheriffs
sometimes challenge diagnoses and they are not qualified to do that".
Many interviewees felt that sheriffs should have a basic training in mental
health issues. Others felt that the use of "reporters" or curators ad litem would
provide sheriffs with valuable information in difficult cases. A small minority thought
that in the few cases where conflicting psychiatric evidence was led, the sheriff should
be assisted by an assessor. In general terms, however, it was felt that it was important
to retain the sheriff as an impartial outsider skilled in weighing arguments, as the final
decision taker: the sheriff was felt to "concentrate the mind" of the professionals,
allow the patient to state his case to an outsider, and make relations between the
hospital staff and the patient less strained after the hearing.
There was an interesting variation in the views of sheriffs on the question of
whether the hearing provided a safeguard of the patient's rights. All felt that it did
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prevent clear abuses, but that it had varying degrees of utility. Sheriff "B" saw the
hearing as "an extremely important, vital safeguard". He did not view his role as a
"rubber stamp" for medical evidence in any way. Sheriff "C", however, felt that
mental health applications stood out "like a sore thumb" from the rest of the sheriff's
business, and that he was not completely happy with taking "on the merits" decisions.
He would have preferred the initial decision to "section" a patient to lie with a local
mental health tribunal, operating in a similar fashion to a children's hearing, with an
appeal to the sheriff. On appeal, he felt that the sheriff should be limited to
considering the case on the same basis as under section 39 of the Licensing (Scotland)
Act 1976 (i.e. to ascertain whether the tribunal eiTed in law, based it decision on a
incorrect material fact, acted contrary to natural justice, or exceeded it discretion in
an unreasonable manner). The consensus of opinion (excluding Sheriff "B") was
that the view of the sheriff as a rubber stamp was not without some foundation, as it
was extremely difficult to refute two medical recommendations; in any case, most
applications were straightforward, and there was no real objection from the patient.
Thus, the sheriff's role was seen by Sheriff "A" as being a "cosmetic safeguard" in
the vast majority of applications. Sheriff "C" commented that "given that there are
two medical practitioners testifying that there should be a hospitalisation, that the
patient usually has symptoms of mental illness and that there is no contrary
professional view, it is not surprising that most appeals are refused". Sheriffs "A" and
"C" usually saw their main tasks as making the patient feel as happy as possible with
the inevitability of hospitalisation, and defusing any tensions between the hospital staff
and the patient arising out of the hearing.
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In the small minority of contested cases where there were conflicting medical
opinions, the majority of sheriffs felt that the evaluation of evidence could be difficult,
but that their experience of hearing experts in a wide variety of cases enabled them
to reach a satisfactory conclusion. It was felt that expert medical evidence could be
evaluated by testing the factual grounds upon which psychiatrists' diagnoses are
based.65
The sheriffs were unimpressed by the idea of assessors to assist them in
difficult cases, feeling that this would merely confuse the issue: however, it was
thought that, in some cases, a report from a curator ad litem could be very useful
(Sheriff "B" dissenting). Sheriff Macphail commented in response to a draft copy of
this chapter66 that the sheriff embarks on a section 18 hearing knowing remarkably
little about the patient. He noted that the application with its two medical
recommendations is always too brief and says very little about the patient's family
background or medical history. Application forms do not even state the patient's age.
He felt that it would be extremely useful to have a report, similar to a social inquiry
report, outlining these other matters. The proposal that sheriffs should have a
basic training in mental health issues was rejected by all sheriffs. It was felt that the
layman's approach to medical recommendations should be retained, and that "a little
learning is a dangerous thing".
In summary, it is argued that, although there are bound to be difficulties with
the evaluation of expert evidence67, shrieval adjudication is the most appropriate
means of reaching decision. Sheriffs should continue to use their own discretion on
the question of how rigorously they should test medical evidence, but it is suggested
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that the fact that there appeared to be something approaching a consensus amongst the
interviewees that the sheriff court process is a "rubber-stamp" must be viewed as a
cause for concern: this is clearly not the role which the legislature had in mind for
the court. Similarly, as Sheriff Macphail has indicated68, it is surprising that
sheriffs have so little documentary information laid before them when considering an
application. It is argued that, as a matter of urgency, new forms should be devised,
which should give to sheriffs more accurate and detailed information on the patient.
Section Three: Summary and Conclusion
The functions which the sheriffs perform as Parliament's first instance
executive officers are now comparatively few. They can be divided into two general
sub-categories. The first is comprised of minor ex officio and executive powers which
appear to have been continued without any real justification, other than then-
connection with the ministerial tradition. The second is also derived from this
tradition, but involves sheriffs in taking decisions which may have serious
consequences for the individuals concerned.
None of these powers can be viewed as being contrary to the standard of
ostensive judicial impartiality. The question which is considered above is whether
they should be criticised on the grounds that they challenge the standard of ostensive
judicial competence.
It is contended that the first sub-category of powers is contrary to ostensive
judicial competence, and that its constituent powers should be viewed as being
anachronistic and anomalous. There is little justification for their continuation.
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Whilst the powers in the second sub-category are not contrary to the standard
of ostensive judicial competence, it is argued that, as the fieldwork example
illustrates, the continuation of the ministerial/administrative tradition is anachronistic,
and does little to further the development of important and weighty powers in a
modern context.
The research into the sheriffs jurisdiction in mental health also illustrates the
point that while shrieval adjudication is a generally effective decision taking process
in cases with a low political content and polycentric effect (and a strong effect on the
rights of the individual), there is still considerable room for improvement. A number
of suggestions were made with regard to the sheriff's powers in compulsory
hospitalisation.
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Chapter Twelve: An Evaluation of Higher Governmental Powers
Introduction; Aims and Objectives
As in the preceding chapter, the general aim of discussion is to use empirically
derived data as a complement to more traditional analysis of cases and materials.
The objectives of the chapter are as follows. First, to establish whether the
higher governmental powers, viewed as a general category, are contrary to the theory
and general principles developed in part one of the thesis. It is submitted that,
following on from the method of distinction adopted in chapter nine1, they are.
Second, to test the practical worth of this evaluation by selecting a representative
provision, and subjecting it to detailed analytical and empirical examination: this
involves general consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of shrieval
adjudication as a decision taking process in this type of appeal. Finally, to summarise
the points and arguments made in a brief conclusion.
Section One; Higher Governmental Powers and General Principles
The protasis/apodosis test set out in chapter nine2 identified higher
governmental powers as being those which are more likely to be contrary to the
standards of ostensive judicial impartiality3 and competence4 than those in the other
categories. The discussion in this section seeks to establish the point that the potential
for higher governmental powers to be at odds with the standards of secondary morality
has been realised. Accordingly, it is necessary to give further consideration to the
two inter-related questions which were asked in the preceding chapter, and utilised
in the protasis/apodosis test. First, does the extent of the sheriffs formal power under
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statute involve a degree of intervention in the political process which is contrary to
ostensive judicial impartiality? Second, has the adjudicatory process been allocated
tasks which are beyond its functional capabilities, thereby causing an unjustifiably
strong polycentric effect? Is ostensive judicial competence affected? For
convenience, it is intended to give separate consideration to the issues that are raised.
Before doing so, however, it is recognised that there are obvious dangers
inherent in generalising the characteristics of a relatively large number of appeals. It
is possible to divide the powers in this group into two sub categories. The first (and
by far the largest) is comprised of those powers which allocate to the sheriff a wide
power of review; and the second requires sheriffs to find certain states of fact to exist
before upholding local authority decisions.5 However, it is submitted that the appeals
share a number of features which make generalised discussion a worthwhile exercise.6
The most important point to note is that, although the subject matter and grounds of
appeal vary widely, sheriffs are required to review the decisions of public authorities
on grounds other than legal or jurisdictional concerns: the statutes appear to
necessitate a de novo consideration of substantive issues. Furthermore, given that the
powers in this category have been selected according to the protasis/apodosis
distinction set out in chapter nine, their subject matter involves a higher political
content and a stronger polycentric effect than in other appeals requiring the review of
substantive merits.
(i) As indicated above, the first point for consideration is whether higher
governmental provisions are likely to involve sheriffs in the political process to the
extent that their activities could be construed as being contrary to ostensive judicial
233
impartiality.
The fact that all the decisions in this category are taken in the first instance by
elected authorities with a mandate to implement policy is of crucial significance: in
the final analysis, if sheriffs are required to review the substance of strongly political
decisions, then they are transformed into politicians acting without a mandate.
Although this may appear an unnecessarily extreme statement, it is submitted that
Himsworth was correct to argue that"... whatever the historical justification for such
supervision [ie of local administration], there cannot now be a case for the creation
or continuation of forms of appeal or review which give to the sheriff the power to
substitute his view of the merits of a policy decision for that of a local authority."7
With this point in mind, the question to be answered is whether the extent of shrieval
involvement in the political arena required by higher governmental provisions is
appropriate. Consideration should be given to a few general examples before forming
an opinion and evaluating more specific fieldwork data.
Mention has already been made of the sheriffs' jurisdiction under housing
legislation, and the controversy which arose from their exercise of it. The sheriff
continues to exercise powers under the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987s, which enable
him to confirm, vary or quash a local authority closure or demolition order on
whatever grounds as may seem just and equitable. The powers of the sheriff were
held to be administrative in Thorn v. Corporation of Glasgow9, although the sheriff
reached the rather eccentric conclusion that he was empowered to review the policy
and substantive merits as he saw fit, but was excluded from providing jurisdictional
review. The ability of the sheriff to review merits and policy was stressed in the more
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recent case of McDonald v. Midlothian District Council10, which concerned an
appeal against a demolition order. In making the order, the local authority had felt
that the cottage in question did not meet a tolerable standard (it had an external WC,
there was rising damp, and access to the rear door was inadequate): demolition was
appropriate in the public interest. The sheriff noted that for the house to be
demolished the authority had to be convinced that it "ought to be demolished": it
followed that on appeal he too had to be convinced. He proceeded to give an
extremely strict interpretation to the statutory grounds, and on visiting the cottage,
found it "... not without charm ... there must be hundreds of such cottages up and
down the land which are eagerly sought after as holiday cottages".11 The authority's
order was then quashed.
It is argued that it is highly inappropriate for sheriffs to be put in the position
of taking decisions of this type. It is for local authorities to decide whether houses
are of a tolerable standard. In addition to acting within their statutory remit, their
judgements are based on public health and housing policies, and in the final analysis
they are answerable to the electorate should they fail to implement them. For a sheriff
to reverse a policy based decision of this sort because the property in question had the
potential to be a pleasant holiday cottage, and the conditions seemed tolerable enough
to him, shows the court in a very poor light.
Decisions of this type must be seen as having a very high political content.
The sheriff is not primarily concerned with questions of legality or jurisdiction, but
with policy based merits. For a sheriff to overturn a decision means that he has
challenged and rejected local authority assessments of fact and policy, substituting
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a subjective opinion instead. This is contrary to the general principles set out in
chapter two, which require that judges should not be allocated powers which provide
for direct involvement in the political process. It may in the long term affect judicial
independence in that ostensive judicial impartiality may eventually be questioned.12
Once it is clear that judges are taking the same kind of decisions as local authorities,
then their motives and impartiality may be doubted in public: this is in essence what
happened in the 1917 Report on Scottish Housing.13 As argued above, destabilising
secondary morality through ill-considered legislation could eventually have a negative
effect on the rule of law.14 Accordingly, the wide policy based discretion allocated
to the sheriff under the 1987 Housing Act must be seen as being inherently
inappropriate.
Similar arguments can be advanced concerning the sheriff's powers in
connection with school attendance orders. The sheriff is, under s.38 of the Education
(S) Act 198015, empowered to take the final decision on appeal to confirm, vary or
annul education authority school attendance orders. Prior to the implementation of
s.28 of the 1980 Act (which is considered at some length below16) attendance order
appeals were used as a means of objecting to education authority school placing
decisions. Himsworth noted that although in some cases sheriffs had sought to limit
their appellate function to legal and jurisdictional considerations, a series of more
recent decisions had indicated that sheriffs were willing to consider wider issues with
strong policy implications: "Local authority assessments of facts (with inevitable
policy overtones) have been challenged by sheriffs in a way which has attracted quite
open resentment and anger and which seems difficult to defend in terms of the normal
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decision taking competence of the sheriff."17 In effect, sheriffs were felt to be
deciding on the merits of education authority policy in a highly political area, and
basing their decisions on premises which were favourable to the parents.
The fact that the legislation involved sheriffs in decision taking which required
a considerable "direct political involvement" was made clear by Himsworth in a
strongly argued article.18 His comments also illustrate the point that the provision
was, when used for the purpose of appealing against school placing, implicitly at
odds with the positivistic ethos of secondary morality and ostensive judicial
impartiality: "... Whatever is formally permitted to the court by the ... Act it seems
constitutionally improper, and a move which is bound to attract political resentment,
if a court appears to assume final responsibility for such matters and especially if,...,
it brings to bear a view of educational policy in the public sector which is at odds
with that adopted by the local authority".19
As noted in chapter nine, a large proportion of the sheriff's higher
governmental functions are held in connection with licensing and registration.20
These powers raise the same issues. Given that the licensing authorities are comprised
of elected members of local authorities21, who are empowered to apply policy based
discretion to the facts of individual cases, what possible justification can there be for
sheriffs retaking their decisions on the same grounds - including policy considerations?
Despite the fact that there may be strong implications for the rights of individuals
arising out of appeals, sheriffs are effectively invited to ignore the standard of
ostensive judicial impartiality.
An example of this type of provision is s.6 of the Nurseries and Childminders
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Act 194822, which empowers sheriffs to take the final decision on appeals from local
authority orders which refuse, vary or cancel registration for individuals to act as
childminders (typically in private nurseries). In the recent case of Roddie v.
Strathclvde Regional Council23, the tension inherent in the provision became
apparent. The authority's Social Work (Child Care) Committee refused the applicant's
registration on the grounds that she was not a "fit person" to look after children. She
appealed to the sheriff as the decision would have meant the closure of her private
nursery. The sheriff's position was a familiar one: "...For the Appellant, ..., [it was]
contended that the effect of this section was to give the Sheriff unfettered discretion
in the conduct and determination of the appeal. I was ... entitled to hear evidence on
the facts, to consider the matter de novo and, if necessary, substitute my own
opinion in place of that of the Respondent's sub committee In reply, ... the
Respondent contended that the jurisdiction of the sheriff in appeals of this nature was
limited to considering whether or not there was any material on which the
Respondent's Sub Committee could reasonably have arrived at their decision. That
is to say, following the dicta of Lord Greene in Associated Provincial Picture Houses
v. The Wednesbury Corporation24, that the sheriff ... is only entitled to investigate
their actions with a view to seeing [sic] whether they have taken into account any
matters of [sic] which they ought not to have taken into account."25
After considering precedent, the sheriff concluded that his function was an
administrative one, and that he was therefore entitled to take the former rather than
the latter course of action.26 He distinguished Wednesbury27, and following Sheriff
Macphail's judgement in Carvana v. Glasgow Corporation28, felt that he was entitled
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to consider all the merits of the case, presumably including policy concerns: "In sum,
I have formed the view that the sheriff is entitled, in his administrative capacity,
to substitute his own opinion for that of the local authority, if he is satisfied that their
decision is quite demonstrably wrong."29
The sheriff did, however, show an awareness that the exercise of this
discretion potentially involved wider issues, and he was anxious to stress that the
"competence of the authority"30 should be given proper regard. Indeed, he sought
to introduce the idea that there was a "presumption"31 that the authority's decision
on the facts (and therefore policy) should be viewed as being correct, unless it can
"... demonstrably be rebutted and their decision clearly proved wrong."32
This approach can be analysed in the same way as Sheriff Macphail's decision
in Carvana.33 There was an implicit awareness that the sheriff's function may
intrude on local authority policy evaluation, and that this was, in general terms,
undesirable. However, as was noted above34, not all sheriffs (or indeed the Court
of Session) can be relied upon to produce such "benevolent"35 judgements. With
this point in mind, and in accordance with the general principles adopted earlier, it
is argued that it is unsatisfactory for legislation to invite sheriffs to exercise powers
which require "direct political involvement".
In criticising the wide, discretionary remit held by sheriffs in these examples,
it is not being suggested that Parliament should never provide for appeals to the
sheriff against the decisions of local authorities. There may be very good reasons for
doing so: the desirability of "external" review to ensure fair procedure and decision
taking for individuals, or questions of cost and accessibility. However, as argued in
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chapter two, the legislature should always as a general principle seek to uphold the
ethos of secondary morality36 - the ideal that the legal order should be separated from
political debate, and that the standard of ostensive judicial impartiality should be
preserved. It is submitted that it has demonstrably failed to do so in so far as higher
governmental powers are concerned.
(ii) The second inter-related issue for consideration is whether higher governmental
powers involve adjudication in areas of decision taking which are likely to have strong
polycentric implications. Is ostensive judicial competence put at risk? It is argued
that it is, and that adjudication should therefore be seen as being an inappropriate
decision taking process. Himsworth correctly considered the polycentric
considerations involved in this type of case to be one of the main arguments against
an "extended" (ie higher governmental) role for the sheriff.37 He argued that the
"sheriff cannot escape his adjudicatory style and his limits deny him, as they would
any judge, the capacity to handle some types of decision which can at present come
his way."38 It is also worth noting his comment that the "further one gets... from
what are strictly questions of law into the evaluation of what is more broadly
reasonable or desirable in terms of policy, the more difficult it is for a process of
adjudication to accommodate the polycentric issues".39
The examples noted above illustrate the argument well. The polycentric effect
of shrieval decisions on local authority policy is clear. The sheriff's decision in
McDonald v. Midlothian District Council40 would clearly cause concern for the
authority if it wished to make demolition orders for other properties with outside
lavatories, rising damp and inadequate access. It would have to consider whether,
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in a subsequent appeal, a court would feel bound to follow the McDonald decision -
might it be felt that an allegedly sub-standard property could also have the potential
to be a pleasant week-end cottage? In short, the polycentric effect of the sheriff's
decision is significant. It establishes the point that, in the final analysis, it is sheriffs
who decide what a "tolerable" standard of housing is, rather than the local authority.
The inevitable result of this is a lack of certainty, and the possibility that local
authority policy implementation could be thwarted.
The McDonald decision also illustrates the point that the court lacks the
functional capacity to evaluate questions of this nature thoroughly. It was hampered
by its concentration on the instant case from making a full evaluation of broader
issues such as housing standards. Accordingly, it can be argued in more general
terms that because shrieval adjudication takes little account of the wider picture - the
policy context in which instant decisions are reached41 - it is likely to have doubly
unpredictable results for local authority planning and decision taking. Uncertainty of
this sort, however indirectly, thwarts the main purpose of the rule of law.42
It is worth noting briefly that s.6 of the Nurseries and Childminders Act 1948,
which formed the grounds of appeal to the sheriff in Roddie43 has recently been
criticised in the 1990-91 Annual Report of the Council on Tribunals.44 The
proceedings before the sheriff were felt to be "unduly time consuming and legalistic" -
in itself an indication that the standard of ostensive judicial competence is not being
met.
(iii) To conclude this section, it is argued that, in general terms, higher
governmental powers do seem to involve sheriffs in the political process to an
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undesirable extent: similarly, the polycentric effect of shrieval decisions is
unjustifiable. Accordingly, they may be viewed as being contrary to the standards
of ostensive judicial impartiality and competence, and therefore at odds with the
wider general principles and rule of law theory adopted in part one.
However, this contention should be tested further using empirically derived
material. The best example of a current higher governmental provision is the sheriff's
power to review local authority decisions on parental choice of school under s.28 of
the Education (Scotland) Act 1980.45 Accordingly, parental choice was made the
subject of a fieldwork exercise, the results of which are set out below.
Section Two: Appeals under the Education (Scotland) Act 198046
(i) Introduction and Research Aims
As indicated above, the purpose of this section is to test the theoretical
evaluation that higher governmental powers are constitutionally anomalous by using
a detailed empirical example. More generally, it is hoped to add to the comprehensive
survey of parental choice of school carried out by Adler, Petch and Tweedie.47
Analytical and empirical materials are combined to build up a better appreciation of
the difficulties which arise in practice when higher governmental powers are exercised
by the sheriff.
(ii) Research Methodology
Two Regional Council Education Authorities were selected for empirical
examination on the basis that the majority of parental choice applications had been
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brought against their decisions. They are referred to as R.C."A" and R.C."B". The
two senior regional council solicitors who represented the authorities were then
interviewed: they are identified as R.S. "A" and R.S. "B". Senior education authority
officials were also approached, as were the conveners of the two education
committees. Unfortunately, all but one - (education authority official "A" (E.A.O "A"
from R.C. "A") - refused to participate.48 A senior official of the Scottish Consumers
Council (S.C.C.) was interviewed: the S.C.C. has a close interest in monitoring the
consumer choice made available to parents by education authorities. For logistical
reasons, it was not possible to interview a sufficiently representative number of
parents. Finally, three sheriffs49 with some experience of school placing appeals
were interviewed (Sheriffs "A", "B" and "C"): others were approached, but declined
to take part. As before, the anonymity of interviewees was guaranteed.
(iii) Background to Parental Choice of School
As was noted in section one and preceding chapters, sheriffs have exercised
a statutory jurisdiction in education for over a century.50 Their main functions were
held in connection with enforcing school attendance, which inevitably involved them
in disputes over school placing.51 Although these powers were commented on by
Himsworth and others52, it was section 28 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (as
inserted by s.l of the Education (Scotland) Act 1981) which gave sheriffs a new and
rather more prominent role in school placing appeals.
Adler, Petch and Tweedie give a detailed account of the political background
to the Act's provisions.53 For reasons of space, it is not intended to set out anything
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more than a brief overview of the main points of note.
During the 1970s, Conservative and Labour politicians in England "recognised
the symbolic value of supporting a stronger role for parents in school admissions".54
There was accordingly some degree of political consensus that choice of school was
not simply a matter which should be left to the discretion of education authorities, but
also involved important parental rights. The championing of individualism in the face
of administrative discretion was in accordance with the ideological convictions of the
post-1979 Conservative government, and so there was a strong political incentive for
change. Nonetheless, primarily for financial reasons, the implementation of parental
choice legislation in England was limited throughout the 1980s.55 In Scotland,
however, the experience was to be different. The provision made for school placing
requests in the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (as amended) was very much more
doctrinaire than in England56, despite the fact that there was little obvious demand
for increased parental choice north of the border.57 In addition, the parental choice
legislation in Scotland became a party political issue. Not only did it have a high
ideological and social policy content, but it must also be viewed in the context of the
strained relationship between a Conservative Scottish Office and Labour controlled
education authorities.58
However, these political factors have no direct bearing on the question of
whether or not the sheriff should be involved in the decision taking process. Indeed,
there is a very strong argument to the effect that shrieval adjudication should have a
role. Given that choice of school involves important questions of parental rights - the
ability of parents to influence where their children are educated - it is not
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unreasonable to suggest that adjudication in the local sheriff court might have an
important part to play in parental choice legislation.59 However, the fact that there
are strong political considerations involved complicates the issue. Although a decision
on school placing may have implications for parental rights, it also has the potential
for strong "direct political involvement" and a significant polycentric effect on
education authority decision taking. School overcrowding, education expenditure and
pupil/teacher ratios may all have to be considered.
Again, this should not necessarily be taken to mean that shrieval adjudication
has no role. What it does mean, however, is that the legislature should seek to limit
the role of the court according to general principles of the sort set out in chapter
two60: if it fails to do so, then the resulting legislation may prove damaging to the
standards of ostensive judicial impartiality and competence. Accordingly, the
questions to be considered here are whether the legislation fails to comply with
general principles, and, if it does, what effect non compliance has had in practice.
(iv) The Sheriff's Powers under Parental Choice of School Legislation
The extent of the sheriff's powers under 28 of the Education (Scotland) Act
198061 is substantial. Education authorities have a statutory duty to place children
in the schools chosen by their parents.62 However, if the authority is satisfied that
one or more specified grounds exist, it may refuse the placing request.63 The
grounds of refusal are that placing a child in a specified school would: "(i) make it
necessary for the authority to take an additional teacher into employment; (ii) give rise
to significant expenditure on extending or otherwise altering the accommodation at or
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facilities provided in connection with the school; (iii) be seriously detrimental to the
continuity of the child's education; or (iv) be likely to be seriously detrimental to the
order and discipline in the school or the education wellbeing of the pupils there".64
In addition, the authority is relieved of its duty if the "education normally
provided at the specified school is not suited to the age, ability or aptitude of the
child; if the education authority have already required the child to discontinue his
attendance at the specified school; if the specified school is a special school, and the
child does not have special educational needs requiring the education or special
facilities provided by it: and if the specified school is a single sex school and the child
is of a different sex from that which is admitted to the school".65
If the authority refuses a placing request, the parent has a right of appeal to an
Education Appeal Committee.66 If the appeal committee upholds the education
authority's decision, the parent may then appeal to the sheriff for a final decision.67
The proceedings before the sheriff are, in effect, a de novo hearing. The sheriff is
empowered to uphold the education authority's decision (the appeal committee cannot
be a party to the hearing) only if he finds that one or more of the specified grounds
of appeal exist, and that "in all the circumstances it is appropriate to do so".68 In all
other cases he must refuse to uphold the authority's decision and must order the
authority to implement the placing request.69 Importantly, the Act provides that
where a sheriff's judgment is inconsistent with the decision of an education authority's
refusals of contemporaneous placing requests for other children who are at the same
stage of education, the authority must review these like cases70, and the parents have
a future right of appeal against the revised decision.
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(v) Research Findings
For the sake of convenience, it is intended to give separate attention to the
two inter-related questions of whether the sheriff's powers in parental choice
legislation are drafted in such a way as to involve an unacceptably close involvement
with the political process (ie a challenge to ostensive judicial impartiality), and an
unjustifiably strong polycentric effect (ie a challenge to ostensive judicial competence),
(a.) It does not require much imagination to appreciate that the legislature, in
limiting the sheriffs discretion to find certain states of fact to exist before upholding
a local authority refusal, has pitched sheriffs directly into the political arena.71 It is
very difficult for sheriffs to decide on matters such as whether the placing of a child
will require the appointment of another teacher, or the alteration of accommodation
or school facilities, without judging the substance of local authority policies.
For example, in G v. Shetland Islands Council72, an appeal against the refusal
of a school placing request by the council was taken to the sheriff under section 28A.
The argument advanced by the education authority was that the specified school was
severely overcrowded and that the addition of one more pupil would require extra
teachers and significant expenditure. It was argued for the appellant that the
legislature had intended each placing request to be considered individually, and that,
as the need for more teachers and significant expenditure was already present, the
addition of one more pupil could not make any difference. The issue for the sheriff
to decide was therefore ultimately whether or not the authority's policies on school
overcrowding, pupil/teacher ratio and education expenditure were justified - clearly,
an extremely political decision for an independent judge to have to take. In this case,
247
the sheriff upheld the authority's decision, noting that although the duty of the
authority was to each applicant child individually, the request in question would have
necessitated the employment of additional teachers and significant expenditure.73
A similar approach was taken in D v. Grampian Regional Council74, where
Sheriff Risk was required to consider whether the admission of one more child to the
school roll would be "seriously detrimental" to the educational wellbeing of those at
the school. The sheriff appreciated that he was in effect required to uphold the
education authority's policy, or replace it with one of his own. He was clearly uneasy
about involving the court in such a directly political area, stating "If the respondents
acted reasonably in fixing a limit of 240, they are surely entitled to say that they will
not go beyond that limit. If 241 is reasonable why not 242? If not 242 why not 243
or 245 or whatever?"75
Both Sheriffs "A" and "C" agreed strongly with this approach. Sheriff "A"
took the view that "the education authority was entitled to lay down a policy", and
that when hearing s.28 applications he had "certainly tried" to "stay out of politics".
Sheriff "C" commented that the education authority's policy had to stand unchallenged
because policy making in this type of area "was not judges' work." He felt that
"questions of educational policy are arrived at by these committees after a lot of
discussion and some of the members of these committees are really quite impressive
people who have had far more first hand experience of these matters than the sheriff
could ever have. If you are going to substitute your own judgment for theirs then you
must have a good deal of confidence that you are right and they are wrong".
However, an entirely different approach to the interpretation of s.28 was taken
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by sheriffs in Strathclyde. In a leading judgment, Sheriff Principal Dick commented
in A.B. v. Strathclyde Regional Council76 that the "weight the sheriff gave to the
evidence before him was entirely a matter for him, and likewise what weight or value
he attributed to the education authority's policy or the grounds for their decision."77
He then went on to reject the education authority's policy, stating that he
appreciated "some of the difficulties which may arise in administration for an
education authority from the nature of the grounds of refusal stated in section 28, but
the duty specified by section 28 resting on them and arising when a written placing
request is made is not met... by seeking to apply an overall numbers criteria [sic]
divorced from the request of a particular applicant".78
The Sheriff Principal then bluntly refuted the authority's policy argument: "I
am not impressed by the equality argument."79 This approach was followed in
Duggan v. Strathclyde Regional Council80, and in a number of other cases concerning
Strathclyde Regional Council.81
Sheriff "B" had followed Sheriff Principal Dick's approach when hearing s.28
applications. In contrast to Sheriffs "A" and "C", he was not impressed by Sheriff
Macphail's argument in Carvana.82 He felt that the political and policy concerns of
the authority should not hamper the sheriff's decision taking power: "Well, it [ie the
Carvana decision] is a nice line. It does not have much meaning in court." He also
commented that he enjoyed hearing education appeals, and liked deciding cases on
a personal, pragmatic basis: "... we do from time to time sway into these funny
areas. My own personal preference is that I find this kind of childrens' stuff pretty
interesting. One comes to it almost as a layman really - bringing what one hopes is
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not too jaundiced an eye to bear on the activities of education committees ... I am
essentially a "people" person rather than a conceptualist. I like dealing with people
and that is why I like dealing with this sort of case, which deals with real questions
of what is going on in schools."
Adler et al stress that the adoption of a particular approach is of considerable
importance to local authorities.83 They identified the first approach as "school
level"84, and the second as "single child"85: "... where a sheriff adopts the school
level approach the education authority can be reasonably confident that, if it can
justify the imposition of admission limits, it will be able to enforce them. However,
where the sheriff adopts a single child approach the authority can have no such
confidence and, although it may still wish to impose admission limits in appropriate
cases, it cannot expect to be able to enforce them."86
The distinction between "school level" and "single child" can be approached
in the context of the secondary morality model.87 Those taking the "school level"
approach may perhaps be characterised as being more aware of the potential danger
of judges being seen to impose subjective policy choices on elected public authorities
- the possible loss of the perception that sheriffs are impartial because of overt
involvement in local authority policy. It is contended that their approach corresponds
more closely with the general principles suggested for judges in "hard cases"88 than
that of the "single child" sheriffs. Where the legislature has failed to give a clear
indication of the limit of judicial discretion they have sought to utilise the mechanisms
of secondary morality (ie "benevolent"89 statutory interpretation and use of precedent)
to protect the ethos of secondary morality and the standard of ostensive judicial
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impartiality. In this context, this meant permitting the education authority to present
policy considerations as factors to be taken into account in decision taking, even
although this does not appear as a statutory ground. As a result, "school level"
sheriffs are spared from having to take direct policy decisions.
Conversely, those who have taken the "single child" approach have a rather
different idea of when the ethos of secondary morality and the standard of ostensive
judicial impartiality is endangered by the exercise of discretionary decision taking
powers. "Benevolent"90 interpretation was felt neither necessary nor possible. For
example, in contrast with Sheriffs "A" and "C", Sheriff "B" did not feel that the policy
content of his decision was something which should weigh particularly heavily with
him. He did recognise that there were some areas of shrieval discretion in "this kind
of field" where "it could be argued that we are straying out of our remit", but he did
not feel that school placing appeals fell into this category. He acknowledged that
there could be controversy arising out of a decision which reversed education authority
policy, but argued that "our decisions are often controversial in the sense that they
arouse hostility in whoever loses - whether that it is in administrative law or criminal
law is neither here nor there."
It is therefore hardly surprising that he was relatively unconcerned by
suggestions that the "single child" approach involved the direct determination of issues
which might not be thought of as "judges' work". His approach was straightforward
and untroubled by more abstract concerns: "we are doing what the Act says, even
although what we are doing in accordance with the Act is inevitably going to have
consequences which may be political."
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(b.) The second inter-related issue for discussion is whether the legislature created
powers which have an unjustifiably strong polycentric effect. Is ostensive judicial
competence breached, and, if so, has this had an undesirable effect in practice?
It is argued that Himsworth was entirely correct to characterise the sheriff's
powers in school placing appeals as being "archetypical examples of Fuller's
polycentric decisions."91 It is not difficult to see how he reached this conclusion.
To take one example, a decision concerning overcrowding may affect not only the
child in the instant case, but any number of children in a similar position simply by
virtue of the fact that it is a court decision.92 Accordingly E.A.O. "A" commented
that in every appeal there were "... serious policy implications for the authority - not
just in the individual case but in terms of the generality of cases - the law really
requires us to square the circle". He went on to state that, "a bad decision can result
in the overturning of perfectly well-founded policies - at the end of the day we have
to justify our individual decisions on policy and if that is replaced by nothing then I
do not see how we can operate. The legislation is absolutely incredible as it stands.
It means that you cannot plan."
However, it should be noted that although the requirement to review all like
decisions93 might on first inspection be expected to magnify this polycentric effect,
its importance is restricted in practice. Both authorities felt able to take a narrow
interpretation of the shrieval decisions, and reviews were seldom successful for
parents. R.S."B" noted that, "... we had to review all like decisions, but usually we
still go against the parents - it is comparatively rare for us to find for parents on
review." Notwithstanding this, it is clear from E.A.O. "A"'s comments that the strong
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polycentric effect of shrieval decisions cannot be denied.
The next point to be considered is whether or not the potential for polycentric
effect causes problems in practice. That it has is clear from the distinction between
sheriffs taking the "school line" and "single child" approaches.
The "school line" interpretation reflects awareness on the part of sheriffs that
their decisions can have a profound polycentric effect, and a consequent
unwillingness to become involved in substantive issues. In G. v. Shetland Islands
Council94, the sheriff noted in his decision that if an individual approach was taken,
"it would have the absurd result, surely not intended by the legislature, of compelling
education authorities to accept requests for placing in understaffed and overcrowded
schools."95 Similarly, in D v. Grampian Regional Council96, Sheriff Risk stated
that, "The effect of the gradualist approach would be to require the court to fix the
limit, or declare that there is no limit, a task which it is manifestly less suited to
perform than the education authority."97
These arguments were supported by Sheriff "A", who was convinced that the
court was not functionally equipped to consider policy issues, and that it was unable
to evaluate the polycentric effect of a decision. He appreciated that the focus of court
proceedings onto the facts and circumstances of individual cases meant that broader
issues could not be considered properly: "... a policy is not something which is capable
of elucidation by evidence -1 am inclined to the view that the function of the court
is not to determine policies at all."
However, the approach of the "single child" sheriffs was very different. They
refused to consider the polycentric effect of their decisions. Under their interpretation,
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the policy implications of decisions were irrelevant, and the only concern of the court
was the facts of the instant case. For example, in Y v. Strathclyde Regional
Council98, Sheriff McNeill noted that, "It was argued that in the event of me
allowing an appeal the education authority would review the other unsuccessful cases
and would of necessity decide them in the same way. Accordingly a question of one
child would be converted into a question of several children coming to the school at
the one time. In my view this contention is unsound. I can only consider the appeal
which is before me. I know nothing of the circumstances of other requests."99
Sheriff "B" echoed the view that the wider considerations were completely
excluded, stating that, "the regional council was on a hiding to nothing - the
legislation was such that if one more child was able to go into a classroom the whole
thing would collapse in a heap: there was no way in which they could prove their
case".
Very clearly, the polycentric element of these cases has caused significant
difficulties. "School line" sheriffs are concerned about the possible policy implications
of their decisions. Conversely, in cases which are heard by "single child" sheriffs,
the polycentric effect of court decisions causes serious problems for the education
authority. Either way, it is argued that the degree of polycentricity is such that it
cannot be justified: parental choice of school appeals taken on the grounds set out in
s.28 are unsuitable for resolution by adjudication. The standard of ostensive judicial
competence is therefore breached in school placing appeals.
(c.) As a final point, however, it should be noted that it would be misleading to
claim that considerations of political content and polycentric effect were all that had
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influenced sheriffs in the adoption of the "school level" and "single child" approaches.
The fieldwork evidence relating to the practical operation of the adjudicatory process
lends support to MacCormick's reminder that the way in which a judge exercises
discretion in "hard" cases is heavily influenced by the nature and quality of the legal
arguments presented to him in court.100 Indeed, Sheriff "C" commented that "one
does rely very much on parties presenting their evidence and efficient cross-
examination. It is not always easy to know what questions to ask. The quality of a
judgment depends enormously on the quality of the people before you, what they
chose to present and how they choose to conduct their case."
Cases in Regional Council "A"'s sheriffdom were decided on the basis of the
"school level" approach. It was noticeable that the E.A.O. and the R.S. liaised very
closely and had a good working relationship: indeed, they insisted on being
interviewed together. The Regional Council had taken a close interest in the
legislation from an early stage, and had been in no doubt of its potential impact on
the authority's policy. Most significantly, R.S. "A" had devised a litigation strategy,
which was designed to minimise the damage to the authority's policy: "We
consciously and deliberately recognised the potential outcome of these cases - they
could have had considerable policy implications - so we used counsel101 right from
the beginning. We quite deliberately wheeled out the big guns."
In addition, the R.S. refused to be pressurised by parents into early hearings
in order to prevent the authority from being "railroaded". Taking full advantage of
the summary applications procedure102 gave more time for case preparation. Rather
more subtly, the authority's counsel also sought to make use of the ground that the
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admission of another child to a school would "be likely to be seriously detrimental to
educational wellbeing"103 rather than attempting to argue that it would definitely
require significant expenditure or the employment of more staff104: the test for
educational wellbeing is not certainty but likelihood. This was felt to give more room
for manoeuvre105 when leading education authority expert witnesses.106
Regional Council "B", however, had its decisions turned down by sheriffs
taking the "single child" approach. At the time of interview, it was still in the
process of developing closer links between the education authority and the regional
solicitor's office: it seemed that the relationship had not been as effective as it might
have been. R.S. "B" indicated that the education authority had not recognised the
implications of the legislation. He also felt that the authority had not given sufficient
thought to the question of what to present as evidence: "the education authority was
not initially geared up to deal with the hearings - we had a devil of a job producing
evidence." Unlike Regional Council "A", Regional Council "B" did not seem to have
attempted to rely on legal grounds which might have been more favourable to the
authority. Indeed, R.S. "B" took the view that the Act effectively prevented the
possibility of leading policy evidence: "the basic principle of the Act is that everything
is handled on an individual cases basis - the sheriff is bound by the legislation to look
at each individual school and to see if there is the possibility of squeezing in another
child. It is usually very difficult to say that a school is so full that it cannot take
another child."
It would also seem that Regional Council "B" had allowed itself to be
pressurised by the parents' solicitors into early hearings, thereby making it more
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difficult to prepare adequately. R.S. "B" commented that the timing of hearings had
been "very hectic", and that he had once had to appear in five different cases in eleven
days.
(vi) To conclude this section, it might well be the case that the differences in
approach taken by the two authorities and their legal experts go some way to
explaining the differences in approach taken by sheriffs. Indeed, R.S. "A" felt that
R.C. "B" had brought the "single child" approach upon itself because of "a lack of
detailed preparation". However, no matter which approach has been adopted, it
seems clear that the ultimate cause of the confusion for sheriffs, authorities and
parents was the difficulty arising from the legislature's creation of a wide statutory
discretion, which requires a strong "direct political involvement" and causes a
significant polycentric effect - in short, legislation which strikes at the standards of
ostensive judicial impartiality and competence.
The resultant confusion has meant that sheriffs are unable to agree on the
nature and extent of their discretionary powers, and that different sheriffdoms enforce
completely different interpretations of the Act. This means that parents who would
expect to win placing appeals in one sheriffdom, would in all probability lose in
another. Similarly, Regional Council "B" has had to face the polycentric implications
of having its policies reversed, whilst Regional Council "A" has been able to avoid
any such dislocation. It is not surprising that Sheriff "C" described the overall
situation as being "hopeless".
The significance of these developments is that they lend support to the
contention that the general principles developed in chapter two do indeed have a wider
practical relevance.
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Section Three: Summary and Conclusion
Section two of the chapter illustrates very clearly that the general arguments
presented in section one are borne out by empirical evidence: higher governmental
powers may therefore be viewed as being contrary to general principles and wider rule
of law theory and therefore inherently inappropriate for allocation to sheriffs.
Legislation which requires sheriffs to exercise a wide, discretionary power of
review over the political decision taking of elected local authorities causes difficulties
for both the sheriffs and the authorities concerned: the standard of ostensive judicial
impartiality is breached, and this has practical as well as theoretical consequences.
It also gives rise to an unacceptably high polycentric effect, which, far from being
a storm in an academic tea-cup, was shown in section two to have a real and negative
effect on both the integrity of adjudication and the authorities concerned. The
importance of maintaining certainty in adjudicatory decision taking through the
maintenance of the standard of ostensive judicial competence is clearly illustrated.
The confusion which results from the legislature failing to uphold the standards
of ostensive judicial impartiality and competence is therefore not only contrary to the
ideal of the rule of law, but is also highly problematical in practical terms.
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Chapter Thirteen; An Evaluation of the Sheriff as Civil Judge
Introduction: Aims and Objectives
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the next category of shrieval powers in
local administration - the sheriff as a civil judge1 - according to the general principles
and theoretical standards developed above. As before, extensive use is made of
empirical material to test whether the evaluation has any practical significance, and
to examine how shrieval adjudication operates in practice.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section one gives consideration to the
question of how the general category of civil judicial powers should be evaluated in
the light of its theoretical context. It is argued that civil judicial powers correspond
with the general principles which have been adopted.2 Section two takes the
discussion further. The results of an extensive fieldwork exercise which looked in
detail at the operation of a representative power are given close consideration. The
resulting combination of analytical and empirical material confirms and illustrates the
more general argument advanced in section one and highlights the strengths and
weaknesses of shrieval adjudication as a decision taking process in this area. The
final section draws together the main themes in a brief conclusion.
Section One: Civil Judicial Powers and General Principles
Evaluating this category of powers involves using the same test of justiciability
that was set out in chapters eleven and twelve.3 Do the sheriffs powers under statute
involve a degree of "direct political involvement"4 which may be said to be in conflict
with the standard of ostensive judicial impartiality?5 Has adjudication been allocated
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to functions which could have a strong polycentric effect6, thereby challenging the
standard of ostensive judicial competence?7
The nature of the civil judicial powers was established in chapter nine: a list
of powers which might reasonably be said to fall into the category was also
suggested.8 It was recognised that the list should not be viewed as final and rigid,
as there will always be doubt over the inclusion of some of the functions. The system
of allocation which was used - the protasis / apodosis model9 - is a general one, and
it is a feature of "broad-brush" allocation of this type that there will always be scope
for disagreement.
However, despite the wide ranging nature of the subject matter, it is possible
to identify the main features of the civil judicial category.10 First, the sheriffs
appellate powers focus on individual rights, in areas in which the judiciary has
traditionally exercised a wide discretion. Accordingly, it is contended that, although
the appeals may be political in the limited sense that they involve review of the merits
of public authority decisions, the degree and nature of the intervention is such that
there is no likelihood of destabilisation of the standard of ostensive impartiality.
There is a general recognition that the issues involved are such that they require the
participation of an ostensively impartial judicial figure to weigh and decide questions
of fact and law, and there is no real potential for a clash over the question of whether
or not sheriffs should feel limited in their review of merits: the issues under
consideration are not directly political. The second closely inter-related contention is
that the polycentric effect of shrieval decisions is limited to an acceptable degree.11
The local authority and the appellant are essentially participants in a normal civil case.
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Although there may be some polycentric implications for an authority arising out of
a decision, appeals are very much more individualised than, for example, school
placing appeals, in that they do not directly concern policy. Accordingly, ostensive
judicial competence is not challenged.
These points are best illustrated by example. There are a number of
provisions in which sheriffs perform functions which are traditionally thought of as
being suitable for resolution by judicial adjudication in areas such as compensation.
However, the most interesting examples of civil judicial powers are to be found in
comparatively recent legislation.
Under the Representation of the People Act 198312, sheriffs are empowered
to hear appeals from the decisions of Electoral Registration Officers.13 There is an
appeal on a point of law from the sheriff to three judges of the Court of Session.14
The subject matter of the provision is clearly an area which can be described as being
highly political. Indeed, in Dumble v. Electoral Officer for Bordersls, the right
of appeal was used as a means of challenging the bona fides of a Conservative party
candidate.16 However, it is clear that the sheriffs ostensive impartiality and the
safeguards afforded by adjudication17 are central features of the appeal process. He
is not reviewing the merits of a local authority decision which might be said to have
been based on policy, but that of a public official who is empowered to carry out a
well defined statutory function.18 The possibility of a strong exercise of discretion
is further limited by relatively strict legislative drafting, precedent and the possibility
of appeal. Ostensive judicial impartiality is not challenged. In addition, any
polycentric effect which shrieval decisions might have is restricted, as the facts tend
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to differ from case to case and there are no direct implications for government or local
authority policy. The standard of ostensive judicial competence is therefore
upheld.
For example, in Moore v. Electoral Registration Officer for Borders19, an
appeal was taken to the sheriff from the decision of the E.R.O. by a student who
wished to be treated as an absent voter. The E.R.O. had based his decision on the
unreported case of Baird v. Electoral Registration Officer for Ayrshire20: his
decision was primarily one of law and fact, rather than the weighing of policy
considerations. In reaching decision, the sheriff principal was able to refer not only
to the relatively restrictive terms of the statute and the Baird case, but also a series
of decisions of the registration appeal court.21 The implications of the decision
cannot be said to be unacceptably polycentric in that, although it affects those who
find themselves in the same situation as the appellant, it does not have a direct or
significant effect on policy.
The sheriffs functions under the Race Relations Act 197671 and the Sex
Discrimination Act 197523 also serve as good examples of civil judicial powers.
Both Acts empower the sheriff to take decisions which may restrain members of the
public from persistent discrimination, and to determine whether a wide range of
discriminatory practices have occurred outwith the field of employment.24 The
responsibility for bringing the applications lies with the Commission for Racial
Equality and the Equal Opportunities Commission respectively.
As in the electoral law jurisdiction, the subject matter of the applications is
both political and potentially controversial. The decision of the Court of Appeal in
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the English case of Mandla v. Powell Lee25, and its subsequent rejection by Lord
Fraser of Tullybelton in the House of Lords, is a clear illustration of the sort of
difficulties which can arise if judges fail to meet the standards of ostensive
impartiality and competence. However, the sheriff's role is not to make a wide
discretionary review of the merits of an elected authority's decision in a directly
political area: both the C.R.E. arid E.O.C. are statutorily appointed bodies and their
functions are set out by Act of Parliament.26 The ostensive impartiality of the court
is used as a means of upholding the rights of those who are alleged to have
contravened the legislation as well as the person who claims to have been
discriminated against.27 The sheriff is empowered to adjudicate in disputes which
are focused on the question of how to interpret the law in an instant case in order to
delineate statutory rights. He is effectively limited by a system of rules (both
statutory and common law28) to considerations which have traditionally been viewed
as being within the special remit of the court and adjudication - questions of
individual rights. Ostensive judicial impartiality is not challenged.
There is obviously the potential for decisions on discrimination to have a
considerable effect on individuals beyond those who are immediately involved in
instant cases. However, it is again argued that the polycentric effect of decisions
should be viewed in the context of the effect that other types of civil court decisions
can have in questions of statutory right: although the implications of decisions may
be far reaching, they cannot be viewed as being unacceptably polycentric29 or
contrary to ostensive judicial competence, as their focus is not the substantive merits
of an elected authority's policy.
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Another more recent example of a civil judicial power can be found in
community charge legislation. In many respects, the sheriff's powers are not
dissimilar to those held in electoral law. Under the Abolition of Domestic Rates
(Scotland) Act 198730, sheriffs were required to hear appeals from the decisions of
Community Charge Registration Officers. Some of these appeals were, given the
highly charged nature of the community charge debate, in the nature of political test
cases.31 All were widely reported by the media. The legislation implicitly provides
that sheriffs are empowered to consider the merits of each application, in addition to
legal and jurisdictional concerns.32 The sheriffs decision is final, other than for
appeal to the Court of Session on a point of law.33
A considerable amount of debate arose when sheriffs chose to interpret their
powers in a restrictive fashion: in effect, it was held that the decisions of registration
officers could only be reviewed on jurisdictional grounds.34 The reason for this
approach may well have been concern on the part of sheriffs that, if they had done
otherwise, some of the political opposition to the tax might have been focused on the
Sheriff Court. Although this is an entirely conjectural suggestion, it may have been
felt that their ostensive impartiality and therefore independence could be damaged if
they were seen as being responsible for taking "on the merits" decisions to remedy the
individual injustices caused by what was perceived by many to be a profoundly
iniquitous and badly drafted statute.
In a series of joint articles35, Reid, Scobbie and Barker criticised sheriffs
sharply for not exercising a wide discretion. Commenting that there was "... nothing
in the legislation to suggest that the role of the sheriff should be limited to reviewing
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the registration officer's decision, nothing to suggest that the sheriff should not be
prepared to allow an appeal simply because he disagrees with the registration officer's
decision"36, they argued that in "... adopting a restricted approach to their task the
sheriffs are denying individuals their one opportunity for a full and independent appeal
against the imposition of a tax." Sheriffs were, it was claimed, responsible for
ensuring that "... the imposition of the community charge will lie too much at the
discretion of officials and defeats the appeal mechanism provided by Parliament."37
On balance, Reid et al are correct to take this view. Although he is a regional
council official, the position of the registration officer is not comparable with, for
example, that of an education authority deciding on a school placing request. He is
not concerned with policy issues: like the Electoral Registration Officer, his remit
is essentially one of deciding on fact and law in individual cases.38 An appeal to the
sheriff cannot therefore be seen as contrary to the general principle that the judiciary
should not be allocated functions which involve direct consideration of the merits of
policy based decisions made by elected authorities. Similarly, as Reid et al point out,
the provision39 has as its main object the protection of individual rights: the
ostensive impartiality of the sheriff and the procedural protection of adjudication may
therefore be seen as being appropriate. As in the other examples noted above, the
polycentric effect of shrieval decisions is limited to an acceptable level. Although
decisions may have important implications for the individuals involved in the
applications and those in similar situations, they should not be viewed as being
strongly polycentric or contrary to ostensive judicial competence in that any effect on
regional council policy is indirect.
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Without disagreeing with the conclusions of Reid et al (which were
subsequently supported by the Court of Session40), it may be argued that they were
not sufficiently sympathetic to the position of the sheriffs involved. Taking strongly
discretionary decisions in highly controversial political areas is an extremely daunting
prospect for any judge, as it pushes them into an area of decision taking which may
potentially give rise to justifiable concern for the standards of ostensive impartiality
and competence. In the community charge cases, the sheriffs clearly erred on the
side of caution, but it is important to be aware of the difficult context in which they
made their decisions.
Section Two: Appeals under the Social Work (Scotland) Act 196841
(i) Introduction and Research Aims
The most effective way of exploring the general themes of the previous section
is to use empirically derived material. Following the pattern of previous chapters, a
representative power has been selected for detailed investigation. The provision which
was chosen was s.16 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. Although there are
comparatively few applications each year, and the numbers are steadily decreasing42,
it is nonetheless an important sheriff court function. The subject matter of the
provision - the assumption of parental rights by a Regional or Islands council - is
extremely weighty, and involves highly contentious and difficult decisions. Section
16 has also been at the centre of a considerable degree of controversy and debate, and
was heavily criticised in the Child Care Law Review which was produced by the
Social Work Services Group after my research was carried out43 Hopefully, my
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findings will contribute to this wider discussion.
As indicated above, the purpose of this section is to test the evaluation of civil
judicial powers as being broadly in accordance with the general principles for
legislation and theory of secondary morality.44 More generally, it is intended to
identify areas of concern in the operation of the adjudicatory process: these are
clearly of relevance in any attempt to evaluate the suitability of court based
adjudication in an area such as child care law. As in the preceding chapters,
analytical and empirical research is combined to promote a more complete
understanding of the provision, how it works in practice, and its wider context.
(ii) Research Methodology
Three regional councils (RCs "A", "B", and "C") were selected for participation
on the basis of a survey of reported and unreported decisions, and senior social
workers (SWs "A", "B", and "C") and regional solicitors (RSs "A", "B", and "C")
were interviewed from each authority. Five sheriffs were approached, but only three
were able to participate (Sheriffs "A", "B", and "C"). The views of children could not
be canvassed.45 Accordingly, representatives of the Scottish Child Law Centre
(SCLC) and Who Cares? Scotland (WCS) were interviewed. As before, the
interviews were semi-structured, and anonymity was guaranteed.
(iii) The Sheriffs Powers Under s.16 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968
Regional and Islands councils are able to assume full parental rights and
powers over children under s.16 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968.46
267
Subsections (1) and (2) set out the grounds which the local authority must make out
before parental rights can be assumed. The authority can base the resolution on the
ground that the child has been in care for a period of three years.47 If the parents
are still alive, a written notice must be served informing them of the authority's
intention and of their right to "appeal" against the resolution.48 The authority may
assume parental rights in respect of one or both of the parents. If the parents wish to
oppose the resolution, they are required to serve a written counter-notice within one
month of the authority's notice being served.49 If the authority does not make an
application to the sheriff within fourteen days of the counter-notice, then the
resolution must lapse.50 However, if an objection to the application is made to the
sheriff, the resolution remains in force until the sheriff has decided whether to uphold
or quash it.
The sheriff must be satisfied that the following grounds have been made out
before upholding the authority's resolution:
(a) that it is in the best interests of the child51,
(b) that the grounds on which the resolution was passed were made out at the time
of the resolution52, and
(c) that at the time of the hearing there continue to be grounds which could justify
a resolution.53
(iv) Research Findings
These are set out as follows. First, consideration is given to the inter-related
issues of whether the sheriffs powers under s.16 involve an unjustifiable degree of
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involvement in directly political areas (therefore challenging ostensive judicial
impartiality54), and whether shrieval decisions cause a strong polycentric effect
(therefore challenging ostensive judicial competence55). Second, a number of
problems and concerns are identified in the way in which the decision taking process
operates in practice.
(1.) Discussion of the first point is facilitated by the fact that the Court of Session
has given indirect consideration to the nature of the sheriffs function under s.16. In
Central Regional Council v. B.56, an Extra Division of the Court of Session was
called upon to consider the question of whether a right of appeal existed from the
sheriff to the Court of Session. The Act makes no provision for appeal, so the court
was required to decide whether one could be implied. The argument which was put
before the court by counsel for the respondent was that: "the sheriffs function was
partly administrative review and partly judicial. If it had been intended that there
should be an appeal from the sheriffs decision, it would have been encompassed
within the framework of the Act."57
Lord Brand was dismissive of this argument (as were Lords Robertson and
Stewart). He quoted approvingly from Lord President Cooper's remarks in the
Arcari58 case, stating that: "in my opinion, the decision of the sheriff under s.16
was, ..."truly a judicial determination of the Court, issuing a judgement within the
familiar framework of our system of practice and subject to ordinary methods of
review"".59 His conclusion was that such a review had not been excluded by statute
and that appeal to the Court of Session was therefore competent.60
This type of reasoning implies consideration, albeit inchoate, of the sort of
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arguments which have been developed above. It is contended that what lay behind
the adoption of Lord President Cooper's test was an appreciation that there was no
evaluation of directly political issues involved in reaching a decision. Whilst it is true
that the resolution to assume parental rights is made by the regional social work
committee (or a sub-committee), and that it is comprised of elected regional
councillors61, it is also the case that judges have traditionally held overriding powers
in cases involving child care and family law. Although family values, child care and
issues such as child abuse are highly political in the generic sense, there is no
likelihood of the sheriffs position being challenged on the grounds that his powers
involve direct intervention in the political affairs of an elected authority. Indeed,
ostensive judicial impartiality is a vital element in provisions of this type.
The nature of the issues under consideration is such as to require judicial
adjudication. Resolutions involve very weighty decisions on individual rights, and
extremely serious consequences for individuals - both parents and children. The
polycentric implications of decisions are extremely limited, as both the court and the
social work authority operate within a statutorily defined system which is (supposedly)
geared towards the protection of individual children and fair treatment for natural
parents. It was held by Sheriff (now Lord) Caplan in Lothian Regional Council v.
TV52 that close consideration must be given to the individual circumstances of each
case. In the leading case of Lothian Regional Council v. H.63 it was held that
sheriffs must also examine the purpose of the authority's resolution. Reaching a
decision clearly involves a weighing of factors, but the polycentric effect is within
acceptable boundaries, as the court's "periphery of concern"64 is focused on
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questions of fact and law, rather than policy concerns. Ostensive judicial competence
is therefore assured.
That there is a general consensus that the ostensive impartiality of a judge,
and the procedural protection of adjudication are necessary to safeguard individuals
was made clear by all of the shrieval interviewees. Sheriff "A" commented that, "the
provisions in s.16 of the Social Work Act lend themselves to the sort of procedure that
we follow in the court, which is a very judicialised procedure. ... it really is akin to
any other civil action in the sheriff court.... I would see these cases as being very
different from those under, for example, the parents' charter." Sheriffs "B" and "C"
held similar views, and Sheriff "C" stated forcefully that in his opinion assumption
of parental rights is a "... purely judicial function ... it is a decision affecting the
parties - a child-based decision."
The other interviewees concurred with this approach either directly or
implicitly. There was a remarkable degree of consensus which was to the effect that
shrieval adjudication was suitable in these cases65, but that the legislation and sheriff
court procedures left much to be desired. How current practice should be altered
depended to some extent on the particular interests of the interviewee. For example,
the WCS representative commented: "We feel that the court is the place to deal with
the assumption of parental rights, but that there should be more of a place for the
child's point of view."
(2.) The common theme that sheriff court based adjudication, although the most
suitable decision taking process in the assumption of parental rights, has serious
deficiencies, is clearly a highly relevant issue for further consideration. Focusing on
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the particular problems which are felt to exist increases understanding of the
limitations of adjudication. This may in turn encourage the legislature to provide for
a more sophisticated utilisation of adjudication in future civil judicial provisions.
The interviewees had three main areas of concern. First, it was felt that the
legislation weighed the decision taking process in favour of the local authority to the
detriment of parents who wished to challenge the resolution: this limited the value
of adjudication. Second, there was concern that the formality and procedure of
shrieval adjudication resulted in witnesses failing to do their evidence justice. Parents
were felt to be intimidated, and some interviewees claimed to find it difficult to lead
wider evidence on general issues (such as social work theory) which may have
influenced the decision to assume parental rights. Finally, there were very serious
criticisms of the delay inherent in the legal process. These concerns are dealt with in
the order that they are listed.
(i) The majority of interviewees felt that the way the legislation is set out means
that parental rights can be assumed by a purely administrative process. If the parent
chooses not to serve a counter-notice, then parental rights will be assumed without
the matter even being brought to the attention of a court. This was felt to be
undesirable on principle66, as the result of a successful resolution is a profound one
for the parent, and also because individual parents are pitted against the resources and
expertise of the regional council. The effectiveness of the adjudicatory process is
obviously limited ab initio if the assumption procedure discourages parents from
forcing a hearing. As noted in the context of the discussion of compulsory
hospitalisation, it is always important to view adjudication in its wider context: to
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do otherwise creates a distorted, court centred picture of how the process operates.
The representative from the SCLC stated that the concern that we hear
voiced is that it is unfair to present an assumption as a fait accompli - an
administrative measure .... I think there is a feeling that there is no natural justice -
there is no adversarial element. Even social workers feel uncomfortable with this -
it should not be done by administrative resolution. The court should be the proper
forum in all assumptions."
The social work interviewees agreed with this view. For example, SW "A"
commented, "It has to be a court which takes these decisions. They are "one-of' and
have tremendous long-term effects for children and parents. There are evidential
grounds to satisfy. There has to be a stricter evaluation of the Regional Council's
decision."
All the regional solicitor interviewees were also concerned by the gap in the
legislation (although RS "A" was concerned by the cost implications of reform). For
example, RS "B" felt that the legislation as it stood was unsatisfactory, and
commented that "... even though the decision [ie to pass a resolution] is made by a
body of people who have advice from numerous experts, it is still a decision of a
regional council. I think it is wrong that a regional council should have the power
to vest in itself somebody's parental rights without any other person necessarily being
required to review that decision."
The shrieval interviewees were similarly unimpressed by the current legislation.
Sheriff "A" was very concerned that illiterate or poorly educated parents might be
intimidated by the local authority notice, a point which was supported by a number
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of other interviewees, in particular the SCLC and WCS representatives. The sheriff
made a number of important points: "... assumption of parental rights is a strange and
cumbersome procedure .... Putting the burden on the parent makes it difficult for the
parent to decide to oppose this massive organisation [ie the regional council] .... it
might well be fair to have some sort of mandatory hearing in court before the final
decision was taken .... This would mean that a parent who is illiterate or only part
literate is able to put some sort of a case before the court."
Presumably because of the general concern that parents were unfairly
disadvantaged by the current legislation, the Child Care Law Review recommended
that there should be a new Parental Rights Order which an authority would have to
secure from a court.67 The order could only be granted without the permission of
the parents if for a stated reason the court decided that the parents' wishes should be
disregarded.68 The Review also recommends that the court should have the power
to appoint an independent reporting officer to "witness agreements and ensure that the
parent is aware of the implications of consenting to a petition."69 Proposals of this
type go some way towards meeting the criticisms which were made by the
interviewees in my fieldwork research. The value and effectiveness of shrieval
adjudication will increase if parents are better informed about their rights under
assumption procedures. As yet, there has been no change in the legislation. If these
proposals are left to gather dust, it will be a matter for serious concern.
(ii) The second issue which was raised by some interviewees was the concern that
the formal, adversarial model of adjudication inhibited witnesses from presenting their
evidence effectively. Two main points were made.
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(a) First, some of the interviewees (particularly social work and interest group
interviewees) felt that the formalised procedure and physical environment of the court¬
room, together with the criminal law connotations of the sheriff's wig and gown,
intimidated parents and children. SW "B" compared parents to "rabbits caught in car
headlights". The sheriffs themselves were not unsympathetic to this view. On
balance, they felt that judicial garb was appropriate given the serious nature of the
proceedings, but that a less formal and more interventionist role might be particularly
appropriate in this type of case. For example, Sheriff "A" commented, "I think a
sheriff is able to do a great deal more than simply sitting in judgement listening to one
side, then listening to the other and then churning out a judgement. It might
therefore be much more desirable for the sheriff to take a more fluid approach than
at present." Sheriffs "B" and "C" both adopted a similar argument, and were in
favour of sheriffs taking a more direct, pro-active role in proceedings. They were
also in favour of a less rigid adherence to courtroom formalities.
The regional solicitor interviewees had mixed opinions. RS "B" and "C" were
strongly against unnecessary formality. For example, RS "B" commented that "the
argument for court formalities is that it impresses upon individuals the majesty and
importance of the occasion. I would have thought that any half-decent judge should
be able to impress that without dressing up. I don't see any benefits in unnecessary
formality. Going to court is sufficiently traumatic .... The more that the witness is
going to be able to think properly in a relaxed fashion the better." Flowever, RS "A"
took an entirely different view. He argued that sheriffs should use every means at
their disposal to ensure that parents and other witnesses did not feel tempted to lie to
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the court: "... for a sheriff it is a great assistance to know whether someone is telling
the truth .... they should be in awe of their surroundings and even a bit uncomfortable.
Being in a physically and psychologically exposed position can be useful. If the
decision is such that it will affect the child for the rest of his life, it is important for
him [ie the sheriff] to be able to use every means at his disposal to find out what
actually happened. If that involves making the parent almost feel like a criminal,
they are not in that regard any different from someone who is being sued for debt".
It is argued that RS "A's views are extreme and untenable. As RS "B"
indicated, experienced judges should be able to ensure that parents and other
witnesses are sufficiently aware of the serious nature of proceedings without reverting
to theatrical behaviour which, in the final analysis, is intended to intimidate. Parents
should not feel that they are being criminalised70: although their conduct may well
have been unacceptable, it is not criminal conduct. A more sensible balance between
creating comparatively informal and relaxed surroundings and maintaining the gravity
of the proceedings should be arrived at. Hopefully, as well as decriminalising the
experience for parents, the quality of their evidence could be improved. The shrieval
interviewees agreed with this, but it is indeed strange that, despite their thoughtful
and sympathetic ideas on how to reduce stress for parents and other witnesses, they
appeared to be convinced that it was of some importance that they should sport a
rather comical eighteenth century periwig during hearings.
There was also concern on the part of some interviewees that current
procedures prevent the children involved from making their views known to the court,
and there was a considerable degree of debate on the wider question of whether the
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legislation is sufficiently "child centred". It would, however, be a mistake to become
involved in a discussion of child care theory and the merits or demerits of the
legislation itself, as issues of this nature are not within the remit of this thesis.
Nonetheless, attention should be given to a few basic points.
The WCS representative argued strongly that children over the age of twelve
are quite capable of forming strong views as to whether or not they should stay with
parents, and that the current system fails to take their opinions into account. Little
attempt is made to inform, or explain what is happening to, the children. Not only
is the whole idea of assumption of parental rights difficult for a child to understand,
but the court itself is highly intimidating: "... children often do not know what the
whole thing is about... appearing in court as a child is really frightening .... it is very
intimidating standing up in the court.... the parent is also there and the child may not
want to say things because of that".
With these points in mind, some interviewees felt that more sheriffs should
be encouraged to take it upon themselves to speak to children privately, particularly
in cases involving older children. Any discussion would have to be non-threatening
(ie in chambers and without judicial garb). It is argued that this type of approach
might prove helpful71, although it would not necessarily have much bearing on the
sheriff's final decision.
Another proposal which was made was that the court should make more use
of independent reporters72 (similar to curators ad litem) to represent the interests of
children. This proposal was mainly supported by the non-legal interviewees. The
majority of legal interviewees (excluding the SCLC) were unenthusiastic if not hostile
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to the idea. It was felt that there would be confusion over the role of reporters, of
the sort which arose in the recent case of Kennedy v. M..73 Both sheriffs and
regional solicitors felt that the role of reporters was superfluous if the examination in
chief and cross examination had been satisfactory. For example, Sheriff "A"
commented that"... unless there is an interim matter, I doubt whether a reporter is
particularly useful.... I doubt if I would pay much attention to the reporter's findings
because when I am in the hearing I am in the situation where I am able to listen to
the evidence of the whole case .... a report is not going to take the place of a proof
... [or] ... materially change the nature of a proof."
The WCS representative also doubted whether, as things stand at the moment,
reporters could actually be of much assistance to the children themselves unless they
were carefully selected. It was argued that reporters often do not relate well to
children: "... the so-called professionals in the social work department do not know
how to confront things in a way that a young child or adult will know what they
mean." In addition, both social workers and lawyers recognised that they each had
failings as reporters - social workers did not know what a sheriffmight find important,
and lawyers are amateurs in child care. None of the interviewees were able to agree
on who might be most appropriate appointees.
It is therefore rather depressing to see the Child Care Law Review
recommending the increased use of curators ad litem74 (the Review used the term
"reporter" in a different context from the fieldwork interviewees75) without giving
any real attention to who should carry out this function, and what exactly they are
meant to achieve.
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(b) Second, the social work interviewees felt that the stress and restrictions of
sheriff court adjudication led to the poor presentation of social work evidence. This
meant that sheriffs were not in the position to evaluate fully their reasons for seeking
the assumption of parental rights.
The other interviewees had little sympathy with this argument, although the
majority felt that proceedings should be made rather less tense. It was argued that
social workers were basically unhappy with the fact that they were being put under
pressure in cross examination to justify their actions, and there is no doubt
considerable weight in this contention. For example, Sheriff "C" commented "...
effective cross examination is at the heart of the adversarial system. It is not meant
to be easy ... maybe some social workers do not like getting their evidence tested."
Social work departments have developed the practice of leading evidence from
senior social workers not directly involved in the case to act almost as expert
witnesses76 and to provide testimony on wider theoretical issues and social work
policies. It was felt by the social work interviewees that this had generally been a
success, although there was some concern that solicitors acting for the parents could
use "tricks of advocacy" to discredit their evidence. However, all the shrieval
interviewees felt that they would recognise and prevent solicitors from either side
employing unfair questioning techniques. Sheriff "A" stated that "... if there was
unfair cross examination then the court would have to intervene ... but of course we
are dealing with very experienced solicitors - experienced in civil law - and I do not
think this has been a problem." On balance, it is submitted that problems of this sort
were more social work mythology about court appearance, rather than the reality.
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Despite the developments noted above, some social work interviewees were
still concerned that wider issues and social work theory which may have influenced
decisions to assume parental rights are sometimes not fully brought out before the
sheriff. RS "C" did occasionally find it difficult to ensure that "the link between the
individual child and more contextual matters is direct enough to be relevant."
However, it seemed that difficulties mainly arise when social workers and regional
solicitors do not liaise properly prior to the hearing: the relevance of theory or
contextual matters might then not be established during the examination in chief,
which inevitably leads to difficulties for the social workers at cross examination. For
example, two social work interviewees criticised their legal departments for not
making what they felt to be proper use of social work precognitions: this had left
them exposed in cross examination.
Notwithstanding these comments, it may well be that some social workers are
at least pardy responsible for their own discomfort under cross examination. RS "A"
was of the view that social workers often use jargon and advance theoretical
justifications without proper preparation. He commented that "if social workers are
going to produce ideas which are not self evident they have got to produce evidence
to support their background and show that they have done their homework. It is quite
often the case that they do not understand the notions lying behind what they are
saying." A similar point was made by RS "B": "There are some social workers who
do not even know what parental rights mean and no matter how much one tries to
prepare them they just cannot put things across in evidence ... some are then caught
out in careful cross examination."
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It is submitted that the argument that adjudication fails to present sheriffs with
a good impression of the local authority case is not particularly convincing. The
problem seems to be a lack of proper pre-hearing preparation, rather than the failure
of the decision taking process.
(iii) The third and final area of concern was that of delay: the majority of
interviewees felt that preparing for and conducting sheriff court adjudication was
cumbersome and time consuming.
The issue of delay was brought out fully in Central Regional Council v. B.77.
On appeal to the Court of Session, Lord Robertson made a powerful statement which
illustrates the problem very clearly:
"The application was initiated in the sheriff court at Falkirk on 16 June 1981.
On the objector's behalf a motion to sist for legal aid was made and granted on 19
August 1981. Thereafter the case proceeded with repeated delays. It was not until
26th January 1983 that the stage of a proof on the application was reached.
Apparently this proof was allowed to extend over 10 days followed by a hearing of
the agent for the applicant and counsel for the objector which also lasted ten days.
It was not until 14 June 1983 - some 26 months after the passing of the resolution by
the applicants - that the sheriff made his decision .... Procedure in a summary
application under this section of the 1968 Act ought to ensure that the matter is dealt
with precisely and speedily. The welfare of children is at stake. In addition, the
delay which has been caused has by this time overtaken the merits of the application
and objections, the situation of the parties - including the children - having altered
since April 1981 .... The history of this case is a matter for disquiet and regret."
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The interviewees felt that it was unlikely - largely because of the serious
criticisms made in Central Regional Council v. B. - that an assumption of parental
rights case could ever again be conducted with so little attention given to time. It was
recognised that the nature of the proceedings required speedy decision taking in the
interests of the children (if not the parents). For example, Sheriff "A" commented
that " ... the longer the process takes then the more the child is separated from the
natural parent [ie provided they are not already in care] and the longer the child is
separated from the natural parent then the less chance the child has of surviving in a
relationship with the parent should the assumption of parental rights fail". Sheriff "B"
agreed, stating that"... the amount of time which it takes to get a case to court and
to deal with it in court is too long."
Two main areas of difficulty were established: (a) court timetabling; and (b)
Legal Aid applications.
(a) The delay caused by unrealistic court timetabling was felt by a number of
interviewees to be unacceptable. For example, Sheriff "A" commented that if"... an
application was made, then it would be put in as soon as possible: but it is probable
that it would only be timetabled for one day - that is almost certainly not going to be
long enough. Most last three or four days and some last longer." Accordingly, it is
clear that sheriff clerks ought to prioritise s.16 applications, and. allocate a sensible
amount of time for hearings: this would prevent adjournments and consequent delays.
There was wide support for accelerated procedures of the sort which operate
in compulsory hospitalisations under mental health legislation78 or referrals from
children's panels.79 It was felt that fixed statutory timetables should be established
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to force the court administration to shape itself around the requirements of the child,
rather than vice-versa.
(b) The other significant cause of delay was Legal Aid processing. Sheriff "B"
was unequivocal; "I would like to see the whole of the Legal Aid process speeded
up. The delays for the processing of applications seem to me to be quite unreasonable
- it has taken four to five months on some occasions."
It does indeed seem quite extraordinary that parents should have to wait
months to find out whether the civil legal aid fund is prepared to pay for the defence
of parental rights - and it is surely even more unacceptable given that children are
kept in care whilst the papers are being processed. The SCLC, in its interview and
submission to the Child Care Law Review, recommended that Legal Aid should
automatically be available to parents in order that the hearing can proceed without
delay.80 The vast majority of cases involve parents from low income groups: it is
therefore perhaps a false economy to vet each individual s.16 application.81 An
alternative possibility might be that the sheriff should be empowered to grant Legal
Aid as in referrals from the children's panels.82 Unfortunately, the Review makes
no mention of delay, or the desirability of immediate, non means tested legal aid.
This is surely an important omission: it seems bizarre and anomalous that one
important area of child law should make provision for legal aid when it is denied in
another equally weighty area. It is submitted that the issue of delay and the
difficulties it can cause should be given close consideration by the government in any
statutory review of the power to assume parental rights by a local authority.
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Summary and Conclusion
It is contended that in both theory and practice, the sheriff's civil judicial
powers in local administration are not contrary to the standards of ostensive judicial
impartiality and competence. Indeed, the maintenance of these standards by sheriffs
is an important justification for the continuation of shrieval involvement in this area
of decision taking. The civil judicial powers are therefore in accordance with the
general principles and wider rule of law theory set out in part one of the thesis.
However, as the empirical research into the assumption of parental rights
indicates, shrieval adjudication can and should be made more efficient. Some of the
points and criticisms which arose in the course of the fieldwork were subsequently
picked up by the Child Care Law Review. However, it is contended that the Review
has not given proper consideration to a number of problems - notably those caused by
court formality, delay and the availability of legal aid. Attention must be given to
topics of this sort before shrieval adjudication can fulfil its potential as a fully
effective and fair decision taking process.
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Chapter Fourteen: An Evaluation of the Sheriff as an Administrative Judge
Introduction; Aims and Objectives
Following on from the pattern developed in preceding chapters, it is intended
to evaluate the last category of powers - the sheriff as administrative judge - using the
general principles and theoretical arguments set out above. Empirically derived data
is then used to test this evaluation, and to illustrate how shrieval adjudication operates
in practice.
The chapter is set out as follows. Section one provides discussion of whether
the sheriff's powers correspond with the theory and general principles of the rule of
law.1 It is contended that they do. This evaluation is taken further using empirical
data. As in preceding chapters, a representative power was selected for empirical
study. However, the empirical material is not separated from more general
discussion: the grounds are effectively the same for all appeals in the category, and,
as is clear from chapter nine, only a few statutes make use of them.2 The arguments
which are put forward are summarised in section two.
Section One; The Sheriff as an Administrative Judge and General Principles
The powers in this category are concerned mainly with the licensing of
individuals or premises for a variety of purposes. Provision is also made for appeals
against the decisions of local authorities concerning permission for, and the regulation
of, public processions, which may, in general terms, be viewed as a licensing
function. The "parent" provision, which is either adopted in entirety or closely
followed in all other appeals, is s.39 of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 19763 (the 1976
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Act): given its subject matter (liquor licensing), this provision is one of the most
frequently exercised powers in the category.4 Discussion of the sheriff's jurisdiction
as an administrative judge is therefore focused on s.39, although consideration is also
given to the other appeals.
Three sheriffs participated in the fieldwork programme (Sheriffs "A", "B" and
"C"), together with three senior district council solicitors (DCS "A", "B" and "C").
The sheriffs gave an important perspective on how the judiciary views the s.39
grounds of appeal. The solicitors were able to provide an extremely helpful overall
picture of the way in which the appeal provision works. They are senior legal
advisers to their councils, and as such assist councillors to reach a decision in the
majority of appeals which are not heard under the 1976 Act5; they serve as Clerks
to the District Licensing Board under the 1976 Act6; and also present the defence in
appeals before the sheriff.7 It was not possible to build up a representative sample
of councillors or agents for appellants (as the majority of those who were approached
were not interested in being interviewed). However, a partner in a large firm of
solicitors8, who specialises in licensing appeals, provided a great deal of helpful
information and comment.
The sheriffs remit in s.39 style appeals has been laid out by Parliament in
such a way as to focus attention on legal and jurisdictional grounds.9 Appeal to the
Court of Session is competent, but only on a point of law.10 The grounds are as
follows. The sheriffmay uphold an appeal and remit, reverse or modify the decision
if he considers that a licensing board has -
(a) erred in law11;
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(b) based its decision on any incorrect material fact12;
(c) acted contrary to natural justice13; or
(d) exercised its discretion in an unreasonable manner.14
The general issues for consideration are the same as in previous chapters. Do
the sheriffs' powers under statute involve them in the political process in a way that
is detrimental to the standard of ostensive judicial impartiality?15 Can it be said that
the legislature has provided for an unacceptable polycentric effect16 - is ostensive
judicial competence17 affected?
It is contended that by specifying the grounds noted above the legislature has
shown itself to be sensitive to the argument that members of the judiciary ought not
to be required to take decisions under statute which can require a "direct political
involvement"18 and cause a strong polycentric effect19 without consideration being
given to the importance of maintaining the standards of ostensive impartiality and
competence.20 Accordingly, the provisions in question buttress both the ethos of
secondary morality21, and (indirectly) the rule of law itself22 In order to illustrate
this argument, consideration should be given to three points. First, it must be
appreciated that the general subject matter of the provisions involves a high political
content Second, it has to be shown that shrieval involvement in the decision taking
process has the potential to give rise to a strong polycentric effect. Third, discussion
of the grounds of appeal must show that the legislation limits these two factors in a
way which is consistent with general principles.23
(a) As indicated above, all of the statutes which make use of the s.39 formulation
concern appeals from the decisions of licensing authorities. In the majority of cases,
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the licensing authorities are either district or islands councils, or licensing boards24
(which are comprised of district or islands councillors). The councillors are elected
by the local government electorate every four years.25 In urban wards in particular,
they are elected to serve on a party political ticket, and may have campaigned for
election on the basis of party policy arguments, as well as personal qualities and local
issues.
The potential for breach of the standard of ostensive judicial impartiality is
clear. If the legislature had made provision for sheriffs to overturn the policy or
merits based decisions of councillors, it is not difficult to imagine sheriffs being
criticised for imposing subjective views on democratically elected authorities.
Although licensing by its very nature involves serious consequences for individuals
and commercial interests, and therefore questions of individual rights and procedural
fairness, it should also be appreciated that local authorities are the most appropriate
bodies to withhold or vary licences on community interest grounds.26 For example,
local feelings may run high on the question of whether a public house should be
licensed in a particular area, or violence and disturbances outside licensed premises,
and it would be difficult to argue that an unrepresentative sheriff is a better judge of
the merits of community interests than an elected authority. Accordingly, DCS "A"
stated :
" I do not think that if a party does not like an authority's decision, there
should be a right of appeal to the sheriff who can run through the whole case again.
The main discretion is that of district councillors who are elected by the people - they
are the ones who are on the licensing authority and they are representative. ... I
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believe that the District Licensing Board is the body whose decision counts the most -
it is not just the first stop, it is the body."
(b) Similarly, when it is appreciated that licensing authorities develop and operate
policies, the potential for a strong polycentric effect27 becomes apparent. DCS "B"
noted that:
"Licensing boards have policies - indeed, the only way that they can operate
consistently is by having a policy based approach to different applications. I think it
is vital that licensing authorities' policies are defended from sheriffs."
If sheriffs had been given strong discretionary powers to review the decisions
of licensing authorities, it is very possible that, because of the constraints of the
adjudicatory process28, they would have taken little account of the policy
implications for authorities which could arise out of a single court decision. Indeed,
as the discussion of higher governmental powers has shown, it is possible that
authorities could have been prevented from basing decisions on general policy
grounds, as the court could have insisted that each application was to be considered
on its individual merits.29 An authority's evaluation of the merits would then be
subject to the discretion of the court. As is noted below, some sheriffs took this
approach under pre-1976 betting and gaming legislation.30
The competence of the court to appreciate the polycentric significance of die
merits can also be questioned. For example, DCS "A" commented that"... in many
ways the licensing board is far better qualified than any judge to decide on licensing
matters. They are much more familiar with local situations than sheriffs and they see
the whole broad picture - the problems which can arise - in a way that the sheriffs
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cannot."
Given Fuller's general point that the stronger the potential for polycentric
effect, the less suitable adjudication becomes31, it is argued that for the legislature
to have allocated to sheriffs a strong discretion in licensing appeals would not have
been in accordance with ostensive judicial competence. The result of strong shrieval
discretion would most likely have been uncertainty and inconsistency in decision
taking, and dissatisfaction with the adjudicatory process as a means of reaching
decisions. Viewed in general terms, a strong discretion would be indirectly harmful
to the rule of law and the reputation of adjudication for efficient and thorough
decision taking.32
(c) These general points were implicitly recognised by the Clayson Committee's
report into Scottish licensing law, which stated that licensing "is basically a system
of control... of a commercial activity in the interests of the inhabitants of a locality,
striking a balance between the many factors that come before the licensing authority.
... the licensing process is the application of an administrative discretion in the
interests of the community and it is therefore not an appropriate function for a court
of law."33
It was this concern which led the committee to support the recommendation
of the Guest Committee34 that the grounds of appeal to the sheriff should be limited
to decisions which are "... wrong in law, "ultra vires", or fundamentally bad or an
unreasonable exercise of discretion".35
As indicated above, the legislature has, following on from these
recommendations, limited the focus of the sheriff's appellate powers to legal and
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jurisdictional matters through the grounds adopted in s.39 of the 1976 Act - although
the shrieval remit is broader than was originally envisaged by the committees.36 This
was very clearly appreciated by the shrieval interviewees. For example, Sheriff "A"
commented:
"One cannot really decide questions of policy ... the s.39 appeals are very
different in that what we are required to do is to look at questions of law and in some
cases questions of fact - however, the fact is usually readily attainable. One looks
at the evidence and on the basis of the evidence the decision is made. The policy of
the local authority may well be disclosed but the only question for the sheriff is
whether that policy if acted upon and expressed in the matter under appeal is a lawful
policy under the Act. The answer to the case is shown in the relevant section of the
Act: it must be decided on the basis of a simple question of law."
Sheriff "B" was also appreciative of the limitations on the court's jurisdiction
imposed by s.39: "It is necessary to limit our [ie sheriffs'] remit to matters which are
proper for a court to determine. It used to be different when licensing appeals [ie in
betting and gaming] to the sheriff used to be "open house" and we were virtually re¬
hearing the case. That was a relic of the days when we were local administrators.
But since licensing boards have been constituted in their present form, our function
is clearly intended to be an appellate one. I think it is quite right that the questions
we are asked to consider should be limited to issues which are suitable for appeal,
rather than the substitution of one man's opinion over the authority's opinion."
Sheriff "C" made the same points in even stronger terms: "From the judicial
point of view it is a nightmare looking into matters which involve policy. The one
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or two pieces of legislation which involve s.39 make it clear on what basis I am
making a procedurally based review - this makes life an awful lot easier."
This is not to claim that the court's decisions do not affect the policy based
considerations of licensing boards - but the sheriffs discretion is very much more
restricted than in higher governmental powers: the court is limited to what can been
termed "indirect political involvement".37 The general view of interviewees was that
the limitations imposed by the statute38 were reasonably effective. For example,
DCS "A" commented:
"Experience has shown that the sheriff does not have carte blanche to do what
he wants. If the sheriff was to take a decision saying, "The board took a reasonable
decision, but I do not like it so I am going to change it", then I [as a District Council
Solicitor] would be able to appeal that to the Court of Session."39
It is important to note that the limitations placed upon the sheriff are very
different from those set out in, for example, school placing legislation.40 Viewed
in a theoretical context, the s.39 grounds can be seen as a statutory version of
common law mechanisms of secondary morality41, which protect ostensive judicial
impartiality and competence by limiting the judicial remit in a way that avoids direct
consideration of substantive merits and policy. The mechanisms in question are the
grounds of common law judicial review.
Clearly, it could not be claimed that the grounds in s.39 are identical to those
of common law judicial review, as summarised by Lord Diplock in CSSU v. Minister
for the Civil Service42: illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety on the part
of the decision taker. There are, however, obvious similarities, which are
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considered below. Indeed, it is worth noting that the s.39 formulation and judicial
review in the Court of Session complement each other: when a statutory appeal to the
sheriff is incompetent, an application may be made to the supervisory jurisdiction for
judicial review. The nature of the grounds of appeal are considered in some detail
below. More specifically, attention is given to the way in which they safeguard the
standards of ostensive judicial impartiality and competence.
However, before embarking on discussion of the grounds of appeal, brief
notice should be taken of the point that the court views s.39 appeals as "judicial"
rather than "administrative" business. This was made clear at an early stage by Sheriff
Principal O'Brien in Martin v. Ellis43: "All these considerations have led me to
conclude that the right of appeal conferred by s.39 is an appeal to the sheriff in his
judicial rather than his administrative capacity." This finding confirms the general
characterisation of s.39 style appeals as having a "judicial" nature, as argued in
chapter nine.44 With this point in mind, consideration should now be given to the
different grounds of appeal.
(i) Section 39(4)(a), which empowers sheriffs to uphold an appeal on the basis
that the licensing authority has erred in law, encompasses a wide range of legal and
jurisdictional concerns. That it includes ultra vires decision taking was made clear by
Lord Mayfield in Allied Breweries Ltd v. City of Glasgow Licensing Board45. In D
& A Haddow v. City of Glasgow Licensing Board46, the licensing authority was
held to have "misdirected [itself] and so erred in law", by basing its decision on a set
of criteria which had little relevance to the appellant's circumstances. Another good
example of error in law can be found in Hart v. City of Edinburgh District Licensing
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j 47Board , which concerned a question of interpretation which had arisen from poor
legislative drafting. %ffjT
Without delving into the distinction between errors in law going to jurisdiction, 3 '* a
"VS1
and error in law in other respects, it can be appreciated that the sheriff's function
under the subsection is one which is clearly within the judicial remit. It could not be ^^ ^
claimed with much conviction that the sheriff has a strong discretion to overturn the
merits of a licensing authority decision. DCS "A" did, however, note that there was
at least the potential for sheriffs to manipulate their jurisdiction:
"The majority of s.39 appeals involve the question of error in law, which
gives sheriffs a very wide power of review. There's nothing wrong with that - but it
is also where sheriffs can "hang their wig", saying, "What do I think the decision
ought to be? Perhaps it is this - so let's find a reason, and turn it round so that it
seems that there has been a misinterpretation of the law as opposed to a flawed
decision.""
It is worth noting that none of the interviewees (DCS "A" included) felt that
this was a significant problem. Indeed, DCS "A" concluded by stating that "...
sheriffs should be able to look at error in law, otherwise it would be for the clerk and
no-one else to interpret the law."
The sheriffs power of review in practice is focused on the construction of
statutory and common law rules within the context of conventional statutory
interpretation and stare decisis.48 In terms of the theoretical terminology adopted
above49, the sheriff is able to operate the mechanisms of secondary morality without
there being any real concern that the standard of ostensive impartiality is being
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compromised.
Clearly, a shrieval decision on error in law has the potential to cause a
significant polycentric effect50. However, in practice the effect is limited. As
indicated above, sheriffs have been careful to avoid intervention in policy or the
evaluation ofmerits under the guise of error in law. This interpretation of the shrieval
function makes it very difficult to argue that the degree of polycentric effect is
unacceptable51, given that, as DCS "A" implied above, it is in general terms
desirable to have alleged errors in law reviewed by an ostensively impartial legal
expert. Ascertaining whether there has been an error in law is, although not an
uncontentious area for sheriffs, one in which their suitability for the function is
unlikely to be questioned closely. The adjudicatory process is also a highly efficient
mechanism for determining an appeal on this ground, which may involve
individualised, detailed arguments on points of law.52 It is therefore contended that
s.39(4)(a) cannot be viewed as being contrary to ostensive judicial competence,
(ii) Section 39(4)(b) - which stipulates that the sheriff may intervene in decisions
which are based on an incorrect material fact also has the potential to give rise to
problems. It causes a considerable degree of difficulty53 in practice given the nature
and amount of fact which authorities must consider, and the evidential problems
which can arise. For example, under the 1976 Act, licensing boards may hear
evidence from the chief constable, planning and environmental officers, the
applicant, the applicant's agent54, and petitions representing local communities.55
Members of the board itself may express views, based on their local knowledge. As
evidence is not given on oath, the Board faces the problem not only of evaluating
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evidence of a technical nature (eg from environmental health or planning officials),
but of deciding whether the potential problems or advantages of a particular
application have been exaggerated or minimised.56
Importantly, the sheriff is given the power to hear evidence on an appeal
which is brought under this subsection. The reason for this is clear: it would be
impossible to have any meaningful examination of whether material facts were correct
or incorrect without evidence being heard. The fact that the power to hear evidence
is limited to appeals under subsection (4)(b)57 is noteworthy. It perhaps indicates an
intention on the part of the legislature to limit the sheriff when hearing appeals under
the other subsections to a legal debate on the validity or correctness of the board's
decision.58 This contrasts very sharply with the sheriff's higher governmental
powers, where he is put in the position of being a de novo decision taker.59 It
should be noted that the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, in its version of the
s.39 formulation, does not restrict the sheriff's power to hear evidence to this ground
alone.60
Clearly, the subsection also marks something of a divergence from the
grounds of common law judicial review, where judges are wary about interfering in
the decisions of administrative bodies on the grounds of incorrect material fact. In a
recent article, Jones61 points out the importance of mistake.of fact: "... it raises
fundamental issues as to the proper scope of judicial review".62 In general terms,
the issue for consideration is how much judges should interfere with the decisions of
public authorities: determining whether a fact is material may potentially have a
powerful effect on an authority's decision.63
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It is contended that the provision that sheriffs can investigate incorrect material
facts does not destabilise ostensive judicial impartiality - although it has the potential
to do so. The reason for this is comparatively clear: sheriffs do not view their
powers under the subsection as providing a strong discretion to substitute their own
interpretations of whether facts are material for those of the licensing authorities.64 A(
L £.bv" »
The power of the court may therefore be viewed as being limited according to a test 1 • .
which is similar to that which Jones suggests common law courts have adopted: for
intervention to be contemplated, the factual error must be material in the sense of
being a "cardinal" error.65 In this respect, a sheriff court appeal is not likely to be
enormously different from Jones' doctrine of mistake of fact in common law judicial
review, although the fact that decision based on incorrect material fact is a specific
statutory ground does give the sheriff rather more justification for intervention than
a common law court. Accordingly, whereas a common law judge would be highly
unlikely to interfere with the decision of an administrative body on the ground of
material error of fact alone, the sheriff may do so if an appellant is successful in
proving that the authority reached its decision on the basis of incorrect material fact.
However, for the reasons indicated above, it is contended that, in the final analysis,
the provision cannot be criticised on the grounds that it has encouraged sheriffs to
exercise a wide discretion over the merits of licensing authority decisions. Although
the subsection takes the grounds for judicial involvement further than judicial review,
it is not wholly inconsistent with recent mainstream common law developments.66
As such, it may be viewed as meeting the standard of ostensive judicial impartiality
and the wider ethos of secondary morality.
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With these considerations in mind, it is difficult to see how it can be argued
with any great conviction that shrieval review of alleged incorrect material fact
involves an unjustifiable degree of polycentric effect.67 There is certainly the
potential for some effect, but - for as long as the court restricts its discretion - it is
effectively limited to an acceptable level. Most would accept that decisions which are
based on incorrect material fact are seriously flawed, and in areas such as licensing,
which may involve the weighing of important individual rights with a multitude of
other factors, it is not unreasonable to view adjudication as a suitable means of
resolving an appeal. This is particularly so when the difficulties that licensing boards
have in terms of gathering reliable evidence are borne in mind. Indeed, in Martin v.
Ellis68, it was noted that a sheriff who had the opportunity to hear evidence on oath
may be better informed than a licensing authority which had reached its decision
without hearing evidence.
Accordingly, the power of review allocated to sheriffs under this ground
cannot be viewed as being likely to result in criticism of adjudication as a decision
taking process, or a high degree of uncertainty and inconsistency: s.39(4)(b) should
not be thought of as being contrary to the standard of ostensive judicial competence,
(iii) Section 39(4)(c) stipulates that a sheriffmay review the decision of a licensing
authority if it has breached natural justice. Interestingly, the equivalent ground
concerning appeals from local authority decisions on public processions under the
Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 does not mention natural justice explicitly,
and states instead that the sheriff may interfere with an original decision if the council
had "otherwise acted beyond their powers".69 This may be taken to indicate an
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appreciation of Lord President Emslie's comment in Cigaro (Glasgow) Ltd v. City of
Glasgow District Licensing Board that "There is no magic in the words "natural
justice.""70, although it is more likely to be a reflection of the suggestion that "the
draftsman has been quite prepared to vary the formula to reflect in some measure the
difference between the powers reviewed."71 However, for the reasons indicated
above72, consideration is focused on s.39(4)(c) of the 1976 Act, which bears a more
obvious similarity to the traditional common law ground for judicial review.
Accordingly, the position of the court is comparatively straightforward, although the
composition and nature of licensing authorities has caused difficulties.73
For example, members of licensing authorities are permitted to make use of
their own local knowledge when considering applications - but the question of the
effect of bias on the part of members can cause difficulties, as was illustrated by
Tennent Caledonian Breweries Ltd v. City of Aberdeen District Council.74
However, sheriffs have for the most part been concerned with the application
and development of the right to a fair hearing.75 Accordingly, although authorities
may base decisions on the local knowledge of members, those involved in the
application must be given the opportunity to comment. More generally, if an
authority proceeds on the basis of information which is unknown to the party, the
court will hold that there has been a very clear breach of natural justice.76 Sheriffs
have also been swift to intervene if licensing authorities have not taken sufficient care
to distance themselves from interested parties.77 There have been some very obvious
breaches of this basic rule. For example, in Coppola v. Midlothian District Licensing
Board78, the decision of an authority was struck down because it had consulted with
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one of its officers, whilst apparently disregarding the fact that he had submitted an
objection to the application in question. Similarly, (in a case which was heard prior
to the 1976 Act) it was held to be contrary to natural justice for a licensing authority
to communicate with an interested party when the others were not present.79
However, it should be noted that the provision does cause some difficulty in
practice, at least in appeals heard under the 1976 Licensing Act. A number of case
reports80 have indicated that it was extremely difficult to determine whether a breach
of natural justice has occurred, as the sheriff is unable to call for evidence. Sheriff
"B" commented that this had caused some confusion when hearing appeals:
"I have been confronted with the situation where it has been argued that the
licensing authority's decision is contrary to natural justice, but one is not allowed to
hear evidence under that sub-heading. For example, if the allegation is that a matter
is contrary to natural justice because the chairman of the licensing board is a
shareholder of the company in question and the allegation is denied, then there is no
way of knowing how to decide the case."
Notwithstanding this difficulty, which is avoided in appeals under the Civic
Government (Scotland) Act 198281, it would indeed be difficult to view this
subsection as providing for an unjustifiable degree of shrieval involvement in the
affairs of licensing authorities. It is surely right and proper for the legislature to insist
that authorities, when taking decisions which may have profound implications for the
individuals involved, should be bound by natural justice.82 Similarly, there can be
little criticism of the appointment of the sheriff as the judge empowered to ensure fair
procedure: it saves time and money for the parties, as the only course of action
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available to them (had the statute not provided for access to the sheriff) would have
been to apply for judicial review under the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of
Session.83
In overturning breaches of natural justice the sheriff is able to act within the
conventional limits of statutory interpretation and stare decisis. The sheriff is not
taking decisions requiring a "direct political involvement": although operating in the
political arena, the remit is limited to an area where it is acknowledged that judges
should be entrusted with powers of decision. Ostensive judicial impartiality is not
threatened by the provision. Indeed, it can be argued that his position as guardian
of fair procedure in decision taking buttresses shrieval impartiality and therefore, in
an indirect sense, corresponds with the ideal of judicial independence.
Similarly, determining whether there has been a breach of the rules of natural
justice is very clearly a function which is in accordance with the standard of ostensive
judicial competence. Any polycentric effect which may arise from a shrieval decision
is, by the very nature of the sheriff's task, justifiable and appropriate.84 It is
submitted that it is entirely desirable for the legislature to make provision for review
of the decisions of licensing authorities on the basis of alleged breaches of natural
justice: the value and importance of applications for individuals means that it is
important that there is external and authoritative review to ensure fair procedure. It
is difficult to criticise the use of court based adjudication in this context. Indeed, its
attributes as a decision taking process make it a highly suitable mechanism for
determining issues of this type.85 It should be noted, however, that the
effectiveness of adjudication has been seriously hampered by the provision in the 1976
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Act which prevents sheriffs from hearing evidence under this ground. Accordingly,
it is contended that sheriffs should be able to hear evidence in all s.39 style appeals
concerning breach of natural justice.
(iv) The final ground of appeal - that the sheriff may uphold an appeal on the
ground that the authority had "exercised its discretion in an unreasonable manner"86 -
again restricts the ability of sheriffs to consider the merits of licensing authority
decisions. The question for consideration is whether it limits that discretion in a way
which is in accordance with ostensive judicial impartiality and competence.
The first point to note is that sheriffs are not given an ex facie unrestricted
power to intervene in the merits of licensing authority decision taking in the way that
they are in higher governmental provisions. It should therefore be noted that the
second edition of Allan and Chapman's commentary on the 1976 Act is potentially
misleading in stating that, "This is the same ground as that which entitles the sheriff
to allow an appeal made to him in his administrative capacity."87 In fact, the
"administrative" (ie higher governmental) provisions make no formal statutory
restrictions in terms of the sheriff's powers to review on the merits88, and, as has
been pointed out at length above, those which have been established by the court are
inconsistent and permit differing degrees of discretionary power.89 It is likely that
Allen and Chapman are referring to Lord Low's test in Allen90, which has a rather
uncertain status following the Rodenhurst decision.91
By its very existence, subsection (4)(d) prevents sheriffs from ever taking the
view that they have a very strong discretionary power on review. The question is
whether, within this constraint, the test of reasonableness has been interpreted by
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sheriffs in such a way as to create a degree of discretionary power which might be
viewed as being inappropriate, given the strong political content and the potential for
an unacceptable degree of polycentric effect in licensing generally.
The test of reasonableness adopted in licensing cases has its origin in betting
and gaming legislation. Prior to the extension of the s.39 grounds to betting and
gaming, the sheriff's powers to review the decisions of licensing authorities under the
Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 196392 and the Gaming Act 196893 were
effectively higher governmental powers: there was no formal statutory limitation of
the sheriff's discretion. Accordingly, there was a degree of confusion and variation
from sheriff to sheriff, with some holding that they had a comparatively strong
discretion and others taking a rather more "benevolent"94 approach similar to that
which was adopted by Sheriff Macphail in Carvana95.
An example of the former can be found in Aitken v. Motherwell and Wishaw
Licensing Court96, where the sheriff held that "... a licensing court has no power to
pass a policy resolution"97, which naturally limited the ability of the authority to
develop policy based administrative rules to guide future decision taking.
However, in Patullo v. Dundee Corporation98, Sheriff Kidd took a very
different approach. She felt that the legislation required the sheriff to act in an
"administrative" (ie higher governmental) capacity, and adopted the approach of Lord
President Clyde in Kave v. Hunter and Lord Low in the Allen case: "... I have to ask
myself whether in refusing the appellant's application for a permit the respondent
acted unreasonably or capriciously".99 It was felt that beyond considering these
points, it was inappropriate for the court to limit licensing authorities. There was also
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clear recognition of the potential for an unjustifiable degree of both "direct political
involvement" and polycentric effect:
"... The local licensing authority, as the duly elected custodian of public order,
is the best judge of what is desirable or the reverse in its area It has sometimes
been suggested that when a local authority reaches a decision on a general principle,
..., that is an unreasonable exercise of its discretion. I do not agree with this view.
While there are circumstances in which a discretion can only be exercised by having
regard to particular and individual circumstances, where a statutory discretion is
conferred on local authorities, it must frequently be exercised on the basis of local
policy."100
Sheriff Kidd's approach was implicit in other decisions.101 For example, in
an appeal concerning amusement machines, the sheriff held that the "... exercise of
a discretion by a local authority is not necessarily bad because they use it to outlaw
from certain premises in their area a perfectly lawful machine which may be
welcomed as a desirable amenity by their next-door neighbours."102
This line of argument was adopted by the court as the test of reasonableness
for the 1976 legislation.103 Accordingly, the court does not view reasonableness as
providing a strong discretion. The potential for shrieval involvement in policy and
evaluation of merits is limited. Sheriffs do not feel uneasy about the range of their
discretion. For example, Sheriff "C" commented that he had "... never found any
particular difficulty with it as a ground of appeal". Similarly, Sheriff "B" stated that,
"There is quite a body of law on the issue. Unreasonableness certainly causes
argument, but it has not caused difficulties which have been insuperable."
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The court has developed its jurisdiction within these boundaries. Accordingly,
it has been held that authorities are acting unreasonably when they fail to compare like
with like, or adopt unreasonable criteria. For example, in Crolla v. City of
Edinburgh District Licensing Board104 it was held that the "lumping together" of all
the different categories of licence to determine whether there was over-provision of
facilities made the decision "... prima facie unreasonable, since it is reasonable to
assume that, if they had not found it necessary to bolster up their decision by
mentioning irrelevant factors they would have felt obliged to grant the application".
The close relationship between s.39 and common law unreasonableness is such
that the former is now indistinguishable from the grounds developed by the Court of
Session in judicial review. This appears to have come about as a result of the recent
expansion of judicial review in general, and in licensing cases in particular.105
Sheriffs are now effectively applying the same test of reasonableness under s.39
appeals as the Court of Session does in common law judicial review. The traditional
ground of "capricious and arbitrary" conduct106, which sheriffs such as Sheriff
Kidd107 felt necessary to justify intervention when acting in an "administrative" role,
has been merged with Wednesbury108 unreasonableness and GCHQ109 irrationality.
Accordingly, the main commentary to the 1976 Act110 notes Bury v. Kilmarnock
and Loudon District Licensing Board111, which concerned a common law judicial
review of a licensing authority decision (which was not appealable under the s.39
formula), as its most recent authoritative statement of unreasonableness.
Since the publication of the commentary, a number of cases have been heard
in the Court of Session, providing further examples of the common law test of
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reasonableness in operation in the licensing context. These must be viewed as taking
the definition of s.39 unreasonableness further. In Semple v. Glasgow District
Licensing Board112 it was stated in the Outer House that, "... the question is not
whether the court would regard that [ie the criteria adopted by the authority] as a
correct or sufficient ground of distinction but whether the respondents are entitled to
regard that as a sufficient ground of distinction without transgressing the limits of
reasonableness." In Elder v. Ross and Cromarty District Licensing Board113, Lord
Weir took a similar approach, but adopted Lord Diplock's terminology: "It was not
suggested that, if the board was entitled to adopt a policy, it was not allowed to
change it from time to time or that the board was required to justify to the court the
reason for the policy or the change of policy, unless the policy or change carried out
could perhaps be challenged on the separate ground of "irrationality"."
To conclude, it is contended that the potential for an "indirect political
involvement" is restricted to an acceptable level by the requirement that the sheriff has
to be convinced that the authority must have acted "unreasonably" before a decision
can be modified or reversed. The reasonableness test may be viewed as a mechanism
of secondary morality114, in that it discourages sheriffs from adopting a strong
discretion in decision taking: in effect, the authority must act in a capricious or
arbitrary fashion for a decision to be altered by the court. The development of a close
relationship with common law unreasonableness (ie Wednesbury115 unreasonableness
and GCHO116 irrationality) ensures that sheriffs do not feel free to review the merits
of an authority's decision in a way which could be interpreted as being contrary to the
standard of ostensive judicial impartiality. Whilst it should be noted that the
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reasonableness test is not without its own difficulties for sheriffs117, they are
nonetheless able to utilise it in a way which does not give rise to any serious concern
that, as unrepresentative judges, they may be imposing subjective value judgements
on elected authorities in areas with a high policy content.
The restrictions imposed by the reasonableness test also narrow the potential
for an unacceptable degree of polycentric effect118 in the licensing process. The
stringent limitations which are imposed on the court by reasonableness show clear
recognition of the point that courts are functionally ill-equipped to review policy based
decisions. Accordingly, the shrieval remit is limited to considerations which,
although requiring a skilful and careful exercise of discretion, are generally viewed
as being appropriate functions for a court - the protection of individuals from arbitrary
and capricious decision taking by administrative authorities. Adjudication is the most
suitable means of reaching decisions within this limited context: the individual
appellant's case is examined in detail, reasoned arguments are presented to an
impartial sheriff, reasons are given for the decision, and appeal is competent on a
point of law to the Court of Session. In addition, sheriffs are not free to adopt
subjective interpretations of unreasonableness, as Sheriff "B" noted above119: the
court must reach its decision on the basis of authoritative and well-established
precedent.120
With these points in mind, s.39(4)(d) cannot be said to give rise to uncertainty
and inconsistency in decision taking, or to expose the court based adjudicatory
process to criticism: it may therefore be viewed as being in accordance with the
standard of ostensive judicial competence, and the wider values of the ethos of
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secondary morality and the rule of law.
Section Two: Summary and Conclusion
It is contended that the provisions in this category avoid the potential for a
strong "direct political involvement" and an unacceptable polycentric effect. They do
not conflict with the standards of ostensive judicial impartiality and competence, and
are therefore in accordance with the theory and general principles of the rule of law
set out in part one of the thesis.
As is exemplified in the discussion of the empirical material and grounds of
review, functions of this nature are highly appropriate for allocation to sheriffs: they
also illustrate the potential that the sheriff possesses as a complement'to the common
law review function of the Court of Session. However, although it is argued that
shrieval adjudication is largely effective as a decision taking process, the evidential
restrictions placed on sheriffs in appeals under the 1976 Act appear to be highly
anomalous.
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Chapter Fifteen: Summary and Conclusion
The aim of this thesis as set out in the introductory chapter was to resolve "the
uncertainty relating to the sheriff's powers on administrative appeals"1, and, having
done so, to evaluate and criticise the sheriffs role. The ad hoc and unstructured
development of the sheriff's statutory functions in local administration has meant that
achieving this aim was not a straightforward task.
It was recognised at the outset that Bradley was correct to argue that
fundamental to any assessment of the sheriff's functions was the construction of
theoretical "general principles"2, which can provide standards or criteria against
which they can be judged. However, devising general principles is not a simple task,
as it necessitates the development of a coherent ideal of the role of the judge and
court based adjudication in administrative law.
Accordingly, Part One of the thesis (ie chapters one and two) sets out a
discussion of the ideal limits of adjudication by judges, with particular reference to
administrative law. It was contended that the basis of any general standards or
principles was the doctrine of the rule of law. Particular attention was given to the
work of Raz3, who argued strongly (and convincingly) that adherence to the rule of
law means little more than adherence to the ideal that"... the law must be capable of
guiding the behaviour of its subjects".4 Put simply, promotion of the rule of law is
promotion of certainty and consistency in the law. Raz also argued that the rule of
law gives rise to a number of "derivative principles"5, the most important of which
is the independence of the judiciary.
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It was assumed that any British legislature would always seek to uphold the
rule of law as a matter of course, although it was also recognised, in accordance
with Raz's arguments, that the emphasis given to it when pursuing "social goals" may
vary to some extent.6 Whilst agreeing strongly with Raz's central arguments, it was,
however, felt necessary to argue that his highly analytical approach to rule of law
theory obscures the point that, in some legal systems, the rule of law is rather more
than a distant ideal: indeed, it has, to a very considerable extent, shaped entire legal
and constitutional systems. Given the obvious importance of the rule of law in liberal
theory, these systems were termed "developed liberal systems". Scotland is an
example of this type of legal system.
It was contended that in developed liberal systems, the rule of law is the
"primary morality" of the legal system (nb the term "morality" was used in a highly
restrictive sense). An important derivative of primary morality is "secondary
morality", which was described as "... a cultural consensus [ie in developed liberal
systems of law and government] that the rule of law and its derivative principles
should be protected from pressures which could seriously destabilise them and
therefore create a crisis for liberal values."7
The secondary morality of the rule of law has three main qualities. The first
is the "ethos" of secondary morality, which was described as comprising "in the
broadest possible sense ... the traditional positivist model of law as an impartial
instrument which can be used for enlightened or oppressive purposes."8
The second quality is comprised of the "standards" of secondary morality, and
these have a special significance in the construction of general principles for the
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evaluation of the sheriff's powers in local administration. The standards serve as
criteria which seek to ensure that the judicial function is in accordance with the ethos
of secondary morality and therefore the rule of law.
The two standards which are considered at length are "ostensive judicial
impartiality" and "ostensive judicial competence". The former requires not only that
the judiciary strives to present itself as impartial, but that it is seen as being so: this
protects judicial independence, and certainty in the law. The latter standard,
ostensive judicial competence, is closely related, and builds on earlier discussion of
Fuller's9 ideas on "polycentric"10 decisions and the proper limits of adjudication as
a decision taking process. Ostensive judicial competence requires that judicial
adjudication is not merely a competent decision taking process in a given area, but
is also ostensively competent. It too protects the rule of law. If court based
adjudicators take decisions which have a high polycentric content, or which are
anomalous or anachronistic, then courts and adjudication will be viewed as being
weak and inefficient: this will give rise to uncertainty in the law, which is contrary
to the ideal of the rule of law.
The third quality of secondary morality is comprised of what is termed the
"mechanisms" of secondary morality. This term is used to describe legal rules (both
common law and statutory) which have been developed to bolster the ethos and
standards of secondary morality. The main examples are the "rules" of statutory
interpretation, stare decisis, and the use of the Institutional Writers, all of which
impose a system and a degree of rigour on judicial decision taking. Ostensive judicial
impartiality and competence are promoted, as is certainty in the law - and therefore
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the rule of law itself.
These ideas were used to develop the general principles which were called for
by Bradley.11 Very briefly, two sets of general principles were devised. The first
was termed "general principles for legislation". It was argued that the legislature of
a developed liberal system, when creating statutory powers for the judiciary, should
show itself sensitive to the potential destabilisation of the doctrine of the rule of law
which can result from ill-considered legislation. The legislature should therefore seek
to ensure that statutory provisions do not challenge ostensive judicial impartiality or
competence. Most particularly, the legislature should avoid creating powers which
involve judges in areas which require what was termed a strong "direct political
involvement", or which have a strong polycentric effect. The second set of general
principles provided standards for evaluating the exercise of judicial discretion. Very
broadly, it was argued that judges should seek to uphold the rule of law: this means
that in the exercise of discretionary powers, they should attempt to maintain ostensive
judicial impartiality and competence.
It was recognised that applying these general principles of the rule of law to
the sheriffs current jurisdiction would not, in itself, resolve the confusion and
uncertainty surrounding it. Accordingly, Part Two (ie chapters three to seven) of the
thesis sets out a discussion of the rather unusual and extremely ad hoc historical
development of the sheriff's powers in local administration, from the advent of the
"modem" sheriff court in 174712 to the present. Rather more specifically, the
exercise had three main objectives.
First, to unravel the historical and socio-legal context of the sheriff's function
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- to consider the wider pressures which have influenced the way in which the current
jurisdiction has developed. The result is, it is contended, highly instructive. It
became clear that, until recently, virtually the only attention given to the sheriff's
functions in local administration was in respect of their potential as "ammunition" for
opposing interest groups within the Scottish legal establishment. It is hoped that the
parish pump nature of the debate between sheriffs depute and their substitutes,
together with the snobbish petty-mindedness of many of the protagonists is illustrated
clearly. The divisiveness of the debate was remarkable, and may be one of the main
reasons why many of the sheriff's more unusual and wide-ranging powers in local
adminstration have survived to this day: because the debate over powers was so
closely bound up with the internal altercations of the shrieval bench, the judiciary
itself gave little thought to the rather more significant question of whether their role
had become anomalous or anachronistic. Whilst the continuation and development
of wide powers for sheriffs in local administration was understandable, and indeed
advantageous, during the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth century (when
Scottish local administration was weak and unrepresentative), the democratisation of
local and central government and the professionalisation of their executives during the
last century were not given a great deal of attention by sheriffs. The largely
unreflective and uncritical approach of sheriffs was adopted in official reports
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: for example, the 1967 Grant
Report on the Sheriff Court13 was strongly supportive of the sheriff's traditional role
in local administration.
The second objective was to trace the development of case law relating to the
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sheriff's jurisdiction in local administration. Discussing case law, and the distinctions
made by the court over the centuries, was useful in terms of providing background
on how to analyse the sheriff's current jurisdiction. It became clear that the
distinctions which are still made in modern decisions14 between "administrative" and
"judicial" functions have their origin in the law and practice of eighteenth and
nineteenth century Scottish local administration: the division of the sheriff's functions
into "ministerial" (later to be termed "administrative") duties and "judicial" duties was
a feature noted in early case reports, the Institutional Writers and official papers.
More specifically, discussion of the development of precedent highlighted the
point that argument from comparatively old decisions (eg Lord Low in Allen and Sons
(Billposting) v, Edinburgh Corporation15 and Lord President Cooper in Glasgow
Churches' Council v. Glasgow Corporation16) is still highly relevant today, and has
formed the basis of all recent court decisions. The question of anomaly and
anachronism is therefore raised once more. The contradictory nature of these older
authorities, and the subtle nature of the distinctions made by Lords Low, Cooper and
Clyde in particular, were discussed. It was argued that there was a sophisticated but
significant difference in approach taken by Lord Low on the one hand, and Lord
President Cooper on the other: on careful consideration of their decisions, it became
clear that they had adopted differing interpretations of the range of discretion available
to sheriffs when acting "administratively" in local administration.
Their respective approaches were considered in the light of the theory and
general principles of the rule of law developed in Part One: it was contended that
Lord Low's restrictive definition of the discretion available to sheriffs in
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"administrative" decision taking17 was less likely to challenge ostensive judicial
impartiality and competence than Lord President Cooper's approach.18 The
difficulties that had faced sheriffs who had attempted to reconcile the conflicting Court
of Session authorities in order to delineate the range of their discretion under statute
was also discussed: it was argued that, by failing to provide a clear statement on the
limits of shrieval discretion, the Court of Session created a considerable degree of
uncertainty and confusion in the law.
As a third objective, Part Two sought to give an idea of the subject matter and
range of the powers held by sheriffs over the centuries. For reasons of space, it was
not possible to provide a complete or highly detailed coverage, but nonetheless a
number of points can be discerned. Many of the sheriffs important functions in local
administration (eg electoral and fiscal duties, "striking" the fiars, maintaining the
peace and mental health provision) can be traced directly to powers held in the
medieval period by pre-1747 heritable sheriffs. The many duties held in connection
with local government, registration, licensing, public health and housing grew out
of the enormous social changes of the nineteenth century, which necessitated a rapid
expansion in local government and social improvement legislation. Between the early
and mid twentieth century, the sheriff s role was maintained and updated, despite the
rapid growth of representative local authorities and central government. The 1967
Grant Report on the Sheriff Court indicated that, even until comparatively recently,
sheriffs held a large number of powers in local adminstration, although some had
been re-allocated to other authorities.19 This is still the case today, notwithstanding
the functions which have been lost in the last twenty-five years.
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Accordingly, whilst the range and subject matter of powers held by modern
sheriffs is at first glance ad hoc and unstructured, study of the historical development
of different areas of activity has revealed a remarkable degree of continuity and lack
of change. Set against the background of enormous developments in local and central
government, this adds weight to the contention that the sheriff's function may be
anachronistic and contrary to general principles.
Part Three of the thesis (ie chapters eight to ten) evaluates and analyses the
modem sheriff's jurisdiction in local administration. The theory and general principles
of the rule of law and historical material set out in Parts One and Two form the
context for discussion. It was noted that the sheriff's jurisdiction was subjected to
academic scrutiny by Himsworth20, who argued strongly that there was no longer
justification for sheriffs continuing to exercise wide discretionary powers over Scottish
local authorities. A number of sheriff court decisions (in particular Carvana v.
Glasgow Corporation21) indicated that sheriffs are concerned by the range of their
powers in administrative appeals. However, the recent decision of the Court of
Session in Rodenhurst v. Chief Constable. Grampian Police22 may, if anything,
encourage sheriffs to exercise a stronger discretion when hearing statutory
"administrative" appeals from the decisions of local authorities. This interpretation of
the sheriffs function is therefore potentially contrary to the standards of ostensive
judicial impartiality and competence.
Himsworth recognised that in order to criticise the sheriff's function closely,
it was necessary to categorise the different "styles" of appeal.23 In addition to
discussing the continuation of general "administrative" appeals, he commented on two
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important recent developments: powers which require the sheriff to find certain states
of fact to exist before finding for the authority, and powers which require sheriffs to
focus their attentions on legal or jurisdictional issues. After noting Himsworth's
observations, it was decided to develop an analytical framework of powers, drawing
on the general principles and historical material set out in earlier chapters. Although
the dangers inherent in analytical classification were recognised, it was clear that,
without some form of categorisation, discussion of the sheriffs current powers would
be disjointed and lacking in structure.
Four categories were developed, and the sheriff's current powers allocated to
them. The first (comparatively small) category was the sheriff as a "first instance
executive authority". The powers in this category were derivatives of the sheriff's
earlier ministerial and administrative powers, and involved them in local
administration as first instance (and final) decision takers. The second category was
the largest, and was comprised of those powers which involved the sheriff acting as
"a higher governmental authority". These powers are essentially the same as those
which the court has viewed, or would be likely to view as, "administrative" powers:
they are comprised mainly of powers which are derived from the nineteenth century
tradition of involving sheriffs as final appellate decision taking authorities in local
administration. However, it is important to note that the means of differentiating
them from other statutory appeals which can be taken from the decisions of public
authorities is different from that developed by the courts. Instead, an analytical
distinction, based mainly on the general principles of the rule of law, was devised.
Using a simple protasis/apodosis mechanism, those appeals providing for a degree of
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discretionary power which prima facie has the potential to challenge the standards of
ostensive judicial impartiality and competence were differentiated from those which
do not: the higher governmental category is comprised of the former. Accordingly,
the third category - the sheriff as a "civil judge" - is made up of those powers which,
under the protasis/apodosis mechanism, are unlikely to clash with the two standards
of secondary morality: the sheriff is empowered to hear appeals from the decisions
of local authorities which can be likened to ordinary civil court hearings. The final
category - the sheriff as an"administrative judge" - is comprised of those powers
which Himsworth identified as requiring the sheriff to focus on legal and jurisdictional
grounds24, similar to those of common law judicial review. The grounds set out in
s.39 of the Licensing (S) Act 1976 are the main model for this category.
Before taking discussion further, it was recognised that it was necessary to
have a reasonably clear picture of the frequency with which the individual powers
were exercised, although the dangers of relying too heavily on bare, "court-centred"
statistics were noted. As the official statistics are largely unhelpful, a survey of court
registers was carried out in twelve representative sheriff courts: sheriff clerks were
also interviewed. The findings were interesting, although not surprising. It was clear
that the number of appeals which were heard was comparatively small, although this
did not necessarily detract from their significance for local authorities or individual
appellants.
Part Four of the thesis (ie chapters eleven to fourteen) set out a full discussion
of the different categories, and made use of empirically derived material. It sought
to evaluate whether the different categories of powers are anomalous or anachronistic,
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and to assess how well shrieval adjudication operates in practice. There were two
main objectives. First, to discover whether the different categories are contrary to the
general principles of the rule of law (ie by using the standards of ostensive judicial
impartiality and competence), and to test the practical value of the theoretically based
analytical framework. Second, to identify more general problems which arise in
practice in each category of powers. The general conclusions were as follows.
None of the sheriff's functions as a first instance executive authority can be
viewed as challenging the standard of ostensive judicial impartiality. However, they
can be divided into two main sub-categories. The first is comprised of minor powers,
which are obsolete historical anachronisms. Accordingly, they may be viewed as
being contrary to the standard of ostensive judicial competence: the discussion of the
sheriff's role as licensing authority for private clubs25 makes this point clearly. The
second sub-category is largely comprised of more weighty powers, which do not
challenge ostensive judicial competence.
However, a detailed study of the sheriffs powers in the compulsory
hospitalisation of the mentally ill26 highlighted a number of issues. It is argued that
the court's insistence on continuing to view powers of this sort as being
"administrative" in nature must be criticised. The continuation of an arcane, obsolete
distinction which is based on a tradition established in the eighteenth century is
unhelpful. Attention should instead be focused on improving decision taking
procedures and the quality of sheriff court adjudication. Indeed, a number of serious
concerns became apparent, although the court process was, in general terms, felt to
be the most suitable method of decision taking. There was concern that shrieval
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adjudication could be avoided at the pre- hearing stage, that patients could be
"steamrollered" into hospitalisation, that legal aid and representation was not always
available, that shrieval adjudication could be viewed as a "rubber stamp" for medical
recommendations, and that patients could be unnecessarily intimidated by the shrieval
hearing itself. It is submitted that, taken together, these points indicate that there is
no room for complacency as regards the current system: indeed, it can be argued that
in some respects the sheriff court process has fallen short of providing a sensitive,
yet effective, safeguard for the civil liberties of patients. Sheriffs and the government
should give attention to these difficulties as a matter of urgency.
The sheriffs powers as an "higher governmental authority" proved to be more
contentious. It was argued that, under the protasis/apodosis mechanism established
in chapter nine, higher governmental functions were potentially more likely to
challenge the standards of ostensive judicial impartiality and competence (and
therefore the ideal of the rule of law) than other statutory appeals. The discussion in
chapter twelve established the point that the potential for challenge has been realised,
and that from a theoretical standpoint alone, higher governmental powers deserve
strong criticism.
The study of appeals concerning parental choice of school27 took the debate
further, by illustrating the point that failure to meet the standards of ostensive judicial
impartiality and competence in legislation has serious practical consequences. There
was confusion, dissatisfaction and uncertainty amongst sheriffs regarding the range
of their discretion under statute, with different sheriffdoms adopting completely
different interpretations of the same appeal provision. This meant that different
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education authorities have had to adopt different policy approaches, and that parents
in neighbouring local authority areas see similar appeals being decided in completely
different ways. It is therefore submitted that higher governmental powers should
be viewed as encouraging an unwelcome confusion and uncertainty for all concerned,
and that, on practical as well as theoretical grounds, there can be no justification for
the continuation of this category of appeals.
The third category - the sheriff as a "civil judge" - served as a contrast to
higher governmental powers. The distinction made by the protasis/apodosis
mechanism indicated that, although sheriffs may be empowered to consider the merits
of local authority decisions, civil judicial powers were unlikely to challenge the
standards of ostensive judicial impartiality or competence, and therefore the ideal of
the rule of law. This analysis was borne out in chapter thirteen, using general
discussion and a detailed study of the sheriffs powers under assumption of parental
rights legislation.28 Accordingly, there can be no real concern that it is inappropriate
or unsuitable, in terms of the general principles of the mle of law, for sheriffs to
hear appeals of this nature.
The fieldwork findings did, however, raise an number of issues, which were
similar to those which had become apparent in the study of compulsory hospitalisation
of the mentally ill: there was concern that adjudication could be avoided at the pre ¬
hearing stage, that parents were intimidated by the hearings themselves, and that
legal aid and delay could become unfair hurdles for the parents in particular.
Although the recent Child Care Law Review29 has reported on some of these issues,
it is once again submitted that the court process as it stands at present leaves much
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to be desired. A more coherent, imaginative and sensitive approach is required from
sheriffs and the government in particular. Failure to address these issues would be
deplorable.
The final category - the sheriff as an "administrative judge" - is potentially
very significant. General discussion and a detailed study of the operation of s.39 of
the Licensing (S) Act 197630 established the point that, although sheriffs are
required to operate in areas which have the potential for a strong "direct political
involvement" and polycentric effect, the provisions in question do not challenge
ostensive judicial impartiality or competence. The grounds of review are limited in
such a way as to make the sheriff's statutory function very similar to that which is
performed by the Court of Session in common law judicial review. Notwithstanding
a few difficulties relating to the hearing of evidence, the limited grounds of review
promote certainty in decision taking for sheriffs, local authorities and individual
appellants, and do not challenge the ideal of the rule of law.
To conclude, a number of suggestions can be made. The continuation of the
sheriff's jurisdiction in local administration as it is presently constituted cannot be
supported. First instance executive powers which are contrary to the standard of
ostensive judicial competence should not be continued; and the continuation of the
administrative/judicial distinction in important areas such as mental health law is, in
itself, pointless and anachronistic. Whilst civil judicial powers should be supported,
and, if necessary, increased, higher governmental functions, which challenge the
ideal of the rule of law, should be viewed as being highly undesirable and, on both
practical and theoretical grounds, unsuitable for allocation to judges and courts.
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Finally, it is submitted that - rather than continuing the tradition of higher
governmental powers - the sheriff s function as an administrative judge could perhaps
be developed as an alternative. Sheriffs would therefore be left with duties which
could be categorised as being either those of a civil judge, or those of an
administrative judge: the ideal of the rule of law would no longer be challenged, and
local authority decisions would be subject to an appeal on their merits when
appropriate (ie civil judicial appeals), or judicial review (ie either special statutory
appeals to the sheriff acting as an administrative judge, or common law judicial
review in the Court of Session). Accordingly, appeals could be made to sheriffs in
areas with the potential for a strong direct political involvement and polycentric effect
(such as parental choice of school), but the sheriff's remit would be limited to the
legal and jurisdictional review of an administrative judge. In other areas, such as
assumption of parental rights, which do not have the same potential for a strong
direct political involvement or polycentric effect, the sheriffs statutory remit to
consider the merits of an authority's decision would remain as it is at present. The
effect of these suggestions would, it is contended, go a considerable way towards
resolving the confusion, uncertainty and anachronism which at present surround the
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It is recognised that the term "direct political involvement" is potentially
contentious. Hopefully, the sort of criticisms levelled against Griffith's use
of the term "political" to mean "controversial legislation or controversial action
initiated by public authorities or which touch important moral or social issues"
(Griffith, (1979) "The Political Constitution", 42 MLR, pp. 17-19) have been
avoided. Harlow and Rawlings are correct to point out that "Arguably any
action becomes controversial once it is contested." (Harlow and Rawlings,
(1988) Law and Administration, p. 319).
The term "direct political involvement" implicitly stresses two points. First,
the degree of "direct political involvement" is relative to the degree of policy
and political content inherent in the individual public authority decision which
is the subject of appeal to the court: if the latter is high, then so is the
former. It is recognised that determining whether a decision has a high degree
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of what is termed "ostensive judicial impartiality" as a standard for
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length below (see eg pp.32-44). Second, it is argued that the degree of "direct
political involvement" is inevitably heightened if the authority concerned is an
elected authority. This contention corresponds with Griffith's argument for
open government (made in the context of his attack on calls for a Bill of
Rights for the UK), which implicitly recognised the dangers inherent in
involving the judiciary too closely in politics:
"... I believe firmly that political decisions should be taken by politicians. In
a society like ours this means by people who are removable. ... A further
advantage in treating what others call rights as political claims is that their
acceptance or rejection will be in the hands of politicians rather than judges
and the advantage of that is not that the politicians are more likely to come up
with the right answer but that, as I have said, they are so much more
vulnerable than judges and can be dismissed or made to suffer in their
reputation. Not only am I very strongly of the opinion that, in the United
Kingdom, political decisions should be taken by politicians, I am very
strongly against further judicialisation of the administrative process." (see
Griffith ibid)
9. For reasons of space, comment is relatively brief, but (hopefully) plain.
10. The term "justiciable" is used in a wide sense to denote whether or not judicial
adjudication is suitable as a decision taking process. The difficulty inherent
in attempting to arrive at more specific tests of justiciability is considered by
Marshall, in "Justiciability", Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, (1961), (Ed.
Guest), pp.265-287. See also Harlow and Rawlings, Law and Administration
(1988) pp.313-315.
11. Fuller, "Collective Bargaining and The Arbitrator" (1963) Wisconsin Law
Review, 3; an almost identical formulation is used in "The Forms and Limits
of Adjudication" (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 353 at 364 and 369; see also
Jowell below at note 12.
12. Jowell, "The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion", (1973) Public Law,
p. 178 at 195.
13. Fuller, (1978), supra at note 11, p.365 et seq; Jowell, (1973), ibid, p.195.
14. Jowell, (1973), supra at note 12, p. 195.
15. See The Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries,
Cmnd 218 (1957), para. 41. This approach has, however, been heavily
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criticised. See for example Harlow and Rawlings, supra at note 8, pp. 96-98.
16. Jowell, (1973), supra at note 12, p.196; and Fuller (1978), supra at note 11,
369-370.
17. The depoliticising nature of adjudication generally has frequently been
commented upon in the context of tribunals. For example, see Prosser,
"Poverty, Ideology and Legality: Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunals and
their Predecessors", (1977), 4 BJLS 39 at 42-44; see also Stevens on the
depoliticising effect of judicial involvement in decision-taking at pp.39-40
below.
The independence of Scottish judges is protected by a series of ad hoc
statutory provisions and conventions.
For a brief general discussion, see Paterson and Bates, The Legal System of
Scodand: Cases and Materials (1986) pp. 169-175. For criticisms of (i) the
judicial selection system, see Campbell, (1973), "Judicial Selection and
Judicial Impartiality", Juridical Review pp. 254-280; (ii) judicial immunity
from suit, see Brazier, "Judicial Immunity and the Independence of the
Judiciary", 1976 Public Law; and (tii) judicial interventions in policy, see
Stevens (at pp.39-40 below), who points out that judicial immunity from
criticism depends to a large extent on the exclusion of the judiciary from
consideration of contentious political issues. See more generally, Cotterrell,
(1984), The Sociology of Law: An Introduction, pp.245-249.
British judges tend to the view (sometimes in a rather bombastic fashion) that
the tradition of protecting judicial independence is of fundamental importance:
see for general examples, Hewart, (1929), The New Despotism, chapter VII;
Denning, "The Independence and Impartiality of the Judges" (1954) SALJ,
345; Elwyn-Jones "Independence of the Judiciary" (1976) Malaya Law
Review, viii; and Hailsham at p.37 below.
18. Weiler, "Two Models of Decision-Making", (1968), 46 Canadian Bar Review
406 at 410: "The first characteristic of "adjudication" is that it has the function
of settling disputes (between private individuals or groups, or the government
and the individual). These disputes are not future orientated debates over
general policy questions ... rather ... [they] involve "controversies" arising out
of a particular line of conduct which causes a collision of specific interests.
There is no logical or factual necessity about the proposition."
19. See Weiler (1968) ibid: and Jowell (1973) supra at note 12 p. 196.
20. Harlow and Rawlings, (1988) supra at note 8, pp. 18-19.
21. Dicey, (1885), The Law of the Constitution, (10th Edition), (Ed Wade), (1959),
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pp. 187-96. Further reference is made to Dicey below, especially at pp.20-21.
22. Hewart (1929), supra at note 17, chapter n.
23. Hayek, (1944), "The Road to Serfdom", chapter VI. In championing the rule
of law, Hayek implicitly lays great weight on court-based adjudication, and the
independence of the judiciary. The relationship between adjudication and the
rule of law is discussed more fully at pp.34-35 below.
24. Supra at footnote (11).
25. Ganz (1974) Administrative Procedures, pp. 1-2:"... an administrative decision
is not a narrow contest between two parties but determination of what ought
to be done in the public interest in a particular case".
26. It is, however, a highly restricted discretion: see pp.36-38 below.
27. Jowell (1973), supra at note 12, p.180.
28. Dworkin (1977) Taking Rights Seriously, p.31.
29. Galligan, Discretionary Powers, (1986), pp. 20-22; and 68-84.
30 Davis, Discretionary Justice, (1969), pp. 29-30, neatly illustrates how confusion
between "arbitrary" and "discretionary" power can arise. Hewart, (1929), supra
at note 17, chapter IV, exemplifies the point that failure to recognise a
distinction results in sweeping, polemical arguments.
31. Galligan, (1986) supra, at note 29, pp. 20-22.
32. Galligan, (1976), "The Nature and Function of Policies within Discretionary
Power, Public Law, p. 332 at 333.
33. Galligan, (1976), ibid, p.334 et seq. N.B. Galligan's use of the term
"individuation" is a highly specific one; see Galligan ibid , at footnote 8.
34. With the "standard" frequently equated with "arbitrary" decision taking; see
Hewart (1929) supra at note 30.
35. Unger, (1976), Law in Modem Society, p.177; as quoted by Loughlin, (1978),
"Procedural Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in Administrative Law Theory",
28 University of Toronto Law Journal, pp. 240-241 at footnote 128.
36. Fuller, (1978), supra at note 11, pp. 394-404.
37. Fuller, (1978), iW^ pp. 395.
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38. Fuller, (1978), iWd, p.397-398.
39. Griffith implicitly makes this point in the context of his opposition to a Bill
of Rights; see Griffith (1979), "The Political Constitution", 42 MLR 1, pp. 16-
19. See also Stevens, pp.39-40 below.
40. Galligan, (1986), supra at note 29, p.216.
41. Scarman, (1974), English Law - The New Dimension, Part in.
42. Scarman, (1974) ibid, p.50.
43. See Scarman (1974), ibid, pp. 35-50. Statutory right of appeal lies to
Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunals, rather than to the courts. The
Labour Party in particular has traditionally been supportive of the allocation
of decision-taking functions to tribunals rather than the judiciary in social
policy areas: see Banting, (1979), Poverty, Politics and Policy: Britain in the
1960s, pp. 50-54 for a general discussion of this point in the context of Rent
Assessment Committees.
44. Scarman (1974), ibid, p.50.
45. Scarman, (1974), ibid, p.49.
46. Scarman, (1974), ibid.
47. Scarman, (1974), ibid.
48. Harlow and Rawlings, (1988), supra at note 8, p.60.
49. My italics around "public interest". See for general discussion of judicial role
Griffith, (1977), The Politics of the Judiciary, chapter nine. See Devlin, (1978)
"Judges, Government and Politics", 41 MLR 501 for another viewpoint.
Jowell illustrates the problem that polycentric elements can cause for all
adjudicators (and not simply judges): Jowell (1973), supra at note 12, p. 199
and pp. 213-215.
50. Scarman, (1974), supra at note 41, p.86.
51. See discussion below at pp.32-34.
52. Griffith, (1977), supra at note 49, pp. 208-209; Griffith (1979), supra at note
39, p. 14, where reference is made to "The illiberal instincts of judges". The
social homogeneity of Scottish judges has been commented on by Willock,
(1969), "Scottish Judges Scrutinised", Judicial Review, 193; and more recently
by Styles (1988) "The Scottish Judiciary, 1919-1988", Judicial Review, 41.
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For a wider comment on judicial background see Paterson, (1983),
"Becoming a Judge", in The Sociology of the Professions, (Eds. Dingwall
and Lewis).
53. See for example Forsyth (1988), "The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate
Expectations", Cambridge Law Journal, pp. 240-241 et sea.
54. Devlin, (1976), "Judges as Lawmakers", 39 MLR, p.7.
55. See discussion below at pp.28-34.
56. Scarman, (1974), supra at note 41, pp . 49-50. This implication was probably
unintentional: see McAuslan (1975) "English Law and Social Policy",
Symposium based on the 1974 Hamlyn Lectures, pp. 20-24. McAuslan was
concerned with Scarman's comments on the environment (see Scarman, (1974),
ibid, pp. 51-60) but his general argument that there are fundamental gaps in
Scarman's approach is highly relevant. See also Griffith (1977), supra at note
49 pp. 187-192.
57. See argument below at pp.32-34.
58. Dicey, (1885), supra at note 21, Part Two, pp. 183-206.
59. Jennings, (1967), The Law of the Constitution, pp. 54-60; Robson, (1928),
Justice and Administrative Law, 2nd Edition (1947), p.343 et seq.
60. Wade, in Dicey, (1885), Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution, supra at note 21, pp. xcvi-cli. Wade is generally sympathetic to
Dicey, but nonetheless draws attention to his failings.
61. Mayhew, (1984), The Rule of Law. This is a Conservative Political Centre
publication.
62. Jowell, in Jowell and Oliver, (1985) The Changing Constitution, p.4, 18.
63. Dicey, (1885), supra at note 21, pp. 187-196.
64. Jennings, (1967), supra, at footnote 59.
65. For a good general discussion see McEldowney, (1985), "Dicey in Historical
Perspective - A Review Essay", in Law Legitimacy and the Constitution (Eds.
McAuslan and McEldowney), Chapter two.
66.
67.
Davis, (1969), supra at note 30, pp. 31-32.
See Davis, (1969), ibid. Wade (1969), supra, at note 60; McEldowney, (1985),
331
supra at note 65 (especially pp. 53-60).
68. Although Hayek was not concerned with the legal technicalities of Dicey's
theory, he referred to Dicey's work as the "classical exposition"; see Hayek,
(1944), supra at note 23, p.72, footnote 1.
69. Hayek (1944), ibid, pp. 72-73, 75-77.
70. It may be more accurate to say that Hayek's arguments were more cogent and
better expressed. Hayek, (1944), ibid, p.79.
71. Hayek, (1944), Md, pp. 75-76, 81-84, 86-87.
72. Davis (1969), supra at note 30, pp. 32-33. In fairness to Hayek, Davis' own
mode of expression is also rather extreme. See also Hayek, (1944), supra at
note 23, pp. 76-79.
73. See footnotes 28, 29 and see also Davis at note 30 supra.
74. Hayek, (1944) supra at note 23, chapter VI generally.
75. This is discussed at length in the context of the United States; Davis (1969),
supra at note 30, pp. 32-44.
76. Raz, (1977), "The Rule of Law and its Virtue", 93 Law Quarterly Review
p. 195. See for a brief general comment, Turpin, (1988), British Government
and the Constitution, pp.53-54.
77. Raz, (1977), ibid, pp. 195-196. For an alternative approach see Marsh (1968).
"The Rule of Law as a Supra-National Concept", in Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence (First Series) (Editor A G Guest), chapter IX.
78. Raz, (1977), iWd, pp. 195-196.
79. Raz (1977), ]Wd, p. 198.
80. Raz (1977), ibid, pp. 198-202: Raz goes beyond making a simple list and sets
out the main features of these principles.
81. Raz (1977), ibid, pp. 202-203. Arbitrary power is not confused with
discretionary power.
82. Raz (1977), ibid.
83. Raz (1977), itod, P-202.
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84. Raz (1977), ibid, p.203.
85. Raz (1977) ibid, p.203.
86. Raz (1977), ibid, especially pp. 210-211.
87. Raz (1977), iWd» P-204.
88. See for example of wide ranging discussion of modern positivism, Lloyd and
Freeman, (1985), Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence, chapter six.
89. Raz, (1977), supra at note 77, pp. 205-208.
90. Raz (1977), ibid, p.208.
91. Raz (1977), ibid.
92. Raz (1977) ibid, pp.206 and 211.
93. Raz (1977), ibid. P- 206.
94. Raz (1977). ibid, p. 198.
95. MacCormick, (1981), "Law, Morality and Positivism", 1 Legal Studies p.132.
96. See generally Fuller, (1969), The Morality of Law: and Cotterrell, (1989), The
Politics of Jurisprudence, pp. 129-144.
97. Dicey has traditionally been associated with laissez-faire liberalism; see
Jennings (1967) at footnote 59 supra. Hayek's championing of liberalism is
self evident; see Hayek, (1944), supra at note 23, chapter VI in particular.
98. MacCormick, (1981), supra at note 95, p. 143.
99. Raz, (1977), supra at note 76, p. 196.
100. Raz, (1977), itod, p. 198.
101. It is possible to make this claim whilst acknowledging that there may still be
abuses of the ideal of the rule of law in Scotland: it would be quite wrong to
claim that the ideal has been realised fully.
102. Miers and Page, (1990), Legislation; provides a good general discussion of the
legislative process.
103. Bradley, (1987), supra at note 7, paras. 249-284; provides an authoritative
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statement of the law relating to natural justice in Scottish administrative law.
104. See Bradley, (1987), ibid pp. 59-196; the "Administrative Law" title is the
most comprehensive and detailed comment on Scottish administrative law.
105. Raz, (1977) supra, at note 76, p. 201. There is an independent prosecution
service in Scotland (see generally Moody and Tombs (1982) Prosecution in the
Public Interest); a highly developed criminal law (see generally Gordon,
(1978), The Criminal Law of Scotland); and a complex law of evidence (see
generally Wilkinson, (1986), The Scottish Law of Evidence).
106. There is comparatively little comprehensive material on the independence of
the Scottish judiciary, but see Paterson and Bates, (1986) at footnote 17 supra
for a brief discussion; together with Willock, (1969); Styles (1988) and
Paterson (1983), all supra at footnote 52. See also Campbell (1973) at note
17 supra. It is not being claimed that the current arrangements which protect
judicial independence are wholly satisfactory: the criticisms of Canipbell
(1973), ibid, are recognised fully (for further comment, see'^^'tielow).
Nonetheless, it is contended that, subject to Griffith's arguments noted supra
at footnote 52, the arrangements do ensure a high degree of judicial
independence: for strong (and occasionally rather extreme) support of this see
Denning, Elwyn-Jones and Hailsham at footnote 17 supra.
107. Raz, (1977), supra at note 76, p.201
108. Raz, (1977), ibid, p. 195.
109. Raz, (1977), ibid, p.211.
110. Subject to the same comment as in footnote 101 supra.
111. General warnings against ignoring the historical and practical context of the
rule of law are implicit in a variety of different works: these can be viewed
as reminders of the danger involved in over-abstraction. See for example
Fuller (1978); supra at note 11, pp. 372-375; Davis, (1969), supra at note 30,
p. 33, p. 50; Jowell, (1985), supra at note 62, p. 19. It is possible to
appreciate the point that the rule of law is rather more significant than an arid
theoretical criterion without necessarily taking the view (as implied by Fuller)
that the rule of law represents an essential "internal morality" of law, without
which law ceases to be law (see for a good general discussion of "internal
morality" Cotterrell, (1989), supra at note 96, pp. 136-138).
112. See the general point made above and footnotes 102, 103, 104, 105 and 106
for illustrations of the Scottish position.
113. More specifically, "primary morality" should not be confused with Fuller's
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"internal morality", which provides a natural law criterion for deciding whether
law is law properly so called, (see generally, Fuller, (1969) and Cotterrell,
(1989) supra, at footnote 96).
114. Raz, (1977), supra at note 76, p. 211.
115. Raz (1977). ibid, p. 210.
116. Raz (1977). ibid, p. 211.
117. I.E. Judicial adjudication is like a vending machine which mechanically
produces a decision. See Jennings (1932), "The Report on Ministers' Powers",
10 Public Administration 333 at pp. 345-346, which was a powerful critique
of the attempt made by the Donoughmore Committee Report on Ministers'
Powers to delineate the judicial role.
118. See footnote 113 supra.
119. For an excellent and very full discussion of the basic theories of Hart and
Kelsen see Lloyd, (1990), supra at note 88, chapters 5 and 6.
120. For an interesting discussion of the pervasive effect of Dicean ideas in UK
public law see McAuslan and McEldowney (1985) in Law. Legitimacy and the
Constitution (Eds McAuslan and McEldowney) pp. 1-38. On the basic
positivism of the legal profession (i.e. the profession's tendency to view its
activities as being separate from wider concerns of politics and morality) see
Shklar, (1964), Legalism, pp. 2-3.
121. The word "ostensive" is used to denote "manifestly or directly demonstrable";
see Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1973) (OUP). The idea is developed
from Campbell (1973), supra, at footnote 17, who quotes from Eckhoff,
"Impartiality, Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence", Volume 9,
Scandinavian Studies in Law, p. 11. Use is made of the term "ostentatious
impartiality" (see Campbell, (1973), ibid, pp. 257 et seq.) to mean much the
same thing as what I have referred to as "ostensive impartiality". The term
"ostentatious" is, it is submitted, something of an infelicity (see Shorter OED
ibid, "characterised or marked by ostentation" (i.e. "false show, mere show,
appearance")), as it implies a bogus or vulgar display.
122. See pp. 11-12 and note 8 supra.
123. See for example Devlin, (1976), supra at note 54, p. 16.
124. See below at pp.39-40 for example of Restrictive Practices Court.
125. See above at pp.31-32.
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126. See discussion of Hayek and Raz above pp.21-29.
127. See above at pp. 15-15, and pp. 11-12 and note 8.
128. N.B. My quotation marks.
129. For example, see Hailsham below at p.37. Learning how to operate these
mechanisms is a vital stage in the socialisation of any lawyer. They are
presented at an early stage as a system to be learnt and a device which makes
law intelligible and capable of application to specific issues. The emphasis on
the impartial, objective and positivistic nature of these mechanisms has the
effect of buttressing both the ethos and the standards of secondary morality.
130. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC
374, at 410-411 per Lord Diplock.
131. Raz, (1977), supra at note 76, p. 211.
132. Raz, (1977), tod, p. 208.
133. See above at pp. 11-12 and note 8.
134. MacCormick, (1981), H.L.A. Hart, p.130.
135. MacCormick, (1981), ibid pp. 128-130 generally.
136. Hailsham, (1978) The Dilemma ofDemocracy: Diagnosis and Prescription, pp.
106-107.
137. See MacCormick, (1981), supra at note 134 pp. 129-130. MacCormick notes
that "So the idea that judges have only a "weak" discretion since their task is
to "find" the right priority ranking of legal principles and deduce from it the
right answer is utterly unsustainable".
138. Paterson, (1982), The Law Lords, pp. 127-128 gives a detailed description
of the problems which can arise for a judge faced with a "hard" decision.
Jowell provides a clear statement distinguishing "strong" and "weak" discretion
(see Jowell, (1973), supra at note 12, pp. 179-180).
139. See above at pp. 11-12 and note 8.
140. On the Restrictive Practices Court see Stevens, (1964), "Justiciability. The
Restrictive Practices Re-Examined", Public Law 221. On sheriff see below
parts three and four.
141. Stevens, (1964), ibid, pp. 232-235.
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142. Stevens, (1964), ]Wd, p. 252.
143. Stevens, (1964), ibid, p. 255.
144. Stevens, (1964) ibid.
145. See generally Devlin, (1976), supra at note 54.
146. Devlin, (1976), ibid, p.8.
147. See above at pp.11-12 and note 8.
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Footnotes: Chapter Two
1. See supra at p.2.
2. Cotterrell, (1989), The Politics of Jurisprudence, especially pp. 85-87.
3. The tradition of deductive reasoning in Scots Law can be traced back to Stair;
see Stair (1693), The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, (1981 edition), (Ed.
Walker), "Introduction", (by D M Walker), pp. 37-41, and see generally pp.
17-28.
4. See Cotterrell, (1989), supra at note 2.
5. See argument advanced above at pp.27-36.
6. Raz, (1977), "The Rule of Law and its Virtue", 93 Law Quarterly Review,
p.211.
7. This thesis is concerned with legislation which provides for judicial powers of
decision taking in local administration. The general nature of the "conflicting
interests" was discussed above at p.7 and pp.30-31.
8. This general premise is in accordance with the quotation from Griffith
concerning the accountability of elected politicians set out at footnote 8,
chapter one.
9. See above at pp. 11-12 and footnote 8, chapter one. The expression "direct
political involvement" is used frequently throughout the chapter. It is not
intended to provide a footnote at every reference.
10. See discussion above at pp.39-40.
11. Particular attention is given to elected authorities. This is for two reasons.
The main one is simple: statutory appeals to the sheriff are (with a few
exceptions) made from the decisions of elected local authorities. The second
follows from the quotation from Griffith noted supra at footnote 8, chapter
one, and the discussion on the maintenance of ostensive judicial impartiality
set out supra at pp.32-34.
12. For a detailed discussion of this provision see chapter 13 below.
13. Which may affect the legal or jurisdictional validity of an authority's decision.
14. For a detailed discussion of this type of application, see chapter 14 below.
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15. See ibid note 14.
16. A classic example of "careful judicial decision taking" can be found in Lord
Diplock's re-formulation of the grounds of judicial review, which, whilst both
useful and clear, avoids any concern that ostensive judicial impartiality has
been challenged. See Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil
Service [1985] AC 374 per Lord Diplock at pp. 408-413.
17. This point is implicit in Jowell, (1973), "The Legal Control of Administrative
Discretion", Public Law at pp. 196-198 - "The Merits of Adjudication". See
also MacCormick, (1978), Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, pp. 14-15; and
Mullan, below at footnote 25.
18. It is worth noting that the problems caused by delay were recognised in the
administrative law context by the establishment of the accelerated procedure
for judicial review under Act of Sederunt (see generally SI 1985 No. 500
(c.48); Page, (1984), "Just and Reasonable", SLT (News) 290; Lyall, (1985),
"Judicial Review: the New Procedure" 30 JLSS 356; Burns, (1985), "Spotlight
on Judicial Review", 107 Scolag Bulletin 121). The problems caused by
expense and the availability of legal aid are discussed below at pp.anr-^.2.0
clacc •
19. See MacCormick, (1978) supra at note 17. For an excellent brief discussion
of the "problems of proof, see pp. 87-93; and for a more detailed discussion,
see Eggleston, (1983) Evidence, Proof and Probability chapters 2, 3 and 5.
20. This can be a disadvantage, but it can also be an advantage, see Jowell, (1973),
supra at note 17, pp. 198-200, for a good itemisation of the main disadvantages
of adjudication. Weiler, (1968), as noted supra at footnote 18, chapter one.
21. There is extensive literature on this point. See for general examples Rosenthal,
(writing from a US perspective) Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge, chapter
4, pp. 109-112 and chapter six; Cotterrell, (1984), "The Sociology of Law, pp.
188-206; Bankowski and Mungham, (1976) Images of Law, pp. 94-100.
22. MacCormick, (1976), supra at note 17, provides a good general discussion of
"high standards" - in this example the requirement of adherence to the
principles of formal justice - that judicial adjudication upholds (see pp. 73-86).
23. See discussion above pp. 15-16, and 34-35.
24. Fuller, (1978), "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication", 92 Harvard Law
Review, pp. 394-398: subject to the caveat on p.398 that; "... if judicial
precedents are liberally interpreted and are subject to reformulation and
clarification as problems not originally foreseen arise, the judicial process as
a whole is able to absorb .... covert polycentric elements".
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25. This is based on a loose adaptation of Mullan's "spectrum" theory, which
seeks to determine when the restrictions of procedural fairness and natural
justice should apply in decision taking. See Mullan, (1975), "Fairness: The
New Natural Justice?", 25 University of Toronto Law Journal 281 at 300: "...
the nearer one is to the type of function requiring straight law/fact
determinations and resulting in serious consequences to individuals, the greater
is the legitimacy of the demand for procedural protection but as one moves
through the spectrum of decision making functions to the broad, policy-
orientated decisions exercised typically by a minister of the Crown, the content
of procedural fairness gradually disappears into nothingness, the emphasis
being on a gradual disappearance not one punctuated by the unrealistic
impression of clear-cut divisions..."
26. See Mullan, (1975), ibid.
27. It should not be forgotten that other institutions (most obviously statutory
tribunals) may be adjudicatory in nature: "ideal type" adjudication is simply
a term used to indicate that the court process is the ideal: see supra at pp.13.
28. And also the rule of law: see supra at pp.34-34.
29. See below at pp.197-204.
30. See supra at p.25.
31. Discussion of these issues frequently takes place in the context of the debate
over the advantages and disadvantages of tribunals. Harlow and Rawlings,
(1988), Law and Administration, pp. 71-78 provide a brief but interesting
discussion of the pressures and assumptions which can be behind government
decisions on the allocation of functions to tribunals which are ostensibly based
on cost, access, formality etc. See also chapter one, footnote 43.
32. See discussion, supra at pp.31-32; and for a useful and concise "standard"
treatment of statutory interpretation see generally The Law Commission and
Scottish Law Commission: The Interpretation of Statutes, (HMSO, 1969) (see
also Anonymous, (1967), "Statutory Interpretation" SLT 243).
33. On the "intention of Parliament" generally, see Cross, (1976) Statutory
Interpretation, pp. 34-41; and Payne, (1956), "The Intention of the Legislature
in the Interpretation of Statutes", 9 Current Legal Problems, 96.
34. See discussion, supra, at pp.31-36.
35. This point is implicit in MacCormick's discussion of statutory interpretation:
"so far as concerns the "rules of interpretation" the burden of this chapter so
far has been to indicate that ... there is a presumption in favour of applying
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statutes in their more "obvious" meaning; and that at all events a fairly rigidly
observed obligation only to give decisions which can be justified under some
ruling which is compatible with some sense which is without excessive
violence to understood linguistic usage ascribable to relevant statutory
provisions. Within that limit, reasons of consequence and principle can
justify resort to less obvious meanings. To advert to the "golden rule" or to
the "mischief rule" in such contexts is simply to express in terms of standard
justifying reasons the justification for departing from the more obvious
meaning - namely, so as to avoid interpreting the Act in a way which will give
rise to some "absurdity" (the golden rule), or in a way which will defeat the
actual objective of the legislation to remedy some "prior" mischief or defect
in the law". MacCormick, (1976), Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, pp.
207-208: see generally on statutory interpretation, pp. 203-213.
36. MacCormick makes this point, albeit in a different context - see MacCormick,
(1981), HLA Hart, p. 130.
37. See supra at p.2; see below at chapter 12 for a detailed discussion of examples.
38. See footnote 138, chapter one for a definition of this term.
39. See chapters 9 and 12 below for detailed discussion.
40. Subject to the general point made by MacCormick that "judicial discretion only
exists within the framework of some predetermined standards"; see op cit
(1981) at footnote 36 supra. For examples of this type of power see detailed
discussion below at chapter 12.
41. It is appreciated that the careless use of the term "controversy" can be
controversial: see on Griffith, Harlow and Rawlings, (1988), op cit at note 31
supra, p.319.
42. R. v. National Insurance Commissioners [1972] AC 914 at 1005 per Lord
Diplock. For a clear and concise general discussion of "purposive" arguments,
see Miers and Page, (1990) Legislation, pp. 170-183.
43. See MacCormick, (1976), ibid, pp. 206-207 for a good statement of the "two
requirements to be met by lawyers who seek to persuade a court to adopt a
less than obvious meaning for statutory words": these provide a brief but clear
description of the constraints within which the judge must make his
interpretation. The point under discussion is a variant of Paterson's analysis
of the "conflict" between "Justice and Certainty" in the development of the
common law - see Paterson (1982), The Law Lords, pp. 122-132.
44. This general point was made above in discussion: see pp.36-38.
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45. "To put it at its very lowest, there are ... strong pressures - apparently very
effective pressures - on judges to appear to be what they are supposed to be.
The reasons they publicly state for their decisions must therefore be reasons
which (so far as taken seriously) make them appear to be what they are
supposed to be: in short, reasons which show that their decisions secure
"justice according to law", and which are at least in that sense justifying
reasons". - see MacCormick (1976), ibid, p. 17 in the course of a discussion
of the "justificatory function of legal argumentation" pp. 13-18. The way in
which a judge arrives at his decisions must also "make them appear what they
are supposed to be".
46. Mandla v. Powell Lee [1983] QB.l; the case concerned the question of
whether a Sikh could be viewed as being a member of a "racial group" under
s.l(l)(b) of the Race Relations Act 1976. Lord Denning in particular made
eclectic use of dictionary sources. See [1983] QB 1, especially pp. 9-10;
reversed by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton [1983] 2 AC pp. 560-565. Lord Fraser
went on to make a number of other serious criticisms of the Court of Appeal
judgement, in particular statements made by Oliver LJ. and Kerr L.J. at pp.
567-568.
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Footnotes: Part Two: Chapter Three
1. See for general example, Vile, (1967), Constitutionalism and the Separation of
Powers.
2. See for a general example of this approach Bradley, (1988) "Administrative
Law", in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (Volume One)
paras. 201-345.
3. Although it is recognised that there is a strong tradition of empirical study in
administrative law (for an example of a classic empirical study in the
administrative law context, see Adler and Bradley (Eds.), (1975), Justice,
Discretion and Poverty), it is contended that the dominant tradition of
administrative law scholarship in the UK has been an analytical, "blackletter"
law approach (see Partington, (1985), "The Reform of Public Law in Britain:
Theoretical Problems and Practical Considerations", in Law, Legitimacy and
the Constitution, (Eds. McAuslan and McEldowny), p.208).
4. See pp.2-6 supra.
5. See for example pp.206-208 below.
6. For example, the recent case of Rodenhurst v. Chief Constable, Grampian
Police 1991 SLT 104 made reference to the 1908 decision of Allen and Sons
Billposting Ltd v. Corporation of Edinburgh. 1909 SC 70, and see also
discussion at pp.158-159 below.
7. See chapter nine below.
8. See Cooper of Culross, (1958), "Introduction to Scottish Legal History", The
Stair Society, Volume 20 chapter one; and Paton, (1958), ibid, chapter two:
Cooper and Paton were the most influential "Dark Age" scholars. Sellar,
(1991), "A Historical Perspective", The Scottish Legal Tradition (Ed. Styles),
pp. 29-30 warns against Lord Cooper's tendency to exaggerate the element of
change and underplay the element of continuity.
9. Darnton, (1984), The Great Cat Massacre.
10. Darnton, (1984), ibid, p.14.
343
Footnotes; Chapter Four
1. Milne (1958), "The Sheriff Court Before the 16th Century", Stair Society
Volume 20, p.350.
2. The term "governmental" is (at this stage) used generally to mean non-judicial
functions held in local administration. Its meaning is developed throughout the
thesis - see p.63 and p. 107 below.
3. Dickinson, (1928) the Sheriff Court Book of Fife, pp. xi, xii.
4. Milne, (1958), op cit at note 1 supra p.350.
5. Milne, (1958) ibid, p.351: a survey of the apparently ineffectual legislation
passed by the Scottish Parliament is given.
6. Caithness in 1719 and Elgin in 1726, Scottish Record Office (SRO) file SRO,
GD 157/2248, noted in Whetstone, (1981), Scottish County Government in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, p. 120, note 14.
7. See generally Milne, (1958), op cit at note 1 supra p.352.
8. Malcolm, (1958) "The Sheriff Court: The 16th Century and Later", Stair
Society Volume 20 p.356; and Whetstone, (1981) op cit at note 6 supra pp. 5-
6; and p.122, note 38.
9. Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, i., 492a; and see Milne, (1958), op cit at
note 1 supra p.351; and Whetstone, (1981), op cit at note 6 supra pp. 5-6; and
p. 122, note 38.
10. See generally Malcolm, (1958), op cit at note 8 supra pp. 356-360; Whetstone,
(1981), op cit at note 6 supra, pp. 1-3.
11. Linklater and Hesketh, (1989), For King and Conscience, pp. 70 et seq.
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12. Union with England Act 1706, (c.7): the ratification of Article XX and the
amendments made to it are noted at APS, xi, 383.
13. Whetstone, (1981) op cit at note 6 supra, p.3.
14. Although it is not completely clear how direct an influence this was on the
government: compare Malcolm, (1958), op cit at note 8 supra p.360, with
Whetstone, (1981), op cit at note 6 supra p.4.
15. It would have been surprising if it had been. Montesquieu's famous and
influential championing of the doctrine of the separation of powers in L'Espit
des Lois was not published until 1748. For a brief discussion of the
significance ofMontesquieu's ideas see Montesquieu, "The Spirit of the Laws,
(1975 Edition) (Editor Neumann), pp. li-lix.
16. For an interesting general discussion of the reformation and the Scottish
"Enlightenment", see Camic, (1983), Experience and Enlightenment. Camic




1. Heritable Jurisdictions (S) Act 1747 (20 Geo 2) (c.43).
N.B. It would appear that there is a some confusion in the recording of this
important statute. The Chronological Table of the Statutes (HMSO)
(1992) notes at p. 104 that the Act was passed in 1746. However, the
statute book itself makes it clear that the Act was passed in 1747 - (see
1747 (20 Geo II) (c.43)). The Act has traditionally been referred to in
texts and other sources as an Act of 1747: accordingly, notwithstanding
the Chronological Tables, it is intended to continue this practice. The
date for the implementation of the changes was set out in s.3.
2. Ibid, at note one, s.l.
3. Ibid, at note one, ss.3, 5.
4. Ibid, at note one, s.5.
5. The duties of the High Sheriff were never defined. Green's Encyclopaedia of
the Laws of Scotland Volume 13 (1931) noted at p.522 that the duties of the
High Sheriff fell to be performed by the Sheriffs Depute and the Lords
Lieutenant. However. The Third Report on the Sheriff and Commissary Courts
(Parliamentary Reports, Law Commission of 1815) could not trace the
functions of the High Sheriff; see pp. 7 and 8. See also The Laws of Scotland:
Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume 5, (1987), para.547.-
The Act also introduced a considerable degree of confusion regarding the
correct titles of the new officials. Sheriffs depute were frequently referred to
unofficially as "sheriffs principal", (ie the pre-reform tide of the High
Sheriffs) in order to differentiate them from the substitutes, who were
informally known as "sheriffs". To confuse the issue further, deputes were
also referred to as "sheriffs" after the Circuit Courts (Scotland) Act 1828
(c.29), s.22. The matter was not resolved until the Sheriff Court (Scotland)
Act 1971 (c.58), s.4(2), when sheriffs depute were finally re-named "sheriffs
principal", and the title "sheriff substitute" was replaced by "sheriff". To
avoid confusion in discussion of the period before 1971, the titles "depute"
and "substitute" are used when appropriate, and "sheriff' is used to denote
either rank.
6. See for example pp.75-91 below.
7. Heritable Jurisdictions (S) Act 1747, op cit at note 1 supra, s.24.
8. Ibid, at note (7).
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9. Ibid, at note (7).
10. This is implicit in the provision noted ibid at note (7). See Whetstone (1981)
Scottish County Government in the 18th and 19th Centuries at p.89, and p. 123
at notes 58-61 for an informative discussion of shrieval practice. See also
Sheriffs (S) Act 1747 (21 Geo 2) (c.19), ss.10, 11 for prohibition of other
work.
11. The Heritable Jurisdictions (S) Act 1747, supra at note (1) had provided that
appointments were ad vitam aut culpam after seven years in office. The
Sheriff (S) Act 1755 (28 Geo 2) (c.7) postponed appointment ad vitam aut
culpam for 15 years.
12. Whetstone, (1981), supra at note 10, chapter one generally, gives an
interesting account of the sheriff's role in local administration in the period
1747-1880. However, there is very little comment on what is, to the eyes of
a modern lawyer, the unusual nature of shrieval functions in local
administration - in addition there is no analysis of case law. For discussion of
these points see below.
13. See Heritable Jurisdictions (S) Act 1747, supra at note (1), ss.24, 30.
14. Bankton, (1752), Institutes of the Laws of Scotland, Book IV, Tit. XIV, p.551.
15. See Heritable Jurisdictions (S) Act 1747, supra at note (1), s.30.
16. See supra at p.59.
17. The Heritable Jurisdictions S) Act 1747, supra at note (1), s.24 provided that
deputes could appoint substitutes to assist them. For the position prior to the
1747 Act, see Malcolm, (1958), "The Sheriff Court: 16th Century and Later",
Stair Society Volume 20, p.356.
18. See Whetstone, (1981), supra at note 10 pp. 5-8.
19. See Shaw (1983) The Management of Scottish Society 1707-1764, chapter two
generally and pp.41-42.
20. Whetstone, (1981) supra at note 10, pp. 6-8.
21. Whetstone, (1981), supra at note 10, p.8 notes the influence of Henry Dundas
in the changes. For a general discussion of the activities of Dundas, see
Murdoch, (1980), The People Above, pp.128-131; see also Ferguson (1978),
Scotland: 1689 to the Present, pp. 236-243.
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22. Malcolm, (1958), "The Sheriff Court: The Sixteenth Century and Later", Stair
Socetv Volume 20, p.361.
23. See Malcolm, (1958) ibid. The "local ties" of the depute were still a
contentious issue in the mid 1960s - see Report of the Grant Committee on the
Sheriff Court, Cmnd. 3248 (1967), para. 355. It should also be noted that a
reasonably effective system of appeals was necessary, as a depute for a large
sheriffdom could have had difficulty in the carrying out all his functions even
in a 4 month period: Erskine, (1773), Institutes, p.58-60, gives an idea of the
sizeable nature of the sheriffs functions.
24. Clark, (1824), The Office of Sheriff, p.257.
25. Clark, (1824), ]bid.
26. See below at p. 151
27. Whetstone, (1981) supra at note 10, chapter one generally.
28. I.E. beyond the provision that the sheriff depute could appoint substitutes to
assist him; see Heritable Jurisdictions (S) Act 1747, supra at note (1) s.24.
29. See Whetstone (1981), supra at note 10, pp.9-17 for detailed discussions see
also Malcolm, (1958), supra at note 22, pp. 361-362 for a more concise
statement.
30. See discussion below at p. 124.
31. Reports of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Courts of Law in
Scotland, 1869-1871, (5 Reports).
32. Ibid, First Report pp., 6, 22.
33. The "local influences" were dwelt on by Clark (1824), supra at notes (24) and
(25).
34. The depute's sheriffdom was usually a county (and sometimes more than one),
where as the substitutes were allocated individual court districts within the
sheriffdom.
35. "... frequently the sheriff principal [the depute] is appointed on merely political
considerations, with but little practical knowledge of law [and] it may well be
doubted whether, on the average, the sheriffs who sit on appeal are superior
in legal attainments" - see, supra at note 31, First Report, p.3.
36. See, supra, note 31, First Report, p. 11.
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37. See ibid. First Report, pp. 154, 115.
38. See, ibid. First Report, p.188.
39. See, ibid. First Report, p. 115.
40. See, ibid. First Report, p. 154.
41. Not everyone was impressed by the substitutes' performance: for example,
see ibid. First Report, p.204.
42. See Green's Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, Volume 11, (1889),
p.323.
43. See for example Hume v. Swinton, Faculty Decisions, February 7th 1806, A
sheriff's decisions were subject to review if he had acted beyond his
jurisdiction: see Leishman v. Magistrates of Ayr, Faculty Cases, 8 March 1800.
44. Sometimes also referred to as "exclusive and final" jurisdictions: Millar v.
Henderson, 1869, 6 SLR 368 illustrates the point that the remit of these
jurisdictions was interpreted strictly: see p.370 per Lord President; and see
Leith Police Commissioners v. Campbell, 1866, 5 M. 247, for a "final and
privative" provision.
45. For-exarnple,Appeal from the sheriff to the Outer House was competent under
burial ground legislation: see Campbell v. Dunlop and Wilkie, 1864, 2M 503,
per Lord President at pp. 505-506.
46. See e.g. Hume v. Swinton noted supra at note 43. "He [i.e. the sheriff] is the
King's officer ... He does not act under the authority of the Court of Session
47. EG - see above at pp.58-61 and below at pp.76-82.
48. Love v. Lang (1872) 10 M 782: see below at note. ^ ^
49. See Lord Deas' comments below at pp.73-74.
50. Accordingly, if there was no provision for appeal, the decision could be
viewed as having "none of the characteristics of an ordinary judicial process",
see Dubs v. Police Commissioners of Crosshill (1876) 3 R 758 at 761, per
Lord Ormidale.
51. See supra at note 48.
52. See Home v. Swinton, supra at note 43.
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53. Love v. Lang, supra at note 48, p.768 per Lord President (Inglis).
54. Love v. Lang, supra at note 48, p. 787.
55. Love v. Lang, supra at note 48, per Lord Cowan at p.787.
56. See supra at note 44.
57. See supra at note 44 per Lord Justice Clerk Inglis at p.251.
58. Campbell v. Dunlop and Wilkie, supra at note 45, and Fulton v. Dunlop, 1862,
24D 1027.
59. Fulton v. Dunlop, supra at note 58 per Lord Deas at p. 1033.
60. I.E. in Campbell v. Dunlop and Wilkie, supra at note 45, pp. 507-508 per
Lord Deas.
61. See generally Little and Godwin, (1988), "History of Local Government", The
Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume 14, paras. 20-22,
23-29.
62. See supra at pp.11-12 and footnote 8, chapter one; also pp.49-53.
63. See generally supra at pp.31-38 and pp.49-53.
64. See supra at pp.52.
65. Green's Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, Volume 13, (1931), p.518.
66. Apart from the different Law Commission reports, there are case reports,
sheriff court practice texts, the institutional writers, the entries in the three
editions of Greens Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland (i.e. 1899, 1914 and
1931), and a number of other secondary sources. Reference is also made to
primary sources stored at the Scottish Record Office (SRO). The SRO
maintains a large holding of sheriff court records, which are indexed under
SRO SC/1 to SC/70. The sources date from the eighteenth century to the
1960s. Much of the material is of limited interest, and its nature and content
varies considerably from court to court. The sheriff court books and holdings
of club registers provide only the most basic information (ie names and
addresses of parties, date of hearings etc.): good examples of each category
are the summary applications "B" registers for Cupar Sheriff Court 1949-1956
(SRO SC/20/8- 7), and the club registers for Glasgow Sheriff Court 1958-
1963 (SRO SC/36/26-9). It is worth noting that the sheriff clerks tended to
record all court business in the ordinary court book (with exceptions such as
Ears and electoral business) until the late 19th century, at which point the
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larger courts split their registers into ordinary court ("A" registers) and
summary applications ("B" registers): the majority of governmental
applications are noted in the "B" registers. A citation prefixed by "SRO"
denotes a Scottish Record Office file.
67. See generally, Little and Godwin (1988), supra at note 61, paras. 20-22, 31-37.
68. Supra, note 31, First Report, Minutes of Evidence paras. 105-107.
69. Sheriffs were also entrusted with a wide range of functions concerning local
police forces; see Police (S) Act 1857 (20 and 21 Vict) (C.72), ss.6, 3 for
general examples of the sheriffs statutory functions.
70. Supra, note 68 for example.
71. Bankton. (1752) Institutions of the Law of Scotland, Book IV, p.557. See also
the record ofmonthly fiars business held for Perth Sheriff Court for the period
1791-1821 at SRO/SC.49/22-3 to 7. There is also a graph showing the
fluctuations in fiars prices between 1790-1862 at SRO/SC.49/22-8. It is clear
from the files that striking the fiars was a complicated and time consuming
undertaking.
72. Bankton, Ibid, at note 71: see also Chisholm, Sir Walter Scott as a Judge,
p.63; and Law Commission Report of 1818 (Report No. 3), p.10.
73. Bankton, (1752) supra at note 71.
74. Knox and Company v. Law and Others, (1771), December 10th, Morison's
Dictionary 4420: The Sheriff of Haddingtonshire had adopted a new procedure,
which was challenged unsuccessfully in the Court of Session.
75. See, supra, at footnotes 43 and 46.
76. See above at p.71.
77. McGlashan, (1868), Sheriff Court Practice, p.8. Previous editions of his book
(i.e. 1842 and 1854) provide further illustration of the point that there had been
little change.
78. See for general discussion, Ferguson, (1984) "The Electoral System in the
Scottish Countries before 1832" Stair Society Volume 35 - Miscellany n, (Ed.
Sellar) p.261. The SRO has a very large holding of material relating to
electoral administration. For example, the Freeholders' (i.e. electors') minutes
for the period up to 1832 for the City of Edinburgh are stored at
SRO/SC.39/91-9: the minutes give a record of the Freeholders' meetings,


















elections. Files SRO/SC.6/84-5 covers the period 1832-1835 at Ayr Sheriff
Court, and include a copy of the Representation of the People (Scotland) Act
1832 together with instructions for sheriff clerks. Most of the material is
extremely mundane, and relates mainly to election expenses: however, it
does give a flavour of the heavy workload which was involved in
administering the electoral system.
Bankton, (1752) supra at note 71, Book IV, p.559.
Bankton, (1752) ibid. Book IV, p.454.
See Ferguson (1984), supra at note 78.
Gash, (1953), Politics in the Age of Peel, p.36.
Bankton, (1752) supra at note 71, Book IV p.457.
Representation of the People (Scotland) Act 1832 (2 and 3 William IV) (c.65).
Ibid at note (84), ss. XIV, XVII, XXII, XXIV, XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX.
Ibid at note (84), s.XIV.
"... under the Royal Burgh Reform Act [i.e. the Royal Burgh (S) Act 1833 (3
and 4 Will IV) (c.76)], the sheriffs in the Appeal Courts sitting on the
Parliamentary registers, have a privative appellate jurisdiction in certain burgh
electoral registers. Also, by other Acts [i.e. mainly the Burghs and Police (S)
Act 1833, (3 and 4 will IV) (c.46)], passed to regulate these and other burghs
of recent date, certain other powers, both ministerial and judicial have been
committed to them". See McGlashan (1842), Sheriff Court Practice, p. 11.
For example, as in the County Elections (S) Act 1853 (16 and 17 Vict) (c.28)
s.2.
Bankton, (1752), supra at note 71, Book IV p.559.
Erskine, (1773), supra at note 23, p.60.
Supra at note 90 and see also McGlashan (1842), Sheriff Court Practice p.9.
Infeftment Act 1845 (8 and 9 Vict) (c.35).
Service of Heirs (S) Act 1847 (10 and 11 Vict) (c.47).
Sheriff Court (S) Act 1853 (16 and 17 Vict) (c.80).
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95. See generally, McGlashan, (1854), Sheriff Court Practice, p.8.
96. Whetstone, (1981), supra at note 10, p.61.
97. See generally, Green's Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland Volume 4,
(1914), p.554.
98. See Whetstone, (1981), supra at note 96.
99. See Commissioners of Supply Meetings (Scotland) Act (28 and 29 Vict.)
(c.38). The Act made alternative provisions under s.2.
100. See below.
101 Whetstone, (1981), supra at note 10, p.80. See also Duties on Income Act
1799 (39 Geo 3) (c.13) s.23; and Duties on Income Act 1799 (39 Geo 3)
(c.22), s.5.
102. House Tax 1803 (43 Geo 3) (c.161) s.7.
103. Taxes (S) Act 1812 (52 Geo 3) (c.95), ss.2, 3.
104. The main pieces of legislation in this period were the Burghs and Police (S)
Act 1833 (3 and 4 Will IV) (c.46); the Burgh Police (S) Act 1847 (10 and 11
Vict.) (c.39); Police (S) Act 1850 (13 and 14) (c.33); and the General Police
and Improvement (S) Act 1862 (25 and 26 Vict) (c.101).
105. See ibid at note 104.
106. See Burgh and Police (S) Act 1833 supra at note (104) s.xxv.
107. See 1833 Act, supra, at note (104), ss. cxxx; cxxxix-xci; xciiii; xcvi; cxv-
cxviii; cxii; cvii; xcvil; cxiii.
108. See 1833 Act, supra at note (104), s.cxxiv, xc; xciii; cxii.
109. See 1833 Act, supra at note (104), s.cxxxiv. The offenses were tried using a
summary form established by the Circuit Courts (S) Act 1828 (9 Geo 4) (c.29).
110. Police (S) Act 1850 (13 and 14) (c.33): see long title of Act.
111. Ibid, ss. iv-xxx.




114. Ibid, s.cclxxviii; and s.cclxxix.
115. Ibid, s.cclxxxvi.
116. Ibid, s.cccxxx. The sheriff's signature was proof of confirmation (s.cccxxxv).
N.B. Sheriffs also had extensive judicial powers under the Act: see for
example the offenses listed under s.xcvi and s.clxxxix. See also generally
Smeaton v. St Andrews Police Commissioners, 1867, 5 M 743, which
considers the general question of the status of the activities approved by the
sheriff (ie whether commissioners could ignore a decision which had been
ratified by the sheriff).
117. Public Health (Scotland) Act 1867 (29 and 30 Vict) (c.101).
118. See generally Evans (1950), A Source Book of Administrative Law in Scotland
(Ed. McClarty), p. 133.
119. EG- ss. 22-26; see also the Public Health (S) Act 1897 (60 and 61 Vict) (c.38)
below at pp. 118-119.
120. See generally, Walker (1950), A Source Book of Administrative Law in
Scotland (Ed. McClarty), pp. 197-200.
121. Whetstone, (1981) supra at note 10, p.81.
122. Highways (S) Act 1718, (5 Geo 1) (c.30), s.vi.
123. The sheriffs connections with the Commissions of Supply have already been
noted: sheriffs were also ex officio justices of the peace: see McGlashan,
(1868), Sheriff Court Practice, p.8. Whetstone (1981), supra at note 10, notes
at p.84 that "the Lords of Justiciary were able to voice their complaints and
give their orders to the reformed sheriffs. They were far more likely to listen
to and report back orders than were the county gentlemen who happened to
attend the circuit as jurors once in a while".
124. See for example, Local and Personal Acts (49 Geo III) 51, 52, 79, 84, 87, 89,
etc.
125. Whetstone, (1981) supra at note 10, p.87.
126. Highways (S) Act 1845 (8 and 9 Vict) (c.41) s.xiii-xvi.
127. Roads and Bridges (S) Act 1878 (41 and 42 Vict) (c.51). See for example
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s.124 (dealing with offenses under the Act); and s.104 (bye-laws made under
the Act required approval of the sheriff).
128. See generally. Little and Godwin (1988), supra at note 61, para 34; and for
a more detailed discussion of poor law administration see Cage, (1981), The
Scottish Poor Laws 1745-1845. chapters 1, 2 and 3. SRO/SC./86-2 provides
a basic record of all poor law applications made at Ayr Sheriff Court in the
period 1854-1933: the applications were soley concerned with questions of
legal entitlement for relief - see below at note 133.
129. Poor Law (S) Act 1845 (c.83).
130. See Little and Godwin, supra at note 128.
131. Poor Law (S) Act 1845, supra at note (129), s.ll.
132. "... I think there could have been no meeting of the Board at which some
question involving considerations of law did not occur. I relied mainly on the
opinions of the sheriffs... I should have unquestionably felt myself greatly
embarrassed ... if I had not had the advantage of such men as the sheriffs."
see Report of the Commissions of 1869-71, paras. 10,372-10,381.
133. Poor Law (S) Act 1845, supra at note 129, ss.27, 73 and 77.
N.B. The sheriffs jurisdiction did not include the power to fix the quantum
of parochial relief - see Paton and Others v. Adamson, Morison's Dictionary
p.7669 and 10577 (November 20th, 1772). See also Cage, supra at note 128
pp. 4-7. The sheriff was limited to deciding questions of legal entitlement.
134. Madhouses (S) Act 1815, (55 Geo 3) (c.69).
135. Ibid at note (134), ss. 3, 5, 7. See generally, Strang v. Strang (1849), 11 D
378 (license of sheriff required to set up asylum). Applications under the
lunacy Acts were usually recorded in the ordinary court book along with other
court business. However, the SRO holds mental health records for Edinburgh
Sheriff Court for the period 1737-1855 in separate storage (in unindexed
bundles). The majority of papers are only of limited interest in the context of
this paper, as they tend to focus on whether a curator bonis is necessary, but
there is interesting material covering hearings into the state of mind of the
individuals concerned.
136. Ibid at note (134), s.8.
137. Ibid at note (134) s.10.
138. Ibid at note (134) s.13.
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139. Lunacy (Scotland) Act 1857 (20 and 21 Vict)(c.71).
140. Ibid, at note (139) ss.xxiii, xxv, xxiv, xliv, lxxxv, lxxxvi, xcl, xcii. The
scheme was continued under the Lunatics (S) Act 1858 (21 and 22 Vict)
(c.89).
141. See Lunatics (S) Act 1858 ibid at note (140), s.l.
142. Lunacy (S) Act 1862 (25 and 26 Vict) (c.54).
143. Lunacy (S) Act 1862, ibid at note (142), ss 4-9, and 14-16. The ministerial
nature of the sheriff's function was stressed in Beattie v. Gemmel, 1861, 23
D 386; 33J. 191 per Lord Cowan at p.397 (in Dunlop report).
144. Heritable Jurisdictions (S) Act 1747 (20 Geo 2) (c.43) s.xviii.
145. Prisons (S) Act 1839 (2 and 3 Vict) (c.42).
146. Ibid at note (145), s.l.
147. Ibid at note (145), s.2.
148. It should be noted that there was a great deal of co-operation between sheriffs,
Commissioners of Supply and Prison Boards, emphasising once more the close
links between the sheriffs and commissions: prisons and asylums were built
using local taxation. See the Prisons (S) Act 1839 (2 and 3 Vict) (c.42) and
the Lunacy (S) Act 1857 (20 and 21 Vict) (c.43) respectively.
149. Prisons (S) Act 1860 (23 and 24 Vict) (c.105).
150. Ibid at note 149, ss.xi, xiii, xlvi.
151. See Prisons (S) Act 1877 (40 and 41 Vict) (c.53) ss.16 and 53; Capital
Punishment Amendment Act 1868 (31 and 32 Vict) (c.24), s.ll and Debtors
(S) Act 1880 (43 and 44 Vict) (c.34) s.10.
152. Public Records (S) Act 1809 (49 Geo 3) (c.42), s.10.
153. Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (S) Act 1854 (17 and 18 Vict)
(c.80).
154. Ibid at note (153), s.xxi.
155. See generally Green's Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland Volume 11
(1914) p.127. The SRO has an interesting holding from Aberdeen Sheriff
Court. SRO/SC.1/70-1 provides copies of the sheriffs' reports on the state and
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progress of public records in the sheriffdom for the period 1810-1874. The
reports provide a clear picture of the extensive general duties held by the
sheriffs.
156. Erection of Lighthouses Act 1786 (26 Geo 3) (c.101) s.l.
157. Scott, (1982), (Editor Laughlan) The Northern Lights, pages 9 and 11.
158. See discussion supra in section three. For an interesting and detailed study of
social welfare and the voluntary principle in Scottish local administration, see
Checkland (1980) Philanthropy in Victorian Scotland, chapter 23.
159. For an example of the restrictive franchise in burghal elections, at the end of
the period under consideration, see the Municipal Elections (S) Act 1868
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1. Cmnd. 3248 (1967).
2. The written and oral evidence submitted to the Committee is not available as
a public record: accordingly, I have avoided identifying individual
interviewees by name. I am grateful to the Scottish Courts Administration for
allowing me to have access. The material is not indexed or stored in any
particular order. Reference is made to original sources by file number
(although there are different arrangements for oral evidence - see note 10
below). The files are held by the Scottish Courts Administration (SCA). The
file cited is (SCA) File B/Law/29/8 A.2.
3. (SCA) File B/Law/29/lA at pp.2-3.
4. The substitutes presented a robust rejection of the deputes arguments in the
Memorandum of the Council of Sheriff Substitutes: "... the part-time sheriffs
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in the Court of Session and do not exercise a continuous or general oversight.
Furthermore, in sheriffdoms, the holder of the office of Sheriff Principal
changes so frequently that he has little opportunity to become known to the
sheriffdom." (see (SCA) File B/Law/29/8A, p.2).
5. Lillie, (1970) Tradition and Environment.
6. Ibid, p.222.
7. The written memorandum of evidence presented by the Sheriffs Depute is held
by the Scottish Law Commission (SLC). I am grateful to the Scottish Law
Commission for allowing me to have access to it. Sheriff Lillie's rather




10. Oral evidence presented to the committee is filed either according to its date,
or according to the number of the meeting. The reference is to evidence
presented by sheriffs depute on 5th February 1965, p.20. Sheriff Depute "B"
made what he admitted to be "cri de coeur for the present system", (see ibid
P-21).
11. Cmnd. 3248 (1967), paras 352-356; and para. 263 (see also Appendix IX).
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B/Law/29/8-A 5(c).
13. Cmnd. 3248 (1967), para. 339.
14. Oral evidence, 11 Jan. 1965, p.33.
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16. File entitled "Second Meeting, para. 16.
17. File entitled "33rd Meeting".
18. Cmnd. 3248 (1967) paras. 277-279.
19. Oral evidence presented by sheriffs depute, 5th February 1965, p. 19. N.B. The
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1965, p.24.
21. Oral evidence presented by sheriffs depute, 5th February 1965, p.20.
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23. Principally "The Limitations of the Judicial Functions of Public Authorites",
in Cooper (1957), Selected Papers 1922-1954. pp.26-38. See also discussion
above at pp. 112-114.
24. Cmnd. 3248 (1967), para. 264.
25. Ibid, para.266; and Cmnd. 2021 (1963) (The Second Report of the Guest
Committee on Scottish Licensing Law), paras. 102-105. See also file on
material presented to the 37th Meeting of the Committee.
26. Cmnd. 2021 (1963) para. 105. See discussion below at chapter fourteen.
27. Cmnd. 3248 (1967), para. 267: and see Minutes of 33rd Meeting, para. 19.
28. Ibid para. 268.
29. Allen and Sons Billposting Ltd v. Lord Provost. Magistrates and Town Council
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32. Arcar v. Dunbartonshire County Council. 1948 SC 62.
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36. Ibid at p.73.
37. (1939) 55 Sh.Ct. Rep. 104
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Sheriff, Judicial Review at p.74.
39. 1944 SC 97.
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41. 1944 SC 97-100.
42. Ibid, pp. 100-103 per Lord Ordinary (Patrick).
43. Ibid pp. 104-129 on a re-hearing per Second Division (Lord Justice Clerk
Cooper, Lord Mackay and Lord Jamieson).
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45. 1944 SC p. 101 per Lord Patrick.
46. Ibid p. 102.
47. Green's Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, Volume 13, pp.517-535
(1931). (It is possible that Lord Wark's entry was based on Sheriff Crole's
submission to the 1927 Commission on the Court of Session and Office of
























1944 SC p. 103: Lord Cooper became Lord Justice Clerk in 1941 on the death
of Lord Aitchison.
See above at pp.112-114 for a general discussion.




See generally citation at footnote 23 above.
See generally discussion at p. 112 above.
1944 SCpp. 115-123.
Ibid at p. 120 per Lord Jamieson.
Lord Cooper became Lord President in 1946 on the appointment of Lord
President Normand as a Lord of Appeal.
Arcari v. Dunbartonshire County Council. 1948 SC 62.
Ibid at p.66 per Lord President Cooper.
Some are stated explcitly, and others are implicit in the argument: see ibid at
pp. 67-68.
See also Ross-shire County Council v. MacRae-Gillstrap 1930 SC 808 at 812
per Lord Sands.
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71. 1958 SC 211.
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1 KB 229-234 per Lord Greene.
74. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374
at 410-411.
75. Indeed, he made no reference to the Glasgow Churches' Council case.
76. IE - The statutory provision in the Allen case expressly required the sheriff to
consider the reasonableness of the Corporation's decision: see Allen and Sons
Billposting v. Lord Provost. Magistrates, and Town Council of the City of
Edinburgh, 1909 SC 70. See also discussion of Rodenhurst v. Chief
Constable, Grampian Police, 1992 SLT 104 at pp.158-159 below.
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in the discussion of the Rodenhurst case noted ibid.
78. Memorandum presented to the Grant Committee by the Sheriffs Depute (stored
at SLC), p.17.
79. Cmnd. 3248 (1967), Chapter VIII and Appendix VIII: the evidence submitted
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is made to it below.
80. The main sheriff court practice text was Dobie (1948), Law and Practice of the
Sheriff Courts in Scotland. Lord Wark's section in Green's Encyclopaedia of
the Laws of Scotland, Volume 13, pp.517-535 also provides a clear picture of
the extent of the jurisdiction at the beginning of the period under consideration.
81. Memorandum presented to the Grant Committee by the Sheriffs Depute (stored
at SLC), pp.5-6. "When military forces require to be summoned to the aid
of the civil power the requisition is made by the sheriff. It is the sheriff's duty
to accompany the troops,... read.... the Riot Act, and ..., request the troops to
take action".
82. Cmnd. 3248 (1967), para. 354.
83. Public Order Act 1936 (26 Geo 5 and 1 Edw 8) (c.6), ss 2 and 8.
84. Licensing (S) Act 1959 (7 and 8 Eliz 2) (c.51), s.188.
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88. Representation of the People Act 1949 (12, 13 and 14 Geo 6) (c.67).
89. Ibid s. 17(e).
90. Lillie, (1970), Tradition and Environment, pp.237-241; and Memorandum
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91. SCA File B/Law/29/17A pp.60-61.
92. Ibid.
93. Cmnd. 3248 (1967), para. 262.
94. Exchequer Court (S) Act 1856 (19 and 20 Vict) (c.56) ss.29-37.
95. Local Government (S) Act 1947 (10 and 11 Geo. 6) (c.43) (ss.300-301). The
Memorandum submitted to the Grant Report by the Sheriffs Depute noted in
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administrative functions of public authorities is, as the late Lord Cooper said
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96. (10 and 11 Geo. 6) (c.43) Md, ss. 131, 133, 136.
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105. Public Health (S) Act 1897 (60 and 61 Vict) (c.38); and see generally Dobie,
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113. Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855 (18 and 19 Vict) (c.68), ss. 4, 10, 18, 24.
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137. See generally, discussion at pp. 121-122 below.
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139. Ibid ss.38-39.
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143. Ibid, s.42.
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148. S.64.
149. Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963 (c.2), Sched 1, para 24, 28, Sched 2,
para 7, Sched 6, para 7, Sched 7, para 6.
150. See e.g. Pharmacy and Poisons Act 1933 (23 and 24 Geo 5) (c.25), ss. 21, 30;
Pharmacy and Medicines Act 1941 (4 and 5 Geo 6) (c.42), s.2; Firearms Act
1937 (1 Edw 8 and 1 Geo 6) (c.12), ss.2, 8, 10, 21, 26; Nursing Homes
Registration (S) Act 1938 (1 and 2 Geo 6) (c.73), s.3. This list is far from
exhaustive - see Cmnd 3248 (1967) Appendix VIII>
151. Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (57 and 58 Vict) (c.60) ss.634-668.
152. NB - This document is stored at the Scottish Law Commission.
153. Stott, 1991, Lord Advocate's Diary, pp. 31-32, pp.54-60.
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Chapter Eight: Footnotes
1. Cmnd. 3248 (1967).
2. Returning Officers (S) Act 1977 (c.14), s.l.
3. Local Government (S) Act 1947, s.301.
4. "Striking" the fiars was considered fully in a memorandum presented to the
Grant Committee (SCA/B/LAW/29/8A), and the Report of the Committee
recommended that "the annual striking of fiars prices in sheriff courts should
cease": Cmnd. 3248 (1967), paras. 310-313.
5. Merchant Shipping Act (57 and 58 Vict) (c.60), s.668.
6. Licensing (S) Act 1976 (c.66), Part VII esp. ss. 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 117.
7. Mental Health (S) Act 1984 (c.34), s.l8; and see discussion below at chapter
11.
8. See above at pp.83-86 and pp. 118-119 for general discussion.
9. Licensing (S) Act 1976 (c.66), s.39; and see discussion below at chapter 14.
10. Nursing Homes Registration (S) Act 1938 (1 and 2 Geo 6) (c.73), s.3.
11. Cinemas Act 1985 (c.13), s.16(1) (N.B. - see note to s.16 in Scottish Current
Law Statutes)).
12. Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 (8 and 9 Eliz II) (c.62),
ss.7, 32, 8.
13. Housing (S) Act 1987 (c.26), ss. Ill, 112, 129, 163, and 186.
14. Public Health (S) Act 1897 (60 and 61) (Vict c.38) ss,52, 54, 55.
15. E.G. Roads (S) Act 1984 (c.54), ss.l, 151, 13, 57, 63, 74.
16. Representation of the People Act 1983 (c.2), ss.56, 57; and see also Stewart,
"A Survey of Electoral Registration Cases", 1980 SLT (News) 250.
17. SocialWork (S) Act 1968 (c.49), s.16; and see discussion below at chapter 13.
18. Education (S) Act 1980, s.28 (as amended); and see discussion below at
chapter 12.
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19. See chapter five, footnote five.
20. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (S) Act 1990 (c.40), s.35.
21. Brown v. Hamilton District Council, 1983 SLT 397 (HL).
22. Himsworth, "Scottish Local Authorities and the Sheriff', 1984 Juridical Review
63; "Administrative Appeals to the Sheriff" (1985) (unpublished);
"Administrative Appeals to the Sheriff: Statutory Title - Conferring Formulae"
(1987) (unpublished).
23. Himsworth, (1985), ibid. Appendix "A"; and Himsworth, (1987),
ibid, pp.27-29.
24. Himsworth (1985), ibid, pp.7-45.
25. Himsworth (1985), ibid, pp. 47-47; Himsworth, 1984 JR, supra at note 22, pp.
80-86.
26. Himsworth (1985), ibid, pp.20-36.
27. See ibid: "restricted powers of review "A" and "B".
28. I.E. "restricted powers of review "A"", discussed by Himsworth (1985), ibid,
pp.20-28.
29. I.E. "restricted powers of review "B"", discussed by Himsworth (1985), ibid,
pp. 28-36.
30. See supra at note 28.
31. But only some: seejbekrttf at pp.32-36 and 43-49.
32. See supra at note 29.





38. Carvana v. Glasgow Corporation, 1976 SLT (Sh.Ct.) 3.
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39. I.E. a provision which did not limit the sheriff's power of review: see Glasgow
Corporation Consolidation (General Powers) Order Confirmation Act 1960 (8
and 9 Eliz 2) (c.3), s.95.
40. Carvana, supra at note 38, p.6.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid at pp. 6-7.
43. See discussion supra at pp. 137-139. Sheriff Macphail restated his case in
Macphail, (1988) Sheriff Court Practice, paras. 26-06 to 26-11.
44. See discussion supra at pp. 132-135.
45. See discussion supra at pp.109-111.
46. See especially at pp. 168-172.
47. I.E. to other sheriffs. Clearly, his views expressed in Sheriff Court Practice,
supra at note 43 would have no formal significance at all.
48. Hamilton v. Chief Constable of Strathclvde. 1978 SLT (Sh.Ct) 69 per Sheriff
Stewart. See also Stuart, "Gun Law", 1980 SLT (News) 17 for comment on
the Hamilton decision.
49. See discussion of Rodenhurst v. Chief Constable. Grampian Police, 1992, SLT
104 below at pp.159-159.
50. Himsworth, 1984 Juridical Review, supra at note 22, p.80. See e.g. Central
Regional Council v. Barbour European Ltd 1982 SLT (Sh.Ct) 49.
51. Stuart, supra at note 48, p.17.
52. Supra at note. 48.
53. Ibid, pp. 69-71.
54. Ibid, at pp.71.
55. Ibid, at pp.69-71.
56. See discussion of Rodenhurst, (op.cit at note 49 supra) for further
consideration of this point.

















Sheriff Stewart does not give explicit consideration to the issue of determining
whether a "true lis" existed.
See for full discussion, pp. 129-135 and pp. 137-139 supra.
Hamilton, supra at note 48, pp. 69-71.
IE - their sphere of interest.
See Hamilton, supra at note 59.
I.E. in Kave v. Hunter, 1958 SC 208 at 211-212: see also discussion above at
pp. 137-139.
I.E. in Glasgow Corporation v. Glasgow Churches' Council, 1944 SC per Lord
Cooper at 125-126: see also discussion above at pp.132-135.
1992, SLT 104.
See for counsels' submissions, ibid, at pp. 108-109.
Ibid, pp. 109-110.
Ibid.
I.E. in Glasgow Corporation v. Glasgow Churches' Council, supra at note 63.
I.E. in Carvana v. Glasgow Corporation, supra at note 38.
See for discussion of this aspect of Kave v. Hunter, ppjl^f39 above.
Rodenhurst, supra at note 49, p. 110.
I.E. in Arcari v. The County Council of Dunbartonshire 1948 SC, pp. 67-68:
see discussion above at pp.135-137.
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Chapter Nine: Footnotes
1. E.G. under Arbitration (S) Act 1894 (57 and 58 Vict.) (c.13), s.6 (as amended).
2. E.G. under Lands Clauses Consolidation (S) Act 1845 (8 and 9 Vict) (c.19).
3. E.G. Sheriffs Principal have ceremonial duties in connection with Royal visits.
See Macphail, (1988), Sheriff Court Practice, para. 1-12, and para 1-18.
4. See generally discussion at pp. 10-11 ibid.
5. I.E. p. 196 et sea.
6. For an authoritative statement of summary applications procedure, see
Macphail, at note 3 supra, paras 26-01 to 26-46.
7. E.G. appointment of members of local valuation appeal panels by sheriffs
principal under Local government (S) Act 1975, s.4.
8. Per Lord Wark in Green's Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland Volume 13,
(1931) p.517; and cited with approval per Lord President Cooper in Glasgow
Corporation v. Glasgow Churches' Council 1944 SC at 126.
9. I.E. in areas such as maintaining the peace, "striking" The fiars, electoral law,
and mental health and prison legislation: see generally at pp.75-91; 115-121;
140-146 above.
10. Above at pp. 150-151.
11. See below at p. 164.
12. As in the recent case of T.F. v. Management Committee and Managers of
Ravenscraig Hospital (I.H.) 1988 SCLR 327 at 335 per Lord McDonald.
13. Ibid.
14. See Macphail (1988), at note 3 supra, p. 26-32 to 26-34.
15. See chapter 11 below for a full discussion of this point.
16. Licensing (S) Act 1976 (c.66), Part VII, ss. 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 117.
17. See full discussion below at pp.200-202.
18. For example, compulsory hospitalisation of the mentally ill under Mental
Health (S) Act 1984 (c.36), s. 18: see also full discussion below at pp.204-229.
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19. See for example general discussion above at pp.81-86.
20. Cmnd. 3248 (1967), para 268. For an example of an important new style see
appeals against school placing decisions under the Education (S) Act 1980
(c.44), s.28. Himsworth considered these appeals in "Administrative Appeals
to the Sheriff, (1985), (unpublished), when he discussed "restricted powers of
review "A"" at pp. 20-28. School placing appeals are also discussed in detail
at pp.241-257 below.
21. I.E. under Lord Cooper's judgement in Arcari v. Dumbarton County Council,
1948 SLT 438; as followed in Rodenhurst v. Chief Constable. Grampian
Police. 1992 SLT, pp. 108-110.
22. See for example discussion of school placing appeals at pp.241-257 below.
23. Subject to judicial review under the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of
Session: see Macphail (1988), supra at note 3, paras. 26-32 to 26-34.
24. This point was appreciated by Sheriff Macphail in Carvana v. Glasgow
Corporation 1976 SLT (Sh.Ct) pp.5-8, and he sought to limit the sheriff's
discretion: see also Macphail (1988), supra at note 3, para. 26-10.
25. This point is explored at pp.241-257 below.
26. This term "direct political involvement" was first used at pp.11-12 (and see
also chapter one, footnote 8). I do not intend to provide a footnote reference
for every citation.
27. See discussion below at chapter 14.
28. Arcari v. Dumbartonshire County Council 1948 SC, p.68; and Rodenhurst v.
Chief Constable. Grampian Police. 1992 SLT, p. 110.
29. See general discussion of protasis and apodosis in Twining and Miers,
(1976), How To Do Things With Rules, pp.52-55.
30. The connection between this type of activity (i.e. "direct political
involvement") and ostensive judicial impartiality is considered at pp.32-34 and
chapter two above.
31. The connection between strong polycentric effect and ostensive judicial
competence was developed at pp.34-35 and chapter two above.
32. T.F. v. Management Committee and Managers of Ravenscraig Hospital, (I.H.)
1988 SCLR 327 at 335.
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33. Ibid.
34. Arcari v. Dunbartonshire County Coundil 1948 SC, per Lord President Cooper
at 67.
35. Allen and Sons Billposting Ltd v. Corporation of Glasgow SC 1909 at p.76 per
Lord Low.
36. Portobello Magistrates v. Edinburgh Magistrates (1882) 10 R 130.
37. See supra at pp.171-172.
38. E.G. see discussion of assumption of parental rights under the Social Work (S)
Act 1968 (c.49) s.16 at chapter 13.
39. It was noted above (at p. 161) that classifications of this nature may cause a
degree of controversy, and may be incapable of resolution to the satisfaction
of all.
40. For a recent example, see Rodenhurst v. Chief Constable, Grampian Police,
supra at note 21.
41. The Grant Committee considered appeals of this nature at Cmnd. 3248, (1967),
paras. 266-268. Himsworth commented on them in "Administrative Appeals
to the Sheriff", (1985), (unpublished), under the heading "Restricted Powers
of Review "B"", pp.28-36.
42. For a detailed discussion of this point, see chapter 14 below.
43. (c.66). The origin of the exclusion of the merits from shrieval review can be
traced to the Second Report of the Guest Committee on Scottish Licensing
Law, Cmnd. 2021 (1963) paras 102-105. These were commented on by the
Grant Report (Cmnd 3248 (1967)) paras. 266, 267; and were approved by the
Clayson Committee on Scottish Licensing Law, Cmnd. 5345 (1973), paras.
6.12 and 6.13.
44. See below at pp.301-307, pp.292-294.
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1. Cmnd. 3248 (1967), para. 263.
2. The Civil Judicial Statistics Scotland 1984-1988 (Scottish Courts
Administration (HMSO) notes the statutory powers in local administration
Odder "Miscellaneous and administrative business in sheriff courts" and
"Registration of Clubs with the sheriff court."
3. See generally Himsworth, Adler and Scott, (1985), "Public Housing, Rent
Arrears and the Sheriff Court".
4. I.E. The powers set out in chapter nine.
5. S.18, Mental Health (S) Act 1984 (c.36).
6. S.16, Social Work (S) Act 1968 (c.49).
7. E.G. Under s.39 Licensing (S) Act 1976 (c.66).
8. Supra at note 5.
9. Licensing (S) Act 1976 (c.66), ss.104, 105, 108, 109, 110.
10. Ibid, s.102.
11. Supra at note 6.
12. Supra at note 1.
13. Similarly, the final outcome of hearings may or may not be noted in the court
book, according to the practice of the individual sheriff clerk.
14. I.E. Under the Public Health (S) Act 1897. (60 and 61 Vict.) (c.38).
15. I.E. Twenty full-time sheriffs, (part-time Temporary sheriffs may also sit).
16. Supra at note 5.
17. Supra at note 7.
18. See above at pp. PSS-IUty
19. Supra at note 6.
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S.28F, Education (S) Act 1980 (c.44) (as inserted).
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Chapter Eleven - Footnotes
1. See supra at pp. 11-12 and chapter one footnote 8. I do not intend to provide
a reference for every citation.
2. See supra at pp.32-34 and chapter two. I do not intend to provide a reference
for every citation.
3. See supra at pp.34-35 and chapter two. I do not intend to provide a reference
for every citation.
4. Supra at pp.162-163.
5. See supra at p. 193 for note of the number of mental health appeals in the
sample courts set out in chapter ten. Some idea of the number of club
registrations can be gleaned from Civil Judicial Statistics, Scotland 1984-88
(Scottish Courts Administration) (HMSO) p.25.
6. See supra at p. 164.
7. As in TF v. Management Committee of Ravenscraig Hospital 1988 SCLR 335
per Lord McDonald.
8. For these different sub-categories see pp. 164-168 supra.
9. At pp. 165-166 supra.
10. At p. 192 supra.
11. See Liddall v. Ballingry Parish Council 1908 SC 1082.
12. See Dunblane and Lecropt Parish Council. Petitioner (1923) 40 Sh Ct Rep 3.
13. See Ayr Town Council. Petitioner (1891) Sh.Ct Rep. 196.
14. Cmnd 3248 (1967) paras. 287-289.
15. See Licensing (S) Act 1976 (c.66) ss.104,105, 108, 109, 110 and p. 121 supra.
16. But see note 5 supra.
17. (c.66), and see also discussion in chapter 14 below.
18. Presumably District Licensing Boards. See discussion below at pp.286-288 for
constitution of District Licensing Boards.
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19. For detailed discussion, see chapter 14 below.
20. See for example, Aitken v. Motherwell and Wishaw Licensing Court 1971 SLT
(Sh.Ct), 25 and Patullo v. Dundee Corporation 1969 SLT (Sh.Ct) 31.
21. I.E. s.39, Licensing (S) Act 1976 (c.66).
22. As in ibid.
23. See supra at pp. 164-165.
24. Western Isles Islands Council v. Caledonian MacBravne, 1990 SLT (Sh Ct)
97. The Western Isles Council, as harbour authority, sought to prohibit the
use of a pier on Sundays, in line with its policy of Sabbath observance. The
Sheriff Principal, as confirming authority, held that the council had acted
ultra vires and unreasonably.
Although the issue of Sabbath observance is highly controversial in the
Western Isles, the terms of the legislation are such that the Sheriff
Principal was able to reach his decision without there being any
likelihood of a challenge to ostensive judicial impartiality: the harbour
authority's statutory discretion to make bye-laws is limited to matters
concerning harbour administration, efficiency and safety.
25. See supra at p. 164.
26. As noted at p. 198 supra.
27. See for most weighty examples, chapter nine, section one (f) at pp.167-168
supra.
28. See National Assistance Act 1948 (11 and 12 Geo 6) (c.29) at pp.167-168
supra.
29. See Health Services and Public Health Act 1968 (c.46) at p. 168 supra.
30. See Public Health (S) Act 1897 (60 and 61 Vict.) (c.38) at pp. 166-167 supra.
31. (c.36).
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid ss.24 and 26; and Criminal Procedure (S) Act 1975, ss.174, 254, 376, 379.
34. Mental Health (S) Act 1984 (c.36), s.21.

















Mullan, (1975), "Fairness: The New Natural Justice", 25 University of Toronto
LJ. 281 at 300. In general terms, Mullan was discussing when it might be
appropriate to introduce procedural protections in decision taking.
Mental Health (S) Act 1984 (c.36), s.21(5).
TF v. Management Committee of Ravenscraig Hospital 1988 SCLR 334-335.
Ibid. (NB The judgement was also reported as Ferns v. Ravenscraig Hospital
Management in 1989 SLT 49.)
As supra at note 38.




Parliamentary Debates, Scottish Grand Committee, Mental Health
(Amendment) (S) Bill [Lords], First Sitting, 8th March 1983: the Secretary
of State for Scotland, Mr George Younger, merely commented that the effect
of the provisions "should be to ensure that no one is detained in hospital or
continues to be so detained unless it is completely necessary that he or she
should be."
Clearly, the court would not have been able to consult Parliamentary
debates (see also Second Sitting of the Scottish Grand Committee on
10th March 1983): see the comments of Sheriff Principal (now Lord)
Caplan at 1988 SCLR 329 and 331.
See SheriffPrincipal Caplan ibid and Article 5 of the European Convention on
Human Rights; and also comments by the secretary of State for Scotland, Mr
George Younger at First Sitting ibid. NB - discussion of the ECHR decision
was in the context of the rights of those who had been detained as criminally
insane.
TF v. Management Committee of Ravenscraig Hospital 1988 SCLR 335.
Mental Health (S) Act 1960 (c.61), ss.26-32.
For the qualifications of MHOs, see Mental Health (S) Act 1984 (c.61), s.9.
See supra at note 48.
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51. See for example supra at pp.88-89.
52. Legal Aid (S) Act 1986 (c.47) s.14, [as amended 1990 (c.40), sch. 8], s.15 [as
amended ibid, see also SI 1987/705, SI 89.720 and SI 90/939].
53. Ibid.
54. 1991 (c.47) ss.l, 2.
55. I.E. The Mental Health (S) Act 1984 (c.61).
56. See supra at note 54. N.B. s.2 provides that if a s. 18 application is timeously
lodged, approval or a first hearing must take place within 5 working days of
the submission: detention continues for this period. Ss. 2 and 3 of the 1991
Act arose out of the difficulties created in B v. Forsev 1988 SLT 572 (N.B.
see also R. Petitioner 1990 SCLR 738).
57. See ibid.
58. (c.47) This provision concerns applications for Legal Aid made under Part HI
of the Social Work (S) Act 1968 (c.49).
59. (c.49).
60. (c.47).
61. See supra at note 54.
62. This point is implicit in Fuller, "Forms and Limits of Adjudication", (1978)
Harvard Law Review, pp.365-372.
63. Galanter, "Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change", 9 Law and Society Review.
64. For a general commentary on the Childrens' Hearing system, see Kearney,
(1987), Children's Hearings and the Sheriff Court.
65. For an excellent discussion on the difficulties and tensions created for
"generalist" judges by expert evidence, see Jones, (1984) "Science in Harness:
A Study of the Expert Witness in the Legal Construction of Reality" (Ph.D
Thesis) (Cambridge University), esp. pp.189-201.
66. See Little, "The Sheriff and Compulsory Admissions to Hospital Under the
Mental Health (S) Act 1984", Socio-Legal Research in the Scottish Courts.
Volume 2 (1991) (Eds. Adler and Millar) p.69 at p.77.
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See general comment at note 65 supra.
See supra at note 66.
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Chapter 12: Footnotes
1. At pp. 169-173 supra.
2. Ibid.
3. See discussion supra at pp.32-34 and chapter two. I do not intend to provide
a reference for every citation.
4. See discussion supra at pp.34-35 and chapter two. I do not intend to provide
a reference for every citation.
5. This point was noted by Himsworth, (1985) "Administrative Appeals to the
Sheriff (unpublished). The first sub-category is analogous to "general powers
of review" (ibid, p. 10); and the main example of the second sub-category is
s.28 of the Education (S) Act 1980 (ibid pp. 21-22).
6. See generally pp.163-173 supra.
7. Himsworth (1984), "Scottish Local Authorities and the Sheriff) Juridical
Review 63 at 67.
8. See p. 173 supra for Housing (S) 1987.
9. Thorn v. Glasgow Corporation (1942) 58 Sh.Ct Rep 94. N.B. The sheriff's
powers in this case were held under the Housing Act 1966, s. 109(4): see also
discussion in Himsworth, (1984), "Scottish Local Authorities and the Sheriff,
Juridical Review 63 at 75.
10. (1983) 28 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 469.
11. Ibid.
12. See supra at pp.42-49.
13. Cd. 8713 (1917), p.84. See also discussion at pp.99-100 supra and Himsworth,
(1979), 2 Urban Law and Policy, 77 at 90.
14. See supra at pp.32-35, 38-40 and 42-49.
15. (c.44).
16. See pp.241-257 below.
17. 1984 Juridical Review noted supra at note 7, pp. 85-86.
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18. Himsworth, (1980), "School Attendance Orders and the Sheriff, Journal of the
Law Society of Scotland, 450.
19. Ibid, p.453.
20. See eg pp.174-177 and 183-185 supra.
21. I.E. District, Regional or Islands authorities.
22. (11 and 12 Geo.6) (c.53).
23. Roddie v. Strathclvde Regional Council 23 June 1989 (Glasgow Sheriff Court)
(unreported) (Sheriff Dean).
24. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948)
1 KB 223.
25. Roddie. supra at note 23, pp. 1, 2.
26. IWd, p.2.
27. Ibid, p.3: "... It is an English decision and refers only to the appellate court's
judicial capacity ... it could not have had in contemplation the functions and
roles of the sheriff.
28. Carvana v. Glasgow Corporation. 1976 SLT (Sh.Ct) 3; and see discussion
supra at pp. 154-156.
29. Roddie. supra at note 23, p.4.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid, pp. 4-5.
32. Ibid.
33. See op.cit at note 28 supra.
34. See discussion supra at p. 155.
35. See ibid and Himsworth (1984) op cit at note 7 supra p.80.
36. See discussion supra at p.31 and chapter two.
37. Himsworth (1985), op cit at note (5) supra, p.18.
391
38. Ibid, p.20.
39. Ibid, p. 19; see also discussion of Fuller's arguments on polycentric decisions
at pp.15-16 supra.
40. See discussion at pp.234-235 supra and citation at note 10 supra.
41. This point is implicit in Fuller, (1978), "The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication", 92 Harvard Law Review, pp.397-398.
42. See generally discussion in chapters one and two.
43. Supra at note 23.
44. Council on Tribunals, Annual Report 1990-91 (HMSO) para. 3.37.
45. (c.44); as inserted by s.l of the Education (S) Act 1981 (c.58) s.l.
46. (c.44).
47. Adler, Petch and Tweedie, (1989), Parental Choice and Educational Policy.
48. Many of them had participated recently in the Adler, Petch and Tweedie
project ibid.
49. Adler, Petch and Tweedie did not interview sheriffs.
50. See for example pp. 120-121 supra.
51. See discussion at p.235-236 supra.
52. Himsworth supra at note 18; Doran, "School Attendances and Exclusions"
(1980) SCOLAG 66.
53. Adler, Petch and Tweedie, at note 47 supra, chapter two.
54. Ibid p.39.
55. Ibid, pp.38-39.
56. Ibid, pp. 49-51.
57. IMd, PP- 39-43.
58. Ibid, p.52-53. The strongly political nature of parental choice of school and
education appeals is illustrated by the recent full page newspaper coverage of
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the 1980 Education Act after 10 years in operation: "So Who Really Won the
Revolution?" , The Scotsman, Wednesday 2nd September 1992, p. 10.
59. This would be consistent with the recommendations of the Grant Report: see
Cmnd 3248 (1967) para. 264.
60. See pp.43-46 supra.
61. (c.44), as amended by Education (S) Act 1981 (c.53) s.l: see also Black v.
Strathclyde Regional Council, (Kilmarnock Sheriff Court) (August 27 1982)
(unreported).
62. (c.44), s.28A(l).
63. Ibid, s.28A (3).
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid, ss. 28A(4), 28C, 28D, 28E; and see Education (Appeal Committee




70. Ibid s.28F(6), (7).
71. This point was implied by Himsworth (1985), supra at note 5, pp. 19-20 (esp.
para. 3.21) and is discussed in detail below.
72. G v. Shetland Islands Council (Lerwick Sheriff Court) (19 October 1983).
(Sheriff MacDonald) (unreported).
73. Ibid, p.6.
74. D v. Grampian Regional Council (Aberdeen Sheriff Court) (29 August 1984)
(Sheriff Risk) (unreported).
75. Ibid, p.4.
76. A.B. v. Strathclvde Regional Council (Glasgow Sheriff Court) (6 September
1982) (Sheriff Principal Dick) (unreported). NB - The case before the sheriff
393
was an appeal from Sheriff Mc Neill (see A.B. v. Strathclvde Regional
Council, (Glasgow Sheriff Court), (16th August 1982), (unreported).
77. IMd, (6th Sept 1982), p. 10.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid. The Sheriff Principal also made it clear that he considered the sheriffs
powers to be "administrative" (i.e. governmental), rather than "judicial":
"Considering The Education Act, it humbly does not appear to me that there
is any lis between the parent and the education authority, and on this test the
appeal to the sheriff appears to be to the sheriff in an administrative capacity".
(Ibid, p.8-9).
80. Duggan v. Strathclvde Regional Council (Glasgow Sheriff Court) (17 Aug
1983) (Sheriff Maguire) (unreported).
81. E.G. Murray v. Strathclvde Regional Council: Paul v. Strathclvde Regional
Council: These appeals were conjoined with Duggan ibid, but they were not
a single appeal and the case of each child was considered separately.
82. Carvana v. Glasgow Corporation 1976 SLT (Sh. Ct 3); and see discussion at
pp. 154-156 supra.
83. Adler, Petch and Tweedie, op. cit at note 47, pp. 159-164.
84. Ibid, pp. 160-161.
85. Ibid, pp. 159.160.
86. Adler, Petch and Tweedie, "When Sheriffs Differ", Times Educational
Supplement, Scotland, (27.2.87), p.8 (column 4).
87. See discussion at pp.31-36 supra.
88. See discussion at pp.51-52 supra.
89. Himsworth, (1984), op dt. at note 7 supra, p.80.
90. Ibid.
91. Himsworth, (1985), op cit at note 5 supra, p.26.




94. G v. Shetland Islands Council (Lerwick Sheriff Court) (19 October 1983)
(Sheriff MacDonald) (unreported).
95. Ibid, p.6.
96. D v. Grampian Regional Council (Aberdeen Sheriff Court) (29 August 1982)
(Sheriff McNeill) (unreported).
97. Ibid, p.4.
98. Y. v. Strathclvde Regional Council, (Glasgow Sheriff Court), (16th
August 1982), (Sheriff McNeill), (unreported).
99. Ibid, p.4.
100. MacCormick, (1976), Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory) rightly stresses the
importance of skilled representatives and expert legal knowledge in choosing
the grounds which are most likely to be successful in adjudication (see ibid
p.46 and pp. 119-128).
101. I.E. Queen's Counsel.
102. Macphail, (1988), Sheriff Court Practice, para. 26-16.
103. Education (S) Act 1980 (c.44), s.28A(3)(iv) (and see Forbes v. Lothian
Regional Council (Edinburgh Sheriff Court) (29 October 1982) (unreported)
where the sheriff was persuaded by this argument).
104. Ibid s.28(A)(3) (i)-(iii).
105. See MacCormick (1976), op cit at note 100 supra.
106. See Goodwin Jones (1984), "Science in Harness: A Study of the Expert
Witness in the Legal Construction of Reality" (Ph.D. Thesis) (Cambridge
University), pp. 134-163 for an excellent discussion of the relationship between
lawyers and expert witnesses.
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Footnotes - Chapter 13
1. See discussion at pp. 170-172 and 178-182 supra.
2. See discussion in chapter two supra.
3. I.E. at p. 197 and pp.231-232 supra.
4. See pp.11-12 and chapter one, footnote 8 supra. I do not intend to provide a
reference for every citation.
5. See pp.32-34 and chapter two supra. I do not intend to provide a reference for
every citation.
6. See discussion of Fuller's arguments in "Forms and Limits of Adjudication"
92 Harvard Law Review 353-409 on polycentric effect at pp. 15-16 supra. I
do not intend to provide a reference for every citation.
7. See pp.34-35 and chapter two supra. I do not intend to provide a reference for
every citation.
8. See pp.178-182 supra.
9. See pp. 169-172 supra.
10. See p. 178 supra.
11. Fuller (1978) "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" 92 Harvard Law
Review, pp. 397-398 recognised that identifying what an acceptable degree of
polycentric effect is an inherently difficult and subjective task.
12. (c.2); and see also pp.179 supra.
13. See generally Stewart, "A Survey of Electoral Registration Cases", 1980 SLT
(News) 250.
14. Representation of the People Act 1983 (c.2), s.57(l)(b), (2): the Act is a
consolidating statute.
15. 1980 SLT (Sh. Ct) 60; and see also Stewart at note 13 supra for wider
discussion. N.B. The appeal was made under earlier legislation, which was
consolidated in the 1983 Act.
16. The Liberal party agent sought to have the conservative parliamentary
candidate's name struck from the roll of voters on the ground that what had
been recorded as his residence in the constituency for electoral purposes was
396
not his main residence.
17. I.E. The right to a proof; the right to present full arguments; the right to
natural justice; and the right to a reasoned decision.
18. I.E. the Electoral Registration Officer: his functions are set out at
Representation of the People Act 1983 (c.2), ss. 8-17, 49-55.
19. Moore v. Electoral Registration Officer for Borders 1980 SLT (Sh Ct) 39; and
see Stewart, supra at note 13, p.254.
20. (Ayr Sheriff Court) (15 May 1978) (Sheriff Grant) (unreported).
21. Moore, supra at note 19, p.40 (per Sheriff Principal Sir Frederick O'Brien).
22. (c.74).
23. (c.65).
24. See provisions noted at p. 181 supra.
25. Mandla v. Powell Lee [1983] QB1: see judgements of Lord Denning, Oliver
LJ. and Kerr L.J.; and then serious criticisms made in House of Lords [1983]
2 AC 560-568 per Lord Fraser: see also chapter two, footnote 46 supra.
26. 1976 (c.74), Part VII; and 1975 (c.65), Part VI.
27. See provisions noted at p.181 supra.
28. N.B. What little precedent exists is English: e.g. CRE v. Amari Plastics Ltd
[1982] Q.B. 1194.
29. N.B. point made supra at note 11.
30. Abolition of Domestic Rates (S) Act 1987 (c.47), ss.16, 29.
31. E.G. Stevenson v. Rogers (Edinburgh Sheriff Court) (3 Nov. 1989); 1989
GWD 40-1876; 1990 (Sh.Ct) SCLR; 1990 SLT (Sh Ct) 30; 1991 SCLR 673
and 1992 SLT 558..
32. 1987 (c.47), s.16.
33. Ibid, s.29.
34. See e.g. Reid, Scobbie and Barker, "Residence, The Community Charge and
the Sheriff 1990 SCOLAG, p.55 for comment of Lord MacLehose on Beoch
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v. Wood (Ayr Sheriff Court) (18 December 1989) 1990 GWD 4-219 and
Stevenson v. Rodgers, supra at note 31.
35. Reid, Scobbie and Barker, SCOLAG 1990, pp.38-40; 55-56; 87-89; 100-102;
SCOLAG 1991, pp. 74-76.
36. Ibid p.56.
37. Ibid.
38. 1987 (c.47), SS.12-20C; and see Reid, Scobbie Barker, ibid, at pp. 87-89 for
detailed comment on the role of the registration officer.
39. I.E. 1987 (c.47) ss. 16, 29.
40. See for a comprehensive discussion of the Court of Session's recent rulings
Reid and Scobbie SCOLAG 1991, pp. 74-76, and Stevenson v. Rogers, 1992
SLT 558.
41. (c.49). For general discussion see Macphail, (1988), Sheriff Court Practice,
paras. 28-218 to 28-226.
42. The s.16 procedure (as amended) is used by authorities as a means of planning
for permanent substitute care: however, an increased use of freeing for
adoption and custody procedures has led to a reduction in the number of s.16
applications: see for comment Child Care Law Review, Consultation
Document One, (January 1989), (SWSG), paras 3.3 - 3.5, and for comment on
freeing for adoption, see O'Hara, "Freeing for Adoption - The Children Who
Wait", SCOLAG No. 119, pp. 123-125.
43. Ibid, para 3.1: "There is a widespread view that the present system for
assumption of parental rights is outdated and inherently unjust." See also
final report, "Review of Child Care Law in Scotland", (HMSO), pp.21-24.
44. See chapter two supra for general comment.
45. Children could not be interviewed for practical reasons: it is accepted that the
research findings should be viewed in this context.
46. As amended: see full citation of amendments etc at p. 179 supra.
47. Social Work (S) Act 1968 (c.49), (as amended), s.l6(l)(a)(iv); and for
definition of timing arrangements, see Strathclvde Regional Council v. M,
1982 SLT (Sh.Ct) 106.
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48. 1968 (c.49) ibid, s. 16(5), (6), (10): repealed in part - see supra at p. 179
49. Ibid, at s. 16(7).




54. See supra at notes 4 and 5 respectively.
55. See supra at notes 7 and 6 respectively.
56. Central Regional Council v. B. 1985 SLT 413.
57. Ibid, p.420, per Lord Brand.
58. I.E. Arcari v. Dumbartonshire County Council, 1948 SC 62; and see comment
at pp. 135-137 supra.
59. Central Regional Council v. B, supra at note 56, p.420.
60. Ibid.
61. For composition of social work department committees, see The Laws of
Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume 22, "Social Work", para.8.
62. Lothian Regional Council v. T 1984 SLT 74, per Sheriff Caplan at p.80.
63. Lothian Regional Council v. M, 1982 SLT (Sh.Ct) 65.
64. IE - sphere of interest
65. See also Review of Child Care Law in Scotland (HMSO) para 11.4.
66. See also Child Care Law Review Consultation Document One, supra, at note
42, para. 3.1.
67. Review of Child Care Law in Scotland (HMSO), paras 11.6 - 11.18.
68. Ibid, para. 11.9.
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69. Ibid, para 11.10.
70. This is in accordance with ibid, para 11.6.
71. Murray (1988) Research Paper on Evidence from Children, (Scottish Law
Commission) provides a concise discussion of the problems caused for children
by the court process (see especially chapter III to VII). N.B. the report is
concerned with criminal proceedings, but it is submitted that much of the
discussion and many of the recommendations are highly relevant to assumption
of parental rights hearings.
72. Reporters in this context should not be confused with Reporters to the
Childrens' Panels.
73. Kennedy v. M. 1989 SLT 687; see also 1989 SCLR 769 (Notes).
74. Review of Child Care Law in Scotland (HMSO), para 11.10.
75. Ibid.
76. A subtle variation of the relationship between legal representative and expert
witness which is discussed fully in Goodwin Jones, "Science in Harness: A
Study of the Expert Witness in the Legal Construction of Reality" (Ph.D
Thesis) (1984) (Cambridge University), pp. 134-163.
77. Central Regional Council v. B 1985 SLT 413, pp.415-416 per Lord Robertson.
78. Mental Health (S) Act 1984(c.36), ss 18-21 (as amended).
79. Social Work (S) Act 1968 (c.49), s.42; see also Kearney (1987) Children's
Hearings and the Sheriff Court (1987) Pt. n.
80. Response of the Scottish Child Law Centre Working Party to the Child Care
Law Review: Consultation Document 1 (unpublished) (SCLC) para. 3.9 (3).
81. The civil legal aid means test is set out under Legal Aid (S) Act 1986 (c.47),
s.14 [as amended 1990 (c.40), sch.8], s.15 [as amended ibid, see also SI
1987/705, SI 89/720 and SI 90/839].
82. Legal Aid (S) Act 1986 (c.47), s.29(2)(b), (4).
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Footnotes - Chapter 14
1. As set out in chapters one and two supra.
2. See pp. 182-185 supra.
3. (c.66).
4. See p. 192 supra for number of appeals made in the sample courts set out in
chapter ten.
5. I.E. the other appeals taken from the decisions of District Councils noted at
pp.183-185 supra.
6. (c.66) s.7.
7. I.E. in appeals under s.39 of the Licensing (S) Act 1976 and the other
"administrative judge" appeals noted op.cit at note 5 supra.
8. Mr G R Maclean, Blair and Bryden, Solicitors, Clydebank. I am grateful for
Mr Maclean's assistance.
9. For general comment, see Himsworth, (1985), "Administrative Appeals to the
Sheriff" (unpublished), paras. 3.35 to 3.43.





15. See pp.32-34 and chapter two supra. I do not intend to provide a reference for
every citation of "ostensive judicial impartiality".
16. See Fuller, (1978), "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication", 92 Harvard Law
Review, pp. 393-404; and discussion at pp. 15-16 supra.
17. See pp.34-35 and chapter two supra. I do not intend to provide a reference
for every citation of "ostensive judicial competence".
18. See pp.11-12 supra and footnote 8, chapter one. I do not intend to provide a
reference for every citation of "direct political involvement".
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19. See op cit at note 16 supra.
20. See general principles set out at in chapters one and two supra.
21. See discussion at pp.31-32 supra.
22. See discussion at ibid.
23. Op cit at note 20 supra.
24. I.E. set up under 1976 (c.66), ss.1-8.
25. Local Government (S) Act 1973 (c.35), s.4.
26. "We are satisfied that the licensing process is the application of an
administrative discretion in the interests of the community and that it is
therefore not an appropriate function for a court of law... Once it has been
established that licensing is an administrative process, logic suggests that
responsibility for it should be placed on an established administrative body
answerable to the electorate for the exercise of its functions - namely, in view
of the local nature of licensing decisions, the district council." Report of the
Departmental Committee on Scottish Licensing Law (Clayson Report) Cmnd.
5354 (1973) paras. 5.22 to 5.23.
The political nature of licensing has been illustrated clearly by the
recent controversy concerning violent disturbances in an around
licensed premises in Scottish cities: see full page feature in The
Scotsman, 22nd September 1992, p.4.
27. Op cit at note 16 supra.
28. I.E. The focus on the individual case and the difficulties of weighing evidence
"on its merits" in this type of case: see also ibid.
29. For an example of this type of approach, see discussion of higher
governmental powers in education at pp.246-257 supra.
30. See p.302 below.
31. Op cit at note 16 supra.
32. Which requires certainty in judicial decision-taking. See discussion at pp.34-
35 and chapter two supra.
33. Cmnd. 5354 (1973) para 5.22; and see op cit at note 26 for a more detailed
citation.
402
34. Scottish Licensing Law (First Report ofGuest Committee) Cmnd. 1217 (1960);
Scottish Licensing Law (Second Report of Guest Committee) Cmnd. 2021
(1963).
35. Cmnd. 5354 (1973) para. 6.13.
36. I.E. - Natural justice is included: see 1976 (c.21), s.39(4)(c), and Himsworth,
(1985), at note 9 supra, para. 3.48.
37. I.E. - The sheriff is not required to exercise a power which requires
"direct political involvement"; see pp.11-12 and footnote 8, chapter
one for general discussion.
38. I.E. 1976 (c.66) s.39(4)(a) to (d).
39. I.E. under ibid s.39(8).
40. See discussion at pp.244-245 supra.
41. See p.35 supra.
42. C.S.S.U. v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at 410. The case
was adopted in Scots Law in City of Edinburgh District Council v. Secretary
of State for Scotland 1985 SLT 551.
43. 1978 SLT 38.
44. See discussion at pp.169 and 182-183 supra.
45. 1985 SLT 302 per Lord Mayfield.
46. 1983 SLT (Sh.Ct) 5.
47. 1987 SLT (Sh.Ct) 54.
48. I.E. the focus of the court is on questions of law.
49. At pp.31-36 supra.
50. Fuller, op cit at note 16 supra.
51. Ibid, esp at pp. 397.
52. This general point is supported by Mullan's arguments on the applicability of
procedural fairness (which is inherent in adjudication). See Mullan (1975),



















"Alcoholic Liquor", The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia
Volume Two, para. 89.
Ibid.
Fitzpatrick v. Glasgow District Licensing Board 1978 SLT (Sh.Ct) 63.
Op cit at note 53 supra.
It is incompetent to lead evidence concerning the other grounds of appeal: see
Troc Sales Ltd v. Kirkcaldy District Licensing Board 1982 SLT (Sh.Ct) 77;
Cigaro (Glasgow) Ltd v. City of Glasgow District Licensing Board 1983 SLT
549; Tennent Caledonian Breweries Ltd v. City of Aberdeen District Council
1987 SLT (Sh.Ct) 2.
Lord President Emslie made this point implicitly in Cigaro (Glasgow) Ltd v.
City of Glasgow DLB, ibid, at 552: "The necessary inference of Parliament's
intention which falls to be drawn from a consideration of these matters is that
... license appeals [i.e. excluding appeals on error of fact] should be disposed
of without evidence and upon the record of the proceedings before the board."
E.G. under school placing appeals: see for general discussion pp.241-257
supra.
Civil Government (S) Act 1982 (c.45) para. 18.
Jones, "Mistake of Fact in Administrative Law", 1990 Public Law, 507.
Ibid, p.526.
See Jones' comparison of "Expansive" and "Limited" review of pp.512 - 520
ibid.
All three sheriffs made this clear during interview: it was felt to be "self-
evident" that the court should be wary of intervention under this ground. (X-Jk
l_A- A-
Jones (1990), op cit at note 61 supra, p.525.
As discussed by Jones ibid.
Fuller (1978) op cit at note 16 supra, and pp.397-398, in particular:
distinguishing what is justifiable or otherwise is a matter of degree.
Martin v. Ellis 1978 SLT (Sh.Ct) 38 at 40 per Sheriff Principal Sir Frederick
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O'Brien.
69. Civic Government (S) Act 1982 (c.45), s.64(4)(c).
70. Cigaro (Glasgow) Ltd v. City of Glasgow District Licensing Board 1983 SLT
549 t 553 per Lord President Emslie.
71. Himsworth, (1985), op cit at note 9 supra, p.36.
72. LE. at pp.284-285 supra.
73. I.E. when members of the licensing board use their local knowledge in an
application and insufficient opportunity is given to the applicant to comment.
See The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, op cit at note 53,
para 90.
74. Tennent Caledonian Breweries Ltd v. City of Aberdeen District Council 1987
SLT (Sh.Ct) 2.
75. See Allan and Chapman, (1989), The Licensing (S) Act 1976 (2nd ed) p.75 for
a useful synopsis of the main decisions relating to natural justice.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid-
78. 1983 SLT (Sh.Ct) 84.
79. Low v. Kincardine Licensing Court 1974 SLT (Sh.Ct) 54.
80. The leading case on this point is Tennent Caledonian Breweries Ltd v. City of
Aberdeen District Council, 1987 SLT (Sh Ct) 2.
81. 1982 (c.47), schedule 1, para 18(8).
82. This point is implicit in Mullan's "spectrum theory", noted op cit at note 52
supra.
83. The "local" qualities of the sheriff court were commended by the Grant Report
Cmnd.3248 (1967) para. 264.
84. See generally Fuller (1978) at note 67 supra.
85. See generally Mullar's "Spectrum Theory", noted op cit at note 52 supra.
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86. 1976 (c.66).
87. Allan and Chapman (1989), noted op cit at note 75 supra, p.75.
88. A point which was recently stressed in Rodenhurst v. Chief Constable.
Grampian Police. 1992 SLT 104.
89. See generally discussion at pp. 154-159 supra.
90. I.E. Allen and Sons Billposting Ltd v. Edinburgh Corporation 1909 SC 70; and
see generally discussion supra at pp.109-111.
91. See op. cit at note 88 supra.
92. 1963 (c.2), Sched 6, para 7.
93. 1968 (c.65), Sched 9, para (8)(2).
94. Himsworth, "Scottish Local Authorities and the Sheriff 1984 JR, 63 at 80.
95. Carvana v. Glasgow Corporation 1976 SLT (Sh.Ct) 3; and see discussion at
pp. 154-56 supra.
96. 1971 SLT (Sh.Ct) 25.
97. Ibid, at p.26.
98. 1969 SLT 31.
99. Ibid at p.32.
100. Ibid at pp. 32-33.
101. E.G. MacGregor v. Berwickshire County Council 1967 SLT (Sh.Ct) 13.
102. Maclntvre v. Elie and Earlsferry Town Council 1967 SLT (Sh.Ct) 78 at 79 per
Sheriff Kydd (not the same Sheriff Kidd as in Patullo supra at note 98).
103. They are cited accordingly in Allan and Chapman, op cit supra at note 75,
p.75.
104. 1983 SLT (Sh.Ct) 11; see also Mecca Ltd v. Edinburgh Corporation 1967
SLT (Sh.Ct) 43 for a general example of unreasonableness.
105. Where there is no right of appeal under statute, review can take place via an
application for judicial review in the Court of Session, (e.g. a board was held
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to have acted ultra vires in Allied Breweries (UK) Ltd v. City of Glasgow
Licensing Board 1985 SLT 302.)
106. I.E. from Lord Low's decision in Allen and Sons Billposting Ltd v. Edinburgh
Corporation 1909 SC 70 (and see discussion supra at pp. 109-111).
107. In Patullo v. Dundee Corporation: see comment at pp.302-303 supra.
108. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesburv Corporation [1947]
2 All ER 680, [1948] 1 KB 223 per Lord Greene. The case has been adopted
by the Scottish courts, and the Court of Session has made it clear that it
considers "Wednesbury unreasonableness" to be an "exacting" test (K v.
Scottish Legal Aid Board 1989 SCLR 144 at 145 per Lord Cullen).
109. CSSU v. Minister for the Civil Service [19851 AC 374 at 410 et seq, per Lord
Diplock. The case was adopted into Scots Law in City of Edinburgh DC v.
Secretary of State for Scotland 1985 SLT 551. "Irrationality" was discussed
in K v. Scottish Legal Aid Board (see ibid); McAlinden v. Bearden and
Milngavie D.C. 1986 SLT; and Purdon v. Glasgow District Licensing Board
1988 SCLR 466. In Purdon (ibid) Lord Davidson (at p.469) made it clear that
the "irrationality" test is a stringent one when he stated, in the context of a
discussion of inferences which could be drawn from a lack of reasons, that: "In
an application for judicial review the onus rests upon [the petitioner] to
demonstrate that the decision challenged is irrational only if on a consideration
of the whole averments the court inclines to the conclusion that there is no
material upon which a rational refund could be based."
110. Allan and Chapman, op cit at note 75 supra, p.75.
111. 1989 SLT 110.
112. 1990 SCLR 73.
113. 1990 SLT 307: 1990 SCLR 1.
114. See discussion at p.34 supra.
115. Op cit at note 108 supra.
116. Op cit at note 109 supra.
117. See generally Jowell and Lester, "Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles
of Administrative Law", 1987 Public Law, pp.368-382 for an excellent
discussion of unreasonableness and irrationality.
The authors note that under the guise of reasonableness, "for many years ...
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judges have been stating principles of substantive review of administration
without knowing or, more likely, admitting it." They then go on to formulate
brief "general principles" of substantive review. Interestingly, Lord Clyde, in
Stewart v. Monklands District Council 1987 SLT 630 at 633 showed a
sophisticated appreciation of the difficulty inherent in determining
unreasonableness. He commented that: "It may be preferable to formulate the
test in terms of whether the authority was entitled to reach its decision rather
than concentrate on the case which lies at the extreme end of all possible
cases...."
His decision shows appreciation of the fact that, as Jowell and Lester
have noted, irrationality/unreasonableness "while appropriate to cover
arbitrary or capricious conduct, is not a satisfactory way of describing
the more normal types of abuse of public power that give rise to
judicial review while being within the scope of a statute and
procedurally satisfactory." (ibidp.371).
118. See generally Fuller (1978), op tit at note 16 supra.
119. See quotation at p.303 supra.
120. Although it should be noted that it is recognised that the
reasonableness/irrationality test is not without its problems see note 117 supra.
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Footnotes - Chapter Fifteen
1. Bradley, Scottish Law Commission Memorandum No. 14, "Remedies in
Administrative Law", para 10.2.
2. Ibid.
3. Raz, "The Rule of Law and its Virtue", 1977 93 Law Quarterly Review 195.
4. Ibid at p. 198.
5. Ibid at pp. 198-202.
6. Ibid at pp.208-211.
7. See above at p.30.
8. See above at p.31.
9. Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication", 1978, 92 Harvard Law
Review 353.
10. Ibid, at pp.394-404.
11. At note 1 supra.
12. I.E. under the Heritable Jurisdictions (S) Act 1747.
13. Cmnd. 3248 (1967), para. 264.
14. E.G. Rodenhurst v. Chief Constable, Grampian Police 1992 SLT 104.
15. 1909 SC 70.
16. 1944 SC 97.
17. In Allen, supra.
18. In Glasgow Churches' Council, supra.
19. As noted supra at note 12, chapter VIII and Appendix VIE.
20. In "Scottish Local Authorities and the Sheriff, 1984 Judicial Review, p.63;
"Administrative Appeals to the Sheriff (1985) (unpublished); and
"Administrative Appeals to the Sheriff: Statutory Title-Conferring Formulae"
(1987) (unpublished).
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21. 1976 SLT (Sh Ct) 3, per Sheriff Macphail.
22. As noted supra, at note 14.
23. In "Administrative Appeals to the Sheriff (1985) (unpublished).
24. Ibid.
25. Licensing (S) Act 1976 (c.66), ss. 102-108.
26. Mental Health (S) Act 1984 (c.36), s.18.
27. Education (S) Act 1980 (c.44) s.28 (as amended).
28. Social Work (S) Act 1968 (c.49), s.16.




The bibliography is divided into three parts:
(i) primary sources;
(ii) secondary sources; and
(iii) official and semi-official reports and papers.
(i) Primary Sources
(a) Scottish Record Office
1. Sheriff court records, stored under indexes SRO SC/1 to SRO SC/70. The
following files were cited in the text;
SRO SC 20/5-440 to 453; SRO SC 20/8-7; SRO SC 39/91-9: SRO SC 49/58-2;
SRO SC 49/58-3; SRO SC 49/22-3; SRO SC 49/22-7 to 8; SRO SC 39/90-90 to
103: SRO SC 29/10-554 (B77/1951; B130/1951; B167/1951); SRO SC 39/92-1 to
10; SRO SC 39/106-9; SRO SC 6/84-5; SRoSC 1/70-1; SRO SC 1/70-6: SRO SC
6/82-2; and SRO 39/47-2 to 12.
2. The Ivory Papers on the Skye Expedition of 1886: SRO GD.1/36.
3. Scottish Home and Health Department Records on the Skye Expedition of 1886.
See the following files;
SRO HH 1/1-306; SRO HH 1/458-61; SRO HH 1/710-3; SRO HH 1/1-58; SRO
HH 1/1-203: SRO HH 1/1 -246; and SRO HH 1/1-712.
(b) Scottish Courts Administration
1. Copies of the written and oral evidence presented to the Grant Committee on the
Sheriff Court (for final report, see Cmnd. 3248 (1967)). The files were not indexed
or stored in any particular order. Reference is made in the footnotes to individual files
by date or as otherwise appropriate. The files may still be closed on the instructions
of the Secretary of State: I am grateful to the Scottish Courts Administration for
permitting access to the papers.
The following files were particularly useful. Minutes of the 2nd, 24th, 25th, 33rd,
and 37th meetings of the Grant committee. Minutes of oral evidence presented to the
committee on 21st December 1964; 11th January 1965; 18th January 1965; 5th
February 1965; 15th February 1965; 17th May 1965, 4th June 1965, and 18th June
1965. Files cited as SCA B/Law/29/lA; SCA B/Law/29/8; SCA B/Law/29/8A;
SCA B/Law/29/9; and SCA B/Law/29/15A.
2. Draft copies of the Civil Judicial Statistics Scotland 1984-1988, which were made
available to me prior to publication. Once again, I am grateful to the Scottish Courts
Administration for their assistance.
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(c) Sheriff Court Records
The Summary Applications ("B" Registers) for the following sheriff courts:
Aberdeen: Dundee; Edinburgh; Glasgow; Dunfermline; Inverness; Paisley;
Stirling; Dunoon; Duns; Jedburgh; and Peterhead.
I am grateful to the Scottish Law Commission and SheriffPrincipal Nicolson for then-
assistance in securing access to the court registers.
(d) Scottish Law Commission
The written Memorandum of Evidence Presented by Sheriffs Depute to the Grant
Committee on the Sheriff Court. I am grateful to the Commission for permitting
access to the file, and to Sheriff Principal Nicolson for ensuring access to sheriffs.
(e) Interviewees
I am grateful to all interviewees for taking part in the research project.
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(ii) Secondary Sources
NB - Not all of these references have been cited in the text. Page numbers have been
given only when the relevant volume lacks a list of contents.
Adler, Petch and Tweedie, "When Sheriffs Differ", Times Educational Supplement
Scotland, (27.2.87).
Adler and Bradley (Eds.), Justice. Discretion and Poverty, (1975).
Adler, Petch and Tweedie, Parental Choice and Educational Policy, (1989).
Allan, "Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law", 1985 Cambridge Law Journal.
Allan and Chapman, The Licensing (S) Act 1976, (2nd Ed.), (1989).
Anonymous, "Statutory Interpretation", 1967 SLT 243.
Austin, (Book Review), 1980, 96 Law Quarterly Review.
Bankowski and Mungham, Images of Law, (1976).
Bankton, Institutes of the Laws of Scotland, (1752).
Banting, Poverty, Politics and Policy: Britain in the 1960s, (1969).
Barton and Haider, "Unnecessary Compulsory Admission to Mental Hospital", 1966
6 Medical Science and Law 147.
Bean, Compulsory Admissions to Mental Hospitals, (1980).
Bell, A Treatise on Scots Election Law, (1812).
Black, Civil Jurisdiction - The New Rules, (1983).
Blackie and Patrick, Mental Health: A Guide to the Law in Scotland, (1990).
Boswell, Observations on the Election Law of Scotland (??).
Bradley, "The Scope of Judicial Review", An Afternoon Seminar on Judicial Review,
8th May 1989, Senate Hall, Old College, University of Edinburgh.
Bradley, "Administrative Law", The Laws of Scotland: The Stair Memorial
Encvlopaedia, Volume One, (1987).
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Brazier, "Judicial Immunity and the Independence of the Judiciary", 1976 Public
Law.
Bryant, Community and Politics. Theory and Practice. (Occasional Papers, Paisley
College of Technology, Local Government Research Unit No.7), (1978).
Burnett Harvey, "The Rule of Law in Historical Perspective", 1961, 59 Michigan
Law Review.
Burnett Harvey, "The Challenge of the Rule of Law", 1961, 59 Michigan Law
Review.
Bums, "Does the Patient Come First?", SCOLAG No.64.
Bums, "Spotlight on Judicial Review", 1985, 107 SCOLAG Bulletin 121.
Burton, Manual of the Laws of Scotland, (1839).
Cage, The Scottish Poor Laws 1745-1845. (1981).
Camic, Experience and Enlightenment. (1983).
Campbell, "The Sheriff of Scotland", 1900, Juridical Review.
Campbell, "Judicial Selection and Judicial Impartiality", 1973, Juridical Review.
Cane, An Introduction to Administrative Law, (1987).
Checkland, Philanthropy in Victorian Scotland. (1980).
Chisholm, Sir Walter Scott as a Judge.
Christian, Approved Social Work? Ten Mental Health Cases. (Norwich Social Work
Monographs), (1985).
Civil Judicial Statistics. Scotland 1984-88. (Scottish Courts Administration),
(HMSO).
Clare, "In Defence of Compulsory Psychiatric Intervention", [1978] 1 Lancet 1197.
Clark, The Office of Sheriff. (1824).
Cooke, "Mental Health Review Tribunals", 1969 113 Solicitors' Journal.
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Appendix "B": Statistical Data
This appendix provides raw data collected from twelve representative sheriff
courts. The purpose of the exercise was to ascertain the frequency of appeals in the
period 1984-1986 inclusive. A table giving an annual breakdown of the total number
of applications for all twelve courts is set out in chapter ten.
The sheriff courts are "city" courts (Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, and
Glasgow), "town" courts (Dunfermline, Inverness, Paisley, and Stirling), and
"rural" courts (Dunoon, Duns, Jedburgh and Peterhead).
The number of individual applications made in each court in each year is
noted, together with a total for each provision. A percentage is given with the total:
this gives an indication of its proportion in terms of the total number of applications
made under the provision in question in the twelve courts. The percentage figures are
rounded up to the nearest percentage point.
A grand total is given for each court, together with a percentage figure, which
represents the proportion of the grand total of all twelve courts.
430
Aberdeen Sheriff Court
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Betting and Gaming Act 1963
Schedule 1 para 24
unspecified 1 1:7%
Building (S) Act 1959
s 13
s 16
Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855
S 4
Civic Government (S) Act 1982




unspecified 3 1 4:4%











unspecified 6 1 7:35%



























Local Government (S) Act 1973
s 231
431
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Mental Health (S) Act 1984
Part V
N/A 53 45 98:18%
Mental Health (S) Act 1960
Part IV
69 N/A N/A 69:19%





Public Health (S) Act 1897
s 16
s 22
unspecified nuisance 2 4 2 8:1%
Registration of Births,
Deaths and Marriages (S) Act
1965
unspecified re-registrations 4 9 8 21:5%
Road Traffic Act 1972
s 90 1 1:7%
Sewerage (S) Act 1968
s 10
s 46

























Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Betting and Gaming Act 1963
Schedule 1 para 24
unspecified
Building (S) Act 1959
s 13
s 16
Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855
s 4
Civic Government (S) Act 1982






















Fire Precuations Act 1971
s 9
s 10 2 2:33%
Gaming Act 1968
Schedule 9 para 15
unspecified












3 4 4 11:8%
Local Government (S) Act 1973
s 231
433
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Mental Health (S) Act 1984
Part V
N/A 25 33 58:11%
Mental Health (S) Act 1960
Part IV
28 28:8%





Public Health (S) Act 1897
s 16
s 22
unspecified nuisance 10 4 2 16:8%
Registration of Births,
Deaths and Marriages (S) Act
1965
unspecified re-registrations 17 15 10 42:11%
Road Traffic Act 1972
s 90
Sewerage (S) Act 1968
s 10
s 46
Social Security Act 1976
s 18
unspecified























Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Betting and Gaming Act 1963
Schedule 1 para 24
unspecified
Building (S) Act 1959
s 13
s 16 6 1 1 8:53%
Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855
s 4
Civic Government (S) Act 1982









































Schedule 9 para 15
unspecified




Housing (S) Act 1969
s 27
s 24
unspecified 2 1 3: 60%




9 2 2 13:10%
Local Government (S) Act 1973
s 231
435
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Mental Health (S) Act 1984
Part V
N/A 40 70 110:20%
Mental Health (S) Act 1960
Part IV
85 N/A N/A 85:24%
National Assistance Act 1947




Public Health (S) Act 1897
s 16
s 22
unspecified nuisance 1 4 5:1%
Registration of Births,
Deaths and Marriages (S) Act
1965
unspecified re-registrations 34 19 29 82:20%
Road Traffic Act 1972
s 90 2 1 3:21%
Sewerage (S) Act 1968
s 10
s 46



























Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Betting and Gaming Act 1963













Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855
s 4 4 1 5:83%
Civic Government (S) Act 1982

















Control of Pollution Act 1974
s 13
s 58
unspecified 7 1 2 10:59%























Schedule 9 para 15
unspecified




























33 22 15 70:54%
Local Government (S) Act 1973
s 231
437
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Mental Health (S) Act 1984
Part V
N/A 100 92 192:35%
Mental Health (S) Act 1960
Part IV
130 N/A N/A 130:37%





Public Health (S) Act 1897
s 16
s 22
unspecified nuisance 56 176 234 466:93%
Registration of Births,
Deaths and Marriages (S) Act
1965
unspecified re-registrations 83 63 48 194:49%
Road Traffic Act 1972
s 90 7 2 1 10:71%
Sewerage (S) Act 1968
s 10
s 46



























1984 1985 1986 Total
Betting and Gaming Act 1963
Schedule 1 para 24
unspecified
Building (S) Act 1959
s 13
s 16
Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855
s 4
Civic Government (S) Act 1982






















Schedule 9 para 15
unspecified












5 2 2 9:7%
Local Government (S) Act 1973
s 231
439
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Mental Health (S) Act 1984
Part V
N/A 2 5 7:1%
Mental Health (S) Act 1960
Part IV





Public Health (S) Act 1897
s 16
s 22
unspecified nuisance 3 1 4:1%
Registration of Births,
Deaths and Marriages (S) Act
1965
unspecified re-registrations 6 5 3 14:4%
Road Traffic Act 1972
s 90
Sewerage (S) Act 1968
s 10
s 46 3 3:75%




















GRAND TOTAL: 970 (5¥T
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Inverness Sheriff Court
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Betting and Gaming Act 1963
Schedule 1 para 24
unspecified
Building (S) Act 1959
s 13
s 16 1 1:7%
Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855
s 4
Civic Government (S) Act 1982




unspecified 12 1 1 14:13%

















Schedule 9 para 15
unspecified













Local Government (S) Act 1973
s 231
441
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Mental Health (S) Act 1984
Part V
N/A 20 19 39:7%
Mental Health (S) Act 1960
Part IV
20 N/A N/A 20:6%










Deaths and Marriages (S) Act
1965
unspecified re-registrations 3 5 3 11:3%
Road Traffic Act 1972
s 90
Sewerage (S) Act 1968
s 10
s 46























Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Betting and Gaming Act 1963
Schedule 1 para 24
unspecified 1 1:7%
Building (S) Act 1959
s 13
s 16
Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855
s 4 1 1:17%
Civic Government (S) Act 1982




unspecified 7 4 11:10%




Education (S) Act 1980
s 28
s 65









Schedule 9 para 15
unspecified
















Local Government (S) Act 1973
s 231
443
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Mental Health (S) Act 1984
Part V
N/A 8 14 22:4%
Mental Health (S) Act 1960
Part IV
17 N/A N/A 17:5%




s 3 1 1:100%




27 38 56 121:100%
Registration of Births,
Deaths and Marriages (S) Act
1965
unspecified re-registrations 9 4 13:3%
Road Traffic Act 1972
s 90
Sewerage (S) Act 1968
s 10
s 46
























Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Betting and Gaining Act 1963
Schedule 1 para 24
unspecified
Building (S) Act 1959
s 13
s 16
Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855
s 4
Civic Government (S) Act 1982




unspecified 2 2 2:4%

















Schedule 9 para 15
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Local Government (S) Act 1973
s 231
446
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Mental Health (S) Act 1984
Part V
Mental Health (S) Act 1960
Part IV
2 2:1%
National Assistance Act 1947




Public Health (S) Act 1897
s 16
s 22
unspecified nuisance 2 2:1%
Registration of Births,
Deaths and Marriages (S) Act
1965
unspecified re-registrations 5 3 2 10:3%
Road Traffic Act 1972
s 90
Sewerage (S) Act 1968
s 10
s 46





















GRAND TOTAL:8 8 6 CW)
447
Dunoon Sheriff Court
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Betting and Gaming Act 1963
Schedule 1 para 24
unspecified
Building (S) Act 1959
s 13
s 16
Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855
s 4
Civic Government (S) Act 1982




unspecified 3 8 1 12:71%
















Schedule 9 para 15
unspecified













Local Government (S) Act 1973
s 231
448
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Mental Health (S) Act 1984
Part V
N/A 6 9 15:3%
Mental Health (S) Act 1960
Part IV
2 N/A N/A 2:1%










Deaths and Marriages (S) Act
1965
unspecified re-registrations 2 1 3:1%
Road Traffic Act 1972
s 90
Sewerage (S) Act 1968
s 10
s 46























Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Betting and Gaming Act 1963
Schedule 1 para 24
unspecified 1 1:7%
Building (S) Act 1959
s 13
s 16 1 1:7%
Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855
S 4
Civic Government (S) Act 1982





















Schedule 9 para 15
unspecified












Local Government (S) Act 1973
s 231
450
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Mental Health (S) Act 1984
Part V
Mental Health (S) Act 1960
Part IV










Deaths and Marriages (S) Act
1965
unspecified re-registrations 1 1:1%
Road Traffic Act 1972
s 90
Sewerage (S) Act 1968
s 10
s 4 6























Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Betting and Gaming Act 1963
Schedule 1 para 24
unspecified







Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855
s 4
Civic Government (S) Act 1982
















unspecified 1 1 2:10%




Schedule 9 para 15
unspecified













Local Government (S) Act 1973
s 231 1 1:100%
452
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Mental Health (S) Act 1984
Part V
N/A 2 2:1%
Mental Health (S) Act 1960
Part IV
N/A N/A





Public Health (S) Act 1897
s 16
s 22
unspecified nuisance 1 2 3:1%
Registration of Births,
Deaths and Marriages (S) Act
1965
unspecified re-registrations
Road Traffic Act 1972
s 90
Sewerage (S) Act 1968
s 10
s 46





















GRAND TOTAL: 615 :T¥
453
Peterhead Sheriff Court
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Betting and Gaming Act 1963
Schedule 1 para 24
unspecified
Building (S) Act 1959
s 13
s 16
Burial Grounds (S) Act 1855
s 4
Civic Government (S) Act 1982





















Schedule 9 para 15
unspecified












Local Government (S) Act 1973
s 231
454
Statute 1984 1985 1986 Total
Mental Health (S) Act 1984
Part V
Mental Health (S) Act 1960
Part IV 1 N/A N/A 1:1%










Deaths and Marriages (S) Act
1965
unspecified re-registrations 2 3 5:1%
Road Traffic Act 1972
s 90
Sewerage (S) Act 1968
s 10
s 46
Social Work (S) Act 1968
s 16
s 80
unspecified
1 1:3%
Unspecified warrants for:
Income Tax
Rates
Value Added Tax
117
7
171
72
7
317
77
9
166
266:6%
23:6%
604:2%
GRAND TOTAL:902;
